A.A. Wolk, P. Browndies, and C. Marchand v. The SD of Lower Merion, A.A. Wolk, P. Browndies, and C. Marchand v. The SD of Lower Merion

Plaintiffs (Wolk, Browndies, Marchand) filed a class-action amended complaint challenging Lower Merion School District’s budgeting, alleged misrepresentations, and a 4.4% tax increase for FY 2016–17; they sought injunctive relief among other remedies.
Under Act 1, a school district may increase taxes up to 2.4% without voter approval, and up to 4.4% with certain Department of Education exemptions (pension, special education) which the District obtained for 2016–17.
Evidence showed the District projected consecutive multi‑million‑dollar deficits from 2009–10 through 2015–16 but actually realized approximately $42.5 million in surpluses over that period and repeatedly transferred general fund balances into other accounts.
Plaintiffs argued those budgeting practices concealed surpluses and enabled repeated tax increases beyond what voters would authorize, thereby violating the spirit (and sometimes the letter) of the School Code and Act 1.
The trial court held a hearing (evidence, cross‑examination, proposed findings) and entered an injunction ordering the District to revoke the 4.4% increase and to limit the FY 2016–17 increase to no more than 2.4%.
On appeal, the Commonwealth Court concluded the trial court’s order was a permanent injunction; because the District failed to file required post‑trial motions, its issues on appeal were waived and the appeal was dismissed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Validity of District’s 4.4% tax increase under Act 1	District’s use of exemptions and repeated deficit projections were unlawful tactics to evade statutory limits and required transparency	The tax increase was facially permitted by Act 1 after Department exemptions for pensions and special education	Trial court found practices violated the spirit (and sometimes letter) of statutes and enjoined collection above 2.4%
Appropriateness of injunctive relief	Injunction necessary to stop recurring illegal budgeting/taxation practices	Relief was improper or premature because Act 1 compliance was facially met; procedural objections exist	Trial court issued a permanent injunction after full hearing; appellate court treated it as final relief
Whether the injunction was preliminary or permanent	Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief (did not specify type) but litigated merits at hearing	District characterized order as preliminary and appealed interlocutorily	Court held the order was a permanent injunction because it resolved merits and included findings; post‑trial motions were required
Preservation of appellate issues	Plaintiffs emphasized finality of relief obtained at trial	District argued immediate appeal was permitted under Pa. R.A.P. 311(a)(4)	Appeal dismissed: District failed to file post‑trial motions within ten days, so issues were waived

Soja v. Factoryville Sportsmen’s Club, 522 A.2d 1129 (Pa. Super. 1986) (distinguishes preliminary vs. permanent injunction and purpose of preserving status quo)
Board of Revision of Taxes v. City of Philadelphia, 4 A.3d 104 (Pa. 2010) (permanent injunction standards; clear right to relief)
Buffalo Township v. Jones, 813 A.2d 659 (Pa. 2002) (permanent injunction may issue without showing irreparable harm)
City of Philadelphia v. New Life Evangelistic Church, 114 A.3d 472 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013) (post‑trial motions required after a trial resulting in final relief)
Watts v. Manheim Township School District, 84 A.3d 378 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013) (trial court may enter permanent injunction based on evidence developed in preliminary‑injunction hearing)
J.C. Ehrlich Company, Inc. v. Martin, 979 A.2d 862 (Pa. Super. 2009) (appellate review of permanent injunction limited to errors of law)