Lead Opinion
In this аppeal, we consider whether the trial court properly granted a permanent injunction in favor of Appellee, Buffalo Township, prohibiting Appellants from interfering with Buffalo Township’s recreational trail along a 20.7-mile right-of-way formerly known as the Butler Branch of the railroad that was operated by the Consolidated Rail
In the late 1860’s, the Western Pennsylvania Railroad Company (which subsequently became part of Conrail) constructed a branch line known as the Butler Branch that ran between Freeport, Armstrong
On October 31, 1985, Conrail notified the Interstate Commerce Commission
In the early spring of 1990, B. Sykes Limited (hereafter “B. Sykes”), a salvage company, purchased the rails and ties along the right-of-way from Conrail and removed these rails and ties. Conrail and Buffalo Township also filed a request for interim trail use pursuant to 49 C.F.R. § 1152.29(a) with the ICC. However, they withdrew this petition on September 12, 1990, after the ICC informed Conrail and Buffalo Township that it needed further information on whether Conrail had consummated abandonment of the subject property. On June 11, 1991, Conrail conveyed by quitclaim deed all of its rights, title and interest in the property to B. Sykes.
In 1992, Buffalo Township began to develop the former rаilroad property as a recreational trail pursuant to the Pennsylvania Rails to Trails Act (hereafter “State Act”), 32 P.S. § 5611 et seq. and the National Trails System Act (hereafter “National Act”), 16 U.S.C. § 1241 et seq. Shortly thereafter, certain property owners along the right-of-way, Appellants herein, erected barriers to prevent passage on the newly developed trails asserting that Conrail had abandoned the right-of-way and thus, the right-of-way reverted to them. Buffalo Township then filed a complaint in equity in the Court of Common Pleas of Butler County and simultaneously filed a preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin Appellants from erecting barriers on its land.
On May 5, 2000, the trial court granted the preliminary injunction, preventing Appellants “from blocking, obstructing, threatening, intimidating, or coercing agents and employees of the Township of Buffalo or individuals using the ButlerFreeport Community Trail.... ” Memorandum Opinion and Order of Court dated July 31, 2000. On July 31, 2000, the trial court entered a final or permanent injunction
On appeal, the Commonwealth Court affirmed. Buffalo Township v. Jones et al., 778 A.2d 1269 (Pa.Commw.2001). The court deferred to the trial court’s determination that Conrail had not abandoned the right-of-way, concluding that Appellants could not meet their burden of demonstrating that the lower court abused its discretion. Additionally, the court held that Buffalo Township was not required to obtain ICC approval for the interim trail use so long as it in fact complied with the requirements of the National Act. Accordingly, the Commonwealth Court determined that the trial court’s order granting “injunctive relief enjoining Property Owners from interfering with the public’s use of the trail was appropriate.” Id. at 1277.
This court granted allowance of appeal to consider whether the trial court properly granted a permanent injunction to Buffalo Township.
Appellants argue that Conrail abandoned the right-of-way prior to the transfer of the property to Buffalo Township via a quitclaim deed. According to Appellants, Conrail abandoned the property either when it filed a certificate of abandonment with the ICC or when it authorized salvage of the railroad tracks. Thus, Conrail had abandoned its interest in the property prior to the time it transferred its “interest”. Alternatively, upon transfer of the property, Conrail abandoned the property since its interest in the property was limited solely to railroad purposes. Further, Appellants maintain that the lower courts improperly relied upon the National Act in determining that the property was not abandoned, since Conrail and Buffalo Township did not comply with the requirements of the National Act, and thus, that Act cannot preserve the transfer of the property to Buffalo Township. Accordingly, Appellants conclude that the property reverted to them under common law and the lower courts erred in granting the injunction in favor of Buffalo Township. Finally, Appellants assert that even if the property was not abandoned, the lower courts improperly granted the injunction, since Buffаlo Township did not establish either a need for immediate relief or irreparable harm. Additionally, Appellants conclude that the trial court erred in failing to refer the abandonment issue to a jury-
Buffalo Township responds that the land was not abandoned at the time of the quitclaim deed, thus Conrail properly transferred its interest in the property. Further, the National Act and the State Act allows the transfer of the property. Alternatively, Buffalo Township offers that case law from Pennsylvania allows a railroad company to transfer the land to further a public use or purpose. In this case, the transfer served such purpose and thus, the property did not revеrt to the underlying landowners.
Initially, we note that in order to establish a claim for a permanent injunction, the party must establish his or her clear right to relief. See Boyle v. Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n., Inc.,
In order to address Appellants’ claims in this matter, we must first consider the nature of the property interest of the parties and whether Conrail abandoned its property interest under state law.
In evaluating whether the user abandoned the property, the court must consider whether there was an intention to abandon the property interest, together with external acts by which such intention is carried into effect. Lawson v. Simonsen,
In determining the intent of the parties, the intermediate courts have considered a myriad of factors. For example, in Birdsboro Municipal Auth. v. Reading Co. and Wilmington & Northern R.R.,
In sum, many different factors can be considered when making a determination of abandonment. Moreover, no single factor alone is sufficient to establish the intent to abandon. Abandonment must be determined based upon all of the circumstances surrounding the alleged abandonment.
Turning to the instant case, we must consider whether the trial court’s decision that Conrail did not abandon its property interest in the subject property was reasonаble.
Having concluded that Conrail did not abandon its interest in the property prior to the transfer of the property to Buffalo Township, we must address Appellants’ argument that upon transfer of the property to an entity that was not a railroad company the property reverted to Appellants. Appellants’ argument is premised on Buffalo Township’s withdrawal of its interim trail use application with the ICC. According to Appellants, formal ICC authorization was necessary to transfer the property for a non-railroad purpose.
In order to place Appellants’ argument in context, we must first provide some background of the relevant pieces of legislation and the purpose for the legislation.
In Preseault v. ICC et al.,
in the case of interim use of any established railroad rights-of-way pursuant to donation, transfer, lease, sale, or otherwise in a manner consistent with this chapter, if such interim use is subject to restoration or reconstruction for railroad purposes, such interim use shall not be treated, for purposes of any law or rule of law, as an abandonment of the use of such rights-of-way for railroad purposes.
16 U.S.C. § 1247(d). Thus, the effect of this subsection was to deem certain interim trail use a “discontinuance” as opposed to an “abandonment,” which had the effect of preventing “property interests from reverting
Pennsylvania, following the federal lead, enacted the State Act, effective ninety days after December 18, 1990.
Both the National Act and the State Act display a strong legislative policy encouraging the preservation of railroad rights-of-way by using existing rights-of-way for interim recreational trail use. The National Act accomplishes this directly by providing that “interim trail use” is a “discontinuance” rather than an “abandonment” of the prior railroad use, thus preventing the right-of-way from reverting under state law. Preseault. The State Act demonstrates its intent by giving counties and municipalities the right to accept title to the railroad rights-of-way. The inescapable effect of these Acts is to allow a railroad company to transfer its possessory interest in the land, i.e., the right-of-way, to a third party for the limited purpose of interim recreational trail use. The interim trail user essentially holds the railroad company’s land in trust until the railroad needs to reactivate service on the rail line. In this wаy, the legislature has effectively prevented the further loss of railroad track. See Preseault supra. Thus, upon the conversion of a railroad line to a recreational trail, the railroad’s right-of-way does not terminate but is held in abeyance, and thus, the land does not revert to the property owner.
Keeping these general principles in mind, we now turn to Appellants’ specific argument. Appellants insist that the only way the National Act could preserve the right-of-way was if Buffalo Township filed an interim trail use application with the ICC. In the absence of formal ICC authorization, the property reverted to Appellants pursuant to the common law. Appellants find support for their argument in the language of the National Act and the ICC regulations. See 49 C.F.R. § 1152.29.
Before beginning our analysis of Appellants’ argument, we must point out that we are unable to find any case law on point with the instant case, since the proposed trail user normally files an interim trail use application with the ICC. Thus, we will first set forth the pertinent portion of the statute and regulations and then look at case law, which has spoken to the statute and regulations in other contexts, to aid us in addressing Appellants’ argument.
The relevant portion of section 1247(d) states that:
If a State, political subdivision, or qualified private organization is prepared to assume full responsibility for management of such rights-of-way and for any legal liability arising out of such transfer or use, and for the payment of any and all taxes that may be levied or assessed against such rights-of-way, then the Board shall impose such terms and conditions as a requirement of any transfer or conveyance for interim use in a manner consistent with this chapter, and shall not permit abandonmentor discontinuance inconsistent or disruptive of such use.
16 U.S.C. § 1247(d)(emphasis added). Additionally, the ICC regulations provide that if the proposed trail user intends to acquire a rail line for interim trail use, “it must file a comment or otherwise request in its filing [with the ICC] ... indicating that it would like to do so.” 49 C.F.R. § 1152.29(a). The regulations set forth the required information for any interim trail use application and provide the relevant time limits for the application process. 49 C.F.R. § 1152.29(a)(l)-(a)(3) and (b)(1).
Appellants argue that the statutory language, indicating that the ICC can impose terms and conditions on any transfer, implies that the ICC must sanction the transfer in order for it to be effective. However, as noted by the Commonwealth Court in this case, there is nothing in the language of the statute requiring a trail owner, such as Buffalo Township, to comply with the ICC regulations. Buffalo Township,
Further support for our conclusion is provided by a decision of the ICC.
As to Appellants’ argument regarding the ICC regulations, we acknowledge that the language of the regulations appears to support Appellants’ argument. Yet, upon closer examination, it becomes clear that Buffalo Township did not need to comply with the regulations in order for the trail conversion to be valid.
The ICC has repeatedly stated that its function with regard to regulating trail use is ministerial. “The Commission is not involved in the negotiations between a railroad
Federal case law has embraced the ICC’s assertion that its function with regard to trail conversions is perfunctory. For example, in Goos v. ICC,
In concluding that the ICC did not need to satisfy those requirements, the court accepted the ICC’s argument that its issuance of a NITU or CITU is incidental to the abandonment process and merely provides an opportunity for the parties to negotiate a trail use agreement. Goos,
The I.C.C. interprets the section to give it no power to compel a conversion between unwilling parties, and, conversely, no discretion to refuse one if voluntarily negotiated. Once the parties reach agreement, the I.C.C. suggests that it cannot refuse to permit trail use.
Id. Thus, the court agreed that the ICC had “little, if any discretion to forestall a voluntary [trail use] agreement” and held that the ICC’s action in these matters was ministerial and therefore, was outside the ambit of the NEPA requirements. Id. at 1295-96.
Other courts, following the lead taken by the court in Goos, have reached a similar result. See, e.g., Citizens Against Rails-to-Trails v. Surface Transportation Board,
Based upon the above, we can surmise that the ICC’s involvement in trail conversions is merely procedural. The regulations provide the procedure for the proposed interim trail user to follow for obtaining the NITU or CITU, which in turn, gives the parties the opportunity to negotiate an interim trail agreement. See, e.g. Goos,
In this case, Buffalo Township agreed to take all financial, legal, and managerial responsibility for the trail and Conrail reserved a right to reactivate railroad service if the need ever arose. Thus, the transfer complied with the requirements of section 1247(d). Additionally, the Butler Branch is an established railroad right-of-way. Southern Pacific, supra. As such, the right-of-way can be preserved under the National Act. We refuse to nullify the trail conversion in this instance due to the Township’s failure to file an application with the ICC, especially where the ICC’s actions in this area amount to no more than a rubber stamp of the application filed by Buffalo Township. We appreciate that if Buffalo Township had not made the inexplicable decision to withdraw its application with the ICC, then the legal action in this case would have been unnecessary. Nevertheless, this lapse does not affect our legal determination that the transfer of the right-of-way to Buffalo Township was effective even in the absence of filing an application for interim trаil use with the ICC. Our decision today furthers the legislative purpose to promote interim trail use in order to preserve the railroad company’s interest in the property, since Buffalo Township will preserve the right-of-way for the railroad company’s future use. Thus, contrary to Appellants’ argument, the land did not revert to them and the trial court properly enjoined Appellants from interfering with Buffalo Township’s property interest.
Our analysis does not end here, since Appellants challenge the trial court’s determination on two other bases. First, Appellants argue that the trial court erred in finding that Buffalo Township established a need for immediate relief and irreparable harm. However, this argument is without merit. As noted at the outset, see supra at 3, the trial court granted a permanent injunction in this matter, and as such, consideration of irreparable harm and need for immediate relief are not elements that are required for the issuance of a permanent injunction. Soja, supra.
Second, Appellants argue that the trial court should have submitted the issue of abandonment for jury consideration. Appellants point to numerous cases, which suggest that abandonment is an issue for the jury to decide. Appellants overlook that a motion for a preliminary or permanent injunction is a matter in equity, and thus, the court “on its own motion or upon the petition of any party may submit to trial by jury.” Pa.R.C.P. 1513. A jury’s verdict in equity cases is merely advisory, since they “shall not be binding upon the court.” Ultimately, it would have been within the trial court’s discretion to submit the issue to the jury and to decide whether to accept the jury’s determination regarding abandonment.
Notes
. The Surface Transportation Board (“STB”) assumed all of the functions of the ICC as of January 1, 1996. 49 U.S.C. § 702. Throughout this opinion and for ease of reference, we refer to the agency as the ICC since at the time of the transfer of the property the STB was still known as the ICC.
. Appellants do not raise any challenge based upon the intermediate transfer from Conrail to B. Sykes. Thus, the effect of that intermediate transfer on the ultimate question of Buffalo Township's present property interest is not before this court.
. Courts refer to the injunction as either final or permanent.
. The intermediate courts have expressed that the standard of review for the grant or denial of a permanent injunction is whether the trial court abused its discretion or committed an error of law. See Boyle v. Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n., Inc.,
. Both parties cite federal law in support of their positions. However, our inquiry is directed at whether Conrail’s property interest in the right-of-way reverted to Appellants. "State law generally governs the disposition of the reversionary interests, subject of course to the ICC’s ‘exclusive and plenary’ jurisdiction to regulate abandonments, and to impose conditions affecting postabandondment use of the property." Preseault v. ICC et al.,
. Determination is defined as "[tjhe ending or expiration of an estate or interest in property." Black’s Law Dictionary 405 (5th Edition 1979).
. The parties do not. dispute the equity court's findings of facts. Rather, Appellants argue that those facts, taken in their entirety, amount to abandonment. Questions of abandonment are heavily fact-driven decisions. Lawson,
. In this case, the question of whether Conrail's right-of-way was limited to railroad purposes is a question of law. Accordingly, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. See supra n. 4.
. In 1920, the Nation’s railroad track reached its peak of 272,000 miles of track. By 1990, only about 141,000 miles were in use, and experts predicted that the amount of track would decrease by 3,000 miles per yeаr through 2000. Preseault,
. The original version of the National Act was enacted in 1968 and known as the National Trails System Act.
. Congress noted that the amendments may be cited as “National Trails System Act Amendments of 1983.” 16 U.S.C. § 1241, History.
. The date the State Act became effective was prior to the transfer of the property to Buffalo Township, thus we may consider the State Act in reviewing the validity of the transfer to Buffalo Township.
. Courts normally defer to the agency’s interpretation of its own regulations. See, e.g., Edelman v. Lynchburg College,
. We disagree with the dissenting opinion’s suggestion that it was improper for Appellee to invoke the trial court’s equitable jurisdiction. In Williams v. Bridy,
The dissent also injects an issue regarding actual possession into this case by citing to the recent Supreme Court of Pennsylvania case Siskos v. Britz,
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
In rejecting Appellants’ contention that their right to a jury trial was implicated, the majority indicates that Appellants overlook that a request for preliminary or permanent injunction is addressed to a court’s equitable jurisdiction, and there simply is no right to a jury trial in an equity action. See Majority Opinion, slip op. at 16-17. Appellants, however, do address this point, in effect, with the contention that it was improper for the common pleas court to invoke its equitable jurisdiction to resolve what is effectively a land title controversy.
I find merit in this argument. See Williams v. Bridy,
In my view, the common pleas court’s order could potentially be validly sustained (putting aside other questions of appropriate proсedure) if the record established that Appellee maintained actual possession of the disputed tracts as of the time of the filing of its complaint. Cf Siskos v. Britz,