A.A. v. Attorney General United States, 973 F.3d 171

Background

A.A., a Syrian national, was conscripted into Jaysh al-Sha’bi (the “Militia”), a militia controlled by the Syrian government; he received weapons training, performed guard duty and errands, suffered abuse, obtained a medical discharge, and fled to the U.S.
Upon arrival A.A. applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection; an IJ granted CAT deferral but denied asylum and withholding, finding the Militia a Tier III (undesignated) terrorist organization and that A.A. provided material support during his service.
The BIA affirmed the IJ’s Tier III designation and material-support determination, rejecting A.A.’s argument that Tier III excludes state actors.
A.A. sought administrative duress exemption from USCIS (the discretionary exemption to the material-support bar); USCIS denied the exemption, finding A.A. failed to fully disclose his service and relying on discretionary factors.
A.A. petitioned for review in the Third Circuit, which reviewed the legal issues de novo and denied the petition.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the Tier III definition in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III) covers state actors (e.g., government-controlled militias)	Tier III was not meant to apply to state actors or national armed forces	Tier III’s plain text covers any “group of two or more individuals”; ordinary meaning of “group/organization” includes militias and state-controlled units	Tier III can encompass state actors; the Militia fits the provision
Whether the INA’s general definition of “organization” (§ 1101(a)(28)) restricts Tier III to non-state entities	§ 1101(a)(28) lists non-state entities and therefore excludes states	§ 1101(a)(28) is non-exhaustive, expressly includes “group of persons,” and does not exclude state actors	§ 1101(a)(28) does not limit Tier III to non-state actors; state actors fall within its plain meaning
Whether U.S. treaty obligations (Refugee Convention/1967 Protocol) bar treating state actors as terrorist organizations for asylum/inadmissibility purposes	The Protocol’s Article 33(2) requires a “reasonable grounds” standard and disfavors broader statutory exclusions; thus Tier III should not be read to sweep in state actors	The Protocol is not self-executing in U.S. courts; domestic statutes govern and § 1227(a)(4)(B) and § 1182 control asylum exceptions	Treaty arguments do not alter statutory interpretation; the Protocol does not override the INA’s plain text
Whether forced or coerced service provides a statutory duress defense to the material-support bar and whether denial of the administrative exemption is reviewable	Forced service should excuse material support and permit asylum/withholding	No statutory duress exception exists; relief is limited to discretionary administrative exemptions by Secretaries (USCIS); A.A. failed USCIS threshold (full disclosure) and exemptions are unreviewable	No judicially enforceable duress exception in the INA; USCIS denial of A.A.’s discretionary exemption stands and is not judicially reviewable

Key Cases Cited

Saravia v. Att'y Gen., 905 F.3d 729 (3d Cir. 2018) (standard of review for combined IJ/BIA decisions; plenary review for legal questions)
Sesay v. Att'y Gen., 787 F.3d 215 (3d Cir. 2015) (asylum/withholding standards and application of material-support bar)
McAllister v. Att'y Gen., 444 F.3d 178 (3d Cir. 2006) (ineligibility for asylum where alien is inadmissible under § 1182(a)(3)(B))
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (U.S. 1984) (framework for agency deference; noted that unpublished single-member BIA decisions receive lesser Skidmore weight)
Uddin v. Att'y Gen., 870 F.3d 282 (3d Cir. 2017) (interpretive guidance on Tier III and authorization of specified terrorist acts)
Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (U.S. 1985) (agency prosecutorial discretion)
Annachamy v. Holder, 733 F.3d 254 (9th Cir. 2013) (discusses duress waivers and discretionary exemption framework)