303 Creative LLC v. Elenis
600 U.S. 570
SCOTUS2023Background
- Lorie Smith, sole owner of 303 Creative LLC, wants to offer custom wedding website and graphic-design services but asserts a religious belief that marriage is between one man and one woman.
- Colorado's Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA) defines "public accommodation" broadly and forbids denial of the "full and equal enjoyment" of goods or services based on protected characteristics (including sexual orientation); enforcement can be by state or private action and may include fines and remedial measures.
- Petitioners and the State stipulated key facts: Smith will work with customers regardless of status, her websites are original, customized, collaborative, and expressive, and she will not create messages that contradict her religious beliefs.
- Smith sued pre-enforcement seeking an injunction against CADA application, arguing the statute would compel her to create expressive content celebrating same-sex marriages; the district court denied relief and the Tenth Circuit affirmed on the merits but found she had standing (credible threat of enforcement).
- The Supreme Court reversed: it held Smith's planned wedding websites are "pure speech" and Colorado may not compel her to create expressive messages she disagrees with under the First Amendment.
Issues
| Issue | Smith's Argument | Colorado's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Smith's wedding websites are protected First Amendment speech | Websites are original, customized, expressive communications authored by Smith and thus "pure speech" | Characterize the services as commercial products; any speech element is incidental | Court: Websites are pure expressive speech; First Amendment protects them |
| Whether CADA may be applied to compel Smith to create websites celebrating marriages she rejects | Compelling her to create that speech would force her to utter messages she does not believe, violating Free Speech | CADA regulates conduct (status-based discrimination) and any burden on speech is incidental; the State can require uniform provision of services | Court: Forcing Smith to speak in state-prescribed ways is compelled speech and unconstitutional |
| Whether Smith lost protection by operating commercially or via an LLC | Compensation or corporate form does not strip First Amendment protections from expressive activity | Commercial sale and holding out to public permits content-neutral regulation of conduct | Court: Commercial nature and corporate form do not eliminate speech protection |
| Whether Smith had standing (credible threat of enforcement) to seek pre-enforcement relief | Past Colorado enforcement (e.g., Masterpiece), CADA's enforcement mechanisms, and state's refusal to disavow enforcement create a credible threat | Deny that enforcement is likely or that hypothetical complaints prove imminent injury | Tenth Circuit (unchallenged here re standing): Smith showed a credible threat; Court proceeded to decide the merits |
Key Cases Cited
- West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (government may not compel individuals to proclaim beliefs contrary to their conscience)
- Hurley v. Irish‑American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557 (1995) (public accommodations law cannot be applied to force expressive organizers to include messages that alter their expression)
- Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (expressive association protected from compelled inclusion of viewpoints contrary to organization’s beliefs)
- Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (public accommodations laws serve a compelling interest in preventing invidious discrimination and may regulate conduct without targeting speech)
- Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (title II and similar laws vindicate equal access and personal dignity; combating discrimination is a compelling interest)
- Rumsfeld v. FAIR, 547 U.S. 47 (2006) (regulation of conduct that incidentally burdens speech may be permissible when the burden is not aimed at expression)
- United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (test for when government regulation of conduct that incidentally burdens expression is justified)
- Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (commercially operated entities offering services to the public are not shielded by First Amendment when laws prohibit invidious discrimination)