12 Percent Logistics, Inc. v. Unified Carrier Registration Plan Board, 280 F. Supp. 3d 118

Background

Plaintiffs (12 Percent Logistics, Inc. and Small Business in Transportation Coalition) sought a TRO and preliminary injunction to force the UCR Board and Indiana Department of Revenue (INDOR) to open the 2018 Unified Carrier Registration (UCR) renewal period and to enjoin Sunshine Act violations.
This is Plaintiffs’ second motion; an earlier motion was denied in part and the court ordered disclosure of draft minutes and recordings of an unnoticed meeting.
Plaintiffs assert a new theory that 49 U.S.C. § 14504a creates an implied private right of action to enforce the UCR Agreement and to compel reopening the registration period; they also allege multiple historical Sunshine Act violations by the UCR Board.
Plaintiffs contend imminent irreparable harm: risk of state enforcement (civil/criminal penalties) against unregistered carriers starting Jan 1, 2018, and diminished roadway safety from non-distribution of registration fees.
Defendants point to the UCR Board’s delay decision, its recommendation that states refrain from enforcement for 90 days after the registration period opens, and to remedial steps (a new website posting meeting notices and minutes); INDOR did not oppose the motion.
The court denied the motion entirely, concluding Plaintiffs failed to show irreparable harm and declining to treat INDOR’s non-response as a concession that would circumvent the UCR Board’s opposition.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether § 14504a creates an implied private right to force reopening of UCR registration	§14504a and the UCR Agreement permit private enforcement to compel the Board/INDOR to open registration	No immediate irreparable injury shown; practical and legal obstacles to relief; states aware of Board action and unlikely to enforce	Denied—Plaintiffs failed to show irreparable harm, so injunction not warranted
Whether Plaintiffs face irreparable harm from possible state enforcement beginning Jan 1, 2018	Imminent risk of civil/criminal penalties for unregistered carriers constitutes irreparable harm	Possibility of enforcement is speculative; courts treat litigation expense/defense as not irreparable; Board recommended non-enforcement period; states likely will not prosecute	Denied—speculative/future enforcement does not constitute irreparable harm
Whether UCR Board’s past Sunshine Act violations justify an injunction barring future violations	Repeated failures: inadequate public announcements, untimely Federal Register notices, and boilerplate subject descriptions harm Plaintiffs’ ability to participate	Board now posts notices/minutes on new website; Federal Register duplicative; Plaintiffs provided no proof of past or likely future concrete harm from boilerplate notices	Denied—no proof of past or imminent irreparable harm from alleged Sunshine Act violations
Whether INDOR’s failure to oppose equals concession and entitles Plaintiffs to relief against INDOR	INDOR’s non-response should be treated as conceded under LCvR 7(b), so injunction against INDOR should issue	Granting relief against INDOR would circumvent the UCR Board (an opposing party); court has discretion under LCvR 7(b) to deny concession treatment	Denied—court declines to treat INDOR’s non-response as concession and will not grant relief against INDOR alone

Key Cases Cited

Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674 (2008) (preliminary injunction is extraordinary relief)
Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008) (four-factor preliminary injunction test)
Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968 (1997) (standard for preliminary relief)
Davis v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 571 F.3d 1288 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (discusses sliding-scale approach to injunction factors)
Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61 (1974) (irreparable harm as basis for equitable relief)
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (irreparable injury as traditional prerequisite)
Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. England, 454 F.3d 290 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (failure to show irreparable harm defeats preliminary injunction)
CityFed Fin. Corp. v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 58 F.3d 738 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (no need to reach other factors if irreparable harm not shown)
Wisc. Gas Co. v. FERC, 758 F.2d 669 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (principles for assessing irreparable harm)
FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 449 U.S. 232 (1980) (litigation expense/annoyance not irreparable)
Jarkesy v. SEC, 803 F.3d 9 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (discusses limits on speculative harm for injunctions)
John Doe Co. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 235 F. Supp. 3d 194 (D.D.C. 2017) (potential investigation/enforcement not irreparable)
Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660 (1931) (fear of future injury insufficient for injunctive relief)