*1 ADJUDGED CASES
' IN THE THE STATES OF UNITED COURT SUPREME AT TERM, 1914. OCTOBER v. STATE OF KANSAS. COPPAGE KANSAS. THE OF STATE OF THE SUPREME COURT TO ERROR January 30, 25, 1914. Decided Submitted October 1915. No. 48. punishable by fine or declaring it a misdemeanor The Kansas statute agree employé require an imprisonment for an organization durihg’the to become or remain a member applies to such a case as employment, far as it time of the so will, age of full , employé a man understand- present, where an at give freely up would merely choose whether he ing, required to agree to refrain from employment would associa- position his being employed, case free from while so tion with the union held, repugnant influence; to the “due element of coercion or undue process” Fourteenth Amendment. clause the effect that it is followed to States, Adair v. United dispense employer to with the services right of an constitutional union, just membership in a labor an'employé because of quit the service of an right of an it is the constitutional employer, employs non-union men. who party has contract, either whatever constitutional freedom Under terminating employ- ground right to treat as sufficient right subject he has the stipulation on where there is no ment respecting shall stipulation by insisting against provide or of con- inception qua non of the
be á sine if at will. tinuance terminable (1)
VOL. CCXXXVI —1 TERM, U. S. Syllabus. prop- private and the personal Included in. to make con- of each—is erty partaking of the nature — among which is that of property, chief acquisition tracts for the *2 services are ex- by labor and other personal employment money property. forms of changed for or other which is not by designating conduct cannot, A as “coercion” State n essentially-innocent any truth, normal such in render criminal deprive the Four- liberty; permit this would personal for to exercise respect. in teenth of its force Amendment effective this rights protection of secured party appeals for the When a court decisiop Constitution, depend by is not to to him the Federal law, upon purpose, its upon nor even the form of the state declared by applied as and enforced upon operation„and but rather its effect proper State; this court cannot these matters qf performance duty yield judgment to that of state court. its the. statutory legitimate pqlice regulation can- provision A which is not a police regu- by placed act with a being
not be in the same made by purpose lation, being a title that declares or enacted under object power. that proper for the exercise of which would be a common, things being that, It all are held some self-evident unless others, persons property than it is from the must have more nature freedom, things impossible uphold of contract and private property recognizing legitimate at the same time as without necessary inequalities fortune that are the result of those rights. exercise of those “liberty” recognizes “property”
The Fourteenth Amendment as any rights co-existent human and debars the States from unwar- ranted interference with either. may liberty rights property
Since a State strike down the or ,do directly, may by indirectly, declaring so as effect public good requires inequalities the removal those are rights, but the normal and inevitable result of the exercise those power invoking police inequali- and then in order to remove the ties, object without other view. striking per-
The Fourteenth Amendment debars the States from down liberty materially restricting property rights sonal their normal necessary exercise, excepting may incidentally so far accomplishment paramount object of some other and and one that liberty public concerns the welfare. The mere restriction of or of property rights “public cannot of welfare” itself denominated legitimate object police power; and treated as for such restric- very thing tion is the that is inhibited the Amendment. v. KANSAS.
COPPAGE the Case. Státement of U. S. intimating anything inconsistent with the of individuals Without legitimacy questioning organiza- join unions, or of such they laws of the land as long conform to the others are tions so do, held, no inherent required to the individüal has employ join of one who is a labor and still remain un- union willing employ a union man more than the same individual organiza- join the consent of that right to the union without has a tion. liberty organization may for the labor or its There not be one rule employers. more restrictive rule for a different and
members and liberty making contracts does not include a employé’s unwilling employer or employment from an without procure may employer legisla- understanding. Nor be foreclosed fair exercising of choice that is the same freedom accorded to tion from employé. agree in to refrain from affiliation man to with the To ask a advance retaining position employment a certain not to ask union while give up part of his freedom. He is him to constitutional free terms, just employment as the on those to decline the *3 any employment other; and, having accepted on decline to offer terms, join employé is still free to employment on those or, employment expires, employed if period of union when the at employment; will, upon simply quitting time if then at stated, joining during agreement from own to refrain bound situation from period employment he is in no different that which general. necessarily incident term contracts party does not mean that a is to- Constitutional freedom of contract before; is not making contract as free break be as free after ' accountability. it without enjoyed contract, very thing, can nature of the Freedom of being exercised; particular exercise of it only by and each involves prevents engagement -for the time making which if fulfilled of conduct. inconsistent course Kansas, 752,
87 reversed. constitutionality involve the under facts, which The of the Fourteenth the due clause process Amendment for unlawful making statute of Kansas employés coerce, or influence require employers stated, organizations, of labor are members join remain opinion. in-the TERM,
4 236 U. S. Argument Defendant in Error. for for Mr. W. Evans plaintiff F. Mr. R. Vermilion and R. in error.: liberty deprivation prop- amounts to
The statute law, to a and also- denial process without due erty of law. process due police
The is not a exercise proper power. statute see, Adair v. In of these contentions United' support T. & F. A., Ry.v. Brown, S. States, 161; U. S. 80 208 Brick Co. v. Coffeyville Perry, 69’Kansas, 297; Kansas, 312; Illinois, 176; 188 Mines Co. v. Gillespie People, v. Goldfield Fed. Union, Rep. 514; Miners’ 159 Lochner v. Goldfield Marcus, v. N. 45; People 257; 198 U. S. 185 Y. York, New Kansas, 752; State v. Daniels,- v. Coppage, State Julow, Missouri, 163; v. State 584; State Rep. N. W. Wisconsin, 530; City v. Kansas Cotting Kreutzberg, v. Connolly Sewer 112; Pipe S. v. Union Yards, 183 U. Stock 8, F. Ellis, 558;. Ry. C. & v. Co., G., 184 V: S. Kansas, 154. Haun, 61
151; State v. Attorney General of the Dawson, Mr. State John Sheppard Mr. I. defendant error: Kansas, and J. violate .the statute does not Fourteenth Kansas guarantee protect but seeks further Amendment immunities of citizens United privileges harmony Amendment, the Fourteenth States. with effect, said, employers Kansas has State of must privilege employés of their attempt abridge the. with labor unions or meddle affiliate themselves their *4 them of unions. deprive affiliate coercion to of They attempt by deprive must not them their financial interest in the property insurance —their for their wives and children provided union.. idly of Kansas not fold' its hands and sit The State will to and coerce their em- employers oppress while seek to a state of will peonage. and reduce them Nor ployés protection poor equal from a switchman the State withhold COPPAGE -v. KANSAS. Argument Defendant Error.
236 U. con- 5508-10, Stat., prohibiting its Rev. laws. See §§ of the United spiracies oppress any citizen States. law, If all the equal provided men are be within if the man Amendment; laboring for in the Fourteenth if corporate officer; wage is to be the earner equal the poor is to be the if the is to be equal employer; man if is of the rich that amendment not to be equal man; the rod then the oppression, distorted into a law under is in this was based prosecution furtherance derogation theréof. amendment A. 24 L. 209, 414, In Arthur C. C. R. A. Oakes, v. general in his held as a rule Judge opinion Harlan it is the man to work for whom and every when he he is the service of his pleases, ready quit and when do But this contract to company may quit so. of. recognized is its unlimited, exceptions. work but has rule, exceptions employé may One to this is, his employer likes, Service of when he that em- quit conspire quit cannot combine and ployés service object is employer, of an when the and manifest intention injure employer. business of to- every Oakes is State v. law law Arthur dispose be of one’s day, so it will seen that upon.by plain- as one capital pleases, labor and relied exceptions. its error, tiff in is not recognized without Oakes, If in Arthur favor of applied v. there law applied is to here the labor corporation, favor members, Kansas statute organization and then the in the only way constitutional. The declare law say eyes that in the law case invalid is present union, poor to the labor superior the corporation equality spoken This is not the organization. man’s Brick Co. v. Goffeyville Amendment. Fourteenth Kansas, longer recognized is no as Kansas Perry, it can distinguished. law Laws differences chapter There are between *5 TERM, 1914. 6 Opinion of the Court. 236 U. S.. Perry Case, held 1897; of unconstitutional of Kansas 222 of the chapter 1903, Laws of Kansas and it; court in justify this questioned, upholding herein held unconstitutional the law of 1897 was rightly while Perry Case, upheld the law here under review substantially because the two laws are different. as valid Illinois, cases,'such Hennessey, as Doremus v. 176 Similar Julow, Missouri, 163; Gillespie People, 129 v. State v. 608; Wisconsin, 530; 114 Illinois, Kreutzberg, v. 176; Zillmer 188 States, N. Y. Adair Marcus, v. 185 v. People 257; United Union, Mines Miners’ 175; Company U. S. v. 2Ó8 Rep. 514, distinguished. can be Fed. Pitney court. opinion
Mr. Justice delivered of Kansas, plain- local court in one the counties In a fine, guilty adjudged pay error found a tiff alternative, upon as the information imprisonment of an act the legislature him with violation charging 13, 1903, Chap. State, approved being March of that also year, session laws found §§ Gen. Kansas 1909. The act reads as follows: Stat. or provide penalty coercing influeneing- Act “An upon making requirements employés, demands or or servants, laborers, persons seeking employment. etc.: Enacted, “Beit 1. That shall be unlawful for any individual “Section . firm, or any officer any agent, employé
or member or corporation, or any company coerce, require, demand to. or any person persons agree- influence to enter into any or join either or or or ment, verbal, written become any association, or organization remain a'member person employ- of such or persons securing a condition ment, continuing individual, or of such employment firm, or corporation. or Any individual or any firm member
“Sec. KANSAS. COPPAGE v. Opinion of the Court.
236 Ü. S. corporation company officer agent, of this act shall deemed guilty violating provisions shall be misdemeanor, conviction thereof *6 than dollars or in fifty imprisoned in less fined a sum not thirty the less than county jail hot days.” the by Supreme affirmed Court The was judgment Kansas, 752), dissenting (87 the State, justices two upon statute, the here the that the ground case brought applied case, this is in conflict construed and in the Fourteenth Amendment of Con- provision declares that no State stitution of the United States which deprive property without any person shall process due law. Supreme facts, opinion
The as recited Hedges was Court, July 1,1911,.one are as follows: About & Fran- St. Louis San employed by switchman of a and was a member labor Railway Company, cisco of North Union organization called Switchmen’s by the employed America. Plaintiff in error was railway he requested and as such superintendent, company as him presented agreement, sign Hedges if informing him that he did same time in at the writing, of the com- employ it not remain sign he could thus paper presented: of the following copy is a pany. --, 1911. Kansas, Scott, Fort Lines, Fort Frisco Superintendent Coppage, Mr. T. B. Scott: your re- by abide undersigned, agreed have
We, the Union, from the Switchmen’s is, to withdraw quest, that Company. the Frisco while in the service ' -' (Signed) this, and refused withdraw sign refused Hedges error, Thereupon plaintiff organization. him from the service discharged superintendent, as such company.. TERM, Opinion of the Court. 236 II. S. be said outset, respecting At the a few words should “coerce,” It uses the term construction act. opinion is laid of the Kansas upon some stress But, record, on this we have Supreme nothing Court. any implied to do with of actual or coercion or question duress, might such as overcome the will by us, means unlawful without the act. the case before court applying the state treated term “coerce” as employer, agent, the mere insistence or its terms prescribe upon which alone would consent to a relationship continuance and em- In this must ployé. sense we understand the statute to construed court, have been in this sense it was enforced in the present case; being there no nor finding, support finding, plaintiff evidence in error guilty other sense. The entire evidence is in *7 exceptions cluded in the bill of returned with the writ of error, and we have examined it the extent necessary to in to order determine the Federal is asserted (Southern Schuyler, 601, 611, Co. v. S. 227 U. Pacific cited). cases is finding There nor evidence that neither employment the contract of was other than a general or to hiring, presumed indefinite such as is be terminable at the will of either party. The evidence shows that it have been to advantage Hedges, would from a pecuniary point view and to have been otherwise, per to his union, mitted retain in and at membership same time remain in the of the employ railway to com pany. particular, In it shows (although no reference this court) made to in the that as opinion a member the union was entitled to in the nature of benefits insurance to the amount of fifteen dollars, hundred which if obliged forego he would have been he had to to ceased be member. But, a aside from matter of pecuniary interest, nothing there is that Hedges show was sub the least or jected pressure influence, or that he was not KANSAS.
CÓPPAGE v. Opinion of the Court.
236 U. S. competent, and at respects in all agent, free a standpoint of his own in best from the what was choose error, repre as the course, acting if plaintiff Of terests. otherwise within railway company, sentative Hedges insisting his legal rights shouldelect companf or in the employ whether to remain . union, that insistence membership retain the choice involved a the fact that rendered unlawful v. Hedges. States, Silliman sacrifice pecuniary United Headley, 45 465, 470, 471; Hackley Michigan, v. U. Massachusetts, 138, Lowell, 141; v. 569, 576; Emery Wisconsin, 314, And if City Viroqua, v. Custin is founded upon in error exercised plaintiff impaired merely it basis cannot a constitutional “coercion.” its exercise the term We have applying as construed therefore, that, a statute deal, with punishable makes criminal offense fine applied, his agent merely for an or imprisonment one secure cer condition prescribe, em-_ (the employment or remain in such employment tain that the shall will), terminable at being ployment or remain a member not to become agreement into an enter employed; the employé so organization while but on disability, incapacity to no subject being voluntary to exercise choice. free contrary 161, this States, court had Adair v. United distinguishable principle .question with a to deal not. 10 of aet Congress, presented. one now from the § concerning carriers 1898, “An Act entitled June *8 employés” their in interstate commerce and engaged any “That em- 428), had enacted 370, 30 Stat. (c. officer, any of this Act and subject provisions to the ployer any require shall employer who or receiver of such agent, employment, as con- seeking person or employé, into an agreement, to enter employment, of such dition a member to become remain verbal, not or or written either ' TERM, ió Opinion the Court. of or association, organization; labor or corporation, of pr loss of any employé shall threaten against any unjustly employé shall discriminate because association, of his in such a membership corporation, labor hereby ... organization guilty or declared to . . misdemeanor, and, upon' of a conviction thereof . punished shall be for each offense a fine of less than dol- one hundred dollars and not than one thousand more Adair upon charging lars.” was convicted indictment he, agent of a carrier to the subject pro- common of the Act, unjustly visions discriminated a certain against of employé by discharging him from the the car- employ of rier his membership organization. because in a lábor coprt The held that of portion the Act which the rested to conviction be an of personal liberty invasion right the Fifth property guaranteed by as well as Amendment, which declares no be de- person shall -liberty prived property without process due law. Harlan, Mr. Justice Speaking by (208 S., court said U. 174): “While, as p. already suggested, the right guaranteed property against Constitution process law, without due deprivation subject to such restraints as the good general reasonable common or the require, welfare is not. within the gov- functions of least in ernment —at the absence contract between the parties compel any his person “course business —to his against will to accept retain the personal serv- another, ices of or to compel any person, against will, to perform for personal services another.
person to sell his labor terms upon such proper he deems is, essence, in its same as the the purchaser labor prescribe the conditions upon accept which will person offering the right sell it. So quit the service of for employer, reason, is the whatever same as the employer, reason, to. dispense whatever with the of such services *9 v. KANSAS.
COPPAGE of Opinion the Court. the legal right It of defendant Adair— was the employé. might however such a course have been —to dis- unwise because his charge employé in that Coppage case] [the it organization, legal a labor as was the being member if he fit to do so—however saw unwise Coppage, part might quit such a course on his have been —to service in because defendant engaged, was of a who not members employed persons some were organization. particulars employer all such legislation of right, have employé equality is arbitrary that an interference with equality disturbs can legally which no government contract liberty free justify in a land.” controlling it is to this decision is overruled,
Unless controversy; prevented for if upon present Congress r from interference contract liberty arbitral of the Fifth process” provision the “due because of it is clear Amendment, argument too for States like prevented are interference virtue corresponding Amendment; clause of Fourteenth Congress deprive hence if it unconstitutional for an em- employer threatening or for an property discriminating employment against loss ployé with organization, of his in a labor membership him because an similarly punish for a State unconstitutional condition for as a requiring employé, employer agree become retaining employment, securing so em- organization member such an while or remain a ployed. that, dealt with
It is true statute was while substantially contained clause identical Case Adair clause now consideration —a Kansas act under with the require an for an it a misdemeanor making a condition applicant employment, as employé or agree to become or remain member, organization, of a labor conviction —'the TERM,
Opinion of the Court. '.JJ. discharging clause, which related another based organiza an membership of his in such because *10 the case decision, naturally, was confined to the tion; case, the In the present for decision. actually presented the Adair sought distinguish to Court Supreme Kansas if distinction, any The there ground. upon decision so pot recognized as substantial, been previously be, has the Adair find. The in opinion able to have been far as we precise the to the restricting decision carefully Case, while on as the first 175), U. S. involved, (208 page cited matter the conclusion supporting of decisions of a number in order 257), Y. in Marcus, v. 185 N. (People a case court, the as unconstitutional was denounced the statute we of the one with which are counterpart the substance dealing. now judicial it has received of whether
But, irrespective real distinction? constitu- is there recognition, employé an be- discharge to employer tional being granted, union membership cause .a this extreme to compelled to resort employer can the option, an employé offer to the he not May measure? to remain in the case, the instant offered in such as was to sever the union; if retire from the he employment will if the latter? Granted prefers he relationship only former contract of em- parties of both equal freedom stipulate upon party has not each ployment, or to inception, to the he consent only terms will what he not in- And relationship? of that continuance, sist, leaving instead express agreement, upon an legisla- Can the implied? to be employment terms of the to act the'beginning at party either require ture effect employment— terms concealing essential covertly; willingly the other would which, perhaps, terms to it is only proposed them when reveáling consent —and terminating the relation- ground them as a upon insist unwilling to in his is have employer Supposing ship? t>.KANSAS. COPPAGE Opinion of the Court. S.U. union,, in a labor employ holding membership one has may prefer membership reason man suppose employment ask, to the without it—we given union employer can the such case to re- legislature oblige at frankly frain from the outset? And not the dealing upon to insist frankness in return? employer equal entitled from a somewhat different stand- Approaching matter join a labor point, employé’s right be free union sacred, founded securely more or more the Con- stitution, will, work for than his whom he the ordinary idle if he will? And does not contract of. include employment an insistence agree,-as shall condition that he will not be and will not work for whom idle only, but will serve his and him pleases present employer, *11 so as the relation between them shall continue? Can long all, except by the be at right making enjoyed of contracts agreement parties coming together requires and for party forego, during purpose each the time of by agreement, any covered inconsistent exercise rights? constitutional answers, The as we These answer themselves. queries think, single to a conclusion: Under constitutional lead contract, party right either has the freedom of whatever terminating employ- for ground to treat as sufficient is subject, no on the ment, stipulation where there stipu- a provide against insisting has the right the inception it shall non of respecting qua be sine lation if it be termin- of the of continuance employment, It this case cannot be distin- at will. follows able v. United States. from Adair guished of that case reached as result The decision opinion and full The argument consideration. elaborate 171): admittedly is one (208 question "This states. U. care and has been examined with and importance, of the court has reached conclusion And deliberation. TERM, Opinion U. S'. of the Court. is both words judgment, in its consistent which, as well Constitution and is sustained spirit and of asked, to over- effect, We áre now sound reason.” of the we have importance issue in view it; rule of both standpoint question re-examined result, As we are constrained authority. reason and there Neither the doctrine applied. doctrine re-aflirm the of it we will novel; endeavor nor this application The rests. grounds upon re-state some right vital. Included in the principle is fundamental private right personal liberty property— .the to make con- each—is partaking, nature Chief among acquisition tracts for the property. which, personal Try that of contracts is other, for exchanged are or other money services If this struck ar- down or forms property. with, impair- there substantial bitrarily interfered a. constitutional long-established ment of -liberty is as to the laborer as to the'- sense. essential for the majority as to the vast rich; to the capitalist, poor begin way acquire have no other honest persons by working money. property, save with this so serious as that now An interference consideration, disturbing under and so equality arbitrary, sup- unless it be right, must be deemed police power exercise of portable as a reasonable But, notwithstanding strong general the State. validity laws, in favor of state we presumption *12 do not think the statute in as construed and question, case, applied legitimate in this can be sustained as a power. possible exercise avoid misunderstand- To emphasize, has been ing, before, we should here what said that so far its title or enacting expresses as clause a pur- coercion,"compulsion, duress, deal with or pose other influence, have present undue we no concern with be- it, cause of that sort is this nothing involved in case. As has KANSAS.
CÓFPAGE v. s; 236 u. Court. Opinion- of the moot deals not with stated, this court times many been the concrete case but with or abstract questions, cases S. Railroad, 149 U. &c. v. San Pablo (California it. before 487, 492; U. S. McChesney, v. Richardson 308, 314; 648.) Cade, U. Ry. v. Missouri, Kan. & Texas therefore, that a State say, do We not mean on its coercion police power exert properly preven^ or vice versa. employes, towards part employers held last resort has case, court of But, in this the Kansas punish is a error, criminal plaintiff that Coppage, simply under this statute or able with fine imprisonment as the because, acting representative while merely dealing Hedges, Company of the Railroad understanding, of full age at will and man employe or insisted that disability, Coppage to no restraint subject would leave freely choose whether he should Hedges agree refrain would employ Company This employed. union while so with the con association of our conclusive is, purposes jurisdiction, for all struction legis intends this by the State of Kansas evidence although that of Coppage, conduct such as punish lation to . coercion, compulsion, entirely devoid element duress, influence, just certainly as intends or undue party But, appeals and the like. when a coercion punish him protection rights secured to for the court Constitution, depend the decision by the Federal its upon nor even declared law, of the state upon the fofm operation its and effect upon but rather purpose, matters State; and these enforced applied duty, of its cannot, performance in the proper this court the state court. St. Louis yield judgment th^t 350, 362, and cases cited. Arkansas, U. S. v. Ry. S. W. statutory provision which clear that a Now, it to us seems cannot made police regulation legitimate is not a police regula act with a in the same placed by being that declares under title being enacted tion, *13 TERM, 1914. U. S. Opinion óf the Court’. the exercise object a for proper would be purpose changed by character cannot be “Its true power. the Passenger said in’ as Mr. Justice Grier collocation,” its think, we clear, It equally is Cases, 7 How. simply pro for or his agent punish circumstances under certain terms of posing influence, has no duress, or imdue coercion, devoid repressing purpose a declared relation tá reasonable State, can a influence. Nor coercion, duress, and undue is not such conduct which as by designating “coercion” essentially innocent normal 'and truth, render criminal for rights; property or of personal liberty exercise of Amendment Fourteenth deprive, this would permit . do of course force in this We regard. effective or the courts legislature to attribute to the intend candor; purpose aiiy or want any improper of Kansas the form the distinction between emphasize only but present applied and its effect of the statute case. pur- present as immaterial for
Laying aside, therefore, purpose so much the statute as indicates poses, has.the practices, coercive what relation repress possible or morals public safety, to the health, residue Act and we are suggested, welfare?' general None unable given to as the construction any. Act, ponceive deprive employ- shows, the state court is intended to byit correspond- contract, of their to the part, ers of a upbuilding and the advantage employed ing made, could But no organizations. attempt strengthen purpose to sustain the reasonably made, other 'vol- more than voluntary organizations, any these a legitimate object persons, associations untary public are not power. They of the police the exercise governmental law with institutions, charged public of their as would render the maintenance duties, such’ general to the of direct concern membership matter v. KANSAS. COPPAGE Opinion of Court. U. S. would be they were, different question If welfare. *14 presented. is of it said employed, to the interest
As 759) be a p. matter (87 Kansas, Court Supreme Kansas a rule, that as are not knowledge "employés, of common making as in contracts financially independent able be in con- making of employers for the sale their labor are doubt, No wherever the thereof.” purchase tracts exists, there must and will right private property naturally it fortune; happens and thus inequalities are not un- equally a contract parties negotiating about applies contracts, to all This hampered by circumstances. employé. that between merely and not right that wherever the will show reflection Indeed little co-exist, contract of free private property inevitably more or less contracting is when party each he has much property, whether influenced the question to the very is made end none; for the contract or or little, that he needs or desires may gain something that each in give proposes than that which urgently more that, all it is unless And, since self-evident exchange. more, persons must have common, in some things are held things the nature of others, it is' from than property and the contract uphold freedom of impossible time recognizing at the same without property private the neces- of fortuné are those legitimate inequalities Four- rights. those But the the e'xercise sary result declaring that State shall Amendment, teenth without property life, any person "deprive sanc- equal these gives process law,” due each as co-existent "property” “liberty” it tion; recognizes rights, and debars States human unwarranted with either. interference directly it them down not strike may a State
And since declaring in byas indirectly, not do so clear of those public good that the the removal requires effect ccxxxvi —2 .von. TERM,
Opinion of the Court. 236 ü. S. that are but the normal and inequalities inevitable result and then exercise, invoking their the police power order to remove the inequalities, without object other police power broad, view. The and not easily defined, given but it scope cannot wide that is here asserted without it, effect nullifying the constitutional guaranty. need not refer to
We
numerous
familiar cases
in which' this court has held
power
that the
may properly
for preserving
be exercised
public
health,
safety,
general welfare,
morals,
and that such police regulations
may reasonably limit the enjoyment of personal liberty,
including
of making
They
contracts.
are re-
in Holden v. Hardy,
viewed
169 U.
366, 391;
Chicago,
Quincy
B.
R. R. v. McGuire,
&
U. S. 549, 566; Erie
*15
Williams,
R. R. v.
COPPAGE Opinion tbe Court. 236 U. necessary the-accomplish- for incidentally far as be
so and one that object, paramount other and of some ment restriction The mere welfare. public concerns be denom- of itself rights cannot property or of liberty legitimate object as a and treated welfare,” “public inated very thing restriction such police power; of the Amendment. inhibited that is that member- of the state court opinion It is said necessarily not affect does organization in a labor ship employer has no to his duty employer; man’s dominate the life nor relation, “to of the by virtue right, in matters liberty employé with the to interfere service”; and that or deteriorate not lessen that do are that labor unions lawful implies statute “the view The same employers.” rights to the inimical where it State, for the of counsel in the brief presented is the organization in a labor membership is said that To this employé. affair” of private “personal it cannot say is sufficient argument line of .it organiza- in such an membership declared judicially employer; to his duty no to member’s tion has relation preserved, is to be if of contract therefore, freedom for himself to decide at must be left is consistent membership whether of the duties satisfactory performance with the employment. intimate, any- nor to say, we do intend
Of course join of individuals with the inconsistent thing *16 of such legitimacy nor do we unions, question labor to the laws they conform long so organizations full Conceding right to do. others are required land as no inherent he has union, to join individual of one who employ and still remain to do this right than any more man, employ to a union unwilling .is without the the union right join has a to individual same that a Can be doubted organization. of that consent TERM, Opinion of the Court. association of organization voluntary working —a the inherent and constitutional to deny
men —has
to
man who will not
membership
agree
during
accept
he will not
or retain
membership
employment
with non-union men? Or that a
company
union man
constitutional
proffered
has
decline
employ-
the.
employer
agree
ment unless the
will
not to employ any'
man?
all
(In
refer,
non-union
we
course,
agree-
cases
ments made
and without coercion or
voluntarily,
duress
parties.
as between
we have no
And
reference to ques-
tions of
with the
monopoly,
rights of third
interference
general public.
or the
These
parties'
involve other con-
siderations,
respecting which we intend to intimate no
opinion.
Galen,
See Curran v.
United
73 N. J. Law, 729, 738;
When a man is called upon agree not to become or remain a member of the union while working for a particu- only lar he is effect employer, asked to deal openly with his frankly employer, so as not to retain employ- ment terms which the latter is not willing agree. liberty And the of making contracts does not include procure employment from an unwilling em- ployer, without fair understanding. Nor *17 v. KANSAS.
COPPAGE Opinion of the Court. S.U. exercising from by legislation foreclosed employer eniployé. that is the of choice same freedom in refrain from affilia- agree, advance, To ask man retaining position certain union while with the tion give any part him to of his up is not to ask employment, He is free to decline the em- freedom. constitutional decline just on those terms, ployment for “It to- any other; on takes two to offer employment those Having accepted on bargain.” employment make a pe- join is still free union when terms, man if at then expires; or, employed will, of employment riod And, upon simply quitting employment. at time agreement joining if own refrain from by his bound in no he is different period during stated incident to necessarily from that which term situation For constitutional freedom of con- in- general. contracts that a be as'free after mak- party tract does not mean he is not free before; to break without ing a contract as of contract, from the na- very Freedom accountability. enjoyed only being can thing, by exercised; ture of of it an en- particular making and each exercise involves if fulfilled, for the Which, prevents time gagement course conduct. inconsistent again for the let us matter; much reason turn So adjudicated cases. the Adair Case is with the al- The decision in accord of authorities in the state courts. current most unbroken distinguishable in principle enactments many States but, except have been one now question passed, inferior instances the decision court (one, two other, decision now under Ohio, repudiated; since judi- find have been review), they we are unable too to say It much laws enforced. is not cially treated unconstitutional, consent been have common adjudged courts of resort have many state last while found, have no such a court void, them we decision TERM, 191L
Opinion of the Court. sustaining legislation of this character, excepting *18 single which is now under The previous review. instance upheld in which court has such a Davis v. any statute is (1893), 342; Ohio 30 Cinc. Law Bull. 11 Dec. State Ohio Reprint, 894; where the Court Common Pleas of Ham ilton an' act of County April (89 sustained Ohio 14, Laws, 269), any person which declared that who or coerced attempted to coerce employés by discharging or threaten ing to discharge them because their connection with any organization lawful labor should guilty of a misde or upon meanor and conviction fined imprisoned. We are to find that unable this decision was ever re directly viewed; Ohio but State v. Bateman (1900),. 10 Ohio Dec. 7 Ohio P. 68; authority N. repudiated upon ground had been in effect by overruled decisions of the subsequent Supreme state Court, and the same statute was held unconstitutional.
The in error right plaintiff is now seeking to main by tain was held Court Supreme Kansas, case, to protection earlier be within the of the Fourteenth Amendment and therefore beyond legislative interference. In Brick Coffeyville Perry, Co. v. Kansas, 76 Pac. 297; Rep. 848; L. 66 R. A. A. E. 185; & Ann. Cas. 936; court had under consideration Ch. 120 of the of 1897 Laws (Gen. Stat. 1901, 2425, 2426), which declared it unlaw §§ , ful any for person, company corporation, or agent, officer, etc., prevent to employés from joining belong and to ing any labor organization, and enacted that person, company, or corporation, etc., that coerced attempted to coerce employés discharging or by threaten ing to discharge them because of their connection with such labor organization should be deemed guilty misdemeanor, conviction to subjected fine, and should person also be liable to the injured in punitive damages. It was attacked violative of the Fourteenth . Amendment, of the Bill and also of Right's of the state COPPAGE v. KANSAS. Opinion of the Court.
'236 U. S. it unconstitutional, court held The saying constitution.1 “The follow lawful vocation (p. 299): protection completely is as within make contracts as the free property the constitution hold seizure, or where liberty go to when and unwarranted con- ways property One of obtaining one will. in- therefore, to contract cannot be right, tract. violating letter legislature without fringed protected citizen is spirit Every constitution. He his he will. work where whom isHe associates. only employer select not but also his in his one who has at refuse continue serve objection- person, persons, or an association of employ him. rights respect able *19 legislature act of the Any employé equal. and are obligation impose employer on an would undertake he any reason, for whom, in his service one keeping n his constitutional not would be a denial of should desire to acquire make terminate contracts and right to provi- act the so be an propérty. Equally hold would re- one require of which should be intended to sions desire not main in service one whom he should (cid:127) by the defendant . . . The conducted servé. business ownership of this its and in the exercise property, wás or It could abandon it protected constitution. right, It had operation pleasure. its at discontinue make interference, possibility legislative beyond of law. not in violation contract with reference any thereto 1 Rights. . Bill of .' . tbe State of Kansas. Constitution natural possessed equal inalienable 1. All men are Section happiness. life, liberty, pursuit among and the rights, which are reputation injuries person, persons, for or All suffered 18. Section law, justice admin- remedy by due course property, shall have delay. istered without TERM, .24 Opinion of the Court. property may employ persons
In the its such operation desirable, and discharge, reason, as áre without those who It is at liberty are undesirable. contract for the services manner that persons satisfactory to both. No restrictions can be legislative upon the lawful imposed exercise of these rights.” Railway Brown, Co. Kansas, 312; v. Rep. Pac.
459, the same court passed upon Chapter (Gen. Laws Stat. 2421-2424), which §§ required employer upon the discharged of a request employé to furnish in writing the true or for cause reason discharge.' The railway did not meet company this requirement, letter,” “service as it called, was only stating that Brown- discharged “for cause,” which the court naturally held was a statement of the cause. The law was held unconstitutional, ground (80 Kansas, 315) that an employer may discharge any reason, or for no. as an reason,Just Jor employé may quit employment for or reason, no reason; that such action the part of on employé, where no obligation is violated, is an essential element of liberty in action; and that one cannot be com- pelled to give a reason cause for an action for may have no specific cause, reason or except, perhaps; a mere whim or prejudice. present
In the case the court did repudiate or over- rule these previous decisions, but on the contrary cited as establishing *20 employer to them dis- charge his employé at any time, for any reason, or for no reason, being responsible damages for violating con- tract as to the of employment, time as establishing, conversely, of quit to the employ- employé ment any time, at for any reason, or without ahy reason, being likewise responsible damages for a violation of his contract with the employer. The court held the act 1903 that is in question now to be distinguishable from the v. KANSAS. 25
COPPAGE Opinion the Court. U. sufficiently indicated and upon grounds of 18.97, act already by what we have said. answered of last other States courts resort have had In five consideration, acts each instance have under similar (1895), held unconstitutional. In State v. Julow them L. A. Missouri, 781; 257; 31 S. 29 R. 50 Am. 163; Rep.W. Court of Missouri dealt with Rep. 443; Supreme St. (Missouri 1893, 187), that em p. an act Laws forbade or to enter into pain imprisonment, any on fine ployers, him to employé requiring an withdraw agreement with to organization, labor union or other lawful or re from a joining organization, “by any from such or frain an any employé or into with attempt compel means coerce society.” or In any organization drawal from lawful (1900); Illinois, 176; 58 N. E. People v. The Gillespie 176; 52 L. A. Su 283; Rep. 80 Am. St. Rep. 1007; R. of Illinois held' an act Court unconstitutional preme 1899, any p. 844) declaring Stat. criminal (Hurd’s or etc., prevent or at any firm, individual member employés forming, joining, from tempt prevent organization, any and that lawful labor belonging employés attempts “that coerces or coerce person them because threatening discharge by discharging organization” labor connection such lawful of their State, ex rel. Zill of misdemeanor. guilty should N. Wisconsin, 530; 90 W. Kreutzberg (1902), mer v. 934; the court Rep. L. A. 91 Am. St. 1098; 748; 58 R. Rep. (Wisconsin Laws consideration statute had under pro now in which, question, act 332), like Kansas ch. the em- agent coercing or his hibited member to become a agreement into an to enter ployé securing em a condition of organization, as of a labor and also ren continuing ployment of his because discharge it unlawful dered organization. The decision being a member denounced but prohibition, to the latter related *21 26 TERM, 1914. J.,
Holmes, dissenting. upon reasoning able and learned that has a much wider People v. (1906), 257; reach. Marcus 185 N. 77 Y. E. L. Rep. 1073; A., N. 7 R. N. S. Rep. Am. St. 282; 902; 118; (N. 7 A. & E. Ann. Cas. Y. statute dealt with Laws, 1887, 688), already ch. have in sub- said, we was stance identical with the Kansas act. These decisions antedated Adair v. United States. They proceed upon reasoning, broad fundamental the same in substance was adopted by in the Case, they court Adair approval opinion 175). are cited with (208 U. S. A like result reached State, ex rel. Smith v. Daniels (1912), Minnesota, 155; Rep. 136 N. with 584; W. respect that, to an act like the statute, Kansas forbade employer require an an person seeking em- ployment, as condition of such to make an agreement the employé would not become or remain a member of labor organization. This was held invalid upon the Adair And see authority Case. Goldfield Mines Co. v. Miners’ 159 Fed. Union, Rep. Goldfield
Upon both principle therefore, are- authority, we constrained to hold that Kansas March 13,1903, act of applied as construed and to punish so as im- fine or prisonment an or his agent merely prescrib- ing, a condition which one may employment secure under or remain in the employer, service that the employé shall into agreement enter not to become remain a of any organization member while em- so ployed, is repugnant the “due clause of the process” Fourteenth Amendment, and therefore void.
Judgment reversed, and cause remanded for further
proceedings opinion. inconsistent with this Mr. Justice Holmes, dissenting.
I think judgment should be affirmed. In present conditions a workman unnaturally may believe v. KANSAS.
COPPAGE Day dissenting. Hughes, JJ., U. S. he secure a contract that to a by belonging union can only Hardy, *22 U. 397. 366, to him. v. 169 S. fair Holden shall be 219 S. McGuire, & R. v. U. Chicago, Quincy R. Burlington be wrong, may right 570. If that whether 649, belief, it may it to me that be man, reasonable seems by held of posi- the equality law in order to establish by enforced begins. of contract in which parties liberty tion between workingmen it is for the run long in wise Whether but I am my concern, is not enact sort legislation Constitu- there strongly opinion nothing is that Adair v. prevent it, tion of the United States and 161, York, Lochner v. States, United U. S. and New 208 my I have stated 45, 198 U. should be overruled. S. it unnecessary cases think add grounds in those and Guntner, I further v. Vegelahn others that think exist. See Woods, 104, Plant v. Massachusetts, 92, 108. I Massachusetts, 492, opinions still entertain the 505. in expressed by me Massachusetts. Day Hughes Justice Justice with whom Mr.
Mr. concurs, dissenting: sufficiently
The of the here involved character question grounds of the which my a statement justifies, opinion, judgment and impel opinion me to dissent from is of the decision further em- importance this case. invalidating only fact that results phasized court, but legislation before Kansas, now fate to like necessarily legislation decrees the same is result far-reaching of the other States Union.1 This attained statute declared to be an infraction because the is California, passed been Statutes like the Kansas statute have Minnesota, Connecticut, Indiana, Massachusetts, New Colorado, Pennsylvania, Oregon, Jersey, York, Oklahoma, Hampshire, New New Rico, of Labor Statistics Bulletin of Bureau Porto and Wisconsin. 2; of the United States. 1 and Labor Laws No. Volumes OCTOBER TERM/ Day Hughes, JJ., dissenting. 236 U. protection afforded the Four^ under of the constitutional Constitution, to the Federal Amendment teenth life, liberty shall be person deprived no declares process of law. The due property without said, part citizen, it is contract, case, done in this is declared to abridge it, as is and to authority of legislative the State. beyond part is a contract individual free- That amendment, of this protection may dom within with, interfered is conceded. arbitrarily While repeated better settled de- true, nothing is this is than that of contract of this court cisions to limitation unyielding, subject but is not absolute of the public health, safety in the interest restraint *23 and such limitations be declared in welfare, and unduly It would extend of the State. what legislation to all to in this case to refer the cases in say I purpose this doctrine has been declared. One them is: U. 165. In that 160, case, United 157 S. States, Frisbie v. form been declared, repeated it and has varying many times since: may generally speaking, it be conceded that,
"While that of among rights the inalienable the citizen is yet liberty and contract, is not absolute liberty It is within the power govern- universal. undoubted contracts, to restrain some all ment individuals from all from It may individuals some well contracts. all deny contract for purchase sale assume lottery the minor the tickets; any except for the obligations, existence; necessaries power the common carrier the make contract releasing himself from re- negligence, and, indeed, engaged strain all employment any contract against public the course of that employment which is policy. possession power by The of this government in no proposition that, manner with the generally conflicts
COPPAGE v. KANSAS.
29
Day
Hughes, JJ., dissenting.
S.U.
a right freely
has
speaking, every citizen
contract for
labor, services,
property.”
price
Hardy,
v.
366,
also Holden
U. S.
Atkin
391)
See
v.
207;
Kansas,
Oregon,
191 U. S.
Muller v.
412,
S.U.
Arkansas,
539;
McLean v.
211 U. S.
421;
Chicago, Bur
Quincy
&
R. R. v.
219 U.
lington
McGuire,
549;
S.
Atlantic
Mills,
186,
Line v. Riverside
202;
Coast
Erie
v.
U.
Williams,
Railroad
Erie
The
Rail
is
very
road Case
recent deliverance of this
court
it was declared:
subject,
wherein
.
making
contracts is
liberty
subject
“But
conditions
public welfare,
pre
in the interest
which shall
by any
or condition —cannot
defined
principle
vail—
formula.
and universal
Each instance of asserted
precise
itself, and
by
be determined
it has been
conflict must
many
legislation
sup
that each act of
has the
said
times
presumption
is
exercise
the interest
port
burden
on him who
The
is
attacks the
public.
by declaring
it is
sustained
legislation,
only
demonstrating
It can
sustained
contract.'
with some constitutional restraint or that
it conflicts
the legislation.
is
public
welfare
subserved
instance,
judge
in the first
of what
legislature is,
welfare,
judicial
public
for the
review
necessary
limited. The earnest conflict of serious
judgment
of its
it within
bring
range
not suffice to
does
opinion
Q.
C., B.
R. Co. McGuire,
& R.
v.
cognizance.
judicial
*24
v.
565;
Alliance Insurance Co.
549,
U. S.
German
Kansas,
It is therefore may of contract be circumscribed this court of people. State and the welfare interest of the authority of exercise transcends given Whether authority must be legislative of determined the limits police arises. preservation case as it in each States, authority under the which that power TERM,
Day JJ., dissenting. U. S. Hughes, and which has for been has enacted legislation great mass and safety wel- health, the promotion its purpose importance. utmost This is of the public, fare the States when Federal by was surrendered power taken from them adopted, nor when was Constitution and was ratified became Amendment the Fourteenth Union. Barbier v. law of the Con- part of the fundamental U. S. 27. nolly, 113 legislature the local legislation, of such necessity
Of the only and its enactments are be set is the judge, itself power involve such abuse palpable they aside when a lawful end that accomplish and lack reasonableness merely arbitrary capricious, be said to be they may in a of laws and not of government out of place and hence conception process of due and irreconcilable men, page on Process Law,” of law. McGehee “Due court cited. this therein cases legislative power it is meant that the is be- By this Such as are yond judicial arbitrary review. enactments thus of legislative exceed the exercise unreasonable faith, invalid authority good declared when judicial proceedings. by proper This brought review necessary to assertion and maintenance of the su- of the Constitution. premacy Conceding that .the contract is a subject then within protection, authority given by judicial States, is, the United question Constitution here arbitrarily of the State so exercised power was the as to its action unconstitutional therefore void? render It that this question authoritatively is said determined court, of Adair States, this in the case v. United case, passed U. S. 161. statute the Congress States, supposed United under sanction of power commerce, was regulate court, interstate before there decided that of contract pro- and.it the Fifth Amendment the Constitution, tected *25 y. KANSAS.
COPPÁGE dissenting. JJ., Daí -and Hughes, deprived of life, 'liberty no shall be providing person law, process without due avoided a statute property or it a an discharge which undertook to make crime em- in a membership organi- because of his labor ployé simply involved, zation. feature of the statute which is.here it or any employé, any person an making require offense employment, condition seeking verbal, or to enter into an either written agreement, corporation, to become a member of association exactly similar to that of organization, provision —a consideration, now under the Kansas statute —was or the charge the made facts upon before the court nor de- provision was neither considered shown, and this that an reaching cided conclusion upon discharged an could not a criminal because be made membership his a labor because of employé simply fact opinion was organization. the course stated, and the before the court question than once more (208 S., 171): p. U. declared against make it a criminal offense "May Congress of 1898 by the tenth section of act United States —as carrier, of an interstate agent an officer does—for carrier, from authority premises full having simply from service because discharge membership organization?” in a labor court, and that before the there question
Such was the it, opinion, at the close no about might be mistake which defendant in that case upon act part from separable was to be the other declared was convicted only statute the act, and that feature parts Harlan, concluding Mr. Justice subject decision. 180): (p. court said opinion the act of 1898 part upon that since the add “We based, upon count of indictment the first which convicted, is severable alone the defendant sufficient other as what has been said parts, TERM, 1914. Day JJ., dissenting. U. Hughes, to con- not called *26 are case, we present of the dispose for such, act, the provisions and independent other sider of This to arbitration. relating provisions instance, as the validity to the question restricted decision of therefore making Congress the act provision the particular of of an agent the United States against a crime officer its service an discharge employé interstate carrier an from organization” a labor a member being because mine.) (Italics involved, charge statute of the
In view of the feature of the opinion reservation made, express and this I am unable statute, as to other features court now at or decided the one involved that case agree that bar. now under consideration in the statute nothing
There is in his discharging one from prevents employer an is, May now presented question at his will. The service or future present employ- as a condition employer, an will,not agree that he exercise an ment, require union, member of a labor becoming privilege the cases are my opinion, fit do so? see should he con- different, questions and the decision entirely join principles. by different trolled subject frequent and has been the undisputed, unions legal within their judicial opinions. Acting affirmation legitimate any organiza- are as such associations rights, promote formed to their common interest. tion of citizens many States, by the laws of organized under They are and, passed purpose, statutes for that express virtue within their constitutional acting rights, being legal, against action to the join them, coercive legitimate subject protection contrary may This authority of the States. police the exercise authority of that statute, particular in the exercise passed limitations of which no court power, police called define, its avowed has for precisely undertaken yet has COPPAGE v. KANSAS. Day Hughes, JJ., dissenting.
236 U. purpose protection the exercise of a legal right, by- from preventing employer depriving an the employé of it as a condition I obtaining employment. see no reason . if it why may not, chooses, a State protect right, as well legal as other rights.
But it is said that must contrary necessarily result, if not from the precise Case, matter decided in the Adair then from principles therein laid that it down, and is' logical result of that decision may, as a condition of require obligation forego the exercise of any privileges because of the exercise of which an employé might be discharged service. I do not concede that this result from anything follows decided in the Adair That solely Case. case dealt *27 the to terminate relations of employ- ment with an employé, and involved the constitutional protection do, of his right so but did not deal with the conditions which might exact or impose upon another as a employment. condition of
The act under consideration is said to have the effect to deprive employers of a of their part liberty contract, for the benefit of labor organizations. urged It is that the statute has no object purpose, express implied, that has reference'to health, safety, morals, or public'welfare, beyond the supposed desirability of leveling inequalities of fortune by depriving him who has of some property of his part “financial independence.” But this argument independence admits that financial is not independence authority legisla- of law or of the of the ture to declare the of the State as to matters policy which welfare, peace have a reasonable to the and relation security community. the motives of many
This court has times decided that legislators subject of laws are not the enactment judicial Federal, and áre inquiry. Legislators, state to the presumption that- their has action been entitled vol. ccxxxvi —3 TERM, 1914.
Day JJ., Hughes, dissenting. 236 U. they deem because of conditions which faith and good Speak taken. to warrant action and sufficient proper 506, McCardle, in Ex Wall. parte for court ing up the doctrine in a sentence Chase summed Justice Chief into inquire at said: “We are not when he can into its only We examine legislature. of the motives Constitu Cooley’s power under Constitution.” Limitations, Ed., 257, says: 7th eminent author tional that legislative assume discretion “They must courts] [the If was it required, evidence properly has been exercised. legislature it before the when supposed that was must be re any special finding if was passed; the act act, particular to warrant passage quired act be held might that the itself passage seem would general to such “The rule is finding.” equivalent legislative of all bodies to the enactments reference legisla into the motives inquire the courts cannot disclosed them, they may on in,passing except tors acts, con operation, or inferable their the face of country to the condition sidered with reference con legislation.' legislators, The motives existing purposes they view, always had in will sidered as follows as presumed accomplish to be of their Their natural and reasonable effect enactments. their moral motives, considered as the inducements legisla vary with different members of the votes, will motives, character body. tive diverse *28 of into the of men and penetrating hearts impossibility all as im truth, the such ascertaining precludes inquiries Ring Crowley, v. practicable and futile.” Soon that legislature “We must assume the acts 703, 710. for the best interests of judgment to the according imputed cannot be to it.” wrong State. A intent Florida S. Reynolds, 471, 480. R. v. 183 U. Central &c. R. be as an attempt legislature
The act must taken necessary good it deemed the statute which (cid:127)to a enact v. KANSAS. COPPAGE Day Hughes, JJ., dissenting. 236 U. and society. It for security imposes penalty order making upon or or or “coercing influencing demands servants, laborers, persons requirements employés, It was in the of this avowed employment.” light seeking interpreted by Supreme that the act was the purpose upon meaning ultimate the Kansas, authority Court of necessarily if act is course, of the law. the terms Of unconstitutional, mere declara- arbitrary and therefore it it, but must be pre- tions of intent cannot save good by legislative branch passed sumed have been for the faith, purpose government good the state may have legislature The reaching the desired end. it, known believed, acting upon conditions by the enactment of a would be public promoted welfare exaction prevent compulsory should statute which acknowledged legal right agreements forego written of employment in one’s trade involved, as a condition here occupation. or one is impossible to maintain that because
It would or because given -employment, or refuse a accept free to it another, or employ at will refuse may employ one have a constitutional the parties follows stipulation employment any in an agreement insert against in terms that are cannot they They put choose. by as it is deemed the courts exist either public policy legislature may be declared law as at common of the public the limits reason within as the arbiter say greater is no answer It policy State.. because free to and that less includes they may to refuse employé' employ, is easily tested as- This matter please. agree they year the in- employment suming contract employment of a condition sertion conditions not to choice continue. should parties may because unrestricted wholly regarded pro- if choose. And as they or not agree the.State *29 TERM, 1914. Day JJ., dissenting. Hughes, 236 U. S. agreement in an it stipulation because particular hibit a security in to the operation to be is deemed opposed may it community, prohibit any of the in being and well a term or at agreement employment whether the one may prohibit attempt way the bind will. It undertaking. objectionable to the might pro- the anyone contend that State Would which an imposition require of conditions should hibit the part right employe on forego agreement country for redress in the to the courts to resort employer? with his While the em- disagreement case suit discharged brought against in case he might be ployé willed, byit no means follows if latter so a condition of required, that he could as the obviously sup- fundamental one right a so forego say that the misleading right of It is therefore posed. right to necessarily impose condi- embraces discharge which shall include surrender of employment tions of it is of the State to maintain. rights policy which a illustration: The exclude foreign another Take carrying purely on a domestic business corporation distinctly recognized by has decisions of State been and is yet held, law, it has been now settled court; beyond authority a require it is State of this file in business character.to corporation doing Secretary agreement of State a written office of the to a suit, removable, otherwise Federal it will not remove Insurance v. Morse, the United States. Co. court of case, exclude held not Wall. impose any condition under to include do business might the State. In that corporation said,: this court connection away freedom, barter his life or his
“A man In a case, cannot, criminal he rights. his substantial Case, tried Cancemi’s other manner was held in although consent in jury men, open twelve than KANSAS. COPPAGE v. Day dissenting. Hughes, JJ., In a civil jury tried eleven men. case to be
court *30 by his own consent particular his suit to an may he submit single judge. of a So arbitration, or to the decision he a right to his to remove his suit to may omit exercise Fed- tribunal, fit, as as he thinks in each recurring eral often may these citizen no doubt aspects case. waive may cannot, to he be entitled. He rights which how- bind, an ever, agreement, himself in advance to may enforced, .rights thus forfeit his specifically be at on all and all whenever the case occasions, may times be Morse, Insurance Co. v. presented.” Wall. 451. may opinion It that be of the may employer be an that National membership employes Guard, by of his in the State, may in the militia of the enlistment detrimental successfully contended that to Can his business. interest, prohibit an not, public agree- may State as against public policy? such enlistment forego ment to police beyond legitimate a exercise it be Would required not be that an should provide to power forego of to affilia- employment, as a condition agree, to support or the party, of a particular political tion awith It seems to me candidate for office? these particular is and There a real hot a answer themselves. questions right to the exercise of distinction between fanciful a imposition requirement at will and the discharge shall make employment, as a condition of a the employé, legal right. agree- to a agreement forego particular to be, against public be, may be declared may ment discharge remains. When although right policy, his right exercises discharged, isman exigencies necessary action because declare such his other judgment the result of business, his he a stipula- himself. makes When reasons sufficient essential future here involved tion the character exercising discharge, he is employment, employé when, at discharge not wish may TERM, Day dissenting. Hughes, JJ., U. S. is act done. is in subsequent time, prohibited What engaging work, the one who accomplished, fact action, independent as a may preserve wish is coerced to the signing condition against will, perhaps impelled by an agreement State, of his situation. The within con- the necessities limitations, judge policy is the own stitutional of the legislative authority.. it in may execute exercise only employed but well statute reaches This The latter never wish seeking employment. .one agreements as signing such are By a labor union. join deprived free choice as here involved must between conduct, employ- choose to his future *31 exigencies the as the to act in future right and the ment contracts, having It such may demand. is of his situation ones seek to and similar effect, that statute of the State. policy prohibit against and punish presented that the case is constantly emphasized is It positions in view of the relative But not one coercion. deny to that the stipu- who is employed, employer law is and forbidden upon here insisted lation it strip form of coercive? No words can essentially opinions our individual its true charactér. Whatever put cannot as to the wisdom of such may legislation, we and refuse judgment place legislature in of that our to of the conditions acknowledge existence to the dealing. it differ as Opinions may ground but cannot understand' what we remedy, to intimately a so subject it that related can be said power. legislative is from the society removed welfare stipula- insert this employer to Wherein is the his to more sacred than any in the agreement tion keep in up the same trade with another agree to his “financial think it essential may quite He prices? is may truth be if he alone so in it independence” deny too that legis- But it is late to be considered. v. KANSAS. COPPAGE Day JJ., dissenting. Hughes, It reaches such a case. would be difficult power lative intimately subject good more related select community than security that order and under one takes view that labor consideration —whether or the reverse. It is organizations advantageous are legislative matter for certainly as much a consideration action as in restraint trade. contracts organization voluntary It that a labor urged —a working-men association —has constitutional will not that membership man who deny agree he membership accept will not retain em- during such it is with non-union men. ployment company And for one rule of that there cannot be asserted its members and a different and organization and employers. more restrictive rule for example, may for true, It course Church unite with other denomina- deny membership'to those who no follows State tions, but means from company a railroad com- constitutionally prohibit not, he- or will will, working-man agree pelling case, analogous An church. join particular —viewed State, Can the be: standpoint, would employer’s power, reach legislative of its the exercise concerted as a to coerce the employer intended employés effort writing engage labor that shall hiring condition employers other of association with privilege give up otherwise, having corporate organizations, legal *32 by legal means promote effort object a united their for the interest to be best believe employers that which business? their rule for be the same there should entirely agree
I of action liberty the same employed, employers may coercive prohibit the law my judgment, for each. involved, to either of deprive as are here attempts, privileges which are theirs exercising right of the free has know, no law undertaken far as I law. So the within TERM, áO Day Hughes, JJ., dissenting. S.U. of labor in right employers the the exercise abridge organizations they as to what will form for free choice of thdir common promotion interests, denying the of action in such matters. right them free But it is said that in this case all that was done effect for a discharge employé was to cause deemed sufficient employer personal to the inherent liberty —a protected by Constitution. This sight purpose loses of the real argument and effect of this The imposed and kindred statutes. is not for penalty attempt but for the to coerce an discharge unwilling em- the exercise of ployé agree forego legal right in- as a It is employment. volved condition the require- agreements ment of such which the State declares to be public policy. against
I think that the act under consideration, now kin- ones, promote liberty dred are intended to the same for the employé employer confessedly action enjoys. should be as zealous to protect law the constitutional liberty guard it is to that of the employer. A principal object protect this' statute is to liberty of the citizen to make such lawful affiliations as he may de- of his It organizations sire with choice. should not be neces- sary protection to the of one citizen that same in another citizen be abridged destroyed'. If one prohibitive condition of sort here involved attached, may so until others, can .employment only be had as the result of written stipulations, which deprive shall the employé of the exercise of legal rights are within authority protect. the State to should, While this court within the limitations of the con- guaranty, protect stitutional the free right contract, important is not less that the State be given its legislative exert if it authority, deems so, best to do protection of rights which inhere in the privileges of every the citizen free country.
COPPAGE v. KANSAS. JJ., dissenting. Day and U. S. Hughes, statute, sustaining of Kansas in this Court Supreme to' financially are not able as rule “employés said for the of their making in contracts sale independent be as making purchase contract employers labor as are law it is that the reply suggested this thereof,” long and that so remedy fortune, inequalities cannot may property happen parties exists, by circum- not be negotiating may equally unhampered stances. legitimacy as to the court,
This view Kansas as I harmony, understand in entire considerations, considering this former decisions of court it, with the laws which shall legislatures of state enact authority exercise oppressive the undue or prevent Hardy, In Holden v. employés. making contracts with limiting considering U. S. court legislation might laborers be em during of hours the number said: particular employment, in a ployed fact, which the recognized “The has also legislature corroborated, legislators in experience many States has and their these establishments proprietors their and that upon equality, do stand an operatives The former extent, conflicting. to a certain are, interests possible from to obtain as naturally desire much are often induced while the latter employés, their which their regulations conform to discharge fear detri- fairly exercised, pronounce would judgment, words, In other strength. to their health mental laborers are lay prac- down the rules proprietors self- obey them. such cases tically constrained to guide, legislature and the is often an unsafe interest . . But fact authority. . interpose properly to contract full age competent parties that both are power necessarily deprive the State does equality, do not stand parties where the interfere party that one public or where the demands health TERM, Day Hughes, JJ., dissenting.- *34 protected against contract shall be 'The himself. in still retains an interest however welfare, State is no than may greater' reckless he be. whole health, of all the and when the individual parts, sum safety neglected, and welfare are the State sacrificed ” (Page 397.) suffer.’ must language quoted approval Chicago,
This was & Burlington Quincy McGuire, R. R. Co. v. S. 549, U. 570, in which sustained, a statute of Iowa was prohibiting injuries limiting liability contracts made advance injuries received, subsequent providing acceptance of under such benefits contracts should not for injuries constitute satisfaction received after it can be no Certainly objection contract. substantial the'exercise of police power legislature has into taken consideration necessities, comparative ability, and contracting the relative situation par- all law, ties. While stand before the equal are alike protection, entitled not to ought be a reasonable objection that one motive which impelled an enactment to protect might those who otherwise be unable to protect themselves.
I therefore think that of Kansas, the statute sustained by the Supreme Court of State, go beyond did not legitimate exercise of police power, when it sought, to require one employ against another man his will, but to put limitations the sacrifice of rights which one man exact from another as a condition of em- ployment. I Entertaining views, these am constrained dissent judgment this case. Hughes
I am to say that Mr. Justice con- permitted curs this dissent.