after stating the case as above, delivered the opinion of the court.
The principles which underlie this case are clearly estab-. lished by the decisions of this court. So long as there is no national bankrupt act, each State-has full authority to pass insolvent laws binding persons and-property within its jurisdiction, provided it does' not impair the obligation of existing contracts; but a State cannot by such á law discharge one of its. own citizens from Ms contracts with citizens of other. States, though' made after the passage of the law, unless they voluntarily become parties to-the proceedings in insolvency.
Sturges
v.
Crowninshield,
*458 A provision of the insolvent law of a State, that all conveyances, by way of preference, of any property within its borders, made’ by a citizen of the State, being insolvent, and within four, months before the commencement of proceedings in insolvency, shall be void, is a usuál and a valid exercise of the power of the State over property within its jurisdiction,' as to all such conveyances made after the passage of the law, whether to its own citizens or to citizens of other States.
■ But even if it should be held, that such a law could not invalidate such a conveyance so far as citizens of other States are concerned, it is clearly valid so far as it makes the conveyance an act of insolvency, sufficient to support an adjudication of insolvency, and the appointment of a trustee or assignee to take and distribute among creditors any property which may lawfully come to his possession. The State might enact that conveyances preferring particular creditors, if made in good fai should be valid.so far as concerned them, and yet provide ihat, so far as the debtor was concerned, the preference showed such a disregard of the’ rights of other creditors as would justify adjudging the debtor to be insolvent, and appointing a trustee or assignee to take possession of and distribute any property not included in the conveyance.-
In the case before us the only plaintiff in error 'is the insolvent himself. The position taken by him in the court below, but not argued in this court, that the obligation of a contract with, him has been unconstitutionally impaired, is clearly untenable, because the statute of the State was in existence when the contract was made, and the subsequent decision of the Court of Appeals was not a law, within the meaning of the provision of the Constitution which declares that no State shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts.
New Orleans Waterworks v. Louisiana Co.,
The only provision of the Constitution of the United States, now relied on by the plaintiff in error, is the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment, which forbids any State to deprive any person of property without due process of law. But the. plaintiff in error has been deprived of no right by the judgment below. There is no doubt of .the validity of that, judg *459 ment, so far as it adjudged him to be an insolvent and appointed an assignee to take possession of his property; and in any view . he has no title or right in the property which was the subject of the conveyance in trust. If that conveyance was valid, the property belongs to the trustee for the benefit of the creditors named therein. If it was invalid, the property vested in the assignee in insolvency.
"Whether the judgment below was ineffectual as against the trustee or the creditors named in the conveyance, either for want of notice or because the conveyance to them could not be set .aside, or whether, on the other hand, that judgment was valid against them, because rendered' in a proceeding
m rem
of which they were bound to take notice, is a question which could be presented by them onty, and they are not parties to this writ of 'error. The plaintiff in error cannot invoke the judgment of this court upon the rights of persons pnder whom he does not claim.
Long
v. Converse,
Judgment, affirmed.
