after stating the case as above reported, delivered the opinion of the court.

The grounds relied on in support of the motion to disiqiss this writ of error .ai’e, in substance, that the granting or refusing of a writ of certiorari "is a matter of discretion, and not the subject of review; that there is no sufficient pecuniary value in dispute to support the jurisdiction of this court; and that *369 tbe proceedings of a justice of the peace under tbe landlord and tenant act of tbe District of Columbia cannot be' reviewed, except by appeal.

Tbe writ of error before us is not upon tbe judgment of the justice in the landlord and tenant process, but upon tbe judg-. ment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia quashing the writ of' certiorari to the justice. Tbe last ground assigned for the motion to dismiss is untenable, because it affects tbe correctness of the. judgment quashing the writ of certiorari, afid not tbe jurisdiction of this court to review that. judgment. •

The other grounds for the motion to dismiss, though more plausible, appear, upon examination, to be also insufficient.

A writ of certiorari, when its object is not to remove a case before trial, or to supply defects in a record, but to bring up after judgment the proceedings of an inferior court or tribunal whose procedure is not according to the course pf the common law, is in the nature of a writ of error. Although the granting of the writ of certiorari rests in the discretion of the court, yet, after the writ has been granted, and the record certified in obedience to it, the questions arising upon that record must be determined according to fixed rules of law, and their determination -is re viewable on error. People v. Brooklyn Assessors, 39 N. Y. 81; People v. Brooklyn Commissioners, 103 N. Y. 370; Farmington Co. v. County Commissioners, 112 Mass. 206, 212.

It is argued that the-justice of the peace had no juTisdiction to try the title to land ; Rev; Stat. D. C. §§. 687, 997; that'the only matter in dispute before him was the right of possession ; and that the rental value of the property in question cannot be considered as in dispute, because, whatever the judgment might be in the action for "possession, the defendant would have to pay that value, either as rent under the lease if the judgment should be in his favor, or for use and occupation if the judgment should be against him.

The case differs from any of the precedénts cited at the bar, and is not frée from difficulty. But the petition for the writ of certiorari alleges, upon the oath of the petitioner, £hat he, is, *370 in the possession of the' premises under a lease haying nearly a ’ year to run, with a privilege of extension for four years more; and that he has expended $15,000 in permanent improvements upon the leased property, of .which he will be deprived, if the judgment of the justice of the peace, which he alleges to be void for want of jurisdiction, is not set aside .by writ of certio-rari. The reasonable inference from this is, that the possession of the premises, with the right to use these improvements, throughout the- lease and the extension thereof, would be worth ■more than $5000, showing that the matter in dispute is of sufficient pecuniary value to support the jurisdiction of this court, '.under the'act of March 3, 1885, c. 355. 23 Stat. 413.

But upon the merits of the case, the judgment below is so clearly right that the motion to affirm must be granted.

The landlord and tenant act, embodied in the Revised Statutes of the District of Columbia, provides not only that every occupation, possession or holding of real estate without express contract or lease, or by a contract or lease the terms of which have expired, shall be deemed a tenancy at sufferance, but also that “ all estates at sufferance may be determined by a notice ■in writing to quit of thirty days,” and that “ when forcible entry is made, or when a peaceable entry is made and the possession unlawfully held by force, or when possession is held without right after' the estate is determined by the terms of ■the lease by its own limitation, or by notice to quit, or otherwise,” then, “ on written complaint on oath of the person entitled to the premises', to a justice of the peace, charging such forcible entry or detainer of real estate” — that is to say, charging either a “ forcible entry,” or any “ detainer,” whether forcible after- a peaceable entry, or without right after the estate is determined — a summons may be issued to the person complained of; and if it appears that the complainant is entitled to the possession of the premises, he shall have judgment for the possession and costs, but if the complainant fails to prove his fight to possession, the defendant shall have judgment for costs; and that eithef party may appeal from the judgment of the justice.of the peace to the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. Rev. Stat. D. C. §§ 680, 681, 684, 686, 688.

*371 As an appeal lies from the judgment, of the justice of the peace, his proceedings cannot be quashed by writ of ceHiorari, unless' for want of jurisdiction, appearing on the'face of his record. People v. Betts, 55 N. Y. 600; Gaither v. Watkins, 86 Maryland, 576.

It' is suggested that the justice of the peace had no jurisdiction, because the oath to the complaint was not taken before, him, but before a notary public in the State of New York. JBut the statute only requires a “ written complaint on oath of the ■ person entitled to the premises.” ' Rev. Stat. D. C. § 8.84, As it requires the oath to be made by the complainant in .person, and does not in terms require it to be administered by the justice or within the District, it is a more reasonable construction to -permit the oath to be taken anywhere before a proper officer, than to require the personal attendance of the complainant at the filing of the complaint.

Tt is further suggested that the complaint does not allege, that, the complainant is “ entitled to the premises,” but only that he is “entitled to-the possession” of the premises. But as the. whole scope and ..aim of the complaint are to recover the possession, the difference is immaterial.

The remaining suggestion is that the complaint doés not show the defendant to have been such a tenant as is contemplated by the landlord and tenant-act of the District of Columbia. But that act, as we have seen, provides that all tenancies at sufferance may be determined by thirty, days’ written notice to quit, and does not require the facts constituid ing the relation of landlord and tenant to be set forth in the complaint. Its requirements are satisfied, at least so far as to support the jurisdiction of the justice, by the distinct allegations in the complaint before us, that the complainant is entitled to the possession of the premises, that they are detained from |iim and held without right by the-.defendant, that the defendant is his tenant at sufferance, and' that the defendant’s tenancy, and estate in the.premises have been determined, by such a notice to quit.

-As was well said, by Mr. Justice Merrick in delivering, the opinion of the court below, “These averments constitute;fully *372 •a statement of the relation of landlord and tenant between the parties. Now whether the proof came up-to these aver-ments or not cannot be inquired into upon a writ of certiora/ri. Certiorari goes only to the jurisdiction. It does not go to any errors of judgment that may have been committed by the justice in the progress of the exercise of that jurisdiction.”

• The decisions cited at the bar, made under statutes requiring the .proceedings to be commenced by affidavit of the facts requisite to bring the case within the statutes, and giving no appeal from the decision of .the justice of the peace, 1 have no application to this case.

Judgment affirmed.