Statement of pleadings
This is a bill in equity brought by John F. Feathers and Layóla M. Feathers, his wife, against Carl R. Baer and Frieda E. Baer, his wife, for the purpose of requiring defendants to remove a fence alleged to be a spite fence and a nuisance.
The bill avers that plaintiffs, husband and wife, are the owners of a lot of ground situated in the Berkley Hills section of Upper Yoder Township, Cambria County, Pa., a suburban district of the City of Johns-town, located less than one half mile from the city limits ; that defendants are the owners of the adjoining lot, both lots fronting on Blair Street; that in 1939 plaintiffs had erected on their lot a dwelling house at a cost of approximately seven thousand dollars and have lived in said house since its erection, and that defendants likewise reside in a dwelling house erected on the ad
Defendants filed preliminary objections to the bill, which were dismissed on April 8, 1944, whereupon defendants filed an answer, stating that any acts of annoyance, threats, and breaches of the peace which may have occurred were on the part of plaintiffs and not on the part of defendants; denying that the said fence was erected without cause and for malicious motives, but averring that the same was erected so that defendants may fully enjoy their own property; denying that the fence is a private nuisance; denying that the property is located in a suburban district of the City of Johns-town ; averring that plaintiffs have an adequate remedy at law, that they are not being personally annoyed, and
Plaintiffs thereupon amended their bill by making an additional averment that the said fence was erected and is maintained by defendants out of malicious motives, serves no useful purpose to defendants, and that the same is parallel to and five feet distant from the northerly side of plaintiffs’ house and shuts out light, air, and view from their windows, and that the said fence constitutes a private nuisance.
Defendants filed an amended answer, in which they averred that immediately upon service of the bill upon them, although not enjoinéd by preliminary injunction, they stopped work on said fence, which they aver is being erected entirely upon defendants’ property. Defendants deny that said fence is a solid board fence, but aver that it is a picket fence, constructed of boards 5% inches wide set with 1 inch of space between each board, and aver that the fence at its highest point will be approximately 7 feet high on defendants’ side. Defendants further aver that the fence is not five feet, but approximately eight feet from plaintiffs’ house, and deny that the fence shuts out light, air, and view from the rooms of plaintiffs or darkens their rooms to any appreciable extent. Defendants further aver that the height of the completed fence as contemplated will be reduced as it approaches Blair Street, and aver that they intend constructing the fence not only along the entire side of their property adjoining plaintiffs but also along the rear of their lot as far as their garage. Defendants specifically deny that the fence was erected out of malicious motives and that it constitutes a private nuisance. They aver that the fence is being erected to protect defendants’ flowers, shrubs, and trees from winds and storms coming from a northerly and westerly direction. . . .
Discussion
The difficulties between the parties to this action began shortly after plaintiffs purchased the lot adjoining
Defendants called an architect, who testified that he made a detailed study of the garden end of the Baers’ lot, but he could not remember whether he prepared it in 1942 or 1943. However, he said it was paid for in August 1943. He said that defendant Carl Baer, and not he, brought up the matter of the erection of a fence, and that Baer, and not he, conceived the idea of using a fence as a windbreak. He further testified that his plan could be put into effect with a fence four feet high.
It will be noted that defendants did not testify that they intended to build a fence around their entire property, but only along their line which adjoins plaintiffs’ property and for a short distance in the rear of their lot, from the end of that line to their garage. Moreover, it will also be noted that the portion of the fence which they built first, which is now standing, is at a point where it would do plaintiffs the most harm. Moreover, the finished side of the fence faces defendants’ lot and the unfinished side is but a few feet from plaintiffs’ •living-room windows. Defendants have referred to this fence as a picket fence. However, a glance at plaintiffs’ exhibit no. 4 clearly indicates that it is not what is .commonly known as a picket fence but, rather, a board fence, although not a solid board fence since there is a space of one inch between each board.
We are convinced that the sole motive which actuated defendants in constructing the fence in dispute was that of malice and retaliation. We are also convinced that there is no substantial benefit derived by defendants from the construction of a fence of this height. Certainly any trifling benefit which might accrue to them could just as well be obtained if the fence had a maximum height of four feet.
At the common law there was a divergence of opinion as to whether a spite fence could be directed to be removed. According to the early and many recent decisions under the common law an owner of land might
While it is, of course, true that when one pursues a strictly legal right his motive is immaterial, yet certainly no one should be permitted to build and maintain an entirely useless structure for the sole purpose of injuring his neighbor. The modern view is stated in the Restatement of the Law of Torts, vol. 4, sec. 829, as follows:
“Under the rules stated in §§826-828, an intentional invasion of another’s interest in the use and enjoyment of land is unreasonable and the actor is liable when the harm is substantial and his conduct is (a) inspired solely by hostility and a desire to cause harm to the other; or (b) contrary to common standards of decency.”
Under the comment on clause (a) we find the following:
“Malicious conduct. Where one’s sole purpose in what he is doing is to annoy and harm his neighbor, his conduct has no utility which the law will recognize. Even the owner of land in fee simple is not privileged to use the land solely for the purpose of harming his neighbors, and if he causes them substantial harm, he is responsible if his conduct was for a nonbeneficial use and solely for the purpose of causing such harm.”
A spite fence is used as an illustration of the rule set forth in this section.
We have not discussed the effect of the Act of May 26, 1939, P. L. 231, 53 PS §4231, because we are satisfied
Conclusions of law
1. The court has jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter in controversy.
2. The erection of a fence of the height and character of the one erected by defendants was unnecessary for the protection of defendants’ flowers, shrubbery, trees, etc.
3. Defendants derived no substantial benefit of any character from the construction of said fence.
4. Malice was the dominant motive for defendants’ erection of said fence, and its erection was inspired by hostility and a desire for retaliation and to cause harm to plaintiffs.
5. The fence is a spite fence and is a continuing nuisance which may be abated at any time.
6. Since defendants have not shown that they derived any substantial benefit from the erection of the fence, malice becomes an important factor.
7. If the fence is of any benefit to defendants whatever, a fence four feet in height would be of equal benefit.
8. The bill should be sustained and an injunction issue.
Decree nisi
And now, August 16,1944, upon consideration of the foregoing case, it is ordered, adjudged, and decreed as follows:
That the bill is sustained and that a mandatory injunction issue directed to defendants, commanding them within 60 days of the date of this decree to remove all that portion of the fence described in the bill and the findings of fact throughout its entire length which extends above and beyond the height of four feet from
That defendants pay the costs of this proceeding.
Unless exceptions are filed hereto within 10 days’ notice of the filing hereof, this decree nisi shall become the final decree in the above-entitled case.
