Upon the petition of Blanche F. Crater, a daughter of John W. Crater, deceased, a citation issued, directed to Frank E. Crater, surviving executor of the last will and testament of said decedent, (1) to show cause why he should not file an account, and (2) to show cause why the distributive share of the petitioner in the estate of decedent should not be paid to her.
John W. Crater died, testate, on Nov. 19, 1914, leaving to survive him a widow, Kate B. Crater, and the following children, to wit, Elizabeth E., intermarried with James Kenneth Satchel; Blanche F. Crater, John S. Crater and Dorothy L., intermarried with Glenn G. Klock. The last will and testament of decedent, bearing date Dec. 21, 1907, was duly probated at the ofiice of the Register of Wills in .and for the County of Northampton, and letters testamentary were issued unto Frank E. Crater and Joseph K. Crater, surviving executors mentioned in said will. At and immediately before the decease of John W. Crater, both Frank E. Crater and Joseph K. Crater (surviving executors mentioned in said will), together with decedent, were members of a copartnership, trading under the firm name of Joseph F. Crater’s Sons. Under the provisions of said last will and testament, testator devised and bequeathed all of his property, real, personal and mixed, unto said Kate B. Crater, her heirs and assigns forever. The will authorized and empowered the acting executor or executors “to make any arrangements which to him or them may seem just or reasonable for the settlement and adjustment, with my surviving partner or partners, of all my rights and liabilities in any business in which I may be engaged as a partner at the time of my death, with full power to accept for my estate as the value of my share and interest in said business, a sum estimated and agreed upon; and to make any arrangements for giving time (meaning thereby extension of credit) to my surviving partner or partners and for accepting payments from him or them in such instalments as they, my executors, may think proper; and generally to act in the premises in such manner as the person or persons exercising this power shall think proper, without being liable for any loss which may be occasioned thereby.” The testator further directed that no inventory and appraisement of his personal estate be filed in the Register of Wills’ Ofiice of Northampton County, or elsewhere, that no account be filed, and no legal proceedings be had other than the probate of his will.
On Nov. 10,1916, Frank E. Crater, Joseph K. Crater and W. Everitt Crater, trading under the firm name of Joseph F. Crater’s Sons, parties of the first part; Frank E. Crater and Joseph K. Crater, executors of the will of John W. Crater, deceased, parties of the second part; Frank E. Crater, surviving
On June 2,1921, Kate B. Crater, widow of John W. Crater, deceased, elected, by an instrument in writing and duly acknowledged, to take against the last will and testament of decedent, and filed her said election on June 4, 1921, with Frank E. Crater, surviving executor of decedent. Subsequently, upon the petition of William Everitt Crater, a member of the copartnership of Joseph F. Crater’s Sons, a citation was awarded, praying for permission to intervene and become a party defendant in the proceedings commenced by Blanche F. Crater against the surviving executor of the estate of John W. Crater, deceased, and to which citation the said Blanche F. Crater made answer with prayer to dismiss.
Depositions taken in open court establish that the terms of the agreement to which Kate B. Crater was a party had been carried out and that she has received full consideration and the benefits thereunder. It does not appear that, subsequent to the filing of the election by the widow of decedent, any offer of restitution has been made on her part of all or any part of the benefits which she received from the surviving executor of her husband.
Both of the citations before the court are predicated upon the validity of the election of the said Kate B. Crater to take against the will of her husband. The petitioner for the accounting rests her claim under the provisions of the Act of April 21, 1911, P. L. 79. Excepting for this act, under the facts as presented, the petitioner would have no standing and would be bound by the agreement and release executed by her mother. Section 1 of the Act of 1911 provides: “That surviving husbands or wives electing to take under or against the wills of decedents shall, in all cases, manifest their election by a writing signed by them, duly acknowledged by them before an officer authorized by law to take the acknowledgment of deeds, and delivered to the executor or administrator of the estate of such decedent.” Section 2: “No payment from the estate of such decedent shall be made to any husband or wife unless his or her election shall have been duly executed, acknowledged and delivered as provided by the 1st section of this act.” The petitioner urges the court that the provisions of the Act of 1911 are mandatory, and any payments made by the executors to the widow without compelling the filing of an election were unlawful; also, that, under the provisions of the act, the widow not being estopped by any time limit in filing her election, the petitioner, as an
It will be observed, however, that the facts presented in the case at bar are entirely different from those in the above cited case. There, the estate had not been settled, nor had the rights of third parties intervened, nor had the widow been given the entire estate, and the moneys received by the widow could be accounted for on the settlement of the estate. In the case at bar, an unusual and remarkable situation is presented, that of a widow who has received, under the terms of testator’s will, the entire estate, and who has made no offer of restitution, electing to take against the testator’s will against her own interest. The 1st section of the Act of 1911 imposes a duty upon the widow to elect to take under or against the will, and prescribes the method. The 2nd section of the act is restrictive and provides that no payments shall be made to the widow unless she shall have made the election prescribed in the 1st section. The failure of the widow to elect simply affected her right to receive any payments under the provisions of the will. No penalty being prescribed for the failure on the part of either the widow or the executors to observe any of the provisions of the act, the payment made by the executors, the acceptance by the widow under the agreement between the parties interested in the copartnership et al., and her release to the executors, amounts to a waiver of any duty imposed either upon the widow or the executors by the provisions of the act.
It has been held in other jurisdictions: “No election is necessary when the widow is sole heir of the decedent, or where she is the donee, under the will, of the entire estate:” 40 Cyc., 1971. The copartnership agreement which decedent entered into on March 1, 1904, consisted of four members, William E. Crater, John W. Crater (decedent), Frank E. Crater and Joseph K. Crater, and contained a clause which provided that, in the event of the death of one or more of the partners, the other copartners should have the privilege of purchasing the deceased partner’s interest in the firm at the price or value at which the same stood upon the books of the firm at the end of their current fiscal year, and prescribed the method of payment to the deceased partner’s representatives for his interest. Prior to the date of decedent’s death, William E. Crater, one of said copartners, became deceased and his interest was acquired by his son, W. Everitt Crater. Subsequent to the time of decedent’s death and prior to the election filed by his widow, Joseph K. Crater, one of said copartners, died and his interest in said copartnership was acquired by the surviving copartners, said Frank E. Crater and W. Everitt Crater. Through the delay of the widow of John W. Crater, deceased, in asserting her right of election under the Act of 1911 for a period of over six years, the rights of third parties have intervened, who had the right to believe that the
Counsel for the petitioner has urged the court that the agreement of Nov. 10, 1916, as well as the release of Nov. 10, 1916, signed by Kate B. Crater, mother of the petitioner, was obtained through fraudulent misrepresentations on the part of Frank E. Crater, surviving executor of the last will and testament of her deceased husband; that Kate B. Crater was not apprised of the size and amount of the estate of her deceased husband, but was deceived by declarations made to her, upon the faith and strength of which she executed the agreement and release, and which were entirely false, and in support of this she points to the recital contained in the agreement, wherein the following is stated: “Whereas, Joseph F. Crater, late of the City of Easton, County of Northampton and State of Pennsylvania, was in his lifetime seized of certain real estate in the State of Pennsylvania, and elsewhere, and being so thereof seized died, leaving a last will and testament duly admitted to probate in the Register of Wills’ Office in and for the County of Northampton, Aug. 27, 1902, end entered in Will Book No. 14, page 614, wherein and whereby, inter alia,, his residuary estate, consisting of real and personal property of which he died seized, is devised to his sons, William E. Crater, John W. Crater, Frank E. Crater, and in trust for Joseph K. Crater; and, whereas, said real estate was sold during the lifetime of John W. Crater, deceased, to the copartnership of Joseph F. Crater’s Sons.”
It is alleged that Kate B. Crater was informed at the time when she executed the agreement that all of the real estate of which Joseph F. Crater died seized and in which real estate, or the proceeds thereof, John W. Crater had a vested interest equal to one-fourth of the value of same had been sold and conveyed to the firm of Joseph F. Crater’s Sons during the lifetime of John W. Crater; and this statement and declaration was preceded by the representation made to Kate B. Crater and to her counsel that the firm of Joseph F. Crater’s Sons, of which John W. Crater was a member, was insolvent. These allegations raise the question of fraud as an inducing cause for the execution of the agreement and release in question. The agreement in question, to which all the copartners were parties, together with Kate B. Crater and surviving executors, after referring to the last will and testament of John W. Crater, deceased, sets forth the purpose thereof as follows: “Whereas, it is desired to settle, satisfy and adjust any and all interest, claim, property and right of John W. Crater, or his estate, or of Kate B. Crater, his widow and devisee, in the -estate of Joseph F. Crater, deceased, and in the said firm of Joseph F. Crater’s Sons; and to settle, satisfy and adjust any and all interests, claim, property and right coming to said Kate B. Crater under the last will and testament of John W. Crater, deceased; and the legacy coming to Dorothy Crater, a grandchild and beneficiary under the said will of Joseph F. Crater, deceased.”
In determining the question of fraud, the court must be guided by the rule laid down under the Pennsylvania authorities, that fraud must be proven and the proofs must be of such a character as to lead to no other conclusion, and
And now, July 7, 1924, the citation awarded Blanche F. Crater, a daughter of John W. Crater, deceased, as well as the citation awarded to William Everitt Crater, surviving partner of the copartnership of Joseph F. Crater’s Sons, are dismissed, at the cost of the respective petitioners.
From Henry D. Maxwell, Easton, Pa.
