The praseipe for summons, the summons and plaintiff’s statement name and describe defendant as “Alyea-Nichols Company, attorney-in-fact for the subscribers at (sic) the Belt Automobile Indemnity Association of El Paso, Ills.” Manifestly, Alyea-Nichols Company is the real defendant and the words “attorney-in-fact for the subscribers at the Belt Automobile Indemnity Association of El Paso, Ills.,” merely describe the capacity in which defendant is sued and the relation which defendant bears to “the subscribers at the Belt Automobile Indemnity Association of El Paso, Ills.” We cannot believe that it was intended by that recital of capacity or relationship to bring either the subscribers or the Belt Automobile Indemnity Association upon the record as parties defendant. If it was so designed, the method employed frustrated the intent: Bullock v. Gaffigan, 100 Pa. 276.
The summons and statement were served, according to the sheriff’s return, “on the Belt Automobile Indemnity Association by leaving” copies thereof “in the office of the Insurance Commissioner of the Commonwealth of Pennsyl
Now, Dec. 18, 1922, motion to strike off plaintiff’s statement is overruled.
Prom James L. Schaadt, Allentown, Pa.
