NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only accordance F ED . R. PP . P. 32.1 United States Court of Appeals

For Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois

Argued March

Decided March

Before

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge

THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge No. ‐

IRINA MARON, et al. Appeal from District

Plaintiffs ‐ Appellants Court Northern District Illinois, Eastern Division.

v . 1:20 ‐ cv ‐ AMERICAN ENTERPRISE BANK, et al. Andrea R. Wood,

Defendants Appellees . Judge .

ORDER

Bishop Partnership, LLC, defaulted loan Bank, leading bank Bishop state Bishop’s collateral. Bishop’s partners responded suit alleging bank extended loans violation Florida’s anti racketeering law. Eight later, partners brought same claim court, time invoking anti law. concluded new barred law’s limitations, dismissed blocked agree affirm judgment. *2 ‐

I. B ACKGROUND recount the in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, who appealing complaint’s dismissal. Molina Healthcare Ill., Inc. F.4th In Bishop received loan about $1.6 million American Enterprise to buy and develop Chicago property. Bishop pledged property as collateral. Three years later, Bishop defaulted on the loan, and American Enterprise successfully foreclosed on the Chicago property and obtained deficiency judgment against Bishop.

About two years after receiving the deficiency judgment, American Enterprise sued Florida state court in order Flor ida condos Bishop had also pledged collateral the loan. The condos were owned Bishop’s partners, the partners challenged the condos’ status collateral, arguing executives had lied secure the loan with the condos. In the partners counterclaimed the Florida suit, alleging fraud violated Florida’s anti ‐ racketeering laws.

Eight anti Florida, and case still pending, partners turned Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), U.S.C. § “a complete identity causes action,” between Florida forum claims, allege its agents defrauded low quality loans, received fees originating loans, then sold loans foreclosed collateral. They seek enjoin proceedings. defendants moved claims lack standing had lapsed. contended plaintiff Michael Fridman lacked standing he no longer had ownership interest buildings. For defense, argued, claims accrued latest partners counterclaimed proceedings. Thus, concluded, claims, see Agency Holding Malley Duff & Assocs., (1987), barred plaintiffs’ suit. agreed were ‐ barred granted motion basis.

No. 2773 3

II. A NALYSIS

A. Standing

Although district court for lack of standing—and American Enterprise does revive argument appeal—we turn first this issue it bears jurisdiction. Lennon v. City of Carmel , F.3d 503, (7th Cir. 2017). American asserted it tried buildings, Fridman no longer had an interest properties thus have suffered an injury standing. district court observed named Fridman defendant case, he incurred attorneys’ fees result. Although, court noted, question whether such fees create RICO standing is unsettled, see Evans v. City of Chicago , F.3d 916, (7th Cir. 2006), it ruled Fridman had standing his fee debt arose directly Enterprise’s alleged foreclosure scheme.

We agree district it had jurisdiction consider Fridman’s claims. RICO requires quantifiable injury “business or property,” Evans , F.3d at 925, proximately caused violation, see Holmes Sec. Inv’r. Prot. Since issued its ruling, however, we clarified this requirement neither jurisdictional nor required standing; rather, it an element of claim. Ryder Hyles WL *1 Mar. Therefore, this requirement were unmet, jurisdiction would remain. any case, Fridman’s satisfy requirement: Because he incurred any expense allegedly wrongful foreclosure suit, his attorney fee debt satisfies requirement injury business property. Furthermore, undisputed other suffered injuries property interests condos.

B. Statute Limitations

With jurisdiction secure, we address defense statute limitations. review de novo ruling requires dismissal complaint. Vergara City Chicago dismissal *4 based on this defense is proper when complaint sets forth everything satisfy Id .

Dismissal was correct here. RICO claim accrues when plaintiffs should have known of their injury. See Rotella Wood This knowledge occurred that is when plaintiffs filed their counterclaims, which they admit share “complete identity” their current claims. do not contest RICO’s of limitations is four years and that they filed this more than 2012. Thus this suit untimely; their arguments contrary are unconvincing.

First, plaintiffs invoke RICO’s criminal conviction rule, U.S.C. § 1964(c), assert period did not begin 2012. relevant part, § 1964(c) states plaintiff may not bring RICO “securities” fraud unless defendant has been convicted of fraud, which case limitation begins when “the conviction becomes final.” An agent of Enterprise—who not defendant— was convicted securities fraud plaintiffs thus conclude their complaint timely.

But this argument fails respects. First, rightly points out plaintiffs failed raise this argument and therefore waived court. Johnson Dominguez F.4th Waiver aside, plaintiffs sued one person convicted securities fraud, § 1964(c) actually blocks plaintiffs suing others under RICO securities fraud unless until they been convicted it. U.S.C. § 1964(c). True, plaintiffs are suing under RICO based fraud other than securities. But just explained, accrued plaintiffs filed fraud counterclaims bear “complete identity” their current suit.

Next, plaintiffs rely equitable tolling estoppel, do facts which either doctrine extend period. Equitable tolling stops clock when, though plaintiff pursued rights diligently, “extraordinary circumstance” prevents timely suit. Herrera Cleveland F.4th argue reflects diligence supplies good faith reason file earlier. assertions diligence good faith enough justify *5 2773 5 equitable tolling; an extraordinary circumstance that blocks required, the plaintiffs do not assert one.

They similarly fail to assert the “fraudulent concealment” equitable estoppel. See Cancer Found., v. Cerberus Cap. Mgmt., LP , F.3d 671, (7th Cir. 2009) (listing “hiding evidence, destroying evidence, falsely promising not to plead the limitations” actions that may justify equitable estoppel). plaintiffs argue that “took active steps made statements to prevent” them bringing the time. But the “steps” that they cite are insufficient. their appellate brief, they cite filings in settlement efforts there, arguing these actions “lulled” them into inaction. But plaintiffs do not identify defendants concealed that, if revealed, would led to a timely suit; nor they, given they enough in to file same Florida. plaintiffs invoke a version “continuing violations” doctrine to avoid argue that, December period to was extended each made a false statement foreclosure proceedings; ongoing falsehoods, they add, explain request enjoin litigation. But plaintiffs misunderstand how doctrine works. It provides a period does not begin run until latest series acts, when combined prior acts, matures into legal injury. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan , But once discrete legal wrong has accrued, plaintiffs occurred they counterclaimed Florida, begins run. See Limestone Dev. Corp. Village Lemont F.3d 800–01 2008) (explaining continuing violations doctrine). recognize plaintiffs cite events occurred since they must least these events predicates fresh pattern RICO, done so; moreover, did, it would allow them recover injuries identify complaint, pre racketeering. See id.

Finally, plaintiffs protest erred offering them an opportunity amend complaint. Although dismissing without giving one opportunity amend defective complaint uncommon, Pension Tr. Fund Operating Eng’rs Kohl’s F.3d 2018), necessarily erroneous: District courts may an original complaint prejudice where amended complaint be futile. Vitrano *6 That rationale applies here. correctly reasoned conceded about violations recant concession otherwise facts that, true, overcome concession. Jauquet Green Bay Area Catholic Educ., That remains true appeal.

AFFIRMED