Arizona state prisoner Damian L. Dudley appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) arising from his inability to observe Ramadan. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de *2 novo. Shakur v. Schriro , 514 F.3d 878, 883 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment because Dudley failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendant MacLaren substantially burdened the exercise of Dudley’s religious beliefs. Jones v. Williams , 791 F.3d 1023, 1031-32 (9th Cir. 2015) (setting forth elements of a § 1983 free exercise claim); Walker v. Beard , 789 F.3d 1125, 1134 (9th Cir. 2015) (setting forth elements of a RLUIPA claim); San Jose Christian Coll. v. City of Morgan Hill , 360 F.3d 1024, 1034 (9th Cir. 2004) (under RLUIPA, to constitute a substantial burden on religious exercise, a regulation “must impose a significantly great restriction or onus upon such exercise” ).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Dudley’s discovery motion and request for discovery-related sanctions because Dudley failed to demonstrate that MacL aren’s belated filing of supplemental discovery resulted in actual and substantial prejudice to him. See Laub v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior , 342 F.3d 1080, 1084, 1093 (9th Cir. 2003) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that a district court’s “decision to deny discovery will not be disturbed except upon the clearest showing that the denial of discovery result[ed] in actual and substantial prejudice to the complaining litigant” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on *3 appeal. See Padgett v. Wright , 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.

[*] This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

[**] The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).