Lead Opinion
The plaintiff husband brought this action for annulment on ¡the ground that the defendant at the time of the marriage was the wife of another then living. The defendant counterclaimed for (1) a separation, and (2) money loaned. The trial court dismissed the husband’s suit for annulment and awarded a judgment of separation in favor of the defendant wife. The claim for money loaned, however, was decided in the husband’s favor.
The parties were married on August 19, 1941, in the city of New York. On July 2, 1941, an interlocutory decree of annulment had been entered in favor of the defendant wife against her former husband in an action to dissolve the marriage on the ground that she was under the age of legal consent at the time of the earlier marriage. (See Domestic Eelations Law, § 7.) On October 2, 1941, the interlocutory decree annulling the defendant’s marriage to her first husband became final.
The trial court in this case found that the plaintiff husband urged the defendant to marry him and represented to her that she was free to enter into marriage; that the marriage was contracted by the defendant in reliance on the plaintiff’s representations; that the plaintiff had full knowledge of the fact that the wife’s interlocutory decree in the annulment suit against her earlier spouse had not become final at the time of the marriage; and that the parties cohabited after the wife’s interlocutory judgment annulling her former marriage had become final. It was also found that the evidence established the plaintiff’s bad faith and inequitable conduct, and that he did not come into court with clean hands. The plaintiff was held to be estopped by reason of his conduct from questioning the validity of the marriage of the parties. The trial court also found that the evidence was sufficient to establish the plaintiff’s abandonment of the defendant wife.
Tf * a ’'T^i tracted when under the age of legal consefffWhs5’ itiBftily1 ‘"4-oidi able: 'and continued á (Domestic RBfátióií ti; 1 ib en ti barli„„ ,„.n_______0_ ___ ______..... iff áhtí does1 not’ dlfBffbfíe ^tilti'tirara atipli’éátxón ‘fffát^ h! ÍMlffíti¿e nW' 'A1?*bhW^sKOrtótiti TYfl’h'1 <n U'-Ks/ÍMtÍÑ1 'Wif fi’’ itríríf) templated a final' 'jtidgtiiéiítass ’ B&kéffiliáf t®¿ atibpfiiplitiH tlíe('ihnriuD 198» v. P'étUfpwS' SS'TB1! sf -i ••'' mu a i-^í ti ÍJ;yVÁ.a"A¥ :+U X ‘JiffUtXu *4A4 tí -vti Ú„MXÁÍ A&'X (See Matter of Crandall, 196 N. Y. 127, 130; Pettit v. Pettit, 105 App. Div. 312, and Gehm v. United States, 83 F. Supp. 1003)pffiffiétwákbtíd f <¡¡$ áffd -r>n A U A' Vr'o í *ivl4 -f xr’ Uxr1 1-iriAI-' AvUA Sr! U i UóÁi AiÁ A ri vAÚU A 'YViúAA'' locutory againtit ‘héi14fBrmeb 'hMb&^Ü’X' (McCullen v. McCullen, 162 App. Div. 599; Earle, 141 App. Div. 611)
(• Binbe Hblditi^ítlaat1 thé mffftiiti^’mfiy ffot* b©-knntillfed;fff''the hdiit/ofiyhB^fílaínfiff^t’^hffilr.thát'tlíy ¡Sta^é^s1 interest® eiti'‘ 'thé * ktktiii^ ^ Bf*1 the4 ‘^ántititi átid; |ffé! sB{MfííJ( Bf th’oS^ife' to ptevétit h’ef ‘fkcütihéctitiiiti^WpAbíno'blikríf ^Wé shotiíd ’ bé: !iib btickme::itiiipticutiiffú^’ifé'qúíí,'é1',hsi' ÍH fétiB'gffi^B, thB ri^hff’tif'fíié 'wit^, to!fá-J!décréd ¿f tiébhbhti'ón^WÉh(prbvlsíph*'ÍBí‘ stibpotti’whér'd, ás^íieré^tié' e^ttiblisHeti !áff hbatidoíímént'.hy' ttip huébktidi4» téU^ds’é (See Krause v. Krause, 282 N. Y. 355.)
On the defendant’s appeal from the'dismissal of ‘tier ‘cOtihterclaim for money loaned, the determination of the trial court
";(Ifoffhfefijfég'Óiiigi’easoiisJdHe'jild^niérit; á^peaíédfford should Bd<íhffifhied'/lh áíf'ffe’p^'ts:,;v' ,l‘i r,! ,
Concurrence Opinion
(concurring: .in,part).. i.i^lthopghip agrpenpept •\yi(h .the yeasonipg. pf .the dissenting Villafana v. Villafana (275 App. Div. 810) I am constrained t}y.the¡^jeqision ,iii¡¡tlya.t case to yote^tp; amrny^hp-dismissal pf.tlye cpmp^gipfpnfh'is actipp.lfpn appiijnpenf^of mqpriage. f¡Thpí^%r ^^«[¡pase^hpy^eypri apppays fo, gq, no, farther thaji, holtíipg vthat pprpyatiyepqpifaljlq relief will bo denied to a husband Avho.has aided and counspled,, p , ^opipn,,iiy,.obtaining a divorce from a ',lXqyq¡¡ 1Xt, hiny'fp¡^e'¡inyglipli at fbpd^p,, w^ep^sh^ .ipqyripd diiflpL-7,.l)iqtydthsta,n^^ ¡íja^p, is void," the" Villafana case folds fhpt(iihe ^qqnpoi;,qbtaip an affirmative declaration from a court, of equity, that it is. void under the familiar maxim that he does not. come into. equity ¡Mtoií, different t|png‘frpip^hplding^qt he is, estopped fp( ,(leny the validity of ;tHe carriage, ,ipqpposipg
This "distinction is mentioned in Fischer v. Fischer (254 N. Y. 463, 466) where, citing Kaufman v. Kaufman (177 App. Div. 162)>7appróyíhg-"it,‘ the’(Court'(of Áp"pepís.said*‘that ir was diétínguísháble1 in (any evení*11 in! ffiat' Here1 defendant A^r.--4. „__-lililí .1'ÍLJ.LL1Vt;¿<', n/¿. rí’i MSf « »7 '! does not come into court with demand for affirmative"relief! .He íñ'éfely híleles :plá'intiíf ’s máfn'a'g’e-ydílb Doli'nsky) déhíéh'páíntiff’s allegation concerning his own marriage with her and puts her to her»"'pro,ofeíto fshow.; that such»iallegation »is> "tiortéctí,¡tin every actions for séparatioií.dhéííprimary fabti to, be. proved is an existing marriage:.hptweepl,,,the pgyfjps.jj (Jones v. Jones, 108 N. Y. 415.) It was decided inrthe ^Fischer, case ( sij pfp,). .that SxSIMi .regardless- of whether heindefendanbíüe. reinv. ha¡di.,assisted Liber in obiaining 11 e r-in valid líen o divorce. - '¡-“i-w A «-'»»<$3 \,s M
the ins Unit %hf§ defendant wife has- obtained' judgment against ^plfeiMf&'for Jsbparatíón:bii’lh^^ sary condition to, maintaining a cansé of, action fqr separation is that tíiéfe',shall" have' been a Valid' marriage, whereas the ^ar(;iag;,e'f,fpt^pen ¡fhepg.!payfi.ps, ’is, .yffhout dispute, absolutely void. The judgment appealed from should be-modifiedffiy dis-r.>.issing • tiefendant’s counterclaims and, as so modified, should I’tn^n r'T" -" ‘ ír ’ sh r 19 "•! !,1: ? i1, ■ ;,in h o." <';■ »'*'■! bo affirmed:'
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting in part). Concededly, defendant married plaintiff, a second spouse, before the interlocutory decree annulling her prior marriage to another man had become final; accordingly, her marriage to plaintiff was absolutely void ab initio under section 6 of the Domestic Relations Law (McCullen v. McCullen, 162 App. Div. 599; Pettit v. Pettit, 105 App. Div. 312; Karpuk v. Karpuk, 177 Misc. 729; Cross v. Cross, 177 Misc. 347). Estoppel against plaintiff could not validate the marriage (Villafana v. Villafana, 275 App. Div. 810 [dissenting opinion in which I concurred]; Caldwell v. Caldwell, 298 N. Y. 146) and it is not validated merely because the parties continue to cohabit as man and wife after the decree of annulment became final (cf. first cases cited, supra).
Plaintiff should-be granted an annulment and, as defendant is unable to prove a valid marriage to plaintiff, a fact essential to support her counterclaim for separation, that counterclaim should have been dismissed.
Accordingly, I dissent in part and vote to modify the judgment appealed from by granting plaintiff an annulment, denying defendant a separation and affirming only the dismissal of defendant’s second counterclaim relating to moneys allegedly loaned plaintiff by defendant.
Shientag, J., concurs with Callahan, J.; Cohn, J., concurs in result and votes to affirm; Van Voorhis, J., concurs in part, in opinion; Dore, J., dissents in part, in opinion.
Judgment, in all respects, affirmed. Settle order on notice.