*1 through group, “experience” that runs every spends
beyond the fact that member percentage of his or her time
a certain privilege It is true that the of a
classroom.
college enjoyed education continues to be only minority of our citizens. Never-
theless, variety rep- groups that are college classrooms is vast and
resented economic,
growing, geographic, so that the
racial, sexual, political, religious demo-
graphics minority nearly of that as those of the nation itself. It is
diverse suggest college expe-
farfetched to that the points
rience could coalesce the diverse necessary product
view that are the of such
divergent experiences single into a “com-
munity go unrepre- of interest” that will jury “college
sented on a if there are no among
students” its members.2 Fletcher has failed to establish a
Because of her Sixth Amendment
violation AF- impartial jury, judgment
FIRMED. OSCAR; Spinosa,
Ruth E. Charles
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
UNIVERSITY STUDENTS CO-OPERA- ASSOCIATION; Proper, George
TIVE al., Defendants-Appellees.
et
No. 90-15750. of Appeals,
United States Court
Ninth Circuit.
Argued and Submitted En
Banc Feb. 1992.
Decided June
1992.
Furthermore,
college
group.”
stu-
in this case
v. Southern
2. Fletcher’s reliance on Thiel
Pacific
"systematically
and automatical-
L.Ed. 1181
dents were
ly"
venire,
jury
daily
had
excluded from the
prohibited the exclusion of
service,
unavailing.
See id. at
According allegations to the factual plaintiffs’ complaint, Barrington Hall resi- collectively agreed dents at a house meet- ing drug dealing allow Barrington. At least nineteen different individuals with- co-operative there, in the drugs sold and drug sales allegedly going on at Barrington twenty years. for over In fur- agreement, therance of according this complaint, posted defendants lookouts Driscoll, Francisco, Cal., Donald P. San neighboring on dumped plaintiffs-appellants. persons bodies of suffering drug ov- erdoses on neighbors’ land. The con- Ephraim Margolin, Margolin, Arguimbau spiracy told, responsible, was also we are Battson, Francisco, Cal., & San for defen- “filth, disease, noise”; risk of dants-appellees. “violence, throwing garbage proper-
ty, urinating
vandalism”;
on cars
[and]
crimes, misdemeanors,
for numerous other
nuisances,
annoyances.
apartments
large
rent
property by reason of a violation of” RICO
apartment buildings
Barrington.
near
Bar-
recover treble
and attorney’s
rington
city
Berkeley,
is located in the
fees. While RICO is to be “liberally con
California,
strued,” Sedima,
which has one of the
strictest
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex
479, 497-98,
rent
control ordinances
the nation. The
3285-
*3
86,
plaintiffs began renting
87
there
the mid-
L.Ed.2d 346
it is well-estab
filed,
complaint
1980’s. Since the
lished that
all injuries
was first
not
compensable
out;
plaintiffs
one of the
has moved
under this
section. Two limitations are
plaintiffs
significant
allege
First,
other remains. The
in this
that
case.
a showing of
they
“injury”
have lost
enjoyment
requires proof
the use and
of concrete finan
is,
loss,
“property”
their
their
cial
rental inter-
and not mere “injury to a valuable
—that
Barring-
intangible property
est—as a result of the activities at
Berg
interest.”
v.
460,
ton.
First State
(9th
Ins.
915 F.2d
464
Cir.1990) (citing First
Bancorp v.
Pacific
allowing
After
opportunities
Oscar three
Bro,
542,
(9th
847 F.2d
547
12
& n.
Cir.
complaint,
to amend her
the district court
1988)); see
Feltner,
also Fleischhauer v.
grounds
dismissed it on the
that Oscar
1290,
879 F.2d
(6th Cir.1989)
could not demonstrate a causal connection
(plaintiffs
1964(c)
under section
entitled to
pattern
racketeering
between a
activity
recover
for money they paid out as a
and
to Oscar. We affirm the dismis-
result
racketeering
activity), cert. de
complaint
sal of
ground
Oscar’s
on the
that
nied,
1074,
1122,
493 U.S.
110 S.Ct.
107
alleged
Oscar has not
to business
1027,
L.Ed.2d 1029 and 494 U.S.
110 S.Ct.
property cognizable
under RICO.
1473,
(1990).
II.
In Berg, we held that directors of the
Getty
Company
Oil
could not maintain an
complaint
Dismissal of a
under Fed.
action under
against
the insurers
12(b)(6)
R.Civ.P.
is reviewed de novo. Kru
who had cancelled
liability policies
their
so v.
Corp.,
International Tel. & Tel.
872
because the directors had incurred no actu-
1416, 1421(9th Cir.1989),
denied,
F.2d
cert.
expenses
al
as a result of the cancellation.
937,
3217,
110 L.Ed.2d
18 U.S.C.
personal inju
it is clear that
§
“[a]ny person injured in his
compensable
business or
ries are not
under RICO.
attempts
distinguish Berg
1. The dissent
The dissent also makes much of the fact that
establishing
case,
the other cases
requirement by suggesting
the financial
Berg
summary judgment
was a
while this
Berg
could have
case arises on a motion to dismiss. That dis-
requiring
reached the result it did without
fi-
Berg
tinction is not relevant in this case.
stated
point. Berg
nancial
loss. That is beside the
proposition
of law:
under RICO re-
unambiguously
"by
injury,’
held that
'actual
we
quires proof of financial loss. We affirm the
meant financial loss ..."
Oscar has had four chances to such make denigrate We do not intend to the severi- allegations. She has not done so. ty To re- of the problems alleged Oscar has or the mand her complaint clear, trial on the off however, harm inflicted on It her. chance that she could showing any make such a she has suffered is at core in the future would be to rely allow her to an intangible injury, not a finan- precisely speculative the sort of future cial loss to Oscar recover for can injury which injuries RICO disdains. See such myriad Hecht v. under one of a House, Clearing Commerce state law causes of action. cannot do She (2nd Cir.1990). RICO, so under however. smashed, enjoyment 4. Oscar has the use "lost” of her 5. If Oscar’s Maserati was or her house down, property only injured very variety in a was burned ways. she is in a technical She sense. However, pays if her the full apartment insurance first moved her into mid- items, replacing cost of these 1980’s; has suffered she according allegations, to her own Bar- might loss. Oscar be attached to rington conducting drug neigh- iinancial deals in the Maserati, certainly her and she almost long borhood before then. Oscar has not thus down, burning not be indifferent to her house anything; really lost she what means that she though buy even intangible she could new one. This has never had enjoyment as much use and compensable or sentimental value is her she as believes she is to. entitled action, just in a compensable. as distress is tort emotional yet step This is another removed from financial compensable Neither is under loss. RICO, however. terms, meanings empowers peo- of its recently said law Circuit As the Seventh expense at the ple attorneys economic losses to hire claim for rejecting'a RICO drug narcotics fundamentally per neighboring whose from a dealers which derived nearby quality economic of life for “Perhaps dealing ruins the injury: sonal as could, homeowners, a theoretical apartment dwellers and pects injuries of such matter, injuries money. away ‘business res- be viewed take criminals’ allying in such meta property,’- engaging neighborhoods, by law abid- but cue of task left to speculation is a best physical ing self-interest with citizens’ financial judiciary.” federal philosophers, altruism, through the mechanism Roe, Cir. F.2d against Doe v. racke- treble lawsuits pleading an 1992). requirements for teers, just appears to what Con- quite are cognizable intended. v. Imrex gress Sedima not met here. They clear. 479, 495, (1985),taught us that L.Ed.2d 346 “[t]here AFFIRMED. n isno language for an statutory room in the additional, ‘racketeering injury’ amorphous KLEINFELD, Judge, with whom Circuit Likewise, there is no room join, requirement.” BRUNETTI Judges HUG and Circuit tangible financial loss re- for an additional dissenting: authorized quirement. Congress has not respectfully I dissent. and shut it on a kind us to erect this door promul- President have Congress and the achieving pur- of case most central people of enables gated a statute which poses of the statute. attorneys with means to retain moderate 1964(c) provides that Title 18 U.S.C. § shifting provision, and fee the aid of a injured in his business or [a]ny person suing narcotics damages, by recover treble *6 of sec- property by reason of a violation of life in quality dealers who reduce the there- chapter this sue tion 1962 of bounty, taken neighborhood. This their appropriate States dis- dealers, any for in United of- property of narcotics from the threefold the and recover trict court shall citizens to act as fers a benefit to induce and the cost he sustains offsets the attorneys general, and private attorney’s suit, including a reasonable rely- might deter them from which burdens fee. justice sys- entirely upon the criminal ing novel construction narrow and
tem. Our
say “injured in his ...
does not
The statute
statutory
damages vitiates
of RICO
financial loss.”
consequential
property with
application.
important
in
scheme
an
property.”
in
says “injured
his ...
just
It
damages for
required, but
Damages are
decision,
University
v.
panel’s
Oscar
The
generally measured
Association, 939
Co-operative
Students
by
financial loss. Sedi
than
realized
other
correct,
Cir.1991),
is
and its
F.2d 808
of a RICO
forth the elements
ma sets
strengthened by the subse
correctness is
incorrectly
opinion
at
The
claim.
in
decision Holmes
quent Supreme Court
—
meaning to
narrow
tributes a novel and
Corp.,
Protection
Investor
Securities
In the case at
“damages.”
“injured” and
U.S. -,
112 S.Ct.
true,
bar,
then Oscar
complaint
if the
is
traditional con
(1992).
Elucidation
paying the same
probably
Spinosa were
property,
property,
cepts of
money
they would have
rent
amount of
concepts
application of those
damages, and
pattern
drug dealing, but the
without
case,
in this
harms claimed
the kind of
the value
dealing reduced
of narcotics
permitted
be
that the lawsuit
requires
dam
they suffered
apartments,
their
so
Damages
the kind claimed
proceed.
in value.
by the reduction
ages measured
not re
traditionally do
Spinosa
Oscar and
loss,
in
though
tangible
quire
I. Facts
applications financial
RICO
some other
appeal
important
this
involves
statute,
interpreted
It is
proved.
must be
12(b)(6)rather than
under Rule
dismissal
common
according to the well established
summary
adverse decision
judgment
an
actionable under
RICO unless
result
required
at trial. We are
tangible
to assume
in
financial loss to
plaintiff.
truth of the
complaint
averments in the
Second, it is clear
inju-
purposes of determining
whether
ries
compensable
are not
under RICO.
upon
a claim
state
which relief can be Maj. op.
(citations
omitted).
granted.
McKeithen,
Jenkins v.
395 U.S.
premise
second
plainly correct,
is
but does
411, 421,
1843, 1848-49,
23 L.Ed.2d not lead to the conclusion
reached
(1969). A
dismissal for failure to state majority, because the injury claimed is of a
proper only
appears
a claim is
“it
beyond
kind that the
always
law has
considered
doubt that
prove
can
no set of
person.
support
of his claim which
facts
premise
The first
unsupported
novel and
Gibson,
entitle him to relief.” Conley v.
by the authorities. Whether injury to a
41, 45-46,
99, 101-02,
2 tenant’s property
interest
real estate
L.Ed.2d
yet
There is as
no evi-
without
pecuniary loss confers
upon
dence before the
court
standing appears
question
abe
evaluation could made
be
of the truth of
first
impression. The authorities relied
alleged
facts.
upon by the majority do not resolve the
issue, and
reasoning
their
cuts in favor of
We must therefore assume that USCA
plaintiffs.
aided,
intentionally
conspired
abetted and
LSD,
in the sale of
methamphetamine
Berg
Ins.,
v. First State
II.
and Other Authorities Cited
put
good
position by
were
in as
a
the
defense and settlement
would
as
have
majority opinion
The
premises
states two
by performance,
damages
been
so no
for its conclusion:
type
injury
rights
for
awarded
to contract
First,
showing
“injury”
requires
proved.
be
could
loss,
proof of concrete financial
and not
“injury
intangible
mere
to a
policy
valuable
Had
insurance
been valuable
property
handsome,
interest.”
tangible property, say
...
lesson of
as
an-
Berg
injuries
property
is that
to
parchment
are not
cient
leather-bound
seal,
proxy fight.
and not
from the threatened
and ribbon
sulted
a wax
Lloyd’s with
apply
Id. at 544. Bro does
a financial
right,
injury
then
to the
contract
just as a
requirement
to screen out a claim
analogous
more
would have been
property
injury
an
in
there is
to
interest
real
injuries. where
Spinosa’s claimed
to Oscar’s
estate in the nature of reduction of value.
the dam-
analogy would exist because
require-
does it
a financial loss
Nor
create
generally
ages
injury
property
are
just
Bro
notes the absence of finan-
ment.
property.
in
the reduction
cial loss in a context where financial loss
damages
at issue in
like those
Contract
damages possi-
only
kind of
would be
generally designed
put
Berg are
ble.
he
good
position
in as
victim
per-
contract
enjoyed
had the
Feltner,
Fleischauer
For tortious
formed.
Cir.1989),
denied,
cert.
U.S.
land,
damages is
the usual measure of
1122,
to the deciding damages kinds of could be what 929(1)(1977). proposition Tofts § pleaded, rather what kinds had been but requires financial loss is property expectancy proved. Fleischauer denied thing Berg, one where the damages, “[although expect in some cases promise protect of a the nature damages might appropriate,” ancy be id. loss, against quite an- owner financial proof support because the did property estate where the is real other them that case. damaged by a tort. majority opinion cites a number of only propositions
Berg stands
proposition
for the correct
other authorities
damages
an element of a RICO
compensable
personal injuries are not
claim,
damages
that the
must be for
RICO,
I
no case from
but
can find
summary judg-
In the
injury to
standing
proposition
for the
any circuit
case, plaintiffs
of that
needed
ment context
must
tangible
that realized
financial loss
be
damages re-
cognizable evidence of
some
Tangible financial loss must be
pleaded.
sulting from the
where,
proved
if the
had
dam-
policies and did not
rights in the insurance
ages
plaintiff’s
from the
Only
tangible
financial
have it.
evidence
business,
tangible
would be
Berg
sufficed in
loss would have
category of
loss. Where the
cognizable dam-
kind of
tangible
that was
person,
finan-
harm is
possible
ages
have been
standing;
which would
cial loss cannot confer RICO
property at stake.
injury to the kind of
given
proposition im-
explanations
for this
category
ply
of harm
that where
Bro,
F.2d
Bancorp v.
First Pacific
type
of a
measured
injury to
(9th Cir.1988),
summary
also involved
value,
fi-
reduction of
absence
dismiss.
*8
judgment rather than a motion to
away
take
RICO stand-
nancial loss cannot
“[ajbsent damages,
We affirmed because
ing.
sustained,” and
claim can not be
RICO
showing of
had “failed to make a
plaintiffs’
the bank
majority concedes that the
The
“provided no evi-
injury”
actual
and had
apartments constitute
interests in their
support the inference that finan-
dence to
n. 3.
Maj. op. at 786
property interests.
a result
injury
or
was incurred as
is
injury
cial loss
to those interests
This means that
proposed
proxy solicitations or the
concludes
property.
majority
injury to
at 547 &
although plaintiffs’
derivative suit.” Id.
interests are
shareholder
injury.
that a threat-
erty, they
pleaded
n. 12. The
had claimed
have not
bank
has
fight
deposits
majority
that Oscar
proxy
had caused
concedes
ened
step
off,
at
presented no evidence
a claim for nuisance.
pleaded
to fall
but
loans
different
majority and I take
specifically noted that the
prove it. We
which
to
money
the next one. Under
paths
or
had not obtained
defendants
Spinosa did not
view,
Oscar and
corporate action had re-
because
property and no
loss, they
gest
tangible
pecuniary
that absence of realized
plead
view,
of value
damages.
my
losses
compensability
Under
cannot eliminate the
nuisance,
damages for
with-
will suffice
under
property injury flowing
RICO of
disagree
We
on
out
financial loss.
racketeering activities,
from
provided that
whether,
RICO, the resemblance of
damages.
always
there are
The issue is
for reduction of the value of
the reasons
damages
whether there are
injury
from
to
by
afflicted
nuisance to emotional dis-
land
property;
pecuni-
whether there is realized
personal injury,
converts nuisance
tress
ary
only
loss matters
where that
is the
injury
property
a claim for
to
to a
from
appropriate
damages.
measure of
Similar-
injury
persons.
to
I cannot ac-
claim
ly,
v.
Drake
B.F. Goodrich
782 F.2d
cept
proposition
that a loss of the bene- 638,
(6th Cir.1986),
per-
purely
ownership,
property
fits of
even “it flows
claim,
injury
sonal
sickness and death
interest,” maj. op.
from a valuable
allegedly arising
exposure
out of
to toxic
787-88,
in the
personal injury
is a
claim
workplace.
Grogan,
chemicals at the
As in
exchange producing
of a market
absence
consequential pecuniary
the existence of
financial loss. None of the cited cases
claim,
harm could not
save
RICO
be-
speak
point.
to that
personal injury,
cause it was for
Corp.,
v.
442 U.S.
Reiter
Sonotone
to
(1979)
2326,
them. Decrease Injury Property III. interest, turn out to hold whatever be, property, like the decrease allege must Oscar and Genty. value of the house in damages, because these elements of their RICO claim. two Services, Ltd,., Beaton Rylewicz v. property alleged by the kind of (7th Cir.1989), stands for F.2d plaintiffs controls what kind here, that propositions, not at issue to their claim. are material recovery is not available injuries or for a shareholder’s derivative Platt, F.2d Grogan claim. In Unnecessary A. Loss Commercial denied, (11th Cir.), cert. of a com- argues that losses USCA *9 nature are recoverable mercial or business mur of the RICO conduct was
the victim 1964(c). majori- Though the section dered; inju personal injury, murder is proposition, adopt that ty opinion does not property, pecuniary and losses flow ry to why it is incor- showing in there is value could not ing wrongful from the death rect, reasoning the cases the to personal injury injury into transform the compels rejection of rejecting it also pecuni presence of property. Just as the realized financial majority’s requirement of injury personal cannot make ary losses sug- I loss. compensable Grogan, under RICO
792 Thus, meanings. Investor Protec rate while the Court not- In Holmes v. Securities — 1311, U.S. -, personal injury 112 S.Ct. ed that would not fall Corp.,
tion
with-
statute,
339,
Supreme
purview
the
in the
of the
Court
id. at
99
2331,
proximate
“property”
ele
at
the term
incorporated the
causation
S.Ct.
given
unmistakably
Clayton
meaning.
Act
into section
broad
ment
the
1964(c).
observed that “Con
The Court
Reiter,
After
Holmes
cannot be
1964(c)
the
gress modeled
on
civil-action
§
disputed
injury
that
to a noncommercial
laws,
antitrust
4
provision of the federal
§
possessory
injury
in real
estate is
Act,”
Clayton
and that the federal
of the
property.
majority correctly
to
con
4
had construed section
and its
courts
Spinosa’s
cedes that Oscar and
interests
Act,
of the
predecessor, section 7
Sherman
apartments,
even if month-to-month
principles
incorporating
common law
lease,
long-term
and without a written
are
112
proximate causation. Id.
S.Ct. at 1317. “property.”
Kelly,
also
v.
208
See
Jones
underlying.
the
decidendi
ratio
251,
942,
(1929);
Cal.
280 P.
v.
Stoiber
Holmes decision was that
903,
Honeychuck,
Cal.App.3d
162 Cal.
RICO,
Congress,
the 91st
which enacted
194,
(1980).
Rptr.
interpretation
federal courts
[knew]
n
Congresses
given the words earlier
had
Alleged
B. The
Harm is
Act,
in 7 of the Sherman
had used first
§
Injury
Property
Clayton
Act’s
4.
It
and later
§
phrase
reads into the
“in
words,
the same
and we can
used
jured
property”
qualification
in his ...
them to have the
assume it intended
consequence
injury
of the
to the
meaning
already
same
that courts had
annoy
discomfort and
given them.
loss,
ance without
(citations omitted).
at 1317-18
S.Ct.
injury
categorized
personal inju
must
be
Although
involved the issue of
Holmes
ry
injury
rather than
That
proximate causation rather than
construction cannot
established
withstand
employed by
reasoning
the Clayton
authority.
Act and
Act
Sherman
compels
Clayton
use
Act and
Court
us to
catego-
We must look to the common law
construe the words
Sherman Act cases to
person
ries of
property.”
“injured in his ...
erty in order to determine
claims are
leading Clayton
Act case on
under RICO.
Corp.,
v.
is Reiter
Sonotone
that the words and con-
Holmes establishes
2326,
793 concepts lawyers de- rate the ancient is a matter of history that has forgot- not veloped centuries in the common over the ten Lord Coke.” Gardiner v. William S. princi- We must look to common law. law Butler 603, 605, & ples determining in whether the kinds of 214, (1918)(Holmes, 62 L.Ed. J.). “The injuries claimed Oscar and ownership rightful or possession of land categorized injury property injury to necessarily right involves the only to person, in order to to determine whether unimpaired condition of property injured property were in their within itself, but also to some reasonable comfort 1964(c). meaning of section occupation.” convenience in its Kee- ton, 87, supra, at 619. alleged by plaintiffs § The harm was to the apartments. value of their in interests We are seven centuries too late to char- tenancy of a creation residential acterize nuisance as person to rather property merely does establish a con than to property. The complaint alleges relationship tractual between the landlord facts sufficient support to a claim that the tenancy, peri and the tenant. A whether racketeering defendant’s activity interfered term, conveys odic or for a definite to the plaintiffs’ with the right to the use and possessory property tenant interest in the enjoyment apartments. of their At com- which is characterized as an estate in land. law, mon allegation an that the defendant 251, 942, Kelly, Jones Cal. 280 P. 943 has plaintiff’s invaded the interest in the (1929); Property Restatement of §§ enjoyment use and sounds in (1936). Although a is leasehold founded tort and states a claim for nuisance. This agreement tenant, an between landlord and tort arose in century the thirteenth to vindi- merely it right, is not a contract as in Berg, cate “interferences with servitudes or oth- but also “an estate land in the strictest rights er Keeton, to the free use of land.” al., Roger Cunningham, sense.” A. et supra, at 617. Blackstone described § 6.11, (1984). Property Law 6.13 §§ nuisance as a and so it right tenant has a to sue directly third always species has been: “A third of real persons trespass pos who on the tenant’s injuries to a man’s lands and tenements is session “or whose conduct constitutes a Ehrlich, by nuisance.” J.W. Ehrlich’s nuisance, decreasing enjoyment the lessee’s (1959). says Blackstone 581 Blackstone of his term.” Richard R. Powell & Patrick the ancient writ for for nuisance Rohan, Property J. Powell on Real available lessees as well as to hold- 225(4) (1968); Honeychuck, Stoiber v. § ers of the fee. Id. at 584. Since this Cal.App.3d Cal.Rptr. 201- “inseparable ownership is of the erty,” conduct that interferes with the The connection between the tort of nui- “right enjoyment undisturbed of the enjoyment peace sance and the of mind premises” constitutes possessor of land does not make meaning 1964(c). within of section plaintiffs’ personal injury, claim one for as Keeton, supra, at 619. § majority opinion suggests. The word classification of nuisance as “enjoyment” just the ancient common anomaly real estate is not a mere historical describing law term of art one of the ten- to be filtered out of the common on the law rights inhering ant’s in the nature way Though consequences to RICO. of his private estate. “The essence of a annoyance persons of nuisance be nuisance an interference with the use land, physical per- rather than harm to Keeton, enjoyment Page of land.” W. sons are harmed because of their con- al., et Prosser and Keeton on the Law nection to the land. 1984). Though Torts ed. § Thus, many description interferences with the interest harmed as comfort, dog enjoyment” might such as a next door which imply “use seem to howls, night makes hideous his disturbance interest would be with person, glance appear to be “the law as to which at first vacuo; logic wrongs purely personal leases is not a matter of landhold- *11 er, they prove damages, are treated as nuisances because cient to even without ex- pert testimony that pecuniary interfere with undis- loss. premises enjoyment turbed of the which ownership inseparable Damages IV. property. nuisance, Once is classified as
Id.
which is an
to real property,
Spinosa
suggest
Oscar
do not
that
damages
compels
measure of
for that tort
any special
the narcotics dealers
them
bóre
a determination
complaint
that the
states
animus, just
drug dealing
that the
adverse-
claim.
ly
nearby apartments in
affected the
they had the misfortune to live.
harm
The
A. Financial Loss
imposed
anyone
on
had the
would be
who
majority
The
path
slides off the
did,
connection to the real estate that
conceptual
relating
of a
error
to the valua-
imposed
and would not have been
damages
tion
in rental
Spinosa
Oscar and
but for their connection
Although
might
one
measure an owner’s
majority opinion
to the land. The
concedes
by
the diminution in fair market
that
state a
for
claim
nuisance.
value, the same cannot be said for a
majority
Ingram
City
cites
renter.
If the
proper-
resale value of the
Cal.App.2d
Gridley, 100
Oscar and
Law of
premises
intended to sublet their
or Remedies 140
The majority’s
they
re-
any out-of-pocket
they have suffered
quirement
tangible
that
of
financial loss as a
loss,
tangible
because realization of
finan
consequence
injury
is analogous to
through
exchange
cial loss
a market
argument
the
person
that a
is not damaged
damages
injury to
required to establish
by the conversion of his umbrella because
property.
damages
of
real
measure
it did not rain.
If what he owned was not
private
a
nuisance case is “dimi
California
umbrella,
promise by
but rather a
some-
property’s
nution of the
value and for an one that he
dry,
should remain
then the
noyance
flowing
and discomfort
from loss majority’s requirement
loss
Cal.App.3d
Moylan Dykes,
of use.”
v.
correct,
would be
and he would have no
(1986). In
Cal.Rptr.
Moy
damages if it did not rain. That would be
lan,
during
the evidence established that
Berg,
like
where the directors owned a
prop
the time
could not use their
promise
that
would be defended and
through
erty
planned
and a
sale fell
be would not suffer financial loss in lawsuits.
interference,
property ap
the
cause
the
person
umbrella,
But if a
owns an
preciated,
tangible pecuni
had
so
no
itself,
physical thing
he
then
is entitled to
ary loss. Yet the court held that “even if
it,
keep
damages
and he has
from
to
real,”
intangible,
damages
are no less
property
damages
his
if a tortfeasor
or
id,.,
upheld
apparently
an award
based
Suppose
steals it.
a merchant’s windows
daily
on a
fair rental value. To measure
by
are smashed
hoodlums because he re-
property,
injury to
we must look what
pay protection money.
fuses to
He has
happened
property,
to the value of the
not damages
property
when the
happened
pecuniary
what
condition
breaks,
glass
though may
he
even
not have
owner, except
insofar as
pecuniary
together
loss until he scrapes
happened
bear on the truth of what
glazier
replace
enough money
pay
a
property.
it.
Taking
majority’s hypothetical
cases
Roe,
majority cites
Doe
5, suppose
person’s
at footnote
car is
Cir.1992),
which holds that no
wrecked,
down,
or his house burned
but RICO claim lies for fraudulent inducement
pays
majority
insurance
full cost. The
consequential
mis-
of “sexual services”
perceives
expenses. The ease holds that
cellaneous
owner has suffered no net financial loss.
losses are “derivatives
where
financial
accurate,
view,
my
say
It is more
distress,” they
plaintiff’s]
emotional
[the
injured, and
has been
treat
personal injury claim into
cannot convert a
consequences to the
the financial
insured
damage
estate, that does not eliminate causa- but Consequences Practical VI. Act, construing Clayton the tion. In the Supreme has held that the availabili- Court My analysis upon transitivity the of rests question the ty remedy of the “is not a of 1964(c) language employed the section conspirators.” Blue specific intent of the Acts, the Clayton and Sherman and McCready, 457 U.S. Virginia v. Shield Clay- property in the meaning of of 465, 479, 102 S.Ct. Act, of the tenants’ ton the classification though the defendants in Even the ancient clas- interests as and themselves, sought that case benefit of nuisance as of the tort sification (cid:127) plain- in mind to harm and did not have it excursion into the Is this tiff, McCready nevertheless harm to law, exegesis and “[t]he technicalities of common clearly and and her class was foreseeable” value, A fair test concepts practical? of of “necessary step effecting ends of reasoning to com- this formal would be of alleged illegal conspiracy.” Id. It is rea- majority’s to see pare its result with the defendant, suppose if it sonable to that the purposes under- better achieves which plaintiffs allege, did what could foresee analyses yield If different lying RICO. our plaintiffs’ apart- do, determining in their answers, harm to interests they then any practical ments. make whether answers solu- help which sense can us to. determine Under Associated General Contractors likely tion is more correct. Carpen State Council of California of inter- ters, 519, 103 majority’s 74 L.Ed.2d characterization S.Ct. enjoy- and proximate ference with the to use analysis injury rather property Clayton Act ment of requirement causation precludes anyone Many people poor away are too to move than bringing when narcotics dealers move into their likely an interest suit to have neighborhood. Their are diminished suing lives under the owners of statute possessory their other established narcot- crack houses and rights dwellings, they in their whether own blight neighbor- their dealerships ics They liberty or rent. lose because of fear says that Oscar and hoods.. USCA’s'brief move, Often cannot even crime. directly by drug Spinosa are not affected comparably priced into other rental dwell- parties, sales to are not and ings, because their financial circumstances plaintiff bring a “rarely if ever a civil moving do not enable them to advance ex- alleged upon narcotic RICO suit based penses, and the first and last rent months’ Appellee’s Brief at 15 n. 11. transactions.” security deposit apartment. new majority’s analysis, sug- Under the USCA’s They buy way cannot their into suburbs gestion But that does not is correct. compounds, secured residential af- .as more my Under square with common sense. people escape They fluent do to crime. operate analysis, those crack houses who rely upon protect law to dealerships expect and narcotics can possessory rights apartments. their in their neighbors away their mon- have their take The value of this real ey by means of suits. RICO quality reflects the of life available to those primary purposes underlying One of the apartments. who live in the Organized Act of Crime Control operation drug of a massive distribu- part, of which formed a was combat- enterprise exactly tion the kind of harm ting in narcotics” that “causes the “trade RICO, against which its with breadth virtually trapped in whole cities to be their penalties, Applied draconian can be useful. of” the maladies associated homes fear against neighboring in favor of tenants drug Organized with use. Crime Control: dealers, drug enabling RICO is a device for Proposals Hearings on S. SOand Related people including people may be too who — No. 5 the House Subcomm. Before poor fight de- own homes—to Comm, Judiciary, Cong., on the 91st 2d stroy pathologies deprive the social (1970) (statement of Senator Sess. 86-87 liberty quality them of and diminish the McClellan, 30). Improv- sponsor of S. their lives. ing quality neigh- life in residential *17 borhoods afflicted with narcotics commerce statutory purpose, so an accurate con-
is a the statute should serve that
struction of
purpose.
ancient
It is no accident that the
words
America,
UNITED STATES
according to their well established
taken
Plaintiff-Appellee,
meanings
Congress
do what
the law
copied
The words were
intended.
GUTIERREZ-MEDEROS,
Faustino
statutes, and carried extensive
much older
Defendant-Appellant.
meanings.
law
In
accretions of common
meanings,
terpreted according to those
No. 91-30128.
statutory
purpose.
words
effect
Appeals,
United States Court of
applied
Though
has been
to conduct
Ninth Circuit.
ordinary
not fall within the
which does
“racketeering,”
English meaning
Sedi
Argued
1992.
and Submitted Jan.
479, 499,
Co., 473 U.S.
ma v. Imrex
Decided June
1992.
3275,
intended
