Ordered that the cross appeal by Rosa E Sena and Elner Sena from the judgment dated September 15, 2005, is dismissed, as they were not aggrieved by the judgment cross-appealed from (see CPLR 5511); and it is further,
Ordered that the judgments are reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, the motion of the plaintiff in action No. 3 pursuant to CPLR 4404 (a) to set aside the verdict as against the weight of the evidence and for a new trial is granted, the complaint in action No. 3 is reinstated, the motion of Rosa E Sena and Elner Sena pursuant to CPLR 4404 (a) to set aside the verdict as against the weight of the evidence and for a new
Ordered that one bill of costs is awarded to abide the event of the new trial.
On December 11, 2002, Jaime Jerez was traveling in a vehicle (hereinafter the Sena vehicle) driven by her mother, Rosa Sena, which was involved in a head-on collision with a vehicle (hereinafter the Negron vehicle) driven by Yvonne Negron. Sena had been traveling north on Route 208 while Negron had been driving south on Route 208.
In action No. 1, Sena and the owner of the Sena vehicle (hereinafter the Sena parties) commenced an action against Negron, the registered owner of the Negron vehicle and the lessor, Hann Auto Trust (hereinafter the Negron parties). A separate action, action No. 2, was commenced by the Negron parties against the Sena parties which action was joined for trial with action No. 1. Action No. 3 was commenced on behalf of passenger Jerez against the Sena parties and the Negron parties. Action No. 3 also was joined with action No. 1 for the purpose of trial. After the trial, the jury returned a verdict finding that neither the Sena parties nor the Negron parties were negligent. Jerez and the Sena parties separately moved pursuant to CPLR 4404 (a) to set aside the verdict as against the weight of the evidence and for a new trial. The court denied the motions. By judgment dated September 15, 2005, the complaint and the cross claims asserted against the Sena parties in action No. 3 were dismissed. By judgment dated November 25, 2005, the complaint in action No. 1 and the complaint and cross claims in action No. 3 asserted against the Negron parties were dismissed.
It has repeatedly been held that a driver who crosses over a double yellow line into opposing traffic, unless justified by an emergency not of the driver’s own making, violates the Vehicle and Traffic Law and is guilty of negligence as a matter of law (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1126 [a]; Foster v Sanchez, 17 AD3d 312, 313 [2005]; Gadon v Oliva, 294 AD2d 397 [2002]; Haughey v Noone, 262 AD2d 284 [1999]).
Here, the evidence presented at trial demonstrated that the statute was violated by either Sena or Negron. Neither party presented a nonnegligent explanation for the accident. Rather, each defendant claimed that although it had been raining and/or sleeting for some time, she did not lose control of her vehicle. In
Jerez’s remaining contention is without merit. Spolzino, J.E, Skelos, Covello and Balkin, JJ., concur.
