The narrow issue of whether two paragraphs from a letter by Ms. Beiny to her father should have been excluded from evidence as subject to the attorney-client privilege was not previously determined and was appropriately raised by petitioners before the referee. In any event, the prior evidentiary ruling that the letter as a whole was privileged from disclosure was not immune from reconsideration (see People v Evans, 94 NY2d 499, 504-505 [2000]). Accordingly, the proffer and admission of the disputed evidence, which was not in fact privileged, provides no basis for dismissal of the proceeding or disqualification of petitioner’s counsel. We note that appellants do not quarrel with the Surrogate’s observation that there was ample evidence, apart from the letter, to support the surcharges imposed. Indeed, that evidence clearly demonstrated that Ms. Beiny, over a period of some eight years, repeatedly breached her fiduciary duties as a trustee of the Wynyard Trust by, inter alia,
