As appears from the record, Mrs. S. M. Deans, through her son, contracted with W. T. Neal to remove her piano from her residence in Rome, Georgia, to a ear upon the tracks of a railroad, for the purpose of having it conveyed to the city of Atlanta. Neal was a regular drayman and transfer man, and, as such, in accordance with his contract, took possession of the piano and had it placed upon his dray. The mules hitched to the par•ticular wagon upon which the piano had been loaded became fright
The plaintiff in error contends that the law as to common carriers does not apply to this case, because, by the contract as to the repairs, his liability as a common carrier ceased, and the plaintiffs only remedy was upon a breach of that contract. It is further insisted that the settlement under the contract was to be made upon a statement of the cost by the Wester Music Company, and that Mrs. Deans never furnished any statement; that under the agreement Neal was to repay to her the cost of the repairs as feed by the statement of the Wester Music Company, furnished to her for settlement; and that until the piano had been repaired and such a statement had been presented, there would be no breach of the agreement. In our view of the matter the defendant was a common carrier. “One who pursues the business constantly or continuously for any period of fime, or any distance of transportation, is a common carrier, and as such is bound to use extraordinary diligence. In cases of loss the presumption of law is against him, and no excuse avails him unless it was occasioned by the act of Gód or the public enemies of the State.” Civil Code, § 2712. As a common carrier he could not limit his liability for his own negligence; and therefore the agreement entered into between him and the plaintiffs son, .acting as her agent, could not amount to anything more than an agreement admitting liability and fixing the amount of the damages. We think the court properly construed the contract, adversely to the contentions of the plaintiff in error, as to the materiality of a statement being furnished to Mrs. Deans. The subject of the negotiations between the defendant and Mrs. Deans’s son was the repair of the damage to the piano. The agreement means nothing if it does not mean that Neal assumes liability for whatever amount may be necessary to repair the damaged instrument. In this view of the case it would be wholly immaterial whether a statement was ever rendered to Mrs. Deans or not. Perhaps the defendant was entitled to have a statement made to him, as to the probable cost of the repairs, so that he might, if he thought the charge of the Wester Music Company too much, have the right to have the repairs made by another. But if the contract is subject to 'this construction, the defendant was not hurt, because (probably upon information from Mrs. Deans as to the terms of the contract)
There is no merit in any of the exceptions to the charge of the court, and the court did not err in refusing a new trial.
Judgment affirmed.
