*1 did not of a continuance which the denial This is a case. delayed the have even not plaintiffs. prejudice only a few case, was filed which young it was day year before days over the circumstanc way to view There is retain to unable That Lowe was dismissed. support reasonably here which would es to with- King’s motion attorney until an and the dismis denial of a continuance unreason- granted is had been draw 1089; Id. at Locas of Mr. Lowe’s case. sal at least want able, attorney would since cio, at 499. 694 F.2d accepting files before Lowe’s see to addition, attorneys would most case. III. CONCLUSION. begin scheduled a case to take hesitate court abused its discretion The district a continuance. without a month trial within denying his dismissing Mr. Lowe’s suit and difficulties, Lowe these without Even Consequently, for a motion continuance. he found February when only had reverse, and Lowe’s action reinstate Mr. we prepara- lack of attorney’s out about apply. Rule 36 shall Circuit remand. a new hire tion, 20 both to March until ready to attorney attorney and have for the fault Finally, much of

try the case. on the sched- to trial proceeding

Lowe’s not had King, Mr. who with rests

uled date apparently had case and

prepared could not he quite a while that for

known date because scheduled trial on the

go to case. with another a conflict & CON- VICINITY FOX VALLEY WORKERS STRUCTION on of discretion abuses have found We FUND, Plaintiff-Appellee, PENSION Beeson, 931-32; facts. F.2d at similar Cir.1983). (7th Webber, 1070-71 721 F.2d at v. on their hearing cases favoring

The policy (Lamar), Laurine BROWN un- court’s outweighed the district merits Defendant-Appellant, clearing its concern derstandable Webber, here. as it does docket Brown, Defendant-Appellee, Dessie Greyhound case is unlike Stevens This Cir.1983), (7th Lines, Inc., action of an affirmed a dismissal Claimants, Defendants. All Unknown plaintiffs’ prosecute based for failure There, the attorney. find an No. 88-2322. failure given several continuanc- had plaintiff been Appeals, Court United States exhorted repeatedly been had es and Circuit. Seventh attorney. find an 18, 1989. Argued Jan. unreason- that it was Having concluded Dec. En Banc Reargued between Mr. Lowe to choice put able to even his when going to trial dismissal 9, 1990. March Decided trial, ready for attorney was not previous motion denial of Lowe’s Judge Lozano’s of discre- abuse was also an

a continuance case is same reasons.

tion for Real Es- Washington Sherwin

unlike Cir.1982),

tate, Inc., F.2d 1081 three which was City, a case

cited request for a old at the time

years

continuance, plaintiffs did not in which se, pro and in case

object trying their *2 Baum, Neuman,

Bernard M. M. James Ill., Sigman, Chicago, Roy Baum & Hassel- Ala., tine, Hasseltine, Florence, Harris & age. The Schramm, reaching retirement died before A. Mark Esposito, F. Nicholas may desig- Heuel, specifies Plan how Chi- Heuel, & Esposito M. Terence beneficiary: Valley. nate Fox Ill., plaintiff-appellee cago, Beneficiary Participant’s shall be Funai, Masuda, & Morel, Eifert L. Gerald designates in the persons he so person or Janich, Ill., Daniel N. Mitchell, Chicago, *3 in received the Admin- last written notice Ill., defendant-appellant Laurine for Lyons, Participant’s prior to the istrative Office Brown. responsibility the death. It shall be Hasseltine, Hasseltine, Harris & Roy writing Participant notify to in Des- Ala., defendant-appellee Florence, for choice of Administrative Office his Brown. sie Beneficiary. Beneficiary any change in or Participant may, the consent A without BAUER, Judge, Chief Before Beneficiary, or designated his then CUDAHY, Jr., WOOD, CUMMINGS, Beneficiaries, change his Beneficiaries. FLAUM, COFFEY, POSNER, [Participant shall In the event MANION, RIPPLE, EASTERBROOK, Beneficiary, or if such fail to name a KANNE, Judges, and Circuit living time Beneficiary shall not be at the Judge. ESCHBACH, Circuit Senior death, Participant’s such benefits of the WOOD, Jr., Circuit HARLINGTON paid to: shall be Judge. (a) living; legal spouse, if his filed action interpleader This is an (b) then to his spouse living, if no Vicinity Work- Valley & Construction Fox shares; living equal children (“Fund”) to determine Pension Fund ers living, (c) spouse if or children be pay- a death benefit recipient of proper shares, equal or parents his then to partici- Fund death of of the because able if parents such the survivor of (“James”). The defen- Brown pant James (1) living; one Laurine Brown action are in the dants children, parents be (d) spouse, if no spouse, and former (“Laurine”), James’s living brothers living, then to his (“Dessie”), mother. James’s Brown Dessie shares; equal sisters Laurine’s motion court denied The district children, (e) parents, spouse, if no sum- and entered summary judgment for living, to then and sisters be brothers in fa- against Laurine mary judgment Partici- of such deceased the estate Dessie, ordering pay the Fund to vor pant. appeals Laurine to benefit Dessie. death Beneficiary executed a James decision. naming Laurine as Designation Form ac- interpleader brought this The Fund Lau- September beneficiary. On 1335. The district under 28 U.S.C. tion § They both were divorced. rine and James to 29 U.S.C. pursuant jurisdiction had court property settle- court-approved to agreed 1132(e). raises issues under This case § following proviso: that included Security Income Employee Retirement any interest or each waive parties (ERISA), 1001- 29 U.S.C. 1974 §§ Act of retirement, pension, any in and claim ap- jurisdiction over this We have 1461. annuity plans re- and/or profit-sharing pursuant peal oth- employment sulting party. er BACKGROUND I. FACTUAL divorce, continued James after their Even were married and James Laurine 1986 and for much live Laurine was covered 1982. James April change his no effort made 1987. James Vicinity Work- Valley Construction Fox & divorce. beneficiary after the designated (“Plan”), provided Plan Pension ers 17, 1987. on June James died (“Death Benefit Lump Sum Death at- when dispute arose Benefit”) plan participant’s payable to paid to Benefit Death have the tempted to if the designated refused, Sears, claiming Co., her. The Fund it Roebuck & F.2d (7th Cir.1988). who should was uncertain receive the Death Benefit. The Fund then filed this noted, As the district court this is a action, interpleader asserting although impression case of first under ERISA. We designated beneficiary, it Laurine was spouse must determine whether a divorced legal as to the effect of the was uncertain designated who was beneficiary prior as a marital in to the divorce will still receive the Death seemingly waived her which Laurine despite Benefit provision in the divorce from the Fund. The Fund settlement waiving any rights to the bene since, Dessie as a also named defendant fit. preempts pen Because ERISA state Plan, under the Dessie would receive the laws, sion 1144(a), benefit if benefit the court determined that Lau- must find the answer to this issue within *4 properly rine waived her claim. ERISA itself or in the federal common law summary judgment Laurine moved for interpreting ERISA. See Pilot Ins. Life 21, 1987, James, arguing Dedeaux, 41, on October 45, Co. v. 481 U.S. 107 S.Ct. 1549, unrepresented 1551-52, who was at their (1987) (state divorce 95 L.Ed.2d 39 hearing, relating never read or understood the employee plans law to benefit settlement, property preempted); of the marital terms Mutual Ins. Co. New Life prepared by Yampol, 421, (7th York lawyer. which had been her 425 Cir.1988)(uniform Laurine also asserted that even after the remedies are fundamen ERISA). divorce, case, tal to intended for In this James her to receive our attention is focused on provi from the Fund. The district ERISA’s anti-alienation court 1056(d)(1), sions. (d)(3)(A). denied Laurine’s motion for summary judg- § ment. The then summary court entered provides pension that a must judgment against Laurine and in favor of prohibit the alienation assignment Dessie, finding that Laurine had waived 1056(d)(1). benefits. 29 U.S.C. These right her to the Death Benefit. In this “spendthrift” provisions designed appeal, Laurine finds fault with the district prevent assignment. unwise alienation or court’s use of the property marital settle- 118, (2d AT & T v. Merry, 592 F.2d 124 agreement. Laurine claims the court Cir.1979). ERISA was amended 1984 to erred when it allowed the marital clarify spendthrift the effect of provi these settlement to affect Laurine’s under family sions on support obligations such as the Plan. alimony, support, separate child main 1984,

tenance. Equity Retirement Act of 98-397, (1984); Pub.L. No. 98 Stat. 1426 see II. DISCUSSION S.Rep. Cong., 18-19, 98th 2d Sess. No. Summary judgment Cong. should be reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Ad & granted only genuine when there are no 2564-65. Prior to the en min.News of material issues fact and when the amendments, mov actment of these some courts ing party judgment is entitled to tentatively as a mat exempted state domestic rela 50(c). ter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. There were tions orders from the ERISA anti-alien disputed facts in See, this case and the provisions. dis ation e.g., Operating En that, law, trict court found as a gineers’ matter of Local # Pension Trust Fund 428 paid the death benefit should be Dessie.1 v. Zamborsky, 650 F.2d 200 Cir. 1981) (order We review decision de novo. assigning EEOC v. alimony benefits for suggested description It was that there were unresolved which either of them had prevented summary judg- might against material facts that hereafter have or claim the other. ment. These unresolved facts concerned the It was stated that the consideration was the agreement promises consideration for the and the back- mutual standings and several and under- ground leading up signing. to its agreement On its face the regarding set forth in the interests, agreement parties states that good each con- and for other and valu- sidered it to be in their best try interests to settle able considerations. We see no need to kind, nature, every go between parties. them all behind the mutual of the

279 part of divorce agreement a ERISA); T v. &AT in conflict with confirming, ap- ratifying, expressly (ERISA provi- decree 124-25 F.2d at 592 Merry, it as an order of the proving, adopting support obli- traditional not alter do sions specifically part of the It was 314, court. Reicker, F.2d Cody gations); of the court “each judgment prevent Cir.1979) (ERISA does not (2d under the terms perform shall parties obligations). support for garnishment agreement.” said un- most removed amendments The 1984 preempted arguing that her waiver exception creating a limited by certainties misinterprets pur- for a state provisions the anti-alienation provisions and spendthrift pose behind the “qualified if it is a order relations domestic QDRO. The effect of a intended (“QDRO”). 29 order” relations domestic are de- provisions of ERISA spendthrift rela- 1056(d)(3)(A). A domestic U.S.C. § employee’s ac- that the to “ensure re- meet certain technical must tions order actually benefits are available crued QDRO recognized as to be quirements un- purposes,” preventing retirement under ERISA. H.R.Rep. assignment or alienation. wise case 1056(d)(3)(B)-(E). parties All reprint- 2d Sess. Cong., 93d No. does property settlement agree Cong. & AdminNews ed U.S.Code QDRO. of a requirements meet *5 4670, focus 4639, provisions These 4734. the settlement argues that since Laurine benefits or alienation of assignment provi- anti-alienation QDRO, the not a is right of a not the waiver by participant, a She property settlement. nullify the sions designat- by made a payment of benefits no ef- can have that the settlement claims QDRO is exception beneficiary. The ed beneficiary. of on the fect assign- alienation or on the centered also alien- assignment or prohibits ERISA legisla- in As noted ment of benefits. and, according to Lau- benefits, of ation creation, recognition, or history, “the tive a only for exception an rine, makes ERISA right payee’s alternate assignment of the marital if a claims that QDRO. Laurine from exempted be benefits” will qualify, does not settlement property QDRO re- if the provisions spendthrift pursuant to paid must ERISA benefits 575, 98th S.Rep. quirements met. No. beneficiary. of original designation 1984 U.S. reprinted in Cong., 2d Sess. A Cong. 2565. when she is states Laurine correct & Admin.News Code of bene- right payment QDRO creates a attempt alienate or any preempts at property settlement The marital or- fits. by a domestic relations assign benefits those any right to waives in this case issue QDRO. The a is not if that order der benefits. in this at issue property settlement marital assignment or case, however, an not was pro- specify the QDRO requirements The In the by James. benefits, of benefits but assign

alienation necessary to cedures attempt to dis- settlement, made James not followed need procedures those Instead, dis- Laurine inter- his interest. an pose waiving is nonparticipant a when benefits. right she had ben- any ERISA allows pension claimed in benefits. est Plan, in the in bene- Laurine, interests nonparticipant a their to waive eficiaries benefit, 1055(c)(l)(A)(i) just as any See, right e.g., 29 her waived fits. joint and in may to benefits interest any (spouse waive waived James time). The any property at This marital of benefit form pension. survivor Laurine’s that a the di- made clear incorporated into ERISA amendments was settlement preserv- method of QDRO proper Court was the by the Circuit decree entered vorce in spouse a former September ing the interests Illinois on County, Kane S.Rep. 575, 98th decree, See pension benefits. No. found That court 1986. 1984 U.S. 19, reprinted in Cong., en- 2d Sess. consideration, “was for its presented As Cong. voluntarily between Code freely and & Admin.News into tered noted, had Browns if the court the district “not unconscionable.” parties” was in the Laurine’s interest to secure the wished made specifically that court Therefore benefits, QDRO they could have executed a Brown, Construction Workers v. establishing right. a F.Supp. (N.D.Ill.1988), such Other methods when it not general available to ed that were also establish Laurine’s rule is that a divorce does not beneficiary designation interest. Laurine and James could have affect a in pension a life policy. left mention of insurance Significantly, out of settlement, Eighth Circuit the marital also cited the district James court opinion in Fox Valley redesignated could have Laurine as when it his ben- observed Instead, eficiary. spouse’s beneficiary jointly the Browns interest “[t]he divested, however, can be agreed pursuant to waive all in interest each other’s to a pension plans. judg Such a waiver in a does not fall divorce Lyman, ment/’ scope within the spendthrift ERISA’s at 693. The Lyman provisions. general We hold that a court found that proper waiver word ing by nonparticipant specifical of interest a divorce decree did a is not ly refer preempted by modify to and the beneficiary ERISA’s anti-alienation inter est provisions, participant’s which in incorpo- this case was ex-wife. The Eighth rated a state court Circuit therefore judgment. into a affirmed the dis trict court’s award of pri benefits to the Lyman erroneously Laurine asserts that mary beneficiary.3 Lyman opinion is Hill, Lumber Co. v. 877 F.2d 692 not in conflict holding with this court’s Cir.1989), conflicts with this holding court’s arguably supports the result we have provisions that ERISA’s anti-alienation do reached. Unlike the in Ly setting factual preempt explicit an waiver of interest man, present and James in the Lyman nonparticipant plan.2 in a case voluntary property settle distinguishable from the' factual situation an explicit included Valley. Lyman, Fox mutual any rights waiver of might each employer profit-sharing plan named his *6 have pension had in the plan. other's primary wife as his beneficiary and his parents and a brother contingent as benefi- Having possi established that it is ciaries. The divorced his wife ble nonparticipant for a to waive an inter approximately years five after naming her pension est using benefits without primary beneficiary as under plan. QDRO, we must now determine whether The Jeffery Hill, divorce decree stated that there was an effective waiver of interest plan participant, own, “shall have as his this case. ERISA is silent on the issue of free of ex-wife], interest of his [his what proper constitutes a waiver in this profit-sharing interest in the plan of his situation, existing body and the of federal employer_” Jeffery Hill died on De- common interpreting law gives lit 15, 1984, having cember without changed guidance tle point. finding this After beneficiary designation after the that provisions ERISA’s anti-alienation did beneficiary divorce. While the prohibit pension a waiver of benefits provision Lyman plan quoted is not circumstances, under these the district Eighth in the opinion, Circuit’s the court court turned to state law and found that Plan, noted that partici- each law, “[u]nder under Illinois and in jurisdictions, most pant may name the beneficiaries who will a divorce decree pen would not affect the receive the remainder of his vested account rights person sion of a who desig has been upon balances his death.” Id. at 693. The nated as a property unless the Eighth Circuit cited Valley Fox Vicinity & specifically settlement included a termi- support position, In of her exclusively Laurine also private ruling cites relies on the IRS letter Ruling IRS Private Letter pri- No. 8905058. A authority. as however, ruling, may vate letter not be used or precedent. 6110(j)(3); cited as See 26 U.S.C. § holding 3. The district court’s was based on its Liberty see Nat’l also Bank & Trust v. United finding primary beneficiary’s waiver of States, 302, (6th Cir.1989); 867 F.2d 305 David knowing voluntary was not Commissioner, 1254, R. Webb Co. v. 708 F.2d Lyman, was therefore without effect. 877 F.2d Thus, Cir.1983). 1257 n. 1 we will not at 693. portion consider that of Laurine’s brief which

281 1976); Cherry, Keeton v. (Iowa 793, v. Cen- 798 rights. See O’Toole those nation (Mo.Ct.App.1987); Bell 694, 697 728 S.W.2d Pension Laborers’ tral Welfare 185, Garcia, (Mo.Ct.App. 191 639 S.W.2d 995, 997, N.E.2d 299 Funds, Ill.App.3d 12 Schleis, 561, 562, N.M. Haley v. 1982); 97 held court (1973). 392, The district 394 (1982); Culbertson 164, 165 642 P.2d property in the marital that the waiver Co., 906, P.2d Assurance 631 Continental termination specific awas settlement (Utah 1981). was The district court 913-14 benefits. contained finding that the waiver correct in issue, When ERISA is silent on an specifi settlement in the marital a federal court must fashion federal com benefits, pension fund cally dealt govern mon law rules to ERISA suits. Na at issue in this Death Benefit including Christie, chwalter v. (11th Cir.1986)(courts 805 F.2d 959 case. develop must federal other by pointing to counters interpreting ERISA); rules when Amato v. qualify seems to O’Toole language Bernard, (9th Cir.1980) 618 F.2d 567 affect ability of a divorce (Congress intended that courts would de O’Toole, beneficiary. In rights of a velop ERISA). federal common law for In only specific Illinois did state court making rules, such we must of course look a benefi- affect benefits would waiver of guidance, to the statute itself for In re or a policy itself ciary’s rights “unless Equip. Co., White Farm 788 F.2d O’Toole, provides otherwise.” statute (6th Cir.1986), proper and it is also As N.E.2d at 394. at Ill.App.3d creating rules, turn to state law when such out, qualifica- pointed court the district Corp., Scott v. Gulf Oil general method does not refer tion (9th Cir.1985), long as as such state in the beneficiary found designating a policies underly law is consistent with the ing re- Instead, court O’Toole was policy. issue, the federal statute at Nachwal would or statutes that ferring provisions ter, 805 F.2d at 960. The district court spousal interest automatically terminate properly closely analogous examined a area argument upon Laurine’s divorce. spouse's right of state law-a former changing beneficiaries method of only the Illinois, recover life insurance benefits. given legal in the Plan should provided a decree of divorce affects the unpersuasive.4 effect spouse of a divorced if a settle rights to agreement specifically pro to waive ability spouse of a includes a *7 in a specific waiver terminating beneficiary's through a a benefit vision inter recognized by O'Toole, Ill.App.3d 997, been settlement has divorce est. 12 at 299 rule for adopt and we (citations omitted). Many many courts N.E.2d at 394 contends ERISA. Laurine interpreting purposes of states follow this rule when need against ERISA’s will work a such rule provisions. See, e.g., divorce settlement uncertainty into bring uniformity and Cooper, F.Supp. Prudential Ins. Co. v. 666 are not plan. We of the the administration 190, (D.Idaho 1987) (applying 192 Idaho arguments. As by these convinced law), aff'd, (9th Cir.1988); 859 F.2d 154 charged with noted, federal courts have Blight, Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. F.Supp. 513, 399 gov- to law rules common creating federal (E.D.Pa.1975) (applying 515 Nachwalter, 959, F.2d at 805 ern Pennsylvania law), aff'd, (3d 538 F.2d 319 will federal rules of such the creation and Cir.1976); Lynch Bogenrief v. 237 N.W.2d life insurance any in the ex-husband's interpreted interest has also appellate court Illinois 4. An property settlement policies contained Laborers’ Pension v. O’Toole Central Welfare collecting 392 under N.E.2d Funds, Ill.App.3d 299 the ex-wife barred 12 finding of waiver when in this (1973), death. As supporting a policy as the ex-husband’s after of a waiver case, neglected executed primary participant/ex-husband upon property settlement part of beneficiary designation ex- her as change after Principal marriage. Mutu waiver, her dissolution of was spouses the mutual Juntunen, Ill.App.3d 189 Ins. Co. al attorney. at 136 Ill.Dec. ex-wife’s Life drafted 702, (1989), the 224 N.E.2d 136 Ill.Dec. at 226. N.E.2d waiving provision found that a appellate court provide uniformity. the needed We also any benefits. Laurine waived her disagree with Laurine’s assertion that our portion of the Death Benefit. The district imposes obligations burdensome decision entry summary judgment court’s plan No such additional administrators. against Laurine and favor of Dessie is because, imposed burdens will be under the Affirmed. scheme, statutory adminis- investigate history the marital

trator must EASTERBROOK, Judge, Circuit of a and determine whether BAUER, Judge, whom Chief relations orders exist that could domestic MANION, Judge, join, Circuit affect the distribution of benefits. This dissenting. just investigation. such an case arose from might Three support giving reasons only requires plan Our decision administra- James Brown’s death benefits to his moth- practice current tors to continue their court, er Dessie: the order of the state thoroughly investigating the marital status contract between James and his former participant. of a Laurine, wife and Laurine’s waiver. Finally, Laurine asserts that James The first unsatisfactory of these is be unrepresented hearing was at their divorce cause the “qual state court’s order is anot and that he did not read or understand the order”, ified domestic relations provisions settlement, property of the in 1056(d)(3). Matrimonial law does not re cluding provision. argu the waiver quire one disposition or another unpersuasive. sign ment is also James did in an uncontested divorce. James and Lau- agreement, provision and the waiver rine were agree anything they free to straightforward. simple was Laurine’s wanted. There is policy no state about the lawyer inserted the language, own waiver allocation of death benefits that could be and Laurine makes no claim that she did disrupted. The approval state court’s not read understand the settlement. private is like a consent She does not claim that she was unaware decree, which should treated like a con of what effect the waiver could have on her Cleveland, tract. Firefighters See own claims. Laurine makes this claim 501, 517-23, 3063, 3072-76, U.S. 106 S.Ct. though even both Laurine and James on (1986). 92 L.Ed.2d 405 Consent decrees do the face of the each stated un legal not alter the obligations strangers they der oath that understood the contents (here, of the Fund to enforce its written- of the settlement. — rule). Wilks, Martin v. suggested argument It was at oral that U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 104 L.Ed.2d 835 holding under the Fund our would be bur- (1989). always having investigate dened with (contract) The second is unsatisfactory waiver, possibly determine if there awas because it attributes to James’s act an ef- payment something affecting else *8 fect specified other than the one by the beneficiary. benefit to the last-named We governing Fund’s documents—which 29 place investigative no such burden or re- 1104(a)(1)(D)requires it to follow. § sponsibility beyond on the Fund what is agree Judge I Ripple’s with discussion of imposed by statute. Under the facts of join opinion. statute and See also only this case we need hold that settle- Central States Pension Fund v. Gerber is effective when it becomes waiver Service, Inc., Truck 870 F.2d 1148 payment. known to the Fund before Cir.1989) (en banc); Dardaganis v. Grace holding in in the Fund its brief concurs Inc., Capital, (2d 889 F.2d 1240-42 go reach. We no further. Cir.1989). III. CONCLUSION (waiver) The third strongest is because it recog- bypasses in The district court was correct reference to James’s acts. The beneficiary nizing nonparticipant designated may give in an ERISA away that a pension pension money the instant she plan receives it. could waive Waiver Guidry disregard next in which to them. gift, to whoever is anticipatory is an — Fund, (Dessie). Sheet Metal Pension Be- Workers rules the Fund’s line under honored, -, 680, 687-88, it gift an actual would U.S. 110 S.Ct. cause anticipatory gift (1990). should be that an follows L.Ed.2d 782 ERISA does not stand however, approach, given thwarting private effect. alone choice. Federal The first is three difficulties. runs into annuity provide insurance and laws often it, too, disregard requires the Fund that paid person that benefits must be Second, under written-designation rule. its name is on file. only whose These not (more federal common precisely, law state bargains, denying undo actual beneficiaries law) prom- unilateral absorbing state law autonomy to choose what to do with not enforceable. gifts to make ises wealth, produce their but also some weird exceptions to the non-enforce- There are Still, Pru E.g., results. we enforce them. promises, but none is ment of donative Parker, dential Insurance Co. (Dessie case. is not applicable to this (7th Cir.1988). Although ERISA does not majority’s opinion treats the charity!) The say “pay person whose name is on if after as it had been waiver file”, say every plan it does must act death, Laurine would have when James’s “in accordance and in with documents give the benefits to present had a it, governing” struments 29 U.S.C. didn’t, wasn’t, she and the law Dessie. It 1104(a)(1)(D), plan and this has a written- § distinguishes accordingly. designation approach rule. Our therefore not contain a writ- Even if the Plan did ought to track that of Parker. anticipatory an ten-designation clause and requiring payment Rules to named bene- principles of contract gift were valid under administration, yield simple ficiaries avoid however, law, given not it would be valid liability, double and ensure that benefi- 29 U.S.C. spendthrift clause get coming quickly, ciaries without what’s 1056(d)(1), pro- says that “benefits the folderol essential under less-certain may assigned plan under the vided orders, Domestic relations even if rules. Although majority holds or alienated”. lodged effect until “qualified”, do not take “participants” applies only to that this rule something plan, 1002(7) pension plan in a as 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(G)(i),(ii)(II) implies in establish- term, not so limited. Sec- it is defines ing procedures plans for to evaluate orders 1056(d)(1) assignment of “ben- tion bars lodged; honoring they have been once is, plan— payments under the efits” —that file reinforces rather “qualified” orders on identity person regard to the without pension inference that than undermines the assignment. Section making beyond written instruc- plans may not look 1056(d)(2) saying that “a reinforces this accompa- Written-designation rules tions. loan made to a anti-alienation ny that contain statutes assignment as an shall not be treated clauses, military insurance as ERISA and alienation”, unnecessary if exemption ensure that Perhaps this is so to laws do. apply the anti-alienation clause does Be- an informed choice. designation place. in the first So beneficiaries change beneficiary, the accepting a fore money to transferred the could not have an un- employee with provide can least, exchange Dessie in sofa —at op- afford recap options of his biased promise Dessie could not have enforced see portunity to reflect. We they came in. by attaching the benefits as Think of many occasions. rules on other then, Laurine be allowed to Why, should Acts, formality make requiring the Wills *9 get- money the to Dessie without transfer practical matter death bene- bequests; as a ting a sofa? bequests. are pension plan in fits a prevents beneficiary from A rule that the rules, unyielding de- of ERISA is full unappealing, but giving up her claim is Rules simplify administration. designed to frus- clauses are anti-alienation flaws; loopholes and over- have their Equitable desires. con- trate individuals’ breadth, unpalatable out- producing both accordingly poor grounds siderations are plan person beneficiary the of the is the unanticipated circum- of in the event comes by the “in the last writ- named But stances, among them. whether notice received in the Administrative ten all) (flaws or more flexible and rules have prior Participant’s death. It Office (with of administra- high costs standards responsibility of the Partici- shall be the is a decision application) erratic tion and notify writing in the Administrative pant to legislation. Congress and by already made Beneficiary any of his choice of Office to use rules rather elected pension plans Beneficiary.” R.l at Ex. change in See standards; patterns of avoidance than question that Laurine 6.4. There is approach the Con- we transmute mean that who, the terms person Brown is the under rejected. it into the one gress chose ought the death plan, to receive benefit. RIPPLE, Judge, with whom Circuit Judge,

BAUER, EASTERBROOK Chief determining the set- In whether MANION, Judges, join, Circuit and binding tlement constitutes dissenting. part of Ms. of these benefits on the waiver Brown, administering policy this federal of in presents important issue case This according must plan the to its documents resolving administration of ERISA. respected in to ensure that the order issue, have one task: to ascertain that purpose of is effectuated. How- ERISA Congress. implement the will of To- ever, majority, by its over-reliance sight objective. of loses that day’s decision principles, sight loses of that state law altered the Su- Consequently, unless and, consequently, frustrates policy federal Congress, majority’s preme Court Analogous prin- congressional intent. significant impedi- approach stands as helpful in ciples of state law often can be congressional goal of achieving the ment to interpreting and in fash- a federal statute em- and certain administration of efficient in ioning gaps federal common law to close plans. ployee benefit However, legislative scheme. this methodology employed must with ex- A. objective treme caution.3 The ultimate is notes, majority quite pointedly As the policy objectives not to fulfill of state law that sets ERISA is a statute feder- federal congressional to fulfill the command but pension plans subject al standards language in of embodied and structure of that mandate is its terms. Part federal Here, federal statute. ERISA’s com- 1104(a)(1)(D).1 in That contained section plan mand that a be administered in accord- plan that a be adminis- requires section plan’s ance with the documents must be with the documents tered in accordance primary fashioning in a waiver our concern plan. of that and the instruments general The maxims of state insur- rule. strong fed- statutory command embodies upon majority relies ance law parties participant, all policy eral that not, course, formulated with this were — trustee, beneficiary to ascer- able in explicit command of ERISA mind. —be certain- rights requires, tain their and liabilities with in to effectuate the order certainty expectations in ty.2 plan policy at issue here fulfills federal administration, and ease in quite explicitly. provides mandate It States, 1104(a)(1)(D) See Central S.E. & S.W. Areas of the Labor Title states 1145. Section Truck, plan that a administrator v. Gerber Pension Fund (7th Cir.1989) (en banc). discharge respect to a shall his duties with participants plan solely in the interest of the and— and beneficiaries detail, Congress majority sets forth in 3.As great precise specifying circum- took care in (D) accordance with the documents and provi- in which ERISA’s anti-alienation stances governing instruments .... may be overridden a state marital sions 1104(a)(1)(D) (emphasis supplied). U.S.C. § ample care settlement decree. Such necessary prudence evidence of the and caution already congressional in- 2. We have noted “analogous” state law con- reliance on certainty obligations sistence on cepts. interpretation our § 515 *10 divorce, had, at the time she of Ms. Brown plan’s the according to made changes be maintains, legitimate expectation a that she require that The documents documents. only by receive benefits. Both she and change made would the beneficiary be the Therefore, beneficiary absent Mr. Brown were aware that the plan. to the notification participant, changed. the At the by designation the had not been notification such beneficiary.4 least, then, binding very on the there is a triable issue of not waiver is of fact as to the intent Ms. Brown with B. the that cannot be re- respect to “waiver” summary judgment. solved on that, accept proposition the if Even we the conformity the lack of with despite that, suggests if Mr. majority The Brown beneficiary a statutory scheme benefits, the wanted Ms. Brown to receive inter- to have waived an can be considered beneficiary a he should have new executed a difficult plan, there remains est in the However, it must form after the divorce. intent of Lau- respect to the with question Mr. knew there remembered Brown that addressed that has been rine Brown designation conformed already was a that district court or satisfactorily by either the entitled to plan to the on file. He was is purported The “waiver” majority. the that, had even if Laurine Brown conclude agree- property settlement in a contained divorce, the at the time of waived benefits part the parties as executed the ment change not to his decision marriage. That a document dissolution of redesignation. designation to a amounted rights be- designed adjust was all, informed, at the time After he had been mar- “growing out of parties tween the original designation, that a he made the previ- relationship now ital or other only by effected his com- change could be R.l parties.” existing ously between changing the benefi- ing to the office terms, then, the By its own at Ex. 5. ciary. “waiver”) with (or does deal agreement judg- reverse the Accordingly, I would respect party’s choices each ground court on the ment of the district property after divorce. disposition of was not effective be- that the “waiver” read the Indeed, quite plausible to it is change of benefi- cause a nothing more establishing as document participant. made ciary was never part of Ms. Brown on the than a waiver However, approach of the even under the QDRO5 part as on a right her to insist issue of there remains a triable majority, Indeed, property. of marital the division summary judgment. precludes fact that supported by the interpretation is such alleges Brown. R.16. She of Ms. affidavit clear, both before Mr. Brown made that divorce, expected he

and after payable to Con- her. would despite the division

sequently, Indeed, regulations, 1056(d)(1). ac- legislative policy § also ren- U.S.C. primary federal 4. provision, pur- corresponding companying tax that Ms. Brown's the fact ders irrelevant 401(a)(13)(A), "assignment” a ported contained in waiver is define § part divorce arrange- as of a state executed "[a]ny direct or indirect as "alienation” arguendo to assume irrevocable) Even if were action. (whether where- revocable are a the settlement manifesta- terms of participant or by party acquires a a benefi- they policy are contained of state because tion against the ciary enforceable or interest judgment, we are still constrained in a state (em- 1.401(a)-13(c)(l)(ii) plan...26 C.F.R. congressional mandate. prefer federal clear supplied). phasis Similarly, Brown's we were to construe Ms. if contingent anticipatory gift to the as an waiver participant to alienate permits 5. ERISA Brown, beneficiary, the fact Dessie remains ordered pursuant a state court in a valid, anticipatory gift if at any all, would be such specific fulfills order that domestic relations rule law and such state under state domes- Such a state in ERISA. criteria set forth policies embodied the federal would contravene “qualified domes- called a tic relations order only frustrate the feder- It would not in ERISA. (QDRO). See 29 U.S.C. relations order” tic 1104(a)(1)(D) but also run al of section mandate 1056(d)(3). provision. 29 anti-alienation ERISA’s afoul of