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Williams v. Williams
2013 UT App 111
| Utah Ct. App. | 2013
|
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Case Information

_________________________________________________________

T HE U TAH C OURT OF A PPEALS

J ERI B OOTH W ILLIAMS , Petitioner Appellee, v.

C LARK E DWARD W ILLIAMS ,

Respondent Appellant.

Memorandum Decision No.

Filed May

Third District, West Jordan Department Honorable Andrew H. Stone

No.

T. Jake Hinkins Aaron S. Gwilliam, Attorneys Appellant Steve S. Christensen, Craig L. Pankratz, and

Samuel J. Sorensen, Attorneys Appellee

J UDGE G REGORY K. O RME authored Memorandum Decision, J UDGES J AMES Z. D AVIS W ILLIAM A. T HORNE J R .

concurred.

ORME, Judge: appeals civil injunction

issued against him favor ex wife, Williams. affirm. Following their separation asked anymore him speak attorney matters related ongoing proceeding. She also changed residences and redacted her new information their divorce documents to keep Clark knowing where lived. Despite her requests no contact, Clark sent Jeri her new home in a text message in August 2011. Jeri reported incident to who turn contacted Clark. Clark assured police he contact Jeri anymore. He also sent Jeri an email with subject line, “i promise to contact you anymore.” Clark true to his word. On contrary, he

continued attempts to interact with Jeri. Between months of August and November sent least sixteen emails shared family email account, to Jeri had direct access, that either addressed specifically her addressed to their children but discussed One email accused Jeri of “destroy[ing] family” and infidelity. Another pleaded with Jeri meet Clark so could resolve their differences.

¶4 A November email called Jeri “con” accused her being sexually active multiple partners high school. In this same email, Clark claimed possession nude photographs Jeri threatened send them both her her church leader, apparently way expose what claimed “two faced” nature. Jeri both testified short while later, an envelope containing two photographs a nude woman. In addition sending nude photographs, Clark

made other August mailed two letters related some jointly owned property direct contravention October no contact order issued by responsible couple’s pending divorce. called cell phone multiple times after unblocking number phone—by using social security number portray request made company as being authorized her—and told hired an v. investigator watch also went home, when she shut the door after seeing there, he continued try talk her.

¶6 By his own admission at the stalking injunction hearing, had hundreds of contacts she, the and the directed him leave alone. testified, “The hundreds letters that got texts, the emails, everything, were—they expressions love and concern, I wanted a second chance. . . . I wanted leave no doubt mind how I felt.” When asked directly if followed through his commitment leave alone, said, “No.” “In order enter a civil stalking injunction, the district court must conclude offense stalking has occurred meets criteria crime stalking.” Coombs Dietrich 2011 UT App 136, 2, 253 1121 (citation internal quotation marks omitted). Anger 14, P.3d 1001. A person commits offense or she “intentionally or knowingly engages a course conduct directed at specific person” “knows should know” the person fear safety “suffer other distress.” Code § ‐ ‐ 106.5(2) (LexisNexis 2012). A “course conduct” defined as “two at toward specific person,” “acts actor . . . surveils, threatens, or communicates . . directly, indirectly, through third party.” Id. 106.5(1)(b). argues because district court’s written

findings mention only calls, text messages, Because statutory provisions effect relevant time do differ materially statutory provisions now effect, we cite current version convenience reader. v. Jeri’s home, that only those contacts can be

considered as evidence stalking, and that these acts by themselves do not support district court’s conclusion that their “volume” supported issuance stalking injunction. However, it is transcript injunction hearing that district court concerned not only with these specific contacts, but with evidence presented, and efforts “undo[]” attempts block communication with him. The stated, “While individually they don’t add up much, I’m concerned about . . quantity them.” In any event, we can affirm district court’s injunction on grounds apparent us record, see Bailey Bayles UT 58, 9–12, P.3d 1158, relevant stalking statute does require myriad contacts but only two or more, see 106.5(1)(b). record clearly supports determination that engaged two or more contacts with that involved threats, surveillance, or communication Jeri. See id . argues that even if is found have engaged two more toward Jeri, do so intentionally or

knowingly with reasonable emotional distress. argues that requisite distress must more than “mere anxiety annoyance” only occurs there is repeated conduct that “outrageous intolerable” “evoke[s] outrage revulsion,” going beyond merely “unreasonable, unkind, unfair.” Anger (citation internal quotation marks omitted). Clark attempts characterize contacts those typical failed familial relationships, contending “were not threats” but “pleas return him” offered man himself admits “he directly attempted communication two occasions through text messaging calls.”

“desperately trying to preserve 34 ‐ year ‐ old marriage.” are not convinced. correctly points out the “outrageousness”

requirement Clark cites from was included in the 2003 version statute not version of the statute in effect today time Clark’s course conduct. courts have not yet determined whether revisions made to stalking statute since “intended to overrule outrageousness requirement.” Id n.4. But we need determine whether outrageousness requirement set forth Salt Lake City Lopez P.2d (Utah Ct. App. 1997), has been overruled because behavior case clearly rises level cause emotional distress under almost any standard, outrageousness.

¶11 Emotional distress defined as “significant mental psychological suffering, whether medical other professional treatment counseling required.” Ann. 106.5(1)(d) (LexisNexis 2012). Each individual act does not have be sufficient distress itself. Ellison v. Stam 28–29, Instead, cumulative effect can taken into account in determining whether mental psychological suffering would result. Id. Here, ignored orders Jeri, a cease contacting her. He threatened send nude photographs her religious leader. sent children via email account which had ready access, called names accused her infidelity sexual promiscuity. Despite her efforts conceal her new address, discovered where lived, her text message her new residence, showed up there person. used social security number when contacting company undo efforts block him texting calling fact these things intent, himself put it, “to leave no doubt mind how I felt” fully aware respecting wishes indication behavior both intentional knowing. easily determine considering cumulative effects actions, subjected such “significant mental psychological suffering.” Utah 106.5(1)(d) (LexisNexis 2012).

¶12 Affirmed.

Rules Appellate Procedure require party seeking “attorney’s fees incurred appeal shall state request explicitly set forth legal basis such an award” argument section party’s brief. R. App. P. 24(a)(9). Jeri request fees manner contemplated rule 24. Instead, requested award attorney fees incurred on appeal separate motion filed briefing concluded. Accordingly, request denied.

Case Details

Case Name: Williams v. Williams
Court Name: Court of Appeals of Utah
Date Published: May 2, 2013
Citation: 2013 UT App 111
Docket Number: 20120208-CA
Court Abbreviation: Utah Ct. App.
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