Mary A. Nelson Rogers appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment in her action challenging Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) tax collection efforts. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court’s dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (b)(6). Davidson v. Kimberly-Clark Corp. , 889 F.3d 956, 963 (9th Cir. 2018). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Rogers’s action because Rogers failed to allege facts sufficient to state any plausible claim. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (a plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief); Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish , 382 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 2004) (a party ’ s conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences need not be accepted as true). To the extent Rogers sought injunctive and equitable relief, such relief is barred by the Anti-Injunction Act (the “Act”), which prohibits any attempt to restrain the IRS’s tax assessment and collection activities, with limited exceptions that do not apply here. 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) (listing statutory exceptions to the Act); Elias v. Connett F.2d 521, 523, 525 (9th Cir. 1990) (setting forth limited judicial exception to the Act).

We reject as meritless Rogers’s contention that her due process rights were violated.

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued *3 in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright , 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009). We do not consider documents not filed with the district court. See United States v. Elias F.2d 870, 874 (9th Cir. 1990).

All pending motions are denied.

AFFIRMED.

[*] This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

[**] The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).