Clifford pleaded guilty selling laced other substances, scheme crimes—as interpreted (1991)—is unconstitutional. controls case, this set aside lack support, affirm. *2 20 3054 2

The facts case are straightforward and undisputed. In Clifford Reed sold a kilogram of heroin to a government informant. The heroin was laced with fentanyl and carfentanil (both substances) and mixed with other, inert to dilute it for sale. Reed acknowledged carfentanil was dangerous, referring to “elephant tranquilizer” and suggesting heroin laced with carfentanil had caused eight recent deaths. Nevertheless, he asked informant to help him purchase two kilograms of carfentanil mix with future supplies of heroin. At point, law enforcement agents stopped car Reed and informant were in, searched and found heroin, and arrested Reed. mixture Reed sold informant weighed 996 grams, and he was

eventually charged distributing 100 grams or more of a mixture containing heroin, 400 grams more of a mixture containing fentanyl, and 100 grams or more of a mixture containing carfentanil. 21 § 841(a)(1). Reed was initially charged distributing than a kilogram of heroin, but a superseding indictment, government revised charge lower actual weight. pleaded guilty all three charges. presentence report, Probation Office calculated offense level

assigning of entire mixture drug resulting highest offense level, carfentanil. Since crime involved than grams less than kilogram carfentanil, Probation Office assigned him a base offense level of U.S.S.G. 2D1.1(a)(5) (c)(4). After a two level reduction accepting responsibility, on a criminal category VI, Probation Office arrived a guideline range months’ imprisonment. It also found crime had statutory minimum sentence months’ imprisonment. objected PSR, arguing he deserved lower he

posed less danger than hypothetical offender sold grams pure heroin carfentanil. introduced an expert’s analysis how much pure (3.300%), fentanyl (0.082%), carfentanil (0.077%) sold. Based estimates—rather than amount total mixture—he proposed correct only months (based an offense level rather than similar reasons, argued applying violate Fifth Amendment right due process. acknowledged went against pointed dissent basis relief. (Stevens, J. dissenting).

The district court ruled Chapman controlling and Reed’s base offense level had been correctly calculated But it ruled in favor another his objections not relevant here, lowering his criminal category to V and his guideline to to months. discretion, the court granted Reed downward variance and sentenced him the month statutory minimum.

Reed appeals solely question whether weight the or the controlled substances should have been used calculate range. He raises two arguments. First, this court should interpret words “mixture” “substance” so as include cases like where substance is small percent mixture. Second, court should alternatively strike statute, 841(b), unconstitutional (at least applied him) “treat[s] dissimilarly situated defendants same.”

Neither these is persuasive, Reed has bigger problem. The Supreme Court already addressed issues Chapman v. United States , (1991), ruled against positions asks us take. Supreme Court there explained purpose “mixture or substance” language is punish street traffickers like distribute drugs cut inert they can sold consumers. Further, Chapman dismisses idea such punishment regime unconstitutional. acknowledged oral argument majority opinion Chapman undercuts arguments. suggests, however, Chapman may control case because, unlike Chapman diluting agents here made up vast majority total weight. Chapman makes no such distinction. further can disregard overturn Chapman three

reasons: (1) majority’s opinion wrong; (2) leads unfair results; (3) later cases “have moved away from majority’s holding .”

We cannot disregard binding precedent Supreme Court. Cross F.3d (7th Cir. This true even if believe Supreme Court opinion unpersuasive leads unfair results. id And even if later cases have questioned reasoning (the cases cites do not), “the Appeals follow case which directly controls, leaving [the *4 No. 20 ‐ 3054 4 Supreme] the prerogative of overruling own decisions.” Rodriguez de Quijas Shearson/Am. Exp., Inc. , 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989).

Relying primarily the dissent in Chapman , also argues that the terms “mixture” “substance” in the statute are ambiguous. Since the majority’s interpretation leads an “absurd result,” interpret differently. But does not propose a definition of “mixture” “substance” that not include brick of heroin. And Chapman provides definitions that do apply case, including “two substances blended together the particles of one are diffused among the particles the other.” Chapman , 500 U.S. at 462 (quoting 9 O XFORD E NGLISH D ICTIONARY 921 (2d ed.1989)). fact, both majority dissent Chapman agreed cut with other substances under § 841(b).

Further, makes clear crime exactly sort Congress intended punish severely when adopted current punishment regime. As described Chapman Congress tried several punishment schemes deter sale before enacting current law. U.S. at 460. As relevant here, Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention Control Act prescribed penalties no regard quantity drug distributed. Pub. L. ‐ 513, Stat. 1236. Unsatisfied results Act, Congress then tied prescribed punishments quantity pure drug involved. See Comprehensive Crime Control Act 1984, Pub. L. ‐ 473, Stat. current scheme took effect when Congress modified 841(b)(1)(A) punish street traffickers heavily tying prescribed sentences “mixture substance containing detectable amount of” drug. at 460–61 (“Congress did want punish retail traffickers less severely, even though they deal smaller quantities drug, such traffickers keep street markets going.”) (citing H.R. Rep. No. ‐ 845, pt. 1, at (1986)). next statute violates Fifth Amendment right due

process. does provide any standards evaluating such right, apart saying “absurd irrational.” held scheme at issue “is rational sentencing scheme” “intended punish severely large volume drug traffickers any level.” Id at (citing H.R. Rep. pt. 1, 12, By punishin g drug traffickers *5 “street weight” their product (regardless purity), Congress hoped disrupt business selling drugs consumers. Id says he entitled be sentenced based relative culpability. He

maintains he should be punished severely wholesaler responsible selling far doses same substances. adds being punished severely than necessary achieve goals sentencing stated 3553(a). these were refuted directly Chapman. “That distributors varying degrees culpability might be subject same does mean system [controlled substance] distribution unconstitutional.”

Finally, extent persists argument have been weight drugs sold, rather than mixture, argument fails. Even if guidelines suggested shorter prison term, district still bound which sentenced. Koons S. Ct. (2018). reasons, AFFIRM judgment.