This appeal is from a conviction of murder in the second degree, the punishment being assessed at five years in the penitentiary. The alleged murdered party was an infant child only three days old, begotten of appellant out of wedlock, but born a little more than a month from the time the appellant and the mother had been lawfully married.
There are five counts in the indictment. Two of them aver that the infant came to its death at the hands of the defendant by means unknown to the grand jury. The fourth count alleges: “That I. B. Warren, on or about the 16th day of May, A. D. 1890, in the State of Texas and County of Bell, did then and there with malice aforethought kill the infant Warren by torture, to-wit: the said I. B. Warren did then and there, on or about the night of the 15th of May, A. D. 1890, take the said infant Warren (the said infant Warren then and there being the same child that was born and given birth to by' Mrs. Alice Warren on the 13th day of May, 1890, in said Bell County, Texas,) from the mother of said infant and from the house of Mrs. M. P. Coons; and on said night did deposit and leave said infant Warren in .the yard of John Powers, in the said State and county, exposed to the prey of ants and flies, without food and without drink, which treatment was then and there torture to said infant Warren, and by means of which torture the said infant Warren, on or about the 16th day of May, A. D. 1890, in the said State and county, did die, said infant Warren being then and there a child of only a few days old and perfectly helpless. And the grand jurors aforesaid do say that the said I. B. Warren, of his malice aforethought, in manner and form aforesaid, did kill and murder the said infant Warren, against the peace and dignity of the State.”
It is upon this count in the indictment, judging from the facts in the case, that the jury must have found the defendant guilty of murder in the second degree, as shown by their verdict. The validity of this conviction depends entirely upon the sufficiency of the evidence to warrant the finding and judgment. In his brief the Assistant Attorney-General says: “The evidence is not as strong as is desirable in such cases, but unless the court think it insufficient the judgment should be affirmed.”
We will give as brief a resume of the facts in the case as the nature of the evidence will permit. ' As above stated, the defendant and his wife were married about the middle of April, 1890. They both knew her condition, that she was pregnant, when they married, but it seems they did not expect the child to be born until at least two months after the time at which it was born. They were boarding at the house of
About 9 o’clock on the evening of the 15th, defendant went to the house for the purpose of getting the child and taking it away. He got it from Mrs. Kramer, who came out on the porch and delivered it to him wrapped in a blanket all ready for the trip. He got in his buggy and started for Temple, where he intended to place the child in the care of Mrs. Crittenden, whom he proposed to get to take care of it until his wife got well and able to move away, and until they could take care of and rear it themselves. He says that after he started toward Temple the child made no noise or movement of any kind until he had reached a point about three miles beyond the river from Belton, when
This is in brief a substantial statement of the facts as they appear in the record before us. This evidence we do not believe is sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt of the murder of his child. Defendant never denied the paternity of the child, and it seems that he was not disposed on his own account to conceal its birth, but that he was induced and agreed that its birth should be kept secret by the earnest solicitations and abuse of his mother-in-law and sisters-in-law, and that on their account alone he consented to the concealment and taking away of the child from Belton. His own statement of the transaction is corroborated by other testimony in its most material features.
In our opinion the preponderance of the evidence goes to show that instead of his having murdered the child or having tortured it to death, it was in fact dead when he received it from Mrs. Kramer at the time he started to carry it from Belton to Temple.
Because the evidence in our opinion is wholly insufficient to support tl}e verdict and judgment, the judgment is reversed’and the cause remanded.
Reversed and remanded.
Judges all present and concurring.
