*1 adequate explanation without its

change policy____ in denying

Neither the Commission order petition denying

Grace’s nor the order

rehearing explain the Commission’s sud- respect policy

den shift in in to small

producer rollover contracts. This is es-

pecially puzzling since the NGPA and 157.40(c)(1) regulations

section in

were effect both cases and have not changed. It is difficult to under- why

stand the Commission has chosen to agreement parties,

set aside an of two into,

freely entered public and what in-

terest the Commission’sorder is intended

to serve.” Order, 61,436-37.

May supra, at perceive justification

We can the Spradling and Riddell rule: If the

parties negotiated are unable to make a

price retroactive to the expiration contract

date, purchaser will have an incentive prolong negotiations during a time of prices,

rising gas and seller will have the (re prolong negotiations incentive to sales) perhaps by

strained fear of reduced falling prices. times of Perhaps why contrary

there are reasons rule is

desirable, but the Commission’s orders hold, therefore, stated them. We the Commission erred its orders.

We reverse and proceedings remand for opinion.

consistent with this

REVERSED and REMANDED. COLON, Plaintiff-Appellant,

Hiram SHAWNEE,

COUNTY OF STATE OF KANSAS, Defendant-Appellee.

United States Court of

employees were entitled to remain on a “lay-off list” for year the lesser of one or period prior the their service.1 As va- arose, employees cancies former retained on the list were entitled to be re- prior positions called to their or to similar positions job within their classification be- fore new were hired. Manzanares, Kan., Topeka, F.G. for Colon, Mr. who was a member of the plaintiff-appellant. Guard, Kansas National was still on the Zima, Joseph County Asst. Shawnee W. layoff list when he was called to active Counselor, Kan., Topeka, defendant-ap- for duty by Secretary Army. the On pellee. day the Mr. reported service, for he was entitled to remain on MOORE, Before McWILLIAMS days. that list for On June ANDERSON, Judges. Circuit completed Mr. Colon his active MOORE, Judge. JOHN P. 3, 1981, and on he re- quested County restore him to his for- presents question This case of wheth- position. County mer refused the re- reemployment rights er the conferred quest. veterans Vietnam Era Veterans’ Re- 1984, adjustment Act of Assistance subsequently filed his com- (the Act), require 2021-2026 plaint alleging this case §§ violation of employer reemployment to offer to a veter- reemployment rights guaranteed by the off, sought an who had been laid but had a limited Act. He restoration to his former eligibility reemployment for when he en- appointment collector or to a tered active service. We hold the of like status with the same senior- requires upon proper application ity sought damages He also for 3, reemployment, pay for a veteran be loss of from precise employment status the veteran had partial Mr. filed a motion for sum- on the date he or she commenced obtained mary judgment question of his duty. We further hold relief, contending that the Act entitled employer required case the was to return eligibility him to retain from the reemployment eligibility the veteran to the he report time received notice to period he would have been twenty-six days before entitled to remain on that list had he not actually entered service. He also con- Nevertheless, service. be- eligibility period tended that the claimed remaining eligibility cause begin July 3, did not expired which the veteran was entitled be- reemployment requested County. employer fore the had a to offer response, County took the him, the district court theory required “tolling” that Mr. Colon’s therefore, judgment employer; we rights reemployment supported affirm. ultimately by the Act. trial court con- specifi- the Act did not permanently

Plaintiff Hiram Colon was cluded that because County cally provide tolling for a employed the defendant rights during Shawnee as a refuse collector veteran’s when eligibility ex- laid off effective October 1980. Under Mr. Colon’s bargaining agree- pired prior to his release from active terms a collective ment in force and Mr. The court further concluded between the union, however, off, permanent employed had not a refuse col- Colon’s laid time. 1. Mr. Colon worked the list for that for 142 therefore, days; he was entitled to remain on lector The Act restores to veterans the rights eligible reemployment, status they enjoyed they when entered active Judgment the Act had not been violated. service. Monroe v. Standard Oil 452 U.S. accordingly entered for the County. 69 L.Ed.2d 226 This Contrary not, however, expressed by to the view restoration does create new court, or rights, “tolling” the trial there must be a nor is or *3 veteran any protection entitled to other preservation layoff period of § than original restoration of the veteran’s any meaning is to have for one who enters position together with accumulated seniori duty layoff active while in a status. That ty and benefits at the time of enlistment or however, tolling, only give the veter activation. Id. at 101 S.Ct. at 2517. employment an the of he or she duty had on the date active commenced. Because Mr. Colon was “in employ” of Shawnee on March controlling statutory provision is 38 date he duty, entered active 2024(c) U.S.C. which states: § employment to retain the Any component member of a Reserve of then available to him. day, On that this the Armed Forces of the United States right was the right to remain on layoff who is ordered to an initial of twenty list for days. Additionally, duty training active of not less than purpose for the applying of shall, three consecutive upon ap- months right to remain on the list for those plication thirty- within days “position” constituted his within the days (1) one such member’s release meaning 2021(a)(2)(B). of § duty from such training active proper application Because he made a satisfactory service ... be entitled to all 3, 1981, July on and was reemployment rights and provid- benefits apparently qualified perform to the duties by chapter ed persons inducted position, Mr. Colon was entitled to be provisions Military Se- layoff restored to the list for a of Act____ lective Service twenty days, or July 1981. Resto- Members the National Guard are mem- ration to status would have returned component” bers of a “reserve by defini- Mr. Colon to the status he 2024(f). enjoyed tion. 38 Additionally, began U.S.C. at the time he active § 2024(c) precisely as the Act incorporates mandate's. § 2021(a)(2)(B), persons which states that § magistrate granted We conclude the who leave a with a summary judgment to the government subdivision of state for induc- conclusion, incorrect reason. This how entitled; tion into military active service are ever, affords Mr. only pyrrhic vic upon satisfactory completion to tory though because even be restored original position to the or to a protected by the Act until no status, seniority, like and vacancies for the collector oc curred before that date. On pertinent While the appear statutes Mr. Colon’s eligibility expired, apply persons perma who are longer and he was no reemploy entitled to nently employed induction, on the date of ment benefits under the Ultimately, Act. statutory protections applied have been then, the trial court denied relief “lay-off' in a status as well. to Mr. Colon. Kelly v. Ford Instrument Div. of Sperry (2d AFFIRMED. Corp., Rand Cir. 1962). Therefore, though even McWILLIAMS, Judge, specially actually working

was not on the date he concurring: he was still “in the employ” Shawnee that I concur the result reached purpose of the Act. majority, but am not in accord with their reasoning. Magistrate’s majority fact I believe to the situation before reasoning Hall, supra, Kelly is correct. us. both to apply was held where a enters on military When Colon military service at a time when he is duty he had thereafter, list, in the while ensuing During list. “lay-off” so-called list, and while still on is nor else on anyone neither recalled to work. recalled to work. That list was far as I’m concerned. the matter as ends disagreement recognize my with 20-day period sense, academic, since, majority is, in a If work, to re and unable either approach, Colon will not then the spond because of job back as refuse collector. I contin- As Readjustment Veterans’ Vietnam Era however, disagree, ue to require Act would that Colon be sistance interpretation view the reemployed upon completion majority *4 upside turns the Act down. I meaning is the which at service. Such Act, meaning and such is the tribute only bearing the Act cases Kelly v. Instrument

the matter. See Ford (2d Cir.1962)

Co., Hall v. Ill. 240

Chicago Eastern R.R. & (N.D.Ill.1964).

F.Supp. majority hold that on date Colon everything Joseph TRUJILLO, on active service Jesse he later him- stopped, presented Petitioner-Appellant, and when his self for v. (20 days) time on the list SULLIVAN, George al., E. et Presumably, to run. started Respondents-Appellees. had approach, if days immediately after during work entry on would have such United States Court right under nullity, been a and Colon’s back on the completion active ser- April least, Certainly, vice. mind at mean that cannot be construed to during recalled to work first 20 days he was and, time, protected, be at the same 20-day

if he was recalled not, is,

period, as he was be back return from his ways. can’t it both insure purpose behind the Act is to person involuntarily who leaves not disad

workbench for service is

vantaged thereby. give It is such not to advantage over fellow work Fishgold Drydock

er. See & Sullivan

Repair Corp., 328 U.S. L.Ed. 1230 know supports approach

no case which taken