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*2 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
In the Matter of the Personal ) No. 95578-6
Restraint of: )
) EN BANC
SAID OMER ALI, )
) Filed __________________ September 17, 2020 Petitioner. )
______________________________ )
MONTOYA-LEWIS, J.—“‘Children are different.’” State v. Houston- Sconiers , 188 Wn.2d 1, 8, 391 P.3d 409 (2017) (quoting Miller v. Alabama , 567 U.S.
460, 480, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2012)). The Eighth Amendment to the
United States Constitution requires our criminal justice system to address this
difference when punishing children. Central to this requirement is that courts must
take into account the differences between children and adults in criminal sentencing.
State v. Ramos , 187 Wn.2d 420, 428, 387 P.3d 650 (2017). Children’s ability to assess risk and make judgments varies distinctly from that of adults because the brain
is not fully mature before adulthood. , 567 U.S. at 471-72. Differences in brain development mean that children possess lessened culpability, poorer judgment, and
greater capacity for change than adults. Id. In order to comply with the Eighth
Amendment, courts must consider the mitigating qualities of youth and have
discretion to impose a proportional punishment based on those qualities. Houston-
Sconiers , 188 Wn.2d at 19. In Houston-Sconiers , we recognized these Eighth
Amendment requirements and held that “[t]rial courts must consider mitigating
qualities of youth at sentencing and must have discretion to impose any sentence
below the otherwise applicable [Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA), ch. 9.94A
RCW] range and/or sentence enhancements.” Id. at 21.
In this case and its companion, In re Personal Restraint of Domingo-Cornelio , No. 97205-2, slip op. (Wash. Sept. 17, 2020), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/,
we consider whether the dual requirements of Houston-Sconiers apply retroactively
on collateral review. We hold that constitutes a significant and
material change in the law that requires retroactive application. Further, we hold that
Ali has established actual and substantial prejudice, and we remand to superior court
for resentencing consistent with .
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY A. Factual Background
In 2008, Said Omer Ali was arrested for his involvement in a series of robberies. Each of the crimes involved a group of male perpetrators, and four victims
identified Ali as one of the assailants. A jury found Ali guilty of five counts of
robbery in the first degree, two counts of attempted robbery in the first degree, and
one count of assault in the first degree. Two of the robbery counts and the assault
count carried a deadly weapon enhancement. Ali was 16 years old at the time of the
crimes, but he was charged and tried in adult court. [1]
Under the SRA, Ali faced a sentence between 240 and 318 months for the substantive charges, plus 24 months each for 3 weapon enhancements. Because the
weapon enhancements must run consecutively under the SRA, the standard sentence
range was 312 to 390 months. RCW 9.94A.533(4)(e).
At sentencing, the State recommended imprisonment for 390 months, which was the high end of the standard range for adults and included the three mandatory
consecutive weapon enhancements. The State argued that youth was not a factor that
would justify an exceptional sentence, citing State v. Ha’mim , 82 Wn. App. 139, 916
P.2d 971 (1996), aff’d , 132 Wn.2d 834, 940 P.2d 633 (1997), overruled in part by
State v. O’Dell , 183 Wn.2d 680, 696, 358 P.3d 359 (2015).
Defense counsel requested an exceptional sentence of 10 years (120 months), which was below the standard range, and argued that the presumptive range was
“grossly excessive in light of the SRA purposes and that the Court does have legal
and factual basis to impose something exceptional below that.” 13 Verbatim Report
of Proceedings (Mar. 27. 2009) (VRP) at 1419-20, 1423. The defense maintained
that the mitigating factors listed in the SRA were nonexclusive and that the court
should consider Ali’s age and background. Ali was only 17 years old at sentencing,
and the State recommended a sentence of 32.5 years. Defense counsel argued that
Ali was “a young adolescent” who “endured extreme turmoil in his young life” and
that “[v]ery little will be gained by crushing his hope and spirit by sending him away
for two lifetimes.” 13 VRP at 1420-23.
Ali presented mitigating testimony regarding his youthfulness and difficult childhood. Dozens of members of his community submitted letters to the court
requesting leniency in his sentencing. Four people also spoke on his behalf at the
sentencing hearing, describing Ali as young and inexperienced but capable of
reform. One community member explained that Ali “has dealt with gang dealing and
peer pressure.” 13 VRP at 1426. Another described him as “a young boy who is a
victim for his whole life, back at home and here” because Ali was born in the midst
of a civil war, grew up in refugee camps, and was placed in high school instead of
middle school when he arrived in the United States at age 13. 13 VRP at 1429. A
family friend asked the court to
look this young boy on a keen eye, give him another chance to rebuild his life, become an active citizen again. And I am sure he will thrive and grow up with dignity and respect with others and to himself. To conclude my statement, as a father, a parent, and a humanitarian, our children make mistakes. And he’s one of those.
13 VRP at 1428.
After hearing the statements from the community members on Ali’s behalf, the sentencing judge explained,
Well, it’s very clear that Mr. Ali has wonderful community and family support. These are individuals of great stature in the community and it is clear that he has a lot of folks looking out for him. But I can’t simply look at the popular support, I have to look at the law. And the question is what does the law require me to impose and is there any justification under the law for imposing a sentence below the standard range. And I cannot find that there is any legal justification that would allow that. So I find that the law requires me to impose a sentence within the standard range.
13 VRP at 1431-32. The court imposed a total sentence of 312 months: the lowest
possible sentence within the standard range with the mandatory enhancements. The
low end of the standard range for each charge would run concurrently, and the
mandatory deadly weapon enhancements would run consecutively. The sentencing
judge acknowledged that 312 months “is a huge sentence for someone of your age.
And I’m very mindful of that. But the law does not allow me to depart from it simply
because of your age.” 13 VRP at 1432. The court also made a point “to note, for the
record that the sentence that was imposed was the lowest sentence that I legally felt
I had the option of imposing in this case. I recognize Mr. Ali’s young age and that is
primarily the reason why that was imposed.” 13 VRP at 1436.
B. Procedural History
Ali appealed unsuccessfully, and his judgment and sentence became final in 2011. Ali filed this personal restraint petition (PRP) in the Court of Appeals in 2017,
asserting that his continued restraint is unlawful under RAP 16.4(c)(2). He argues
that even though it was filed more than a year after his judgment and sentence
became final, his petition is timely under RCW 10.73.100(6)’s exception to the time
bar: there has been a significant change in substantive law that is material to his
sentence and sufficient reasons exist to require retroactive application of the changed
legal standard. He argues that provides a basis both to overcome
the time bar and to entitle him to relief.
The Court of Appeals transferred his petition to this court as a successive petition that raises new grounds for relief. We set Ali’s petition for full consideration
on the merits and also granted review of a companion case, Domingo-Cornelio , slip
op. at 4.
II. ANALYSIS Ali was sentenced as an adult for crimes he committed as a child. He seeks collateral review of that sentence. He filed this PRP more than one year after his
judgment and sentence became final, so the petition is untimely unless it is based
solely on a statutory exception to the time bar. RCW 10.73.090, .100. Ali relies on
the exception for a significant change in the law that is material to his sentence and
requires retroactive application. RCW 10.73.100(6). Ali argues he can overcome the
time bar and is entitled to relief based on . We agree.
In , we held that when juveniles are adjudicated as adults, “[t]rial courts must consider mitigating qualities of youth at sentencing and must
have discretion to impose any sentence below the otherwise applicable SRA range
and/or sentence enhancements.” 188 Wn.2d at 21 (emphasis added). There, 16- and
17-year-old defendants were adjudicated as adults for a series of robberies they
committed on Halloween. Id. at 8. The charges triggered the mandatory automatic
decline statute, RCW 13.04.030(1)(e)(v), and both defendants were tried and
convicted as adults. Id. at 12. Each was convicted of several counts of robbery in the
first degree, one count of conspiracy to commit robbery, one count of assault in the
second degree, and multiple firearm enhancements. Id. Under the SRA, one
defendant faced a sentencing range of 501-543 months, which included 372 months
for the firearm enhancements; the other faced a sentencing range of 441-483 months,
which included 312 months for the firearm enhancements. Id. at 12-13. The State
recommended, and the trial court accepted, an exceptional sentence below the
standard range: zero months on each of the substantive counts for both defendants.
Id. at 13. The defendants received 372 and 312 months, respectively, the full time
for the consecutive weapon enhancements. Id. At sentencing, the judge heard
mitigating testimony regarding both defendants’ youth but “expressed frustration at
his inability to exercise greater discretion over the sentences imposed.” Id. The Court
of Appeals affirmed the convictions and rejected the defendants’ challenges to their
sentences. Id.
On review, we traced the United States Supreme Court’s recent decisions that “explicitly hold that the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution
compels us to recognize that children are different.” Id. at 18; see, e.g. , Miller , 567
U.S. at 479-80 (the Eighth Amendment forbids mandatory sentences of life without
parole (LWOP) for juvenile offenders); Graham v. Florida , 560 U.S. 48, 74, 130 S.
Ct. 2011, 176 L. Ed. 2d 825 (2010) (the Eighth Amendment forbids LWOP for non-
homicide juvenile offenders); Roper v. Simmons , 543 U.S. 551, 578, 125 S. Ct. 1183,
161 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2005) (the Eighth Amendment forbids the death penalty for juvenile
offenders). “In each case, [ Roper , Graham , and ,] the Court found that
legitimate penological goals failed to justify the sentences [that it] invalidated as
applied to youth.” Id. at 19 n.4. Those cases held that certain punishments are
impermissible because of three significant differences between children and adults:
(1) juveniles are more likely to possess a “lack of maturity and an underdeveloped
sense of responsibility . . . [and t]hese qualities often result in impetuous and ill-
considered actions and decisions,” (2) “juveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible
to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure,” and (3) “the
character of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of an adult [and t]he personality
traits of juveniles are more transitory, less fixed,” and more capable of reform.
Roper , 543 U.S. at 569-70 (citing studies).
In , we recognized that those cases invalidated certain sentences for juvenile offenders because children have diminished culpability, which
renders some punishments “unconstitutionally disproportionate for youth.” 188
Wn.2d at 19 n.4. We concluded that
[t]hese cases make two substantive rules of law clear: first, “that a sentencing rule permissible for adults may not be so for children,” rendering certain sentences that are routinely imposed on adults disproportionately too harsh when applied to youth, and second, that the Eighth Amendment requires another protection, besides numerical proportionality, in juvenile sentencings—the exercise of discretion.
Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Miller , 567 U.S. at 481). We held that “sentencing
courts must have complete discretion to consider mitigating circumstances
associated with the youth of any juvenile defendant, even in the adult criminal justice
system . . . . To the extent our state statutes have been interpreted to bar such
discretion with regard to juveniles, they are overruled.” Id. at 21 (footnote omitted)
(citing State v. Brown , 139 Wn.2d 20, 29, 983 P.2d 608 (1999)). Finally, we held
that “[t]rial courts must consider mitigating qualities of youth at sentencing and must
have discretion to impose any sentence below the otherwise applicable SRA range
and/or sentence enhancements.” Id. (emphasis added).
Following , Graham , and Roper , identified a category of sentences that are beyond courts’ authority to impose: adult standard
SRA ranges and enhancements that would be disproportionate punishment for
juveniles with diminished culpability . Recognizing that “legitimate penological
goals fail[] to justify” certain sentences as applied to youth, we held that courts must
exercise discretion and consider the mitigating qualities of youth to determine
whether standard SRA ranges and enhancements are proportionate for a particular
juvenile in order to avoid imposing unconstitutionally disproportionate sentences.
Id. at 19 n.4. Thus, we recognized that the Eighth Amendment requires that the
sentencing judge consider the defendant’s youthfulness and retain absolute
discretion to impose a lower sentence. Id. at 34.
Not long after we decided Houston-Sconiers , we accepted review of In re Personal Restraint of Meippen , 193 Wn.2d 310, 440 P.3d 978 (2019). A majority of
the court declined to reach the question of retroactivity in that case, instead holding
that “[e]ven assuming Meippen can show that is a significant,
material change in the law that applies retroactively, [the petitioner was] not entitled
to collateral relief because he [did] not demonstrate that any error actually and
substantially prejudiced him.” Id. at 312. As discussed below, Ali does demonstrate
actual and substantial prejudice, so we must decide whether is a
significant and material change in the law that requires retroactive application. [2]
A. Houston-Sconiers Requires Retroactive Application Under RCW 10.73.100(6), the one year time limit to file a PRP does not apply when a petition is based on a significant change in the law, which is material to the
conviction or sentence, and sufficient reasons exist to require retroactive application
of the changed legal standard. constitutes such a change in the
law, and Ali’s PRP is, therefore, timely.
1. Significant Change in the Law represents a significant change in the law because it
requires the sentencing court to consider the youthfulness of the defendant. A
significant change in the law exists “when an intervening appellate decision
overturns a prior appellate decision that was determinative of a material issue.” State
v. Miller , 185 Wn.2d 111, 114, 371 P.3d 528 (2016) (citing In re Pers. Restraint of
Yung-Cheng Tsai , 183 Wn.2d 91, 104, 351 P.3d 138 (2015)). Prior to Houston-
Sconiers , we held that the SRA “deprives a sentencing court of discretion to impose
an exceptional sentence downward below the time specified for a mandatory deadly
weapon enhancement.” Brown , 139 Wn.2d at 22. Under Brown , Ali’s sentencing
RCW 10.73.090 “is a threshold inquiry; we do not have to decide whether the entire claim is
completely meritorious in order to decide whether it fits within an exception to the time bar.” In
re Pers. Restraint of Schorr , 191 Wn.2d 315, 320, 422 P.3d 451 (2018) (citing In re Pers. Restraint
of Yung-Cheng Tsai , 183 Wn.2d 91, 99-108, 351 P.3d 138 (2015)). “To actually obtain relief on
collateral review based on a constitutional error the petitioner must demonstrate [prejudice] by a
preponderance of the evidence.” In re Pers. Restraint of Davis , 152 Wn.2d 647, 671, 101 P.3d 1
(2004) (emphasis added).
court was required to run each of his weapon enhancements consecutively and had
no discretion to run them concurrently. In Houston-Sconiers , we stated explicitly
that we overruled any interpretation that would bar such discretion with regard to
juveniles, citing to Brown and recognizing that the case failed to address juveniles.
188 Wn.2d at 21 n.5. Prior to Houston-Sconiers , sentencing courts did not have
discretion to consider the defendant’s age at sentencing as a basis to run weapon
enhancements concurrently. Thus, Houston-Sconiers is a significant change in the
law because it overruled Brown .
Another “‘test to determine whether an [intervening case] represents a significant change in the law is whether the defendant could have argued this issue
before publication of the decision.’” , 185 Wn.2d at 115 (alteration in original)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re Pers. Restraint of Lavery , 154
Wn.2d 249, 258-59, 111 P.3d 837 (2005)). Even if Ali’s sentencing court had
discretion to run the sentence enhancements concurrently before ,
Ali could not have argued that the court must consider the mitigating factors of his
youthfulness and that it had absolute discretion to impose any sentence below the
applicable SRA range and sentence enhancements. 188 Wn.2d at 21. Ali could have,
and did, argue that the court had some discretion and that it should consider
youthfulness. But before , he could not have argued that the court
was required to consider youthfulness and could impose a lesser sentence based on
youth. Under either test proffered to demonstrate a significant change in the law,
Houston-Sconiers qualifies.
2. Materiality Houston-Sconiers is material to Ali’s case. Ali was sentenced to a standard adult range under the SRA, which included mandatory consecutive weapon
enhancements, just as in . If Houston-Sconiers applies
retroactively, it would affect a materially determinative issue in Ali’s petition:
whether the sentencing judge had discretion to impose a lower sentence given the
mitigating testimony regarding his youthfulness. The sentencing judge heard
testimony and argument regarding Ali’s youthfulness but felt that she had no
discretion to impose any sentence below the bottom of the standard range, explaining
that “the law does not allow me to depart from it simply because of your age.” 13
VRP at 1432. If applies retroactively, it would materially affect
Ali’s sentence because it would allow the sentencing judge discretion to run the
weapon enhancements concurrently or impose any exceptional sentence downward
based on youthfulness. [3] Ali received the kind of sentence that implicates Houston-
Sconiers ; therefore, that case is material.
The State argues that Houston-Sconiers is a significant change in the law but is not material to Ali’s case because Houston-Sconiers is limited to effective life
sentences. Nothing in Houston-Sconiers limited the holding to life sentences or the
functional equivalent. In fact, one of the defendants in Houston-Sconiers received a
sentence of 312 months, the same as Ali. 188 Wn.2d at 13. We explicitly stated that
“sentencing courts must have complete discretion to consider mitigating
circumstances associated with the youth of any juvenile defendant , even in the adult
criminal justice system,” and that “[t]rial courts must consider mitigating qualities
of youth at sentencing and must have discretion to impose any sentence below the
otherwise applicable SRA range and/or sentence enhancements .” Id. at 21 (emphasis
added). [4] Houston-Sconiers applies to adult standard range sentences as well as
mandatory enhancements under the SRA imposed for crimes committed while the
defendant was a child. This is material to Ali’s case because he was sentenced as an
adult under the SRA for crimes he committed as a child.
3. Retroactivity announced a new substantive constitutional rule that must
be applied retroactively upon collateral review. Washington courts follow the test
laid out in Teague v. Lane , 489 U.S. 288, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 103 L. Ed. 2d 334 (1989)
to determine whether a rule applies retroactively. See In re Pers. Restraint of
Colbert , 186 Wn.2d 614, 623-26, 380 P.3d 504 (2016). Under Teague , a new rule
applies retroactively on collateral review only if it is a new substantive rule of
constitutional law or a watershed rule of criminal procedure. Montgomery v.
Louisiana , __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 718, 728, 193 L. Ed. 2d 599 (2016). Houston-
Sconiers applies retroactively because it announced (1) a new rule (2) of
constitutional magnitude (3) that is substantive.
First, announced a new rule. Whether there is a “new rule” under Teague is a distinct inquiry from whether there has been a significant change
in the law. Tsai , 183 Wn.2d at 103-05. A new rule is one that breaks new ground or
imposes a new obligation, or “‘if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at
the time the defendant’s conviction became final.’” Id. at 104 (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting State v. Evans , 154 Wn.2d 438, 444, 114 P.3d 627 (2005)).
“‘If before the opinion is announced, reasonable jurists could disagree on the rule of
law, the rule is new.’” Id. (quoting Evans , 154 Wn.2d at 444). The dual mandates of , that sentencing courts must consider youth and must have
discretion to impose any exceptional sentence downward based on youth, were not
dictated by existing precedent at the time Ali’s conviction became final. Reasonable
jurists could disagree whether the court had such discretion or whether they could
consider youth; however, because no prior precedent required courts to do so,
Houston-Sconiers announced a new rule.
Second, we decided Houston-Sconiers on constitutional grounds. We concluded that “the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution compels
us to recognize that children are different” and “courts must address those
differences in order to comply with the Eighth Amendment[] with discretion to
consider the mitigating qualities of youth.” , 188 Wn.2d at 18-19.
We reached this conclusion based on rules stemming from Roper , Graham , and , which we identified as “substantive rules”: some sentences routinely
imposed on adults are disproportionately too harsh when imposed on children who
lack adult culpability, and the Eighth Amendment requires the exercise of discretion
in order to protect such children from disproportionate punishment. Id. at 19 n.4.
Third, announced a substantive constitutional rule. “Substantive rules . . . set forth categorical constitutional guarantees that place
certain criminal laws and punishments altogether beyond the State’s power to
impose” and include “‘rules prohibiting a certain category of punishment for a class
of defendants because of their status or offense.’” Montgomery , 136 S. Ct. at 729,
728 (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh , 492 U.S. 302, 330, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 106 L. Ed. 2d
256 (1989), abrogated on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia , 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.
Ct. 2242, 153 L. Ed. 2d 335 (2002)). “Procedural rules, in contrast, are designed to
enhance the accuracy of a conviction or sentence by regulating ‘the manner of
determining the defendant’s culpability.’” Id. at 730 (quoting Schriro v. Summerlin ,
542 U.S. 348, 353, 124 S. Ct. 2519, 159 L. Ed. 2d 442 (2004)). Houston-Sconiers
established a category of punishments that are prohibited: adult standard SRA ranges
and enhancements that would be disproportionate punishment for juveniles who
possess diminished culpability. It also established a mechanism necessary to
effectuate that substantive rule: sentencing courts must consider the mitigating
qualities of youth and have discretion to impose sentences below what the SRA
mandates.
Following , Graham , and Roper , recognized that “legitimate penological goals fail[] to justify” certain sentences as applied to youth,
and courts must have the discretion to impose sentences below the SRA,
proportionate to the individual’s culpability. 188 Wn.2d at 19 n.4. Without the
context of a defendant’s youthfulness and the discretion to impose something less
than what the SRA mandates, sentencing courts cannot protect juveniles’ Eighth
Amendment right to be free from unconstitutionally disproportionate punishment.
The discretion and consideration that requires are necessary to
effectuate the substantive rule that certain punishments routinely imposed on adults
are unconstitutional as applied to youth.
Miller and Montgomery compel the conclusion that is a new substantive constitutional rule. Miller held that mandatory LWOP sentences for
juveniles violate the Eighth Amendment because “[b]y making youth (and all that
accompanies it) irrelevant to imposition of that harshest prison sentence, such a
scheme poses too great a risk of disproportionate punishment.” 567 U.S. at 479. In
Montgomery , the Supreme Court explained that “ Miller took as its starting premise
the principle established in Roper and Graham that ‘children are constitutionally
different from adults for purposes of sentencing.’” 136 S. Ct. at 733 (quoting Miller ,
567 U.S. at 471). The Court concluded that mandatory LWOP for children
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment because those differences “result from
children’s ‘diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform,’” and “‘the
distinctive attributes of youth diminish the penological justifications’” for imposing
certain punishments on juveniles. Id. (quoting , 567 U.S. at 471-72). A life
sentence for a child is rarely constitutional, and the sentencing court must exercise
discretion and consider youth and its effect on a child’s culpability and capacity for
change in order to distinguish between “children whose crimes reflect transient
immaturity and those rare children whose crimes reflect irreparable corruption.” Id.
at 734. [5]
The same constitutional principles form the foundation of Houston-Sconiers . In Houston-Sconiers , we recognized that the Eighth Amendment compels courts to
treat children differently from adults because the legitimate penological goals fail to
justify certain sentences for juveniles in light of the mitigating qualities of youth.
188 Wn.2d at 18. We concluded that the Eighth Amendment requires courts to
consider the mitigating qualities of youth at sentencing and to have absolute
discretion to impose anything less than the standard adult sentence because children
possess diminished culpability, and “certain sentences that are routinely imposed on
adults [are] disproportionately too harsh when applied to youth.” Id. at 18, 19 n.4.
Houston-Sconiers is substantive because it placed certain adult sentences beyond
courts’ authority to impose on juveniles who possess such diminished culpability
that the adult standard SRA ranges and enhancements would be disproportionate
punishment.
The fact that a juvenile could receive a sentence within the adult standard range if the sentencing court complies with the dual requirements of Houston-
Sconiers does not render procedural. Miller did not foreclose a
sentencing court’s ability to impose LWOP on all juveniles; it acknowledged that
such a punishment may be appropriate for “‘the rare juvenile offender whose crime
that substantive rule. Like , ’s procedural component (consideration of
youth and discretion to impose sentences below the SRA) is necessary to achieve the substantive
protection (punishment proportionate to culpability).
reflects irreparable corruption,’” as long as the sentencing court takes the
defendant’s youth into consideration as the Eighth Amendment requires. Miller , 567
U.S. at 479-80 (quoting Roper , 543 U.S. at 573). But the sentencing court must
engage in this consideration in order to determine whether the juvenile falls within
the category of people for whom such a severe and rarely imposed punishment would
be permissible. Similarly, under Houston-Sconiers , sentencing courts must exercise
discretion and consider youth to determine whether the child falls within the
category of juveniles for whom standard adult sentences or enhancements are
permissible. Like in Miller , announced a procedural component
as a mechanism to protect the substantive rule. The substantive protection of
proportionate punishment ceases to exist without the mechanism to determine
whether the juvenile belongs in the class of culpability that would allow adult
sentences versus the more likely outcome of a sentence that reflects the juvenile’s
immaturity. This does not transform ’s substantive rule into a
procedural rule.
In Montgomery , the Supreme Court held that Miller was not procedural because it “did more than require a sentencer to consider a juvenile offender’s youth
before imposing life without parole; it established that the penological justifications
for life without parole collapse in light of ‘the distinctive attributes of youth.’” 136
S. Ct. at 734 (quoting , 567 U.S. at 472). In reaching that conclusion, the Court
rejected the State’s argument that Miller announced a procedural rule because it
mandated a process of considering youth before imposing a particular sentence. Id.
at 734. The Court explained that that argument
conflates a procedural requirement necessary to implement a substantive guarantee with a rule that “regulate[s] only the manner of determining the defendant’s culpability.” There are instances in which a substantive change in the law must be attended by a procedure that enables a prisoner to show that he falls within the category of persons whom the law may no longer punish. . . . Those procedural requirements do not, of course, transform substantive rules into procedural ones.
Id. at 734-35 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Schriro , 542 U.S. at
353). The Court concluded that Miller announced a substantive rule of constitutional
law because “it rendered life without parole an unconstitutional penalty for ‘a class
of defendants because of their status’—that is, juvenile offenders whose crimes
reflect the transient immaturity of youth.” Id. at 734 (quoting Penry , 492 U.S. at
330).
Our holding in Houston-Sconiers contains the same substantive and procedural components as Miller . followed Miller and its
progeny, which centered on the substantive guaranty of the Eighth Amendment:
punishment proportionate to culpability. Montgomery , 136 S. Ct. at 732-33
(“Protection against disproportionate punishment is the central substantive
guarantee of the Eighth Amendment and goes far beyond the manner of determining
a defendant’s sentence.”). Like , includes a procedural
component that specifies a method of achieving its substantive requirement: courts
must consider youthfulness with the knowledge that they have absolute discretion to
impose any sentence less than the standard adult sentence based on a finding of
diminished culpability due to youth.
Again, this does not render Houston-Sconiers procedural. Rather than merely establishing a manner of determining the defendants’ culpability, Houston-Sconiers
prohibits certain punishments when imposed without the consideration and
discretion that the Eighth Amendment requires. See Montgomery , 136 S. Ct. at 735
(“The hearing does not replace but rather gives effect to Miller ’s substantive holding
that life without parole is an excessive sentence for children whose crimes reflect
transient immaturity.”). Houston-Sconiers prohibits a certain category of
punishment (adult standard SRA ranges and enhancements) for a class of juvenile
defendants because of their status (juveniles who possess such diminished capacity
that those punishments would be unconstitutionally disproportionate). That
Houston-Sconiers prohibits a broader category of punishments than LWOP or an
effective life sentence is inapposite. The difference is one of scope, not of kind. [6]
Like , protects juveniles from receiving certain
disproportionate sentences. Houston-Sconiers rendered certain adult sentences
beyond the courts’ authority to impose on juveniles who possess such diminished
culpability that the standard SRA ranges and sentences would be disproportionate
punishment. The Eighth Amendment requires both consideration of youthfulness
and absolute discretion in order to avoid imposing unconstitutionally
disproportionate sentences on juveniles. announced a new
substantive rule that must be applied retroactively.
Houston-Sconiers satisfies RCW 10.73.100(6)’s exemption to the time bar: (1) it constitutes a significant change in the law (2) that is material to Ali’s sentence
and (3) requires retroactive application. Therefore, Ali’s PRP is timely under RCW
10.73.100(6), and he may be entitled to relief. In order to obtain relief, he must show
that he was actually and substantially prejudiced by the error in sentencing and there
are no other adequate remedies available under the circumstances.
B. Ali Demonstrates Actual and Substantial Prejudice “We have three available options when reviewing a personal restraint petition: (1) dismiss the petition, (2) transfer the petition to a superior court for a full
determination on the merits or a reference hearing, or (3) grant the petition.” In re
Sconiers is incorrect and harmful, or that its legal underpinnings have changed, nor does the
dissent.
Pers. Restraint of Yates , 177 Wn.2d 1, 17, 296 P.3d 872 (2013). A petitioner must
demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that he was actually and
substantially prejudiced by the constitutional error in order to obtain relief on
collateral review. In re Pers. Restraint of Davis , 152 Wn.2d 647, 671-72, 101 P.3d
1 (2004). A reference hearing “is appropriate where the petitioner makes the required
prima facie showing, but ‘the merits of the contentions cannot be determined solely
on the record.’” Yates , 177 Wn.2d at 18 (quoting In re Pers. Restraint of Hews , 99
Wn.2d 80, 88, 660 P.2d 263 (1983)).
In , we explained that the sentencing court should have considered
mitigating circumstances related to the defendant’s youth—including age and its “hallmark features,” such as the juvenile’s “immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences.” It must also consider factors like the nature of the juvenile’s surrounding environment and family circumstances, the extent of the juvenile’s participation in the crime, and “the way familial and peer pressures may have affected him [or her.]” And it must consider how youth impacted any legal defense, along with any factors suggesting that the child might be successfully rehabilitated.
188 Wn.2d at 23 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting , 567 U.S.
at 477); see also Gilbert , 193 Wn.2d at 176. We also held that “sentencing courts
must have absolute discretion to depart as far as they want below otherwise
applicable SRA ranges and/or sentencing enhancements.” , 188
Wn.2d at 9.
Ali has demonstrated actual and substantial prejudice. His sentencing judge was presented with, and considered, testimony and evidence regarding the mitigating
factors of Ali’s youthfulness, but she found that she lacked the discretion to impose
an exceptional sentence downward based on those mitigating factors. The State
requested a high end standard sentence of 390 months. Ali’s defense counsel
requested an exceptional downward sentence of 10 years (120 months), arguing that
Ali was a “young adolescent” at the time of the crimes, and “[v]ery little will be
gained by crushing his hope and spirit by sending him away for two lifetimes, which
is what the State is asking for.” 13 VRP at 1420, 1422. Ali presented letters and
testimony from members of his community, who referenced his age, inexperience,
and susceptibility to peer pressure, and the fact that “children make mistakes.” 13
VRP at 1424-29.
Ali has demonstrated prejudice by a preponderance of the evidence. The judge imposed 312 months, the minimum sentence she had discretion to impose under the
SRA. She imposed the lowest available sentence after hearing and considering
testimony from family, friends, and community members who knew Ali well and
described his inexperience, challenges with peer pressure, and potential for
rehabilitation. She made a point to note for the record that she was imposing what
she believed to be the lowest available sentence and that Ali’s age was the primary
reason she imposed the low end sentence.
Ali’s case is unlike Meippen , where the sentencing judge imposed a high end standard range sentence but said nothing about whether his discretion was limited to
the standard range and, instead, emphasized his reasons for imposing a sentence at
the high end of the range. 193 Wn.2d at 313. While nothing in the record in Meippen
suggested that the sentencing judge would have exercised discretion to depart from
the SRA in light of the defendant’s youth, id. at 317, here, the sentencing judge made
a point to state that she was ordering the lowest sentence she had discretion to and
that she was doing so primarily because of Ali’s age.
Ali’s sentencing comported with only one of the two constitutional requirements we announced in . The sentencing judge considered
the mitigating factors of Ali’s youth and arguments for an exceptional sentence, but
because she did not have the discretion to impose any sentence below the standard
SRA range and mandatory enhancements, she sentenced according to the SRA’s
mandates for adult sentencing. Based on the record, it appears that more likely than
not, the judge would have imposed a lower sentence had she understood that the
Eighth Amendment requires absolute discretion to impose any sentence below the
standard range based on youthful diminished culpability. Since
applies retroactively, Ali was actually and substantially prejudiced by the sentencing
court’s (understandable) error.
C. Ali Is Entitled to Resentencing A court will only grant relief by a PRP if other remedies available to the petitioner are inadequate under the circumstances. RAP 16.4(d). The State argues
that Washington’s Miller -fix statute, RCW 9.94A.730, is an adequate remedy
because it would allow Ali to petition for early release after serving 20 years of his
26 year sentence. We disagree.
The -fix statute does not necessarily provide a remedy to a Houston- Sconiers violation. RCW 9.94A.730 permits a person convicted of crimes committed
when they were under 18 years old to petition for early release after serving 20 years
in confinement. After receiving the petition, the Department of Corrections will
assess the petitioner’s dangerousness and the likelihood that they will engage in
future criminal behavior. RCW 9.94A.730(3). The assessment at this stage is not
whether the person possessed adult culpability at the time of the crimes but whether
they pose a continued danger after 20 years of incarceration. In ,
we emphasized that sentencing courts must consider the mitigating qualities of youth
and have absolute discretion “ at the time of sentencing itself , regardless of what
opportunities for discretionary release may occur down the line.” 188 Wn.2d at 20
(emphasis added). We acknowledged that “[s]tatutes like RCW 9.94A.730 may
provide a remedy on collateral review,” but we viewed that statute as “just one
possible remedy . . . on postconviction review.” Id. at 23, 22 (emphasis added).
Additionally, Houston-Sconiers applies to all juveniles sentenced as adults under the SRA, including those who received far less than life sentences. Id. at 21.
While RCW 9.94A.730 might provide an adequate remedy for a Miller violation, it
may be grossly inadequate under the circumstances of a Houston-Sconiers violation.
As explained above, Houston-Sconiers is not limited to life sentences, and, in this
case, the Miller -fix statute would still require Ali to serve most of the sentence
imposed in violation of Houston-Sconiers before he could even be considered for
early release. Although Miller is limited to life sentences and de facto life sentences,
Houston-Sconiers applies to any adult standard sentence imposed on a juvenile, so
RCW 9.94A.730 cannot provide an adequate remedy under all circumstances. [7]
A statute that permits early release after 20 years of incarceration based on rehabilitation is not always an adequate remedy when a sentencing court fails to
comply with the dual mandates of . That case announced a rule
requiring something more than Miller . It is imperative for courts to consider
youthfulness at sentencing and for courts to have absolute discretion to impose any
sentence below the SRA, including as little as no prison time, for crimes committed
by children. Thus, under Houston-Sconiers , Ali’s sentencing range went from 312-
390 months to 0-390 months. RCW 9.94A.730 would permit Ali to petition for early
release only after serving 240 months of the 312 month sentence imposed in
violation of . Under these circumstances, other available remedies
are inadequate, and Ali is entitled to resentencing.
III. CONCLUSION
We hold that Houston-Sconiers is a significant and material change in the law
and that it announced a new substantive constitutional rule that must be applied
retroactively upon collateral review. Ali has established actual and substantial
prejudice, and his PRP is granted. We remand to superior court for resentencing
consistent with .
In re Pers. Restraint of Ali
WE CONCUR:
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In re Pers. Restraint of Ali
JOHNSON, J. (dissenting)—I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that
our cases establish a substantive rule of constitutional interpretation requiring
retroactive application—though I agree our cases can be read to establish a
procedural factor requiring sentencing judges to consider general qualities of youth
in considering the discretionary sentencing decision. Our cases, however, also
recognize that the sentencing framework under the Sentencing Reform Act of
1981, ch. 9.94A RCW, continues to guide sentencing decisions for juveniles in
adult court. In order to maintain principles of consistency and finality in
sentencing, I view our cases as establishing additional procedural factors
applicable to the sentencing process, and, as being procedural not retroactive. I
dissent.
ANALYSIS This case asks us to decide whether State v. Houston-Sconiers , 188 Wn.2d 1, 391 P.3d 409 (2017), announced a new, substantive rule of constitutional law that
applies retroactively. There, we held that “courts must consider mitigating qualities , No. 95578-6
(Johnson, J., dissenting)
of youth at sentencing and must have discretion to impose any sentence below the
otherwise applicable [Sentencing Reform Act of 1981] range and/or sentence
enhancements.” Houston-Sconiers , 188 Wn.2d at 21. The majority reasons that must apply retroactively because it established the same kinds of
substantive and procedural components as the United States Supreme Court’s
decision in Miller v. Alabama , 567 U.S. 460, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407
(2012), and Miller applies retroactively. See Montgomery v. Louisiana , __ U.S. __,
136 S. Ct. 718, 732, 193 L. Ed. 2d 599 (2016). I disagree.
In my view, does not contain a substantive rule because, unlike , it does not set a category of punishment altogether beyond the
State’s power to impose for a class of offenders. To understand the distinction
between substantive and procedural rules, we must engage with the Eighth
Amendment analysis at the heart of the United States Supreme Court’s juvenile
sentencing decisions. U.S. C ONST . amend. VIII.
The United States Supreme Court has told us that the Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishments, including “‘extreme sentences that are
grossly disproportionate to the crime.’” Graham v. Florida , 560 U.S. 48, 60, 130 S.
Ct. 2011, 176 L. Ed. 2d 825 (2010) (internal quotations marks omitted) (quoting
Harmelin v. Michigan , 501 U.S. 957, 1001, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 115 L. Ed. 2d 836
(1991) (controlling opinion of Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in , No. 95578-6
(Johnson, J., dissenting)
judgment)). Miller implicated two lines of United States Supreme Court precedent
regarding the proportionality of punishments. 567 U.S. at 470.
The first line of precedent “has adopted categorical bans on sentencing practices based on mismatches between the culpability of a class of offenders and
the severity of a penalty.” Miller , 567 U.S. at 470. These categorical bans create
substantive rules of constitutional law: they place certain punishments “altogether
beyond the State’s power to impose.” Montgomery , 136 S. Ct. at 729. Substantive
rules are retroactive because when the State imposes an unconstitutional sentence,
that punishment is always unlawful. When a substantive rule has eliminated the
State’s power to impose a particular punishment, the “possibility of a valid result
does not exist”—even “the use of flawless sentencing procedures [cannot]
legitimate a punishment where the Constitution immunizes the defendant from the
sentence imposed.” Montgomery , 136 S. Ct. at 730.
The second line of precedent holds that sentencing laws that make the harshest punishments mandatory pose “too great a risk of disproportionate
punishment,” so those sentences can be imposed only when a sentencing court is
able to “consider the characteristics of a defendant and the details of his offense” to
ensure the harshness of the punishment matches the individual offender’s
culpability for the crime. , 567 U.S. at 479, 470. These cases condition the
imposition of the law’s harshest sentences on a particular procedure—namely, a , No. 95578-6
(Johnson, J., dissenting)
sentencing judge’s consideration of the offender’s individual culpability—“to
enhance the accuracy of a . . . sentence by regulating ‘the manner of determining
the defendant’s culpability.’” Montgomery , 136 S. Ct. at 730 (quoting Schriro v.
Summerlin , 542 U.S. 348, 353, 124 S. Ct. 2519, 159 L. Ed. 2d 442 (2004)). New
procedural rules are generally not retroactive because they merely enhance the
accuracy of future sentencing rather than taking a category of punishments out of
the State’s hands altogether. Accordingly, the announcement of a new procedural
rule does not “have the automatic consequence of invalidating a defendant’s
conviction or sentence.” Montgomery , 136 S. Ct. at 730. Automatically
invalidating sentences imposed under procedures that were understood to be
constitutional at the time would “seriously undermine[] the principle of finality
which is essential to the operation of our criminal justice system” and deprive
criminal law “of much of its deterrent effect.” Teague v. Lane , 489 U.S. 288, 309,
109 S. Ct. 1060, 103 L. Ed. 2d 334 (1989).
Drawing from both lines of precedent, in my view, Miller announced both a new substantive rule and a new procedural requirement. ’s substantive rule
“rendered life without parole an unconstitutional penalty for ‘a class of defendants
because of their status’—that is, juvenile offenders whose crimes reflect the
transient immaturity of youth”—because the distinctive attributes of youth are
inconsistent with the penological justifications for imposing life without parole. , No. 95578-6
(Johnson, J., dissenting)
Montgomery , 136 S. Ct. at 734 (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh , 492 U.S. 302, 330, 109
S. Ct. 2934, 106 L. Ed. 2d 256 (1989)). In order to enforce that categorical
constitutional guaranty, Miller ’s procedural component requires a sentencing judge
to consider a juvenile offender’s youth and attendant characteristics “to separate
those juveniles who may be sentenced to life without parole from those who may
not.” Montgomery , 136 S. Ct. at 735. These rules work together: “when the
Constitution prohibits a particular form of punishment for a class of persons, an
affected prisoner receives a procedure through which he can show that he belongs
to the protected class.” Montgomery , 136 S. Ct. at 735. Both rules apply to juvenile
sentences imposed after Miller .
However, only Miller ’s substantive rule applies to juvenile sentences imposed before Miller was decided. See Montgomery , 136 S. Ct. at 736. States
must ensure that juveniles whose crimes reflected only transient immaturity will
not be forced to serve a disproportionate sentence in violation of the Eighth
Amendment, but “does not require States to relitigate sentences” so a
sentencing judge can consider youthfulness under the procedures Miller
established “in every case where a juvenile offender received mandatory life
without parole.” Montgomery , 136 S. Ct. at 736. Instead, States can establish their
own procedures to remedy such sentences retroactively, including “by permitting
juvenile homicide offenders to be considered for parole.” Montgomery , 136 S. Ct. , No. 95578-6
(Johnson, J., dissenting)
at 736 (citing W YO . S TAT . A NN . § 6-10-301(c) (2013) (“juvenile homicide
offenders eligible for parole after 25 years”)). [1] Under the Eighth Amendment, the
procedural sentencing requirements Miller prescribed do not apply retroactively.
Houston-Sconiers announced a similar procedural rule that should not apply retroactively. It does not bar any particular punishment for a category of offender
but, instead, requires the sentencing court to consider a juvenile offender’s
youthful attributes with the knowledge it has the discretion to impose a sentence
below the standard SRA range because of those attributes. 188 Wn.2d at 21. So
long as those proper procedures are followed, Houston-Sconiers does not
categorically place any sentence beyond the authority of the judge to impose. The
majority seemingly recognizes this: “a juvenile could receive a sentence within the
adult standard range if the sentencing court complies with the dual requirements of
.” Majority at 19. Because Houston-Sconiers does not
categorically bar any SRA sentence for juvenile offenders, it should not be viewed
, No. 95578-6 (Johnson, J., dissenting)
as announcing a substantive rule. See Montgomery , 136 S. Ct. at 729 (“Substantive
rules . . . set forth categorical constitutional guarantees that place certain . . .
punishments altogether beyond the State’s power to impose.”). Because Houston-
Sconiers did not announce a substantive rule, it does not apply retroactively.
The majority disagrees, reasoning that “ Miller and Montgomery compel the conclusion that Houston-Sconiers is a new substantive constitutional rule” because
“[o]ur holding in Houston-Sconiers contains the same substantive and procedural
components as Miller .” Majority at 18, 21. I disagree because this conclusion, in
my view, blurs the distinction between Miller ’s substantive and procedural
components and consequently it mischaracterizes the nature of ’s
holding in three ways.
First, I disagree with the majority’s claim that Houston-Sconiers is like Miller because both “announced a procedural component as a mechanism to
protect the substantive rule.” Majority at 20. But unlike Miller , the majority’s
description of fails to provide an adequate distinction between
the substantive and procedural components. The United States Supreme Court has
discussed how ’s substantive rule is distinct from the procedure protecting
the rule: “Even if a court considers a child’s age before sentencing him or her to a
lifetime in prison, that sentence still violates the Eighth Amendment for a child
whose crime reflects ‘“unfortunate yet transient immaturity.”’” Montgomery , 136 , No. 95578-6
(Johnson, J., dissenting)
S. Ct. at 734 (quoting Miller , 567 U.S. at 479 (quoting Roper v. Simmons , 543 U.S.
551, 573, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 161 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2005))). Miller announced a
substantive rule precisely because it took a category of punishment (life without
parole sentences) off the table for a class of offenders (juveniles whose crimes
reflect the transient immaturity of youth) regardless of the procedures followed in
imposing that punishment . In contrast, Houston-Sconiers announced a procedural
rule because it took a category of punishment (standard SRA sentences and
enhancements) off the table for a class of offenders (juveniles) unless the
sentencing judge considers the mitigating qualities of youth at sentencing with the
knowledge it has the discretion to impose a lesser sentence because of those
qualities . 188 Wn.2d at 21. What this means is that the sentencing judge retains
discretion to determine the appropriate sentence under the SRA and the sentencing
range remains the same.
That is the difference I see in these cases. ’s substantive rule is
categorical and distinct from its procedural requirements, while Houston-
Sconiers ’s holding is conditional and can best be described in terms of its
procedural requirements.
Second, I disagree with the majority that the “fact that a juvenile could receive a sentence within the adult standard range” after Houston-Sconiers “does , No. 95578-6
(Johnson, J., dissenting)
not render Houston-Sconiers procedural.” Majority at 19. The majority bases this
conclusion on the fact that Miller applies retroactively even though “ Miller did not
foreclose a sentencing court’s ability to impose LWOP [life without parole] on all
juveniles; it acknowledged that such a punishment may be appropriate for ‘the rare
juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.’” Majority at 19-20
(quoting Miller , 567 U.S. at 479-80). But I view that reading of Miller as being
rejected by the United States Supreme Court in Mongtomery . Miller did not
purport to categorically bar life without parole for all juvenile offenders: “ Miller
drew a line between children whose crimes reflect transient immaturity and those
rare children whose crimes reflect irreparable corruption.” Montgomery , 136 S. Ct.
at 734. That Miller ’s substantive rule does not bar life without parole for every
single juvenile offender does not make it equivalent to ’s
procedural rules.
Finally, I disagree that the difference between Miller and Houston-Sconiers “is one of scope, not of kind.” Majority at 22. The United States Supreme Court
has reasoned: “Life-without-parole terms . . . ‘share some characteristics with
death sentences that are shared by no other sentences.’” , 567 U.S. at 474
(quoting Graham , 560 U.S. at 69). But concerns the “other
sentences” that do not share characteristics of life without parole or the death , No. 95578-6
(Johnson, J., dissenting)
penalty. According to Miller itself, that difference is one of kind and not merely of
scope.
And the difference between the “ultimate penalt[ies] for juveniles” and lesser sentences is crucial. Miller , 567 U.S. at 475. After all, the Eighth
Amendment “‘does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence,’
but rather ‘forbids only extreme sentences that are grossly disproportionate to the
crime.’” Graham , 560 U.S. at 60 (internal quotations marks omitted) (quoting
Harmelin , 501 U.S. at 1001). The analytical justifications that inform the
substantive rules announced in Roper , Graham , and Miller should not apply to the
lesser sentences, however long in duration.
While I agree proscribes new, better methods of determining a juvenile offender’s culpability, not every juvenile offender
previously sentenced as an adult is suffering from an unconstitutionally cruel and
unusual punishment. That conclusion is not supported by the United States
Supreme Court’s decisions in Roper , Graham , , or Montgomery or the
Eighth Amendment itself. Accordingly, I dissent.
CONCLUSION I would hold that ’s rules are procedural and apply only prospectively. I would therefore dismiss the personal restraint petition.
In re Pers. Restraint of Ali, No. 95578�6
(Johnson, J,, dissenting) 11
[1] There was a dispute over Ali’s age at trial, but all parties now agree that Ali was 16 years old at the time of the crimes. The State concedes that Ali is entitled to an order correcting his date of birth on the judgment and sentence to reflect his true year of birth as 1992.
[2] Although we assumed without deciding the retroactivity question in Meippen and dismissed that PRP based on the petitioner’s failure to establish prejudice, we are not required to conduct the analysis in that order. Whether a PRP is exempt from the one year time limit under
[3] If, for example, the sentencing judge had run enhancements concurrently, the sentence would have been shortened by 48 months.
[4] See also State v. Gilbert , 193 Wn.2d 169, 175-76, 438 P.3d 133 (2019) (“Our opinion in [ ] cannot be read as confined to the firearm enhancement statutes as it went so far as to question any statute that acts to limit consideration of the mitigating factors of youth during sentencing.”).
[5] As the dissent correctly acknowledges, Miller contained both a substantive and a procedural component: Miller categorically banned LWOP for juveniles whose crimes reflect the transient immaturity of youth and required the exercise of discretion as the mechanism to protect
[6] To the extent the dissent argues that is not substantive because, as it contends, the reasoning of Roper , Graham , and should not apply to lesser sentences, the dissent’s dispute is with the holding of itself, not with our conclusion about the substantive nature of that holding. In order for us to reconsider an established rule of law that is otherwise entitled to stare decisis, there must be a clear showing that the rule is incorrect and harmful, or that the legal underpinnings have changed or disappeared altogether. State v. Pierce , 195 Wn.2d 230, 240, 455 P.3d 647 (2020) (plurality opinion). No party has argued that Houston-
[7] Compare State v. Scott , 190 Wn.2d 586, 594, 416 P.3d 1182 (2018) (the Miller -fix statute provided an adequate remedy for a juvenile sentenced to 900 months because it transformed a de facto life sentence without the possibility of parole to a life sentence with “‘some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation’”) (quoting Miller , 567 U.S. at 479), with Domingo-Cornelio , slip op. at 14 n.8 (the -fix statute would not provide an adequate remedy for a petitioner sentenced to 20 years because it would not allow early release until he served the full sentence imposed in violation of ).
[1] Two years ago, this court approved Washington’s similar “ Miller fix” statute— RCW 9.94A.730, which allows juvenile offenders sentenced as adults to petition for early release after serving 20 years—without dissent. State v. Scott , 190 Wn.2d 586, 597, 416 P.3d 1182 (2018) (“ Montgomery provides that the Washington fix statute’s parole provision cures the Miller violation in Scott’s case.”), 603 (Gordon McCloud, J., concurring) (agreeing “that under current Eighth Amendment precedent, RCW 9.94A.730 . . . provides an adequate remedy for the Miller violation” and writing separately “to clarify that the adequacy of the statutory remedy available to Scott . . . remains an open question [only] under Washington law”).