Case Information

*1 Before K ANNE S CUDDER K IRSCH Circuit Judges . K ANNE Circuit Judge

. Plainti ff  Sally sued various local government cials entering condemning con scating thirty seven cats, all without warrant. She’s right would usu ally prohibit such conduct. emergencies breed excep tions—and case li ered emergencies.

Namely, Gaetjens went missing in action, and Defendants had reason to believe she was experiencing medical emergency. Plus, Defendants empted to check her home, they deemed so noxious it posed public safety risk. Given these exigencies, require Defendants to wait for judicial approval before acting. We thus ffi rm decision district court granting sum mary judgment to Defendants.

I. B ACKGROUND

The following facts are undisputed and stated in light most favorable Gaetjens as nonmoving party. Wonsey Chicago 394, (7th Dayton Oakton Cmty. Coll.

Gaetjens bred her Loves Park, Illinois. On December she visited her doctor and was told go hospital high blood pressure. Later day, doctor couldn’t locate Gaetjens, so she phoned Rosalie Eads (Gaetjens’s neighbor who was listed emergency contact) ask help fi nding her. Eads called Gaetjens knocked on front door but got no response. next day, Gaetjens still missing, so Eads called

Loves Park police told them Gaetjens might expe riencing medical emergency. Defendant Sergeant another cer went Love s Park but could see anyone inside. They did, though, notice pack ages on porch, untended garbage, full mailbox. police then met up Eads, who said she had key house con rmed what said phone. With these facts before them, asked Eads key so could enter see if *3 danger. Eads obliged but also said thought perhaps other home Rockford. police went into the home but didn’t get far. After making about ten feet, intense odors forced them back out. Allton described the smell as mix urine, feces, maybe decomposing body. then called on the Fire Department to enter the home breathing devices. Defendant Fire Chief Foley arrived fi rst, told him the whole tale. So Foley approached cracked front door for himself got whi ff  something could “gag maggot.” Foley thus temporarily condemned fi t for human or animal habitation by placing placard front door read: “CONDEMNED[.] Structure Unsafe Its use or occupancy has been prohibited code administra tor. It shall unlawful for any person enter such structure except for purpose making required repairs re moval.”

More re fi ghters soon arrived went into look Gaetjens. instead Gaetjens, they found thirty seven cats.

At point, responders summoned Winnebago County Animal round up Gaet jens allowed inside condemned house care clowder herself. Some felines proved more di cult catch than others. In particular, male stud, Calaio, looked ready ack workers. So pulled out metal “cat grabbers” trap him. *4 1295

In end, Animal Services impounded the De cember December 2014. Sadly, four cats, including Calaio, died result of impoundment.

Based on these events, Gaetjens—who unbeknownst cers been hospital all along—sued City Loves Park, Winnebago County, and various employees of each under U.S.C. § 1983. Relevant this appeal, al leged individual Defendants (Allton, Foley, and three Animal Services employees) violated her Fourth Amendment rights (1) entering home, (2) condemning her home, (3) seizing cats. She also alleged Winnebago County are liable these violations under Monell Department Social New York U.S. (1978). district court granted summary judgment all De

fendants all claims. now appeals.

II. A NALYSIS

We review district court’s grant summary judgment de novo . Wonsey Dayton 465). In case, district court determined Gaetjens’s Fourth claims fail individual de fendants are entitled quali ed immunity. We agree claims fail, but more basic reason—the indi vidual defendants violate Fourth Amendment. Amend ment, made applicable States through Fourteenth Amendment, protects “[t]he right people secure their persons, houses, papers, e ff ects, against unreasonable searches seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. protection exists both criminal civil contexts. Soldal Cook County (1992). *5 20 1295 5

“[T]he ultimate touchstone Fourth is ‘reasonableness.’” Brigham City v. Stuart , 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (citing Flippo v. West Virginia , 528 U.S. 11, 13 (1999); Ka tz  v. United States , 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)). “[S]earches sei ‐ zures inside a without a warrant are presumptively un ‐ reasonable.” Id. (quoting Groh v. Ramirez , 540 U.S. 551, 559 (2004)). “warrant requirement is subject certain ex ceptions.” Id. (citing Flippo , 528 U.S. at 13; Ka tz , 389 U.S. at 357).

One such exception arises “‘the exigencies sit uation’ make needs law enforcement so compelling [a] search [or seizure] is objectively reasonable under Amendment.” Mincey v. Arizona , 437 U.S. 385, (1978) (quoting McDonald v. United States , 335 U.S. 451, (1948)) Johnson v. United States , 10, 14– (1948)). In these situations, one principle governs—“[t]he need protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury jus ti cation what would otherwise illegal absent exi gency or emergency.” Id. 392–93 (quoting Wayne v. United States F.2d 205, (D.C. Cir.

To determine whether exigency permitted warrant less search seizure home, we “conduct[] objective review, analyzing whether government met its burden demonstrate officer ‘reasonable belief there compelling need act no time obtain warrant.’” United States v. Andrews F.3d (7th (quoting United States Saadeh 1995)) . objective review looks “the totality facts circumstances ‘as would have appeared reason able person position ... officer —seeing what he saw, hearing what he heard.’” Bogan Chicago *6 6 20 1295 572 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Mahoney v. Kesery , 976 F.2d 1054, 1057 (7th Cir. exigent circumstances doctrine applies equally

warrantless searches of home, seizures of home, sei zures of private property within home. See Sutterfield v. City of Milwaukee , F.3d 542, 558 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Shrum , F.3d 1219, (10th Cir. 2018) (“[T]he warrantless seizure home … ‘is per se unreasonable, unless can show it falls within one carefully defined set exceptions based on presence “exigent circum stances.”’” (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire , U.S. 443, 474–75 (1971)) (citing Brigham U.S. 403)); Siebert v. Severino (7th (“Exigent circum stances may justify seizure animals.” DiCesare Stuart 1993))).

Here, all parties agree “searched” Loves Park by entering it look Gaetjens. Likewise, all agree Foley “seized” by placing condemnation placard Animal workers “seized” by capturing them. United States Jacobsen (1984) (“A ‘seizure’ prop erty occurs there some meaningful interference individual’s possessory interests property.”). Fi nally, all agree Defendants obtain warrants or any other judicial administrative approval before conducting these searches seizures.

So, satisfy Amendment, Defendants’ war rantless searches seizures needed fall into exception warrant requirement. They all did—each justified exigent circumstance. *7 ‐

First, (who searched house) had an objectively reasonable basis for believing experiencing medical emergency required immediate action. Second, Foley (who seized house) an objectively basis which believe posed safety threat required immediate tt ention. Third, An ‐ imal employees (who seized cats) reasonably de termined were imminent danger because could cared home.

Last, none individual defendants violated rights, Monell claims fail as well.

A. Home Entry

In exigent circumstance often referred “emer gency ‐ aid” situation, government o ffi cials may enter without warrant “to ‘render assistance or prevent harm persons property within.’” Su er eld (quot ing Sheik–Abdi McClellan In recent concurring opinion, Justice Kavanaugh provided “[a] few (non exhaustive) examples [that] illustrate” “some heartland emergency aid situations.” Caniglia Strom S. Ct. (2021) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). follow ing example is particularly apt appeal:

Suppose elderly man uncharacteristi cally absent Sunday church services repeatedly fails answer his phone throughout day night. A concerned relative calls asks o ffi cers perform well ness check. Two cers drive man’s *8 ‐ home. They knock but receive no response. May o ffi cers enter home? Of course.

Id. (Kavanaugh, J., concurring); accord United States Tepiew (permi ing o ffi cers’ warrantless entry into a home basis a report a child in home that her one year ‐ old brother had sustained head injury a pu ff y face). home entry in this case likewise falls into heart land emergency aid situations. It undisputed that Allton knew that (1) Eads Gaetjens’s doctor were unable to get touch with Gaetjens; (2) doctor’s o ffi ce called Eads cause she was Gaetjens’s emergency contact; (3) Eads was concerned Gaetjens experiencing medical emer gency; (4) mail garbage were piling up.

If, Justice Kavanaugh posits, failing come church answer phone provides objectively reasonable basis believing occupant needs emergency assistance, then litany concerning circumstances facing Allton more than provided him same. His entry Loves Park thus violate Amendment.

In response, Gaetjens makes much fact Eads told Allton believed her Rockford home, Loves Park home. statement just gave Allton reason also look Eads Rockford house; no way contradicted above facts gave ob jectively basis enter home.

B. Condemnation

“The exigent circumstances doctrine [also] allows cers enter without warrant … address threat *9 safety law enforcement cers general public … .” Caniglia S. Ct. at (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (citing, among other cases, Michigan Cli ff ord & n.4 (1984)). Two precedents guide our analysis whether Foley an objectively basis for believing that safety threat required him condemn without warrant.

First, Wonsey building inspectors found thirty two building code violations plainti ff ’s home. at 398. Based “dangerous conditions” those viola tions presented, inspectors asked police help them with “emergency evacuations.” Id. police so, then faced § suit an evacuee violating rights. Id. We rejected claim because “police entered house … help evacuation given immediate safety concern.” Id. at 401.

Second, Sixth Circuit addressed similar scenario Flatford Monroe 1994), which we find persuasive. There, officers evacuated residential apartment building after inspectors determined “posed immediate danger its occupants public” because its dilapidated wooden structure faulty electrical sys tem. Id. at 171. court determined officers were entitled qualified immunity evacuation reasonably believed their entry justified exigent circumstances. Id. And court noted “[t]he very point exigency exception under these circum stances allow immediate effective action necessary protect safety occupants, neighbors, public large.” Id. 170. *10 case aligns both Wonsey Flatford . Allton re ‐

ported to Foley that the home was so noxious that the could not bear going in more than ten feet. Foley then probed the front door himself smelled stench that could “gag maggot.” These circumstances gave Foley basis on which to conclude the home’s “conditions posed immediate danger its occupants the public.” Id. at 171. Thus his reflex temporarily condemn home “pro ‐ tect preserve life” such danger did not violate Amendment. Mincey at 392–93 (quoting Wayne 212). retorts summary judgment on claim

inappropriate because condition of home was put dispute testimony friend, Joan Klarner, who tes ‐ tified she believe home posed health risk when visited it several hours before Defendants arrived. Klarner’s testimony doesn’t directly dispute state home as Defendants found it later on day. More im portant, even if home bad as Allton made out be, Foley nonetheless entitled rely on Allton’s state ments about condition su perior information after entering moments earlier. Cf. Flatford (“[R]equiring officers second guess more informed judgment building safety spector would hinder effective swift action. Officers should, therefore, have wide latitude rely building safety official’s expertise where expert determination ap pears have some basis fact.”).

C. Con scation Cats

Last, “[e]xigent circumstances may justify seizure animals” cial reasonably believes *11 ‐ 1295 11 the animals are in “imminent danger.” Siebert , F.3d (citing DiCesare , F.3d 977); see also, e.g. , Commonwealth v. Duncan , N.E.3d 469, (Mass. 2014) ( fi nding exigent cir ‐ cumstances seize dogs where the dogs were left out “in se ‐ verely inclement winter weather” and “extremely emaci ated”); Hegarty v. Addison Cnty. Humane Soc’y A.2d (Vt. 2004) (permi tt ing the warrantless seizure horse where o ffi cer reasonably believed that horse’s “health was jeopardy that immediate action required protect her”). imminent danger animals here plain—Gaet

jens’s thirty seven cats could cared Loves Park home condemnation placard prevented Gaetjens from entering purpose. Given this situation, Animal Services o ffi cials’ entry into seizure vio late Fourth Amendment. argues rebu al regardless whether An

imal Services could seize cats, still violated using excessive force doing so. Speci fi cally, alleges o ffi cials used “cat grabber” injured ultimately killed stud Calaio.

We have held before “the use deadly force against household pet is only if pet poses imme diate danger use force unavoidable.” Viilo Eyre Brown Muhlenberg Township 210–11 (3d case, cases circuit applying its rule involved cers shooting dogs fi rearms. case involved Animal cials using cat catching tool catch cat (which, according indisputable testimony, looked ready *12 ‐ 1295 “maul” cat catcher). That Calaio died result this manifestly tactic is unfortunate, but it does not unreasonable seizure make.

Gaetjens also argues that even if initial seizure cats lawful, Animal Services violated Fourth Amend ‐ ment rights retaining longer than necessary. argument fails we have made clear that Four ‐ teenth Amendment, not Fourth Amendment, provides appropriate basis challenging post seizure procedures for retrieval property. Bell v. Chicago , F.3d 736, (7th Cir. 2016).

As nal note, Gaetjens argues district court ‐ correctly granted summary judgment sua sponte Animal Services cials. While Gaetjens is correct this procedure warrants caution, permissible “the losing party is given notice opportunity come forward its ev idence.” Jones v. Union Pac. R.R. Co. (7th Celotex Corp. Catre U.S. (1986); Goldstein Fid. Guar. Ins. Underwriters, Inc. has argued here she re ceived inadequate notice, nor has shown she de prived opportunity marshal evidence dispute facts relied opinion.

We therefore conclude Animal workers, like other individual defendants, violate Gaet jens’s rights.

D. Monell Liability

According Supreme Court’s decision Monell mu nicipalities are sometimes liable constitutional viola tions their employees commit. 658. “But *13 municipality cannot liable under Monell there no underlying constitutional violation municipal em ployee.” Sallenger v. Spring eld F.3d (7th Cir. King ex rel. King E. St. Louis Sch. Dist. (7th 2007); Jenkins Bartle That’s case here. con stitutional rights were violated, thus Monell claim cannot succeed.

III. C ONCLUSION

For foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM judgment district court.