PER CURIAM:

Ednecdia Johnson, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se , appeals the district court’s denial of her motion for compassionate relief under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) as amended by Section 603 of the First Step Act. Pub. L. 115-391, § 603, 132 Stat. 5194, 5239–41 (2018) (amending 18 U.S.C. § 3582). The district court found that Johnson’s medical conditions were not extraordinary and compelling reasons that would justify a reduction in her sentence. The government has moved for summary affirmance and to stay the briefing schedule.

Pro se pleadings are liberally construed. Tannenbaum v. United States , 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998). Still, summary disposition is appropriate where “the position of one of the parties is clearly right as a matter of law so that there can be no substantial question as to the outcome of the case, or where, as is more frequently the case, the appeal is frivolous.” Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis , 406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1969). ^[1]

We review de novo determinations about a defendant’s eligibility for a sentence reduction under Section 3582(c)(1)(A). United States v. Bryant , No. 19- 14267, at 11–12 (11th Cir. May 7, 2021). We review a district court’s decision to grant or deny an eligible defendant’s reduction request for abuse of discretion. Id. When we apply the abuse of discretion standard, we recognize that the district court had a “range of choice” and that we cannot reverse unless the district court applied the incorrect legal standard, made clearly erroneous factual findings, or committed a clear error of judgment. United States v. Harris , 989 F.3d 908, 912 (11th Cir. 2021) (citations omitted). The district court did none of those here.

Section 3582(c)(1)(A) allows a district court to reduce a defendant’s sentence, after considering the Section 3553(a) factors, for “extraordinary and compelling reasons,” as defined in the Sentencing Commission’s policy statement found at U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. Bryant , No. 19-14267, at 13–14, 38. Johnson argues that her medical conditions—hypertension and a few previous bouts of bronchitis—in conjunction with COVID-19 are extraordinary and compelling reasons that warrant relief. Under the policy statement, a medical condition is extraordinary and compelling if it is “serious” and “substantially diminishes the ability of the defendant to provide self-care” in prison, and if the defendant is not expected to recover from it. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 app. n.1(A). The documentation Johnson submitted shows that her bronchitis resolved over three years ago, and her hypertension is well controlled by medication. And “the mere existence of COVID-19 in society and the possibility that it may spread to a particular prison alone cannot independently justify compassionate release.” United States v. Raia , 954 F.3d 594, 597 (3d Cir. 2020). See also Harris , 989 F.3d at 910. The district court did not err in concluding that Johnson’s conditions, alone or considered in light of COVID-19, are not extraordinary and compelling reasons to reduce her sentence.

We GRANT the government’s motion for summary affirmance because there is no substantial question about whether the district court erred in denying Johnson’s motion for compassionate release. See Groendyke Transp., Inc. , 406 F.2d at 1162. We DENY as moot the government’s motion to stay the briefing schedule.

AFFIRMED .

[1] We are bound by cases decided by the former Fifth Circuit before October 1, 1981. Bonner v. City of Prichard , 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).