Case Information

*1 TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN NO. 03-18-00753-CV

Darius L. Heads, Appellant

Brittney McDade, Appellee

FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW #4 OF WILLIAMSON COUNTY NO. 13-3062-FC4, THE HONORABLE JOHN MCMASTER, JUDGE PRESIDING M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Darius L. Heads appeals from the trial court’s order modifying the parent-child relationship, holding Heads in contempt for failure to pay child support, granting judgment for arrearages, and awarding attorney’s fees to appellee Brittney McDade. ^[1] Heads, who represented himself in the trial court and continues to do so on appeal, brings four appellate issues. We construe his issues as challenges to the trial court’s order holding him in contempt and awarding attorney’s fees to McDade. ^[2] We will dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction to the extent it challenges the trial court’s contempt order and affirm the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees. ^[3]

DISCUSSION

Contempt Order

In his first three appellate issues, Heads, in effect, challenges the trial court’s order holding him in contempt for failure to pay child support. As we noted in a previous appeal by Heads, this Court does not have jurisdiction to review contempt orders on direct appeal. Heads v. McDade , No. 03-19-00084-CV, 2019 WL 2041765, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin May 9, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.). Accordingly, we will dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction to the extent that it challenges the trial court’s contempt order.

Attorney’s Fees

In his fourth appellate issue, Heads contends that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding McDade attorney’s fees for the following reason:

There is no prerequisite requiring a party to hire a licensed attorney to participate in a child support hearing; therefore there is no absolute physical necessity or inevitability. Appellee’s decision to hire a licensed attorney is out of mere convenience and any subsequent accumulated fees are Appellee’s sole responsibility.

The trial court’s award of attorney’s fees was authorized by statute. See Tex. Fam. Code §§ 106.002(a), 157.167(a). Heads cites no relevant authority for the proposition that a court may never award attorney’s fees to a party unless the party retained counsel because of “absolute physical necessity or inevitability.” See Coburn v. Moreland , 433 S.W.3d 809, 840 (Tex. App.—Austin 2014, no pet.) (noting “the broad discretion trial courts are afforded in *3 awarding attorney’s fees in SAPCR proceedings”). Accordingly, we overrule Heads’s fourth appellate issue.

CONCLUSION

We dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction to the extent that it challenges the trial court’s contempt order. We affirm the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees.

__________________________________________ Chari L. Kelly, Justice Before Justices Goodwin, Baker, and Kelly

Affirmed in Part; Dismissed for Want of Jurisdiction in Part

Filed: August 7, 2019

Notes

[1] McDade has not filed a brief in this appeal.

[2] Although we attempt to construe a pro se appellant’s briefing liberally, see Tex. R. App. P. 38.9, we must also hold pro se litigants to the same standards as licensed attorneys and require them to comply with applicable procedural rules. See Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn , 573 S.W.2d 181, 184–85 (Tex. 1978); Veigel v. Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Found., Inc. , 549 S.W.3d 193, 195 (Tex. App.—Austin 2018, no pet.).

[3] The only modification the trial court’s order made to the parent-child relationship was to grant McDade “the exclusive right to make decisions concerning the child’s education.” Heads has not challenged that modification on appeal.