*2 arise under might HENDERSON, disputes resolve Before FAY and Circuit judgment. TUTTLE, terms Judges, Judge. Senior Circuit duties and responsibilities are specifically the special master conducted hearings on described in agreement. The parties objections. those After the special master were required to attempt to agree upon a filed rulings some of the disappointed particular special master, or absent such class member claimants objected to his find- agreement, to have the district court ap- ings and attempted to the district *3 point a master. Because no agreement was court. reached, the district court entered an order Counsel for the PMC filed a response to appointing special master. the objections to report Under 7 of Section the consent judg- alleging that the defendants ment, entitled “Class Member Compensa- parties to the consent judgment, intended tion,” pertaining to distribution of the special master to act arbitrator, as an $2,000,000 fund, damage the PMC was re- whose final, actions would be not as a spe- quired to make an initial determination cial master pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 53. that a person seeking a award damage was They asserted that the district court had no eligible to receive an award under jurisdiction to entertain the objections to terms of the judgment. Following the de- the special report.1 The Air Force termination of eligibility, the PMC was and the government individual defendants, then required to apportion among the eligi- however, although not position taking on ble class damage members awards accord- the merits of the objectors’/appellants’2 ing ato formula contained claims, in responded to the PMC’s brief by judgment. Once that was accomplished, supporting the objectors’/appellants’ posi- the list of eligible class members and their tion that the district court jurisdic- did have proposed damage awards was to be for- tion required and was to hear objections warded to the special master his to the approv- pursuant rulings to al. Class members were to Rule 53. be notified of the PMC’s initial determination The district court a hearing held on Sep- were allowed to object to determina- these tember September 13, 1982 and on tions of the PMC. The PMC in effect made issued an order dismissing all of the appel- determinations, two one that established objections lants’ to the district court for which class members would be entitled to jurisdiction. lack of This decision that the any relief under consent judgment, and rulings of the special master are final and the second which established the amount of in unreviewable the district court is the damages each eligible class members subject appeal. of this would receive. Because of this bifurcated process, decision-making the consent judg- II. DISCUSSION ment provided that there would be two The district court appears to have opportunities for class object members to based its finding master the initial PMC determinations. provided for in the consent judgment was The first opportunity involved only those intended to be the equivalent of an arbitra persons whom the PMC determined were tor largely on the testimony a lawyer ineligible for any damage award. Notices the original plaintiffs. lawyer was were sent persons these by the PMC present when the judgment negotiated was giving them opportunity an object and he testified that had dis their exclusion sharing in the damage cussed Rule but had decided explicitly A award. persons number of objected and not to make their special ap- one master supplemental 1. The Objectors/appellants PMC later filed a potential brief ad- 2. are the mitting trator, if was an arbi- master rejected by members special claims whose pow- the district court would some master, appealed. and who have Not findings, er scope to review but his every potential class member whose claim was review would be limited to the of whether issue by appealed. denied master has engaged the havior. master fraud or misbe- First, Rule 53. We hold that PMC directs our attention to pointed under clearly was errone- district court’s paragraphs two of the consent following reasons. ous parties explicitly spelled which the out cer- tain rights decisions First, going erred in the district court four, paragraph master.3 In Section outside the four corners of the consent parties incorporat- IX the to find that what an “special labelled a master” was instead right appeal any ed the decision uses “arbitrator.” The consent (pertaining duties repeatedly, and “special the term mastér” court, and paragraph) The term never uses the term “arbitrator.” that “all other further technical, and fairly ap master” is paragraph The next preserved.” Therefore, it pears specifically in Rule the district provides for review that, explicit logical to assume absent *4 decisions, but court of the contrary, parties indication to the of specifically rights waives “all further for a master” intend appeal.” a master. This is so ed Rule 53 practice because it is common particularly argues specific The PMC that the court, liability for a in cases in which is provisions regarding appeal paragraphs in discrimination, involving found classwide to five, IX, in all prove four and section that appoint pursuant to Rule judgment involving other sections of the 53 the in indi fashioning to aid both that parties the master the intended See, e.g., Kyr vidual and classwide relief. an appeal. equally there be no We believe Co., F.Supp. iazi v. Electric 527 18 Western plausible explanation paragraphs of the two (D.N.J.1981); City v. of Par United States that the to waive their is drafters wanted ma, F.Supp. (N.D.Ohio 1980); 504 913 Hart rights” paragraph “further to in Brooklyn, v. 383 Community School Bd. of five,4 any but did not want there to be Moreover, (E.D.N.Y.1974). 699 F.Supp. rights confusion about the fact that no nothing there is in the consent waived in four. being paragraph that the an suggests special master is arbi Moreover, accept argument if we the PMC’s trator, vary or his duties are to from the except paragraphs, for these two those of a normal Rule 53 master. parties intended that there be no The several unpersuasive argu PMC makes decisions, the contrary. ments to from the we 5.Complaints by Eglin employee paragraphs provide: of ra- 3.The two arising be- cial discrimination or retaliation wishing present 4.All class members January and the date of the tween 1976 complaints of violations shall con- Court, by judgment approval the not other- Monitoring tact the Plaintiffs’ Committee. timely any filed in administrative or wise inquire The Committee shall into such com- forum, judicial as of the date of plaints paragraph in the manner described Court, approval by may presented the be Committee, 3 above. If the in consultation paragraph pursuant procedures the counsel, opinion with plaint is of the that the com- above, hereby and the Defendants waive all presentation Special merits before the respect of timeliness with to such defenses complaints. complaint presented Master the shall be adjudication complaints The Special Special the The Master shall Master. by paragraph in this shall be made described authority pro- plenary to determine the right Special the Master with the of review resolving cedures to be used in such com- court, by rights the district and all further plaints by event the class members. In the hereby appeal are waived. Special that a Master determines occurred, he violation of the has parties Although grants the 4. Fed.R.Civ.P. 53 appropriate shall be authorized to order all rights appeal from a certain decision, therefor, including of costs relief the award agree parties to waive are free to attorney’s and The shall have fees. Leasing rights. v. some of those See Iten Co. right appeal any decision such (8th Burroughs Corp., F.2d 574 Cir. Northern United District States Court 1982); Duryea Third Northwestern National Florida, all other District of appeal Bank, (8th 1979). 602 F.2d 809 Cir. preserved. would have to find that the waiver lan- intended the “special master” to be akin guage paragraph five is surplusage, be- to an Mr. testimony arbitrator. Wells’ is language cause right credible, would waive a however, not because he himself claims para- PMC would not exist if had at least on one occasion appealed graph simply remained silent about ruling master to the district Therefore, matter. court, we believe paragraph court had on ruled five refers to a waiver of some the merits of that appeal. On that occa- specific rights of appeal guaranteed sion, Rule Mr. began motion, Wells entitled Finally, we note that the vaguely “Notice Objection Of To Appeal And From worded “other rights to preserved appeal” Master,” Order Of Special by stating in paragraph four, implies right to appeal, Plaintiffs, through “COMES NOW their stating without the source or of that scope counsel, undersigned pursuant to Rule right. right Because that 53(a)(2), not delineated Federal Rules of Civil Procedures itself, the consent judgment we believe hereby files objection this their [sic] were referring drafters Rule as and appeal attached Order of the scope Thus, source and of the right. at Special Master....” (emphasis We added). best, we find that the paragraphs cited by believe this speaks document as to itself are ambiguous PMC as to intent of Mr. Wells’s understanding parties’ with regard to Rule 53. intent in consent judgment. Moreover, we note that the record is full of instances The PMC also argues that the dis in which various appealed spe- *5 trict court’s order appointing special the cial decisions to the district court master 53, fails to refer to Rule 53. Rule and in which the district court considered however, does not require specific refer the merits appeals prior of those to the time ence to rule the for it to apply. Finally, the that the in this appellants case told were PMC claims that the district court’s order that they no such right appeal had the appointing the master was not a special master’s findings. Rule 53 not, order because it did as a “nor The court would, mal” 53 appointment Rule erred when it describe seemingly the the ignored position de- powers. duties and See case, fendants in this PMC, parties who were 53(c). however, Fed.R.Civ.P. the consent judgment *6 CHAVARRIA, Petitioner, Eliseo Jacinto STATES DEPARTMENT OF

UNITED

JUSTICE, Immigration Board

Appeals, Respondent.

No. 82-6164. Appeals,

United Court States

Eleventh Circuit. 3, 1984.

Jan. notes when and whose parties that intentions “created the role of therefore at least as relevant ‘special as master’ ... those [they] spe Mr. Wells judg- construction of the cifically established respon duties and [his] ment. Thus, Both the district court and on this sibilities.” the district court’s order defendants, although appointing technically master adequately case, appellees in this argued described that powers Rule 53 master for in the purposes by consent stating that the master is indeed was a Rule 53 mas- perform “to all duties and functions Thus, Wells, ter. if Mr. authorized even required by the Consent and the PMC intended that Rule not Judgment January 1981.” The dis apply, it is that parties clear not all to the trict was not required order its intent, consent judgment shared the same describe in detail the duties set carefully the district court’s forth therefore judgment. in the clearly erroneous. The district court’s second was to error assign significant weight testimony Finally, district court failed Wells, plain- William D. attorney give weight implicit to the policy sufficient tiffs, stated that dis- who had which ac governs Fed.R.Civ.P. class tions, ultimately cussed Rule 53 and had decided that places special responsibility on against be- using Rule 53 master the district court protect potential settle- they expedite cause wanted to members that receive the they and ensure See, ment. due process Mr. Wells testified to which are entitled. Corp. Motor Antitrust e.g., In Re Nissan (5th Cir. Litigation, 552 F.2d necessary review to assure 1977) (appellate members are not of absentee class in the wake of a district court’s “inundated Rule 23 does supervision”). Although brisk prohibited not mean in a consent providing arrangement type the arbitrator case, it was intended in this urges PMC mean that in cases of doubt about does agreement, of such an meaning clear uses the agreement particularly master,” the courts should term provide construe the allowed Rule 53. kind of above, we hold For the reasons stated was clear- the district court’s erroneous, and RE- ly and we REVERSE further not incon- proceedings MAND for with this opinion. sistent FAY, concurring specially: Judge, Circuit majority I in those join portions opinion dealing provisions with the appointing the order and the of Rule applicability 53. I concur in the result.