Charles G. Kinney appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing sua sponte his action arising from a state appellate court order requiring Kinney to post a security bond. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We *2 review de novo a dismissal under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Noel v. Hall , 341 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2003). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Kinney’s action as barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because Kinney’s claims amount to a forbidden “de facto appeal” of a prior state court judgment or are “inextricably intertwined” with that judgment. See id. at 1163-65 (discussing proper application of the Rooker- Feldman doctrine).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Kinney’s motion for a temporary restraining order. See id. ; Earth Island Inst. v. U.S. Forest Serv. , 351 F.3d 1291, 1298 (9th Cir. 2003) (setting forth standard of review).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the complaint without leave to amend because amendment would be futile. Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. , 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that dismissal without leave to amend is proper when amendment would be futile).

We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright , 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.

2 16-17255

[*] This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

[**] The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Kinney’s request for oral argument, set forth in the opening brief, is denied.