*1 holding expansion this an Such likely Majority C. ROVERANO because the William

particularly Roverano, of the Jacqueline novel rule as identifies its “version knowledge doctrine,” terming collective h/w amplification ap- the vertical “modest v. plication” doctrine. Id. at view, rule no bears my resemblance CRANE, JOHN INC. and Brand knowledge collective because vertical Insulations, Inc. communication there is no whatsoever imputed cause be could that probable Insulations, Appeal Inc. of: Brand discussed, officer As from one another. is the hallmark vertical a communication C. Roverano William Instead, knowledge. an- the rule collective closely Majority more nounced col- aligns application horizontal with a Crane, Inc., Appellant John knowledge, hind- permits as it

lective sight of what officers were review No. EDA 2016 arrest, despite the time of the aware No. 2847 EDA nothing the fact that there was’ communi- Superior Pennsylvania. Court directly arresting officer cated justify an arrest under the Fourth Amend- Argued April ment. ’ December Filed Majority posits it' be The- suppress “hyper-technical” the evidence Yong from result of Officer

obtained Id, me, at-889. To it is Gibson’s actions.

hyper-technical to adhere the probable protection

cause standard ensure free right unreasonable citizen’s of, rec,ord

search seizure. facts officer, proba-

here an without reveal cause, individual,

ble arrested searched

his and recovered firearm person N.T., 11,17-18. 4/17/2013,

his waistband. agree Superior majority

I with the Court required sup- police conduct

pression of af- I would evidence and ex-

firm on the rationale basis

pressed opinion in the then- authored

judge, I Accordingly, now-Justice Wecht.

dissent. .opin- joins dissenting Todd

Justice

ion. *3 Nass, Philadelphia, ap-

Edward M. pellee. Pollard, IL, A. Chicago,

Michael John Crane. SOLANO, DUBOW, J., J.,

BEFORE: ELLIOTT, and FORD P.J.E. PER OPINION CURIAM: Crane, Inc., Appellants, John and Brand Inc., Insulations, appeal July from the denying Order Posh-Trial Motions *4 Judgment in favor of entering Appel- Jacqueline lees William and Roverano. We part, part, affirm in reverse in and remand for a apportion damages new trial to. among the tortfeasors. facts, briefly

We sunimarize the relevant record, gleaned from as the certified follows.' Appellee Roverano was em- William ployed at PECO from 1971 until his.retire- ,2001. part As ment his employment, was variety Mr. Roverano to a ten-year products period, over asbestos 198Í. 1971 until In Mr. Roverano November lung lungs.' diagnosed cancer both treatment, his Despite prognosis extensive poor.' 10, 2Ó14, March Mr. Roverano filed On Complaint thirty against named defen- dants, averring exposure to asbestos attributable to those products defendants addition, lung his cancer.1 Mrs. caused a claim for made loss consor- Roverano tium. trial, trial

Prior to ruled Act, § Byer, L. the Fair Share Pa.C.S. Pittsburgh, Robert for Brand apply Insulations. asbestos cases. settled with the Roveranos

1. More than a dozen named Crane and Brand of those defen- bankruptcy. dants had filed for remain- prior jury’s verdict. Of defendants, ing Appellants named all but trial, issues parties presented Appellants At evidence number collective expo primarily follows:2 that focused Roverano’s raised as products to Appellants’ that contained sure in defining -1. The trial court erred exposure and whether cause” in its instructions “factual The lung cancer. thrust Roverano’s caused to a written response ques- and in Ro- defense it was Appellants’ was .that tion from jury. history smoking caused his verano’s by denying 2. The trial court erred lung Appel exposure cancer Appellant proposed Crane’s Verdict could insignificant lants’ Form whether Rovera- that addressed his In con limg: have caused cancer. exposure injuries no’s were caused trast, Appellees’ experts opined it was .that asbestos, or, Appellant Crane main- tp Ap smoking the exposure his both tains, smoking. lung his can pellants’ products caused by failing 3. trial erred The cer. Form that provide Verdict deliberating, jury found in fa After Ap- them determine whether allowed against Mrs. of Mr. and Roverano and vor pellant packing was defective in Crane’s eight as well as1six of the warning. of a the absence awarded other defendants. by allowing court erred $5,189,265 $1,250,000 Mr. Roverano and experts offer “each and Roveranos’ Mrs. Roverano. every”.or “whatever” asbestos *5 separate filed Motions for Appellants case, in a where causation Ro- testimony 27, 2016, July On Post-Trial Relief. mesothelioma, verano did not have as- and denied'Appellants’ court Motions trial bestosis, any or marker medical of in judgment of the Rovera- favor entered exposure. asbestos apportioned judg- The trial court nos. n 5. The trial'court erred when refused among eight equally defendants ment to mold for the verdict account tortfea- whom the to'be determined Georgia Pacific Ce- named-defendants particular, In the trial court entered sors. Hajoca ment Corporation. and judgments separate Appellant against Appellant failing and Crane Brand each the. trial 6. The court erred $648,858 plus $29,604 delay for amount of apply the Fair and Share'Act erred '' damages for of the verdict in favor Mr. specifically follows: $156,250 for the Roverano and verdict A. The trial shoúld have re- court of Mrs. Roverano. favor quired apportion liability tortfeasors; timely trial among alleged and appealed. Appellants order, did not and in- B. The trial court should have file, Complained of Errors of a Statement alleged certain tortfeasors on eluded 1925(b). pursuant Pa.R.A.P. Appeal sheet, notwithstanding verdict Although Appellants separate alleged fact those tortfeasors had have filed briefs, largely protection, over- filed or bankruptcy issues are raised We, therefore, lapping. paraphrase re- mold the to reflect settlement and verdict para argument, argument Appellant argues in one 2. Crane also this wáived. find graph Co., that we should reverse the trial Toll Naval Asso See J.J. DeLuca ciates, Inc. v. Ap its errors Since 402, (Pa. 2012) because cumulative. Super. 56 A.3d develop argument pellant does cite or 2119). (citing Pa.R.A.P. support or law references to the record bankrupt- charge received from the payments as a whole is inadequate or not cy alleged estates tortfeasors clear a tendency or has mislead .confuse rather than clarify a material 5-6; Appellant p. Appel- Crane’s Brief at issue that error a charge bewill found at p. lant Brand’s Brief 3. to be basis the award a.sufficient Standard of Review new trial. on appeal standard of review Our Further, a trial [court]- wide has latitude is clear or an error of abuse discretion language choice of charging [its] when that controls the law case: a jury, .provided always that the court Our regarding standard review trial fully adequately appli- conveys of a for a court’s motion denial new cable law. grant power a new limited. Lock, Phillips 86 A.3d 916-917 inherently the trial court trial lies (Pa. (citation 2014) omitted). Super. decision ab- and we will reverse its sent a clear abuse discretion controls, error law which outcome cases, “Pennsylvania law requires that a of the case. plaintiff prove “that two elements: Maya Johnson, v. Johnson and 97 A.3d defective, product that the defect (citation (Pa. 2014) Super. omit- causing was the factor in substantial ted). determining the trial When whether Company, injury.” Ford Rost v. Motor CQurt an error of law control- committed (2016) 625, 151 1032, 1037 637 Pa. n.2 cáse, ling the “our outcome standard (citations omitted; added.). emphasis novó, de scope our review is When a to more than plaintiff was 'plenary.” Bros. Con- review is Fizzano asbestos, product contained Prods., XLN, Inc., crete Inc. v. when, jury, fac applying ‘-‘substantial (2012). test, consider “frequency, tor” should regularity plaintiffs proximity” Jury Cause Factual Instructions *6 Gregg exposure product. asbestos to-each argue Appellants that the. trial Co., 596 943 V-J Auto Pa. V. Parts defining court erred “factual cause” (2007). requires A.2d 216 This assessment jury response its and in instructions plaintiffs a nature precise “focuS'on the question jury. to from a written the product, exposure to the defendant’s particular, Appellants that argue the “law containing product.” on other asbestos- requires a for’ for ‘but causation standard Rost, origi (emphasis 151 A.3d 1048 at [causation], .of definition factual the nal). was an of law that the error controlled case.” outcome of the at 30. Brief Crane’s a the defen jury When focuses challenge a to This Court reviews product, jury the dant’s should consider following instructions under the well- to plaintiffs, exposure each the defendant’s . Pennsylvania principles settled law hand, the product “was on one substan a tial, or, [O]ur review when consider a the factor or substantial cause standard ing adequacy hand, in other con instructions whether the defendant’s case, negli civil whether an insignificant determine duct or a was cause committed a clear abuse at gible trial court cause.” Id. 1049 Ford v. (quoting Jeffries, controlling error discretion or law Pa. (1977)). only

outcome of case. It is when the (em- Id., Tragarz, quoting 980 F.2d at Supreme concluded Court omitted). plaintiff phasis exclude never has “insisted for her possible cause his or every other forego on our of the Based review consistently fact, have injury and in ing precedential authority, we conclude multiple causes held that substantial trial court in the instant-' case produce the re- cooperate combine Appellant’s request for properly rejected Rost, supra plaintiff.” sulting harm the juxy charge. The Penn for “but causation” at reject sylvania clearly Court has Supreme ap- noted Finally, the Rost Court ed such a standard causation re Tragarz v. Keene proval analysis quires, addressing a situation in when 1992), (7th Corp., Cir. . 980 F.2d 411 exposed to more than plaintiff which a Gregg, supra that re- adopted containing products, “frequen- test of any notion that the jected plaintiffs ex whether .the determine cy, regularity proximity” requires posure product to each defendant’s was expo- comparative of different analysis “frequent, regular proximate” de sures to asbestos and instead made clear a sub exposure termine whether was the focus the level must be on plaintiffs in causing stantial factor Rost, product. exposure to the defendant’s jury. supra Using analysis, n.13. argue further that the “trial rejected a for” Supreme “but our Court provide a suffi- court’s instruction did analysis. causation legal guide basis to cient and correct Suppose plaintiff shows that jury.” Crane’s Brief at 33. exposure amount received First, explaining Verdict while product was A’s asbestos

defendant’s Sheet; the court stated: alone sufficient to cause .mesothelioma. plaintiff If exposed such a I with ex- first said deals products, plaintiff would posure particular- product support have sufficient evidence Now, these are elements defendant.

finding -to the de- but prove exposure. plaintiff has product, plaintiff A’s fendant one, exposed Number hand, gotten not have ill. On the other defendant, did it product if [comparative approach], under a asbestos, plaintiff ex- contain was the plaintiff was to numerous other posed par- of that to the asbestos fibers *7 products, plaintiff might the regular frequent ticular defendant a prove able cause fact in a not be to basis. proximate A against the suit defendant because Now, question with the second deals exposure product same to A’s defendant manufactured, products these whether might comparison be substantial distributed, supplied by or the individual exposure products. to the to the other bring- defendants was factual cause promote pur- a result Such does ing test, plaintiffs lung cancer. In about poses'" of factor the substantial words, you if exposure, did this alleviating is inequi- at aimed it, in bringing find it a factual-cause applying ties that the but result when cancer, case, lung plaintiff in a at about his for test multi-defendant disease, an creating suffer from asbestos-related inequities. is, lung cancer, cancer, it tiffs by lung that was caused court “fully and adequately convey[ed] the exposure. applicable law.” Philips, We, thus, A.3d at 916-17. con- N.T., 336-37; 4/18/16, at RR 687a. clude the trial court did not abuse its the attorneys closing After made their or discretion commit an error of law. arguments, explained Appellants argue also that the trial court the need for Mr. to Roverano establish in responding erred to the jury’s question that he was the asbestos to fibers regarding the definition of “factual” cause. manufactured, had distrib- 34; Crane’s Brief at Brand’s Brief at 29. supplied “regular, uted or frequent response In to question, trial court N,T. basis,” 122; proximate RR. charged corréctly by instructing jurors 709a. The court instructed the then cause, “legal cause is factual on the definition of factual cause as: sometime as referred substantial fac- is, And here the were the as- tor:” manufactured, products bestos distribut- legal cause, Factual cause is some- supplied particular ed or by that defen- times factor, referred to as substantial dant, Insulation, Crane, you John Brand my but it’s the opinion they’re same—in discuss it separately, these a factual definition, so going the same I’m give cause in bringing lung about cancer. you the definition factual as a cause short, legal In plaintiff did the suffer an cause. disease, is,

asbestos-related that was the plaintiff order for recover case, lung cancer an exposure asbestos-related disease. defendant’s on the elements that I based Now, what do I factual cause? mean gave you must been substantial— have Well, you imagine lawyers and with with must bring- have a factual cause in been lot of judges there’s been a discussion Roverano, ing plaintiffs Mr. about what do factual cause. I we mean lung recog- cancer. what the This law used use the word substantial factor. legal cause. nizes . same, they today I think mean the but A real factual cause is a actual-a factual cause; using we’re factual factor, although cause an is actual real legal Factual cause is a cause. In order expected, unusual or may be result case, for the in this recover imaginary or but is not an fanciful defendant’s asbestos having no factor or a factor connection products must have been a factual cause or only insignificant an connection with in bringing lung about his This is cancer. cancer. lung recognizes legal what the law as a cause: Keep you in mind could have more than factor, A factual actual cause is an real cause, one cause which factual but - although the result unusual .you’ve got If you to decide. that’s unexpected, not an imaginary but it you say couple of one is not a causes having fanciful factor or no con- a factor is, only factual can cause and only insignificant nection or connec- you be the one find the factual lung tion Mr. cancer. Roverano’s cause, you but can find' both were 118-19; up you. N.T. factual You’re RR at 708a. cause. That’s *8 the factfinders. By instructing jury' the Mr. Rovera- 136-37; N.T. at RR 712a. exposure nb must his establish that was regular, frequent, proximate and such the court’s re- contend exposure sponse inquiry plain- jury’s improper was a cause of to the substantial n .Roverano, Plaintiff, 1. the Mr. jury’s] mind.” “Was “changed [the- it

because . products manu- 37; Brief asbestos see Brand’s at also Brief Crane’s factured, by supplied properly distributed court instruct- The trial at 32-33. Defendant, Crane, It is John Inc. law. for the jurors the on the ed law and apply the determine jurors manu- 2. the asbestos Were products only on trial focus liability. We can factured, distributed, by supplied jury to the court’s instruction Crane, Inc, cause John factual timing jury’s speculation about bring lung can- about Plaintiffs verdict. cer.” added.). (emphasis RR 1058a-1059a Question on 2. Verdict Causation explaining question, In the second Sheet alia: jury, trial court inter instructed’ argues that a Appellant Crane words, you if “In did this exposure Appellants’ defense theory of principal an it, find fi’om did suffer lung cancer was Mr. Roverano’s “was cancer, disease, lung asbestos-related by at caused his asbestos riot by caused the exposure.” is was all; cancer,] along his rather [the N.T., 4/13/16, 37; RR 687a. COPD, by his emphysema and was caused history.” smoking Crane’s Brief extensive of the Verdict Sheet The purpose Appellant 29. denying contends general guidepost provide is question on Verdict specific Sheet jury jury general issues the must reflecting theory, pre this trial court party’s It not to reflect decide. is either Appellant presenting Crane cluded specific theories. theory to jury. Id. case, about question the second re- factual on the cause Verdict Sheet challenge to the

This quired jury consider whether fashioning court’s questions discretion in lung smoking Mr. Roverano’s that caused on the Verdict Sheet and review had it was jury cancer. If found that challenges for abuse discretion. an “An smoking that had Mr. Roverano’s caused just abuse is more than discretion lung cancer, have answered judgment and, appeal, on error a trial question. “no” to second court to have will not be found abused its discretion unless discloses that the record Therefore, .that the trial we conclude judgment manifestly exercised un deny- its discretion abuse reasonable, or partiality, prej the result ing Appellant’s request ques- to include udice, bias, or Commonwealth v. ill-will.” its tion on the Sheet reflected Verdict Lane, 1325, 1328 theory of the case. (1981) (citation quotation internal marks omitted). Dangerous” Ques- “Unreasonably Sheet tion on Verdict argues the trial

Appellant Crane , specifically included a should have argues Crane Appellant also question the Verdict Sheet about by failing trial court erred provide smoking caused Mr. Roverano’s whether Sheet Verdict lung cancer. asking Crane’s whether “unreasonably on the were questions dangerous” Verdict Sheet thus, defective. as follows: *9 rejected request products court Crane’s .their contained asbestos without trial warnings.” question proper for such a “the issue in Op. because Trial Ct. 6. at exposure Therefore, this case was one and causa- rejected the trial court properly tion, not an issue of the defect Appellant request Crane’s that Verdict 7/25/15, Ct. at product.” Op., 6. Trial dated question Sheet contain about whether The trial court further noted that “neither unreasonably dangerous the asbestos was products that disputed defendant their questions and limited the on Verdict contained warn- proper asbestos without Appellee exposed Sheet whether was ings. Their on defenses were based the defendant’s asbestos and whether exposure cancer, products fact that to their exposure lung caused his or, Crane, best with was minimal at encapsulated.” Id. The trial court conclud- Every” Exposure 4. “Each and Testi- defect question

ed that about was “[a] mony irrelevant.” Id. Appellant argues Crané agree We with the trial court’s .conclu- trial court allowing erred Roveranos’ primarily trial sions .the focused experts to offer evidence that “each and n exposure and causation. Appellant did every” exposure or “whatever” asbestos dispute its product not contained as- injury Mr. caused' Roverano’s where Mr. above, questions As bestos. discussed mesothelioma, Roverano have did as gener- provide on the Verdict are to Sheet bestosis, or asbestos marker’ To guideposts jurors. alized add a exposure. parties defect about when the did disagree We Crane’s Appellant present argue or evidence the issue expert, testimony of characterization closing it in opening about state- their A entire Roveranos. review the tes- jury.’ ments would have confused the timony of the Roverano experts demon- Moreover, trial properly relied experts strates Roveranos’ Ericsson, Moore v. upon analysis single it testify exposure that was Inc., (Pa. 2010), Super. 7 A.8d 820 Appellants’ Ro- products that Mr. caused approval Court noted with trial rather, cancer; it lung verano’s that was court’s determination as a laui matter multiple exposures a substantial were containing that wire and cable causing lung cancer. factor Roverano’s was defective. See id. at 826. stated, judge instance, As the trial the issue was For Dr. Frank testified not whether a product length regular, was defective be- smoking both asbestos; “instead, cause contained frequent exposure to proximate, and as- issues, the trial and therefore factual Appellant bestos Crane’s remaining for issues limit- lung Roverano’s cancer. Dr. caused Mr. ed to particular whether Defendant’s general Frank testified about first causa- asbestos, product contained whéther the tion: it, Plaintiff and whether smoking lung Cigarette cancer. causes exposure caused Plaintiffs meso- lung cancer. causes Asbestos thelioma.” find no error We abuse together, you put is there When the two discretion. the two that some interaction between

Id. (citing Opinion). Court Trial getting lung the possibility of increases cancer, yes. As And there in the instant case answer noted, on this disputed “neither defendant varies de- numbers *10 Rost, 40, Brief, citing at Appellant look Crane’s study you on which' at

pending supra. experts’ By characterizing the testi- is we call a time... So there what assessment,” lacking “any response. mony serious multiplicative synergistic vary by-what challenges weight, again other averment studies Crane’s And higher, admissibility, number. Some some are of the evidence. that not the lower, simply it more than an addi- but province It is of within the you togeth- put two tive effect when give weight to jury to determine the er. not and Court will disturb evidence this 36-38; N.T., 4/7/16, at RR. 533a-34a. See weight the fact-finder’s determination. testimony re- provided Frank

Dr. later Champney, Commonwealth 574 Pa. specific by testifying garding causation (2003) (noting that testimony upon Mr.Roverano’s based exclusively weight “the the evidence .frequent proximate, and regular, of his appellate and “an for the finder of fact” Appellant to Crane’s asbestos exposure judgment its court cannot substitute that, cer- products, to a of medical degree fact.”). Accordingly, that of the finder tainty, weight not factfinder’s disturb the will exposure had to Mr. Roverano

whatever determination. de- packing products Crane John Appellant also “the Plaintiff’s avers that hypothetical in the would have scribed additionally experts’ testimony should have cause or contributing been substantial not this a mesothe- been barred because of his have been factual cause Again, at 43. case.” Brief lioma Crane’s and his lung cancer would have added argument to the pertains weight, Crane’s of his cumula- exposures, part total admissibility, of the not the evidence. exposure part of tive and therefore are presented evidence as- his lung caused cancer.” what only cause exposure bestos can mesotheli- 63; N.T., RR at R540a.3 oma,4 argued Ro- that because Mr. and Dr. Frank did base his conclusions cancer, it developed lung verano had on had a premise that Mr. Roverano demonstrated fact, Appel- single exposure asbestos. However, caused his Dr. lung cancer. testimony failed to point lant Crane general Frank causation testified on any expert opinion who his based exposure as- factor and concluded premise single of a exposure. cancer. Dr. lung bestos can cause Gelfand that, also on the argues Crane the trial testified based medical Appellant Mr. experience, literature and his Rovera- precluded have the Rovera- court should opinions they exposure no’s asbestos was “substan- experts’ no’s failed because lung contributing “any tial factor to his cancer provide serious assessment poor prognosis fre- to his survival.” by assessing' attribution causal 16-17, citing of Mr. See Crane Brief at regularity N.T. quency, proximity 540a, RR 765a. exposure products.” Roverano’s JCI’s opined contributed Frank also Brand Insu- wás one that "the factors Dr. totality up giving his his dose which ended Roverano was lation materials which Mr. 67; N.T., 4/7/16, lung RR. cancer." 541a. exposed to were a and contrib- factual cause lung developing his cancer. The uted to his same, lining part basis of that is that it’s his 4. Mesothelioma is a cancer risk, Co., Gregg lungs. Parts exposure, it to his v. V-J Auto cumulative added disease, (2007). say got you when he have to Act, Appellant essentially argues apply the Fair Crane Share 42 Pa.C.S. 7102(a.l)-(a,2), Roveranos’ § because believed case because the experts Appellants’ experts litigation involves to asbestos. causation, general the court They argue that the Roveranos’ claim falls *11 in permitting experts testify. erred the to ambit of Act within the that noth- and jury’s weight decline to disturb deter- We ing plain in the of language Act sup- mination. the trial ports court’s to exempt decision litigation require- asbestos from Act’s Molding 5. to Verdict Include agree.6 We ments. Non-Liable Defendants Statutory interpretation question of Georgia Hajo- Cement and Pacific Therefore, law. our of standard review is Corporation ca were both included novo, de and our of scope plena- review is Sheet, jury specifical and Verdict Hall, Commonwealth v. ry. 396, 622 Pa. ly instructed determine either whether (2013). 1204, A.3d 1211 “In all 80 matters “manufactured, named defendant distrib involving statutory interpretation, ap- we uted, or supplied” products which “were Act, Statutory 1 ply Construction Pa. in bringing factual causes Plaintiffs about seq., 1501 et § provides C.S. that the lung Jury Questions cancer.” Verdict — object interpretation and construction of Jury, 4/15/16, by the at be Answered filed is to statutes and effectuate the as.certain hearing presented After 3. evidence intention of Assembly.” Com- General trial, jury Georgia found that Pacific monwealth McCoy, 599, 962 Hajoca Corporation Cement and 1160, (2009) (citation omitted). A.2d 1166 Appellees. liable the harm to Id. light In jury fact that did Generally, plain language a statute’s that Georgia find Pacific and Ha- Cement provides legislative the best indication tortfeasors,5 Corporation to joca — Taylor, Pa. -, re intent. In Trust of in refusing err to mold 1147, (2017). 1155 We will look the verdict include them. beyond plain language of the statute only when the or ambig words are unclear 6. Fair Share Act uous, id., meaning see plain absurd, impossible lead “a result that the trial court contend as a by refusing erred matter of law execution or 1 unreasonable.” Pa.C.S. light holding 5. of our in the policy next section cited footnote in Rost discussed issues apportion finds that it is a who must underlying Supreme some of the Court's deci tortfeasors, liability among we note that since regarding liability expo sions from asbestos Georgia did not find Pacific Cement sure, stemming including applica issues tortfeasors, Hajoca Corporation to be joint liability, tion and then and several they should not be in a included determi- “Pennsylvania added: has now eliminated apportioning damages among nation tortfea- joint liability in most cases several sors. See note infra. through Fair of the Share Act.” amendment cry This sentence is a far from clear state Application 6. of the Fair Share Act strict application ment about the statute's -asbes involving cases is a and, cases, although tos we address issue impression Ap of first in this Court. Supreme mindful guidance of the Court’s Rost, pellants argue that dicta 151 A.3d at Rost, footnote we do not find the determina n.7, dealing personal another case tive. asbestos, injuries by exposure caused estab applies lishes that the Act these cases. 1922(1). Therefore, ascertaining (iv) release A or threatened § release when statute, sec- of a under meaning the-language is hazardous substance if. of October tion 702 the act clear, give plain words their No, 108), .(P.L. 756, Haz- Hall, known ordinary meaning. Cleanup Act. ardous Sites Pair in 2011 Act enacted Share action, (v) which a A defen- civil as- amendment section section 497 dant has violated § Code, 42 Pa. that had Judicial C.S. (P.L. 21), 12,1951 No. April act comparative negligence. See provided Liquor as the known Code. P;L. 2011). (June 28, 2011-17, Act No. (4)Where has held been defendant (b) replaced It subsection of that statute severally jointly liable under two new subsections: *12 with discharges by payment and subsection (a.l) Recovery against joint defen- proportion- than more that defendant’s dant; contribution.— liability, that share of the de- ate total (1) recovery is Where allowed is to recover contribu- fendant entitled person, including against more than paid from who have less tion defendants liability, lia- strict actions for where arid Further, proportionate than their share. bility is to more than one attributed any case, any may in recover defendant defendant, liable defendant shall each be any portion all of person from or other of proportion for that the total dollar damages that defendant assessed as ratio damages in amount awarded of a pursuant terms contractual liabili- of the of amount that defendant’s agreement. to the of

ty liability attributed amount (a.2) Apportionment responsibility of other persons defendants and all among nonpairties ef- certain and sub- apportioned under whom liability apportioning fect.—For of lia- purposes - (a-.2). section bility only, liability of of person any other or who has (2) defendant Except forth paragraph as set in plaintiff entered into- a release with the (3), liability be sever- shall defendant’s respect is not to the action and who shall joint, not court al and and the party shall to the trier be transmitted separate judgment and enter several requests of fact upon appropriate and each in favor plaintiff against by any person A proofs whose party. of the apportioned for amount defendant liability pursuant be determined liability. that defendant’s employ- not this section include does (3) any liability A defendant’s employer er extent joint and following shall actions be immunity liability or granted suit several, joint court shall enter (P.L. 2, pursuant to act of 1915 June judgment favor of several 736, 338), as No. known the Workers’ for against the defendant An Compensation Act. attribution re- dam- dollar as total amount awarded sponsibility any person entity or as ages: in this subsection provided shall (i) misrepresentation. Intentional upon any or relied admissible (ii) An intentional tort. or proceeding purpose. action (iii) Nothing Where the deféndant been has in this section shall affect 60% of nonadmissibility held less of evi- admissibility liable than settlements, releases, total to all liability apportioned par- regarding dence compromise ties. compromises offers to

905 7102(b) Pennsylvania (deleted § 42 forth in the Rules of Pa. set C.S. 2011); see Nothing Embrey Borough shall Mifflin, Evidence. section v. of West 257 joinder parties affect the rules Pa.Super. 168, 765, (1978) 390 A.2d Pennsylvania (role in the set forth Rules in: allocating liability). Liabili Civil Procedure. ty among joint tortfeasors were who strict ly 7102(a.1)-(a.2). liable § was not ap Pa. The Act covered C.S. statute and, under decisions, claims that June plies accrued after calculated 2011,* per capita7 is; agree basis—that parties and the Rover- if five liable, strictly defendants found anas’ claims did accrue before each would be time. allocated 20% of liability each, regardless of how much defendant’s One of the main purposes conduct contributed to injury. See joint.and Share Act was to Fair make ACandS, Baker 755.A.2d liability inapplicable to most tort several (2000); Corp., Walton v. Avco accomplished objec cases. The statute 454, 462 (1992) Pa. . (a.1)(2), tive subsection which states that, apart excepted from a limited class One the new Fair provi Share Act cases, “a shall be defendant’s sev replace 7102(b) sions enacted Section joint, and the shall enter eral and not 7102(a.1)(1),’ Section employed *13 separate judgment and several in favor language 7102(b), similar that in Section. against and each defendant applied it to both negligent but and strictly apportioned amount that of defen joint liable tortfeasors: lengthy The liability.” dant’s Act’s recovery against Where is allowed more however, clear, provisions make that the including than person, actions for is only restricting statute limited liability, liability strict and where is at- Rather, joint liability. and several insofar defendant, tributed to more than one here, is as. relevant the Act also made each liable shall be for that defendant to the .rules for adjustments several allo proportion of the dollar amount total cating liability among joint tortfeasors: damages in awarded as the ratio of the Act, Before enactment Share Fair liability to amount of that defendant’s Negligence Comparative provided Act attributed to liability amount all proportionate recovery against negli- persons defendants and other to whom joint gent per- to a according tortfeasors liability is apportioned under subsection centage determination that was made (a.2). the fact-finder: § 7102(a.1)(1). principal A C.S. is recovery against Where allowed more whether, question in this case is and defendant, each shall than one defendant extent, changed provision what proportion be liable total for that .the strictly way to allocaté lia liability.among awarded, damages dollar amount as joint ble tortfeasors. ratio, the amount causal his of. Prior, trial, defendants,

negligence negli- to the of causal includ- amount several Crane, gence ing- to all defendants attributed Brand and motion filed a against recovery ruling liability, their limine seeking allowed.... that whom is law, Appel- terminology imply Consistent some of does the case ent- substan "pro Appel lees call this a rata” allocation. liability way tive difference was deter “per capita,” provides lants use and that-term mined. description a clearer of the result. The differ 7102(a.l)(3) only excepts spe- four by the Section any, apportioned

if de- tort actions—intentional mis- which each cific kinds of according extent torts, The representation, harm to Mr. Roverano. other intentional cer- fendant caused cases, on shop motion argument tain and dram heard environmental motion April involving summarized the asbestos are and actions—and cases among follows: them. an you is that want you’re saying [W]hat The contend Section Roveranos capita, per than apportionment —rather 7102(a.l)(l)’s liability to strict reference an instruction you apportionment want only to make clear actions was intended you want the to'the abrogation joint that the Act’s and sev- liability if actually apportion the share of They liability applies to eral such cases. they reach that issue. contend that the Act is how liabil- silent Tr., 4/5/16, explained at 9. then among strictly is ity joint liable tortfeasors deny why it would the motion: apportioned, to be silence why my difficultly] with this and Here continue apportionment means here past it in the I will way I’ve denied was done be done the same all exception, all you per have an .is statute’s enactment —on a before the as- testimony support I’ve ever heard in capita argument, of this basis. bestos, say quantifies They 7102(a.l)(l) no one it. they point out Section you can’t it. If can’t you quantify says only joint that each tortfeasor’s liabili- it, quantify can Act how the Fair Share total ty equal proportion shall “that apply? damages” that amount awarded as dollar by determining “the ratio calculated during Id. at 9-10. After discussion liability” the amount of defendant’s proposed possible which defense counsel Act total of all defendants. allocation, ways proving the trial *14 not how specify that ratio is to be does in limine that reiterated the motion therefore, contend, determined, they and Id. post-trial at 10-16. its denied. per capita apportionment appli- the rule of opinion, it “prop- the trial court stated that Fair cable before the Act’s enact- Share erly [Appellants’] apply to motion denied disagree. ment unchanged. remains We the Act to this Fair Share case” because Rather, by explicitly making strictly liable jury- presented was not evidence the subject joint tortfeasors same liabili- permit apportionment that to be ty applicable allocation as that to section 7/27/15, by Op., made it. Trial Ct. 9-10. tortfeasors, negligent joint Legislature In holding that the Act did Fair Share liability that it for made clear to intended case, not to “apply” this way be allocated the same for each. to Appel- erred. This was an action hold strictly lants al- injuries liable in tort for The fact that the Fair Share Act does legedly by asbestos-containing say liability explicitly not to allocate caused how distributed, among strictly just they joint made or liable tortfeasors ambiguous and to explicitly applies the Fair Share Act means that is statute issue, tort in which not that not “recovery cases is allowed that the statute does against including Taylor, person, more In re than one address it. See Trust (a liability.” if ambiguous for C.S. is actions strict statute added). 7102(a.l)(l) Nothing explicit § language (emphasis “contain[ ] does raised”). exception addressing for strict statute statute makes an issue Rather, involving calculating is silent on the manner of liability cases asbestos. e cases, just for of tort ratio all kinds before th Fair enactment, Act’s Share Any liability suggestion strict cases. which for called a fact-based allocation in meaning has strict special the silence for negligence cases a per capita alloca liability therefore unfounded. cases liability tion in strict cases. If Legisla nothing suggest statute to change rules, There ture did intend to those Legislature that the un- intended the ratio there would be no reason to add the “in 7102(a.l)(l) Section to be der calculated cluding actions for liability strict clause” to way negligent for and a tortfeasors 7102(a.1)(1). Section way strictly different for those liable. A comparison Section Rather, similarity the lan- between 7102(a.l)(!) to language of Section 7102(b) guage former new Section 7102(b) that it replaced shows that 7102(a.l)(l) suggests Leg- Section that the Legislature accomplished objective .its islature that the allocation meth- intended changing components allocation from— applicable negligence to od cases the amount of [the tortfeasor’s] causal merely being to expanded apply strict negligence to the amount of neg causal liability cases The “including too. actions ligence to all attributed defendants liability” strict clause Section against recovery whom is allowed 7102(a.l)(l) conclusion; supports this to— suggests clause of lia- allocations liability the amount of

bility that had done defendant’s been liability the amount negligence now cases would “include” attributed all liability persons. strict as well. defendants and other cases liability whom is apportioned. Legislature’s “in placement of the liability The inclusion of strict cases obvi- cluding liability” actions for strict clause is Legislature’s ously If, accounts re- revealing. Appellees suggest, placement negligence” “causal with “lia- Legislature only to intended make clear bility.” only'change Because Was-the abrogation joint several actions, Legislature relevant this issue liability applied liability .it strict formula,8 its made to allocation this com- would have added clause to Section 7102(a.1)(2), again parison supports the view that abrogates joint and sev Instead, liability. liability Legislature Legislature eral intended allocation add 7102(b) 7102(a.1)(1), carry under over under ed clause to Section Section apply which deals new statute strict with allocation *15 among joint so, By liability way in doing cases same it tortfeasors. as had Legislature clearly previously compara- intended make a done been under change in the allocation rules that applied negligence tive statute.9 Walton, 462, Legislature phrase, liability,” The 8. also added the “and 610 A.2d but that Flex, persons liability appor- other tioned,” Omega whom v. dam was cracked in Tincher Inc., 296, 328, 376-81, discuss below. 628 104 Pa. A.3d 399- (2014) (discussing, .rejecting prior 406 require negligence This case opine completely 9. does us to on law’s divorce effort the factors that be allo- liability concepts). should considered in Even if and strict there n cating liability among strictly liable tortfea- some a were still reason to avoid fault-based 7102(a.l)(l). method, not-apparent sors under law Section Prior it is on this allocation prohibited strictly why liability among a fault-based allocation because record liable tort- product liability may by a desire actions at that a feasors not be allocated without "fortif[y] wrongdoing. may time dam A between theoretical consideration able, negligence liability identify notions apportion and strict 'no fault’ when it is 908 liability apportioned how be the Fair would structure and context law; support proposed a thus excuse as whole under Share Act law— 7102(a.l)(l) reflects the me. that Section

view a fact-find- intention have Legislature’s of those If Mr. TURZAI. Yes. both de- joint liability among tortfeasors er allocate present, you sug- are have fendants cases, including liabili- strict types in all gested, 'you liability strict have is confirmed conclusion cases. This ty claims, not take into you ... ac- would 1 history. See Pa. C.S. the statute’s or the plaintiffs plain- actions count (“When 1921(c)(7) § the words a statute reducing in terms of tiffs behavior explicit, the intention Gener- you negligent ultimate award do be ascertained consid- al'Assembly However, you ... ap- situations. would ... con- ering, among other matters [t]he damages strict portion the between lia- legislative history”). temporaneous one and strict bility defendant number a substan Act was reenactment Let liability two. us defendant number enacted in 2002 legislation tially identical you go they are 70-30 and would assume was declared invalid because later liability for the after strict 70 addressing multiple of bill sub part liability you go two for after strict 3, Article '3 of jects in violation of Section jury or degree that the 30 to Pennsylvania See Fair Constitution. causally responsible. judge them found 2002, 2002-57, Act of No. P.L. Act Share (June (House). 4, Leg. 2002 1199 Pa. J. (June 2002), 394 invalid in held DeW 2002).10 Representative. Turzai’s answer Weaver, (Pa. 54, 62 eese liability be- apportionment made clear 2005), opinion, 588 aff'd without Cmwlth. strictly liable two tortfeasors would tween A,2d (2006). The 2002 Pa. per capita, but would be instead hotly Legislar in the statute.was debated jury or degree that the based “the ture, during those debates the bill’s .and judge causally responsible,” found them House, manager Representa floor among neg- manner similar allocation Turzai, precise tive Mike was asked the ligent joint tortfeasors. that now is before Court: GANNON,... the, debates, during no time At Speaker, Mr. Mr. where legislation or the 2011 legislation you Pennsylvania have a manufacturer Represen- product any-suggestion selling, there ever in Pennsylvania seller, liability .-through tative allocation prod- Turzai’s view sells seller uct, got defect, under has the statute was incorrect manufacturing determining is for "a basis Their reasonable the con from fault. reasonableness instance, single tribution of each to a harm.” cause first to determine (Second) 433A(1) § Restatement of Torts weight supporting and the of their evidence (1965); Owens-Corning Fiberg see Martin v. jury. a matter for Corp., las (1987), suggests Brand could Representative clarified if Turzai later apportioned according been here have *16 liable, two the one of the defendants was 70% potential Mr. of Roverano’s amount exception in Sec- case would fall within the product. Br. to each defendant's Brand's 7102(a.l)(3)(iii) that permits tion defen- ' argument makes 19-20. a similar Crane severally jointly dant to be held liable. potency type in of of would factor the the J, (House) Leg. That 2002 clarifi- Pa. at 1199. which Mr. Roverano was asbestos to change of the his cation does relevance (chrysotile amphibole). versus Br..at Crane's purposes in answer for of the issue this case. arguments These 45-46. causation-based clearly apart suggest apportionment for bases

909 any there would be allocation among important tion make an provision strict- would of Act, ly joint per capita 7102(a.l)(3)(iii), liable on a the tortfeasors inapplica- Section Rather, liability throughout debates, basis. the the ble to strict --actions. .Section 7102(a.l)(3)(iii) repeated compromise provi- concern was about was a tortfeasors (both strictly sion. negli- states that if a liable tortfeasors and It defendant is held tortfeasors) gent for. more than liability liable 60% of in who would be allocated case, joint only liability applies a of and several percentage liability; small to that exception bill’s if defendant. This opponents legisla- worried assures enacted, that those who are tion substantial- recovery against were defendants ly responsible for .plaintiffs injury will defendants not make plaintiff would have to account for the of whole, full .amount proponents while worried that un- plaintiffs harm. liability ifBut a strict were less bill enacted such in defendants liability per case it is mathemati- capita, would to pay have more than fair their cally impossible any for of those defen- suggested share No one- verdict. dants to reach 60% with implications threshold: these different defendants, just liability two joint strictly liable tortfeasors than for oth- defendant’s only 50%, can the liability percent- ers. age will decrease as the of number defen- fact, general understanding that dants is not increases. That the result the strictly joint liable tortfeasors would have Legislature intended. liability way allocated in same other of tortfeasors led We, therefore, enactment liabil conclude that 7102(a.l)(3) of exceptions ity Section liability in strict cases must be allocat During debates, the Act. the 2002 there cases, ed in way the same tort other about af- concern how the bill basis, on per capita and not and that the actions, fect toxic tort recoveries holding erred that the liability which strict claims liability apportion pursuant often could not brought against multiple See 'course, defendants. Act. Of apportion- the Fair Share (House) 1204-05,12Í3- Leg. Pa. J. require by ment will submission debates, 14. As a result those bill appropriate ju- from which the evidence amended include Section Questions rors make an allocation. 7012(a.l)(3)(iv), preserves joint and regarding the nature that evidence liability liability several certain strict in the by should be trial court resolved Leg. J. environmental claims. See Pa. first instance remand. (June 12, (Sen.) 2Ó02); 1908-09 agree We also with 1349-5Q (House) (June 2002). Leg. J. permitted on remand to con- must be the Legisla- amendment shows any sider settlements evidence non-per capita ture allocation on a believed in con- bankrupt. Roveranos entities. basis in cases liability strict would be liability. nection with the apportionment of

rule, exception had to enact an 7102(a.2) of 'Fair Act Section Share n if it rule. wanted different apportioning “For states: lia- purposes Finally, only, the' Legislature bility has instructed interpret give- are to “to person statute who defendant has entered

effect to all its provisions.” Pa. C.S. into release "with' re- with' the § 1921(a); party see spect to the action Commonwealth and who not"a (Pa. Anderson, fact Super. shall be transmitted trier 2017) (en banc). upon Appellees’ interpreta- appropriate requests proofs But

910 7102(a.l)(l), on the among such manufacturers

any party.” liability Under Section were liability ground bankrupt in the manufacturers settling party’s is included Ottavio, liability not in calculation. of attributed to all included “amount defen- holding feder- persons liability whom 617 A.2d at 1300. In dants and other to (a.2)” of Bankruptcy prohibited for al inclusion apportioned Code under subsection calculation, companies in the we purposes allocating liability among bankrupt pursu- that an fault joint provisions require allocation tortfeasors. These observed Act12 Comparative Negligent bankrupt with be ant to the entities settlements allocation parties lia- made the other in the calculation allocated included whom, bility joint against tortfeasors under the statute.11 under joint then-prevailing rules of and several 7102(a.2) exception contains no Section con- another could seek liability, tortfeasor settling persons bankrupt. for who violate the tribution. That result would Rather, “any the section refers defen stay provisions Bankrupt- of the automatic into person dant or other who has entered cy preempted therefore Code13 and respect release with with Ball, See id. In we reached federal law. party.” 42 Pa. the action and who is not a holding result on same the basis our 7102(a.2) added). (emphasis § The C.S. Ball, 660. Ottavio. See in 625 A.2d claim, however, Roveranos deci our Corp., v. Fibreboard 421 Ottavio sions in Act The Fair Share does (1992) 284, 617 1300 Pa.Super. A.2d n permit only here. Not a similar result does (en banc), and v. Johns-Manville Ball joint away it do with several Corp., Pa.Super. 625 A.2d cases, following most but it contains the (1993), prohibited consideration 7102(a.2): “An attribu mandate Section bankrupt prior entities settlements with any person tion or enti responsibility Act, enactment-of the Fair Share continue ty shall provided subsection to bar consideration of settlements upon any or other relied admissible here. Because Ottavio and Ball any purpose.” action or proceeding policy based on considerations that do prohibits an Act use of allocation thus Act, Fair con apply under the Share we against bankrupt company a basis argument that this is mistaken. clude recovery other seeking contribution Ottavio, defendant, indeed, Act against company; In one of several finding inadmissible containing as- makes allocation manufacturers finding, therefore, bestos, in any objected apportionment case. Bankruptcy pro- Code requirement 362 of the concede that this 13.Section qualification subject they bankruptcy petition “sub filing vides of. a non-parties entities, mit that the evidence to establish "operates stay, applicable as a all joint & were Gossett, tortfeasors.” See Amato v. Bell proceeding against the of ... [an] action (Pa. 2015) Super. against the ... to recover a claim debtor , Vinciguerra appeal dismissed sub nom. that arose before the commencement debtor Inc., Bayer CropScience, "any case under title” and act addition, (2016). agree assess, collect, against or recover claima 7102(a.2) Appellees ap does not Section commencement debtor that arose before the (or bankrupt ply their entities successors U.S.C. case under this title.” 11 interest) they with .whom have not settled (6); 362(a)(1), § releases. received apparently negligence 12. The included case claim.

911 expose bankrupt company cannot to and we therefore need to remand this any by sort of claim the- for forbidden Bank- case trial on new result, ruptcy As a it not con- Code. does apportionment liability.- flict with the Code not preempted and is vacated, Judgment denying Order Post by it.14 Trial respects Motions affirmed in all oth- This is the same conclusion as that than portion dealing er with Fair by colleague reached our Strassbur- Judge Act; portion of Share the Order is ger when he confronted issue as trial reversed. Case remanded a new trial to judge Finding under 2002 statute. apportion among Ap- verdicts “inapposite,” cases like and Ball Ottavio pellants, non-bankrupt settling defen- he observed: (excluding Georgia dants Pacific Cement Act, it game[.] Under a new ball Hajoca and because the determined ’ seeking The defendant Ball was they tortfeasors) and bank- judgment against' bankrupt entities. rupt Settling defendants. Jurisdiction relin- Clearly that would have au- violated quished. tomatic stay. provides: new Act

An of responsibility attribution Judge President Emeritus Ford-Elliott entity person provided or in this joins this Opinion Per Curiam. subsection shall not or be admissible Judge Concurring Solano flies a upon relied action or any other Dissenting Opinion. proceeding for any purpose. Thus, judgment no auto- violative CONCURRING AND DISSENTING matic stay can eventuate. SOLANO, BY OPINION J.:

Slayton Pumps, Inc., v. Gold No. GD 03- join I portion full the of Majority 010873, 2004 Pa. Dist. & Dec. LEX- Cnty. heading Per Curiam Opinion under the “6. 335, (C.P. 25, 2004). IS Alleg., *5 Oct. Fair Share Act.” Because I believe the jurisdictions Courts have reached charge clearly explain.what failed similar conclusions when confronted proof of causation was needed to establish legislation similar the Fair Share Act. liability, I for a would remand new trial on See, e.g., Ott, 82, v. Bondex 774 N.E.2d 87 liability, just apportionment and not (Ind. 2002); Shondel, App. see In re also damages. (7th 1301, 1991) 950 F.2d Cir. 1306-07 (discussing bankruptcy discharge effect A trial in fram- has wide latitude Code). 524 of under Section ing jury, its charge to will order we reasons, “only charge For these we that the trial when the as a hold new apply inadequate Act in or not has a failed Fair Share whole clear Legislature tendency than manner intended to mislead confuse rather 14. respect, clearly, palpably, "there is note that constitutional unless against presumption preemption.” plainly Dooner v. violates the Pa. State Constitution.” Commonwealth, DiDonato, Jury Ass’n Comm’rs v. Pa. (cita- (2009) (2013) original). (emphasis A statute that is omitted). pre- preempted by quotation federal tions and marks law is unconstitutional (Art. corollary sumption against preemption Supremacy because violates VI, Clause 2) against presumption unconstitutionality cl. of the federal Constitution. Id. at passed strongly weigh against following as a 1193. But "acts the General Assem- Ottavio declining bly strongly apply Share presumed the Fair Act to be constitution- basis al,” according and "a statute will not be declared un- to its terms. Lock, Phillips

clarify plaintiff, a material issue.” *19 2014); see a (Pa. Super. regular, frequent, these fibers 916-17 Flex, Omega Inc., Tincher v. proximate Pa. basis. (2014) charge (jury regular? by I mean Usu- Now what do inadequate if issues are is “the made al, in recurring, habitual action. jury, “the the by clear” or was misled often, Occurring Frequent: happening instructions”). repeatedly. Here, portion of the relevant .trial the Close, space. in Proximate: near the .jury to court’s instructions came with, dealing So the and' elements First, parts.

four the Ver- explaining while you one individually, deal with each did Sheet, closing arguments, to the prior dict asbestos, product the contain the was court stated: plaintiff exposed to the asbestos fibers I The first said deals ex- question with oh coming product out of a regular, product particular’ to of the posure frequent, proximate basis. That’s Now, these are elements defendant. your exposure question and that initial plaintiff prove exposure. has to on question with Crane would deal John one, plaintiff exposed Number was on question Brand Insulation defendant, product of the it did three, asbestos, ex- contain was plaintiff question deals causa- second with posed par- asbestos fibers of. Now,. I obviously you give tion. —and regular, frequent, a ticular defendant instructions, gone road this. If I’ve over they’re And proximate basis. you exposure question, no on the answer proven be by elements that this must you get get don’t causation. You weight fair or fair preponderance you yes if answer the expo- causation I’ll get evidence that to later in order is, question. the question sure And here you yes. to answer products were the manufac- asbestos Now, the second with deals tured, distributed, supplied by manufactured, products whether these Crane, defendant, particular John Brand distributed, by or supplied the individual Insulation, you separately, discuss these bring- was a factual defendants cause bringing factual cause about plaintiffs ing In lung about cancer. lung cancer. words, exposure[,] you if did short, plaintiff In suffer from did it, bringing was it find a factual cause disease, is, an asbestos-related cancer, lung his plaintiff about did. lung an dis- cancer asbestos-related disease, suffer an asbestos-related ease. is, cancer, lung by that was it caused Now, exposure. do I mean factual what Well, you imagine law- cause? can N.T., 4/13/16, Second, following 36-37. lot yers judges there’s and with been closing arguments,, the court instructed: as to we mean discussion what do must You détermine whether or not I factual use the Word cause. used product either asbestos manufac- they factor. I think mean substantial tured, distributed, supplied by the same, today using factual but we’re defendant contained asbestos individual cause. emit, give and was it' off the—did .fibers, or- fibers, regu- legal these asbestos on a Factual is cause. cause lar—to the .recover in defendant —I mean to the der case, exposure to defendant’s ticular defendant a cause in factual bringing plaintiffs have been fac- lung must about cancer? bringing lung tual his cause about cause, legal cause Factual some- recognizes cancer. what the law This factor, times referred as substantial legal cause. my but-it’s the opinion same—in they’re definition, the same so I’m going give A cause is an fac- factual actual real you the definition of cause factual as a tor, result although unusual legal is,not cause. or-unexpected, imaginary but it *20 In plaintiff for the order to recover in or or having fanciful factor a no factor case, (cid:127)this exposure the to the defen- only or con- insignificant an connection products dant’s based on the elements lung Mr. with Roverano’s can- nection I gave you about that must have cer. been a substantial —must have been a said, again, as I I think And in bringing cause factual about Mr. Ro- sense, you makes would treat each de- verano[,] plaintiffs[,] lung the cancer. inquiry fendant separately, your but This is what the recognizes law as a far as the same as the is con- legal cause. cerned. A cause is a factual real actual —a Third, Id. at following charge, 116-19. the factor, factual cause is'an actual real counsel for pointed the Roveranos out that although result may the be unusual or given charge not court had con- unexpected, it is not or imaginary but curring causes. The court then told the or having fanciful factor a factor no con- jury: only nection significant connection my defining question, In the causation lung- cancer. cause, not is the I’m sure if factual you mind could have Keep-in more this, I I can said You have büt should. cause, than which is factual one cause ¾ in bringing than one factual cause more you’ve but If you got that’s for decide. given about a end. you say couple of causes arid one is riot Finally, began Id. at 130. after jury is, a factual and one then it' can cause deliberations, question it sent a only you be the one find the factual asked, you give please court that “Can us cause, can both you find that but at 134. definition factual?” Id. up you. That’s You’re factual cause. response, instructed: the fact finders.

Now,-you want me to this cau- define Id. at 135-37. legal ques- .a question, sation causation regarding The Verdict instruction tion, which,, know, you apply it properly had to Sheet told of fac- both So the definition defendants. Appellant’s] [each determine “whether ques- two and in tual cause ... a factual products w[ere] cause .in . tion It’s the same. same four cancer,” plaintiffs, lung bringing about the area of Was Mr. inquiry. or, lung Mr. more Roverano’s simply, was products Roverano to asbestos exposure” to those by cancer “caused manufactured, distributed, supplied N.T., 4/13/16, But products. .at 36-37. then particular defendant? Now—I’m define sought cause.” “factual .to sorry, strike that. The use that it used court-told explain factor” Were .manufac- words “substantial tured, distributed, supplied par- requirement, but then ex- confusion, Instead, clarity, rather than sow phrase meant. what that plain issues this case. key contested legal is a cause a “[factual said cause,” Appellants’ prod- con charge was concern is that the My a factual cause have been ucts “must necessarily fusing; was said was what can- lung Roverano’s] bringing [Mr. about purpose of the “but The main erroneous. recog- cer,” the law is what “[t]his is to a causation instruction aspect for” Id. at 118-19. legal cause.” nizes as not hold liable that it inform the is an actual real cause court said “factual some whose conduct did defendant factor,” insig- imaginary than an rather harm. See Pa. plaintiffs way cause one, than one factu- and that more (2016) nificant (Civ.) § Jury 13.20 Inst. Standard “given Id. bring about a end.” cause can al “must (charge that defendant’s misconduct 119,130. bringing cause have been factual harm”). charge trial court’s But the about perceived that jury apparently general conveyed message. Under “factual tautological definitions court’s law, for” causation is subsumed tort “but “legal cause” and legal as “a cause” *21 stringent requirement the more within recognizes being the law as what cause” sufficiently “proxi must be that a cause provided cause” is a “factual when there recovery, permit or to mate” “substantial” it was to guidance regarding what little Ass’n, see, e.g., Zeta Delta Zeta Alumni determine, the court it therefore asked and 696, Sullivan, A.2d Pa.Super. 536 v. 369 4/13/16, N.T., at 134. to define “factual.” 356, (1987), aff'd, 1096, 624 Pa. 572 1098 said, “Factual cause response, (Pa. 1990), this remains true 1209 and A.2d cause, to as referred legal sometimes Ford Motor cases. See Rost v. factor, ..., so it’s the same substantial but 1032, 625, Co., 1050 Pa. 151 A.3d 637 going give you I’m the definition (“our (2016) proof sub regarding law legal Id. at 136. cause.” factual cause as a exposure is the same stantial causation to Appellants’ that exposure The court said contexts”), tort to asbestos a substantial— products “must have been causation, (“[t]o proximate 1049 establish bringing a factual cause must have been to show adduce evidence plaintiff must Id. lung cancer.” Roveranofs] about Mr. the defendant’s act was substantial factual that a repeated The court then bringing plaintiffs factor about factor,” real and “an actual cause had be harm”). concepts there The two causation one, insignificant imaginary not an may describing conflated in fore be factual there be concurrent could n.2 proof. See id. at 1037 elements causes. Id. causation, only (stating, respect prove “that must the defect court’s portions The clearest inju causing factor was the substantial charge incorporate are material those ry”). pro- Pennsylvania’s from 13.20 Section civil may instructions for from posed standard harm result physical Because That instructions small amounts exposure relatively cases. includes material actual, asbestos, required Supreme must an real Court has factual cause as- imaginary factor that is not defendant’s causative “evidence sufficiently was bestos-containing product that there can be concur- insignificant and sup- ‘frequent, regular, proximate’ But those injury. despite of an rent causes prod- port jury’s finding that defendant’s I with the convic- subsidiary, am left substantially causative of dis- tended to uct charge that the as a whole tion

915 Rost, 1044; id. ease.” 151 A.3d at see Parts,

1043, 1047; Co., Pennsylvania Gregg v. V-J Auto COMMONWEALTH of 274, (2007). 596 Pa. v. require court instructed the on-this Brittany Appellant SMITH, Nora ment, identify clearly but it did not No. 877 WDA 2017 requirement element causation. charged

The court also concurrent about Superior Pennsylvania. Court injuries, causes of indivisible Submitted October important conflicting for resolution of the which, claims if any, about of the defen Filed December dant’s Rovera- was cause Mr.

no’s cancer whether cancer was

caused a factor unrelated defen

dants, Rost, smoking. as his See (explaining

A.3d at 1051 “multiple coop

substantial causes combine produce resulting

erate harm the

plaintiff’); Summers Certainteed

Corp., 1164-65

(2010) (same). charge

The trial court’s thus did

materially legal depart governing

principles, clearly explain but *22 Instead,

them terms either. substituted “legal

such as “factual cause” and cause” sophisticated concepts more re

quired explanation, provide and it failed

clear definitions of the terms it used. it,

resulting charge, as I read generates than I clarity.

more confusion understand

my colleagues’ reluctance to overturn

jury verdict the trial court made a where

good-faith com simplify such a effort

plex area of law. . because But

purpose charge “to clarify of a the issues comprehend ques

so that the Pittsburgh decide,” Lee

tions must

Corning Corp., Pa.Super. (1992), and because clarify charge

court’s failed to. issues

here, I new trial on believe a

warranted.