UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED judgment District Court is AFFIRMED in part and DISMISSED in part.

Brandon appeals from a judgment District (Buchwald, J.) sentencing him principally to a months’ imprisonment after denying motion to vacate guilty plea. We assume parties’ familiarity facts and record prior proceedings, which refer only as necessary to explain our decision affirm dismiss part.

We affirm Court’s holding failed raise significant question as “the voluntary intelligent nature [his] decision plead guilty.” Arteca, 2015). The unsworn statement David Touger, Esq., who replaced Randy Zelin, Esq. counsel *3 after the guilty plea, fails to show that Zelin had an actual or per se conflict of interest that rendered guilty plea involuntary. Even after the Government stressed that Touger had not provided an affidavit to support his vague allegations of conflict of interest, Touger failed to address deficiency. Second, our review of record, including Government’s explicit representation prior to Lisi’s plea that its “commitment” to meet with Lisi’s counsel in advance any new charging decisions was not part Lisi’s agreement to plead guilty, persuades us that Government’s expression such a commitment did not “induce” Lisi’s guilty plea. Finally, conclude that Zelin’s Sentencing Guidelines advice to Lisi was not incorrect, see U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1, cmt. n.3(E), that in any event has not demonstrated that Zelin’s advice, even if inaccurate, affected his decision to plead guilty. Although better practice may be to hold a hearing, acted within its discretion in denying motion withdraw guilty plea his request *4 an evidentiary hearing on ground that “counsel’s contentions conflict history of this case,” and were conclusory. Special App’x 28; see id. at 26; v. Gonzalez, 647 F.3d 41, 57 (2d Cir. 2011). With respect Lisi’s challenges his sentence, we dismiss that portion of his appeal barred valid appellate waiver. See v. Arevalo, F.3d 93, 98 (2d Cir. 2010). In plea agreement, agreed writing not challenge any term imprisonment less than months or any forfeiture or restitution order $7 million or less. At plea hearing, acknowledged that he understood terms plea agreement, including appellate waiver. Lisi’s imprisonment, amount restitution, and amount forfeiture are within range that he agreed not challenge appeal. As Lisi’s argument that appeal waiver is unenforceable, review this unpreserved challenge plain error, see v. Cook, F.3d 477, (2d Cir. 2013), conclude none “very circumscribed” exceptions validity an waiver applies, see Gomez Perez, 2000). We have considered remaining arguments conclude they are without merit. For foregoing reasons, judgment *5 1 AFFIRMED DISMISSED part.

2 THE COURT: 3 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk

[1] also argues that he received ineffective assistance counsel from Touger in connection motion withdraw guilty plea, because Touger failed submit evidence he was prejudiced by ineffective assistance on Zelin. But any such claim would depend on existence such evidence, none which appears present record. Accordingly, any such claim would have be made petition pursuant U.S.C. § 2255. See Billy Eko States, 1993) (holding “ineffective assistance claims are appropriately brought § petitions . . . because resolution such claims often requires consideration matters outside record direct appeal”).