In re: R.S.M.Â
257 N.C. App. 21
| N.C. Ct. App. | 2017|
Check Treatment IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA17-499
Filed: 19 December 2017
Hoke County, No. 15-JB-23
IN THE MATTER OF: R.S.M
Appeal by Defendant from orders entered 17 October 2016 and 2 November
2016 by Judge Regina Joe in Hoke County District Court. Heard in the Court of
Appeals 6 September 2017.
Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Special Deputy Attorney General
Stephanie A. Brennan, for the State.
Leslie Rawls, for the Defendant-Appellant.
MURPHY, Judge.
Ryan1, appeals from a 2 November 2016 order2 committing him to a youth
development center for a minimum of six months up to his eighteenth birthday. On
appeal, he contends that the trial court had already filed a written dispositional order
on 17 October 2016 continuing him on probation, and therefore the trial court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction to enter a second dispositional order on the probation
violations when it had already entered a disposition order and no new motion for
review was pending. We agree.
1 A pseudonym is used to protect the identity of the juvenile.
2 Ryan also appeals a clerical error in the 17 October 2016 order, which we address below.
IN THE MATTER OF R.S.M.
Opinion of the Court
Background
In an Order entered 20 January 2016, Ryan was adjudicated delinquent upon
pleading guilty to various charges of breaking and/or entering, common law robbery,
felony larceny, breaking and/or entering [a] motor vehicle, and intimidating a
witness. The order placed Ryan under probation for a period of twelve months.
On 1 August 2016, juvenile court counselor Damain Terry filed two Probation
Violation-Motion[s] for Review in Hoke County District Court alleging that Ryan
violated the terms and conditions of the probation imposed on him on 16 December
2015 in that:
1. [Ryan] left the home without parents’ permission on
the 17th day of July 2016 and not returning back [sic]
to the home.
2. [Ryan] failed to comply with curfew by leaving the home
on the 17th day of July 2016 and not returning home.
3. [Ryan] left the home without parents’ permission on the
7th day of July 2016 and returning back [sic] to the
home until the 8th day of July 2016.
4. [Ryan] failed to comply with curfew by leaving the home
on the 7th day of July 2016 and not returning home
until the 8th day of July 2016.
Ryan admitted to these violations on 12 September 2016. A dispositional
hearing was conducted on 17 October 2016, and Judge Joe orally announced that she
was ordering the active commitment of Ryan to a Youth Development Center (“YDC”).
Later that day, the written disposition order was entered referencing the 12
September 2016 hearing date. This order continued Ryan on probation, and was
signed by Judge Joe. No further probation violation motions were pending at the
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IN THE MATTER OF R.S.M.
Opinion of the Court
time. However, on 2 November 2016, Judge Joe entered a purported disposition order
on the probation violations, committing Ryan to a YDC.
Ryan’s trial attorney filed a notice of appeal on 31 October 2016, and an
amended notice of appeal on 4 November 2016. Ryan’s appellate counsel filed a
petition for writ of certiorari due to defects in the notices of appeal, which we granted
on 5 October 2017.
Analysis
I. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
On appeal, Ryan argues that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction
to enter a second written dispositional order committing him to a YDC when it had
already filed a written dispositional order continuing him on probation. An issue of
subject matter jurisdiction presents a question of law subject to de novo review on
appeal. McKoy v. McKoy, 202 N.C. App. 509, 511,689 S.E.2d 590
, 592 (2010).
The trial court’s written disposition order filed 17 October 2016 controls over
its earlier oral judgment committing Ryan to the YDC. Any conflict between the
announcement of judgment in open court and the written order is resolved in favor of
the written order. State v. Buchanan, 108 N.C. App. 338, 340,423 S.E.2d 819
, 821
(1992).
Furthermore, because there were no motions for review filed, notice, or
hearings conducted after the 17 October 2016 disposition order, the trial court lacked
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IN THE MATTER OF R.S.M.
Opinion of the Court
subject matter jurisdiction to create a new disposition order committing Ryan to YDC.
N.C.G.S. § 7B-2510(d) (2015). See also State v. Gorman, 221 N.C. App. 330, 333,727 S.E.2d 731
, 733 (2012) (“Where jurisdiction is statutory and the Legislature requires
the [c]ourt to exercise its jurisdiction in a certain manner, to follow a certain
procedure, or otherwise subjects the [c]ourt to certain limitations, an act of the [c]ourt
beyond these limits is in excess of its jurisdiction. If the [c]ourt was without
authority, its judgment […] is void and of no effect.” (Citations and quotations
omitted)).
N.C.G.S. § 7B-2510(d) has three requirements before a trial court may “review
the progress of any juvenile on probation”: (1) a motion by the court counselor, the
juvenile, or the court; (2) notice; and (3) a hearing. N.C.G.S. § 7B-2510(d) (2015).
None of these requirements were met after the 17 October 2016 order, and the trial
court had no authority under our statutes or caselaw to enter a new dispositional
order.
II. Clerical Error
A clerical error is “[a]n error resulting from a minor mistake or inadvertence,
[especially] in writing or copying something on the record, and not from judicial
reasoning or determination.” State v. Lark, 198 N.C. App. 82, 95,678 S.E.2d 693
, 702
(2009) (citations and quotations omitted) (alterations in original). When a clerical
error is found, the case may be remanded, “to the trial court for the limited purpose
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IN THE MATTER OF R.S.M.
Opinion of the Court
of correcting the clerical errors in the judgment and commitment forms.” Id. at 95,
678 S.E.2d at 703.
The 17 October 2016 Order for Motion for Review (Probation Violation) states
that Ryan’s actions violated the prior dispositional order entered on 16 September
2015. The probation order was not entered until 20 January 2015. This order is thus
remanded to the trial court for correction.
Conclusion
The trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter a subsequent order
on 2 November 2016. The 17 October 2016 order is controlling, and the 2 November
2016 order is vacated. Additionally, the 17 October 2016 Order is remanded for
correction of a clerical error.
VACATED AND REMANDED.
Judges CALABRIA and ZACHARY concur.
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