NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only accordance Fed. R. P. 32.1 United States Court of Appeals

For Seventh Circuit Chicago,

Argued November Decided December Before

DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge No.

PETER ABATANGELO Appeal States District CALVITA J. FREDERICK, Northern District

Plaintiffs Appellants Illinois, Eastern Division. v .

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., Matthew F. Kennelly, DLJ MORTGAGE CAPITAL, INC., Judge

Defendants Appellees

O R D E R

After losing homes separate actions court, Peter Calvita brought U.S.C. mortgagees, Bank DLJ Capital. demanded judgments set aside homes be returned, on premise aspect process them protection. court, relying doctrine, see D.C. *2 ‐ Appeals Feldman (1983); Rooker Fidelity Trust Co. U.S. (1923), dismissed the case for lack of subject ‐ matter jurisdiction. We affirm.

The two foreclosure actions before us are wholly unrelated, and so one might wonder why appear in the same case. F ED . R. C IV . P. 20(a). Nonetheless, misjoinder parties a ground for dismissal, and we can disregard problem. F ED R. IV P. In the first case, Wells Fargo filed a foreclosure action against Abatangelo in Illinois circuit That court entered a judgment foreclosure and later confirmed the judicial sale the residence. Abatangelo appealed, and the Illinois affirmed. Wells Bank, Abatangelo WL *4 (Ill. App. Ct. He then filed the court and leave appeal the Illinois. Both denied. the second case, DLJ filed a foreclosure action Frederick. There too circuit court entered judgment foreclosure and later confirmed sale property. Frederick appealed, but upheld foreclosure and judicial sale, DLJ Mortg. Capital, Inc. Frederick Ct. and appeal.

Abatangelo and Frederick then jointly filed lawsuit under U.S.C. each claiming decisions pertinent foreclosure violated right protection. The Illinois Foreclosure Law concerning judicial sales, ILCS 5/15 ‐ 1508(b), note, restricts challenges judgments. Those seeking judgment are more restricted than ordinary appellants courts, latter protected Rule which provides judgment civil case “appealable right.” The distinction, contend, violates Equal Protection Clause. asked district invalidate decisions cases, order return homes, dismiss Fargo’s DLJ’s actions. initially dismissed case basis claim preclusion. Plaintiffs moved reconsideration, but defendants responded request revise dismissal reflect lack subject matter jurisdiction. granted defendants’ motion clarified it lacked subject doctrine. added somehow escaped clutches doctrine, barred preclusion. It modified show dismissal lack jurisdiction, followed. *3 17 ‐ 1794 3

The district court correct to make this modification. The Rooker ‐ Feldman doctrine divests courts except subject ‐ matter jurisdiction to adjudicate suits plaintiffs who effectively seek review an adverse state ‐ court judgment. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp. , 544 280, 284 (2005); Iqbal v. Patel , F.3d 728, (7th Cir. 2015).

Recognizing that they problem, plaintiffs urge that Rooker ‐ Feldman does not apply to they are not “ask[ing] this court to review reverse” judgments. But that is precisely complaint asks district court to do—and much more. And they explicitly ask court to “send cases back to Court.” Their theory is that state appellate court denied them protection limiting its review judgments. It impossible to grant relief perceived without “disregarding or effectively vacating” state ‐ court judgments. See Mains Citibank, , F.3d 669, (7th Cir.), cert. , U.S.L.W. (U.S. Oct. 2017) (No. ‐ 89). plaintiffs’ lawsuit seeks reversal state appellate ‐ decisions, well as ‐ court decisions. Avoiding use word “reverse” does not change anything. id. at (“Claims that directly seek to set aside state - de facto appeals trigger doctrine.”); Landers Seed Co. Champaign Nat’l Bank , (7th Cir. 1994) (explaining district lacks subject to consider constitutional challenge if granting relief effectively require invalidating state decision). also seem to misunderstand exception to Rooker Feldman doctrine allows raise claims “were afforded ‘reasonable opportunity’ raise claims court.” Gilbert Ill. State Bd. Educ. 901–902 (7th Cir. argue constitutional claims did arise issued its decisions, did an opportunity raise them court. That correct. Gilbert concluded plaintiff had reasonable opportunity litigate his claims, which plaintiff attributed decision, through petition rehearing Id. at same true here. Hale Comm. Character Fitness 682–83 2003) (invoking when litigant opportunity file petition writ certiorari). Both petitioned sought Illinois. Indeed, expressly note raised “the issue [c]onstitutional violation” least Frederick’s petition rehearing. As noted, “[t]hese allegations establish both *4 1794 4 plaintiffs’ opportunity to assert the constitutional issue once was presented[,] and either their failure to do or the rejection of their contention.” plaintiffs take the position that they did not have reasonable opportunity to raise their constitutional claims in because their petitions for for review the supreme were denied. But, as in Gilbert , the denials of the plaintiffs’ do not mean they lacked the opportunity raise their constitutional claim. See Gilbert , at 902. Moreover, if the constitutional claims did not arise the gave its reasons ruling them, then they could have appealed the as right under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 317. Gilbert , at (explaining Rule authorizes as right constitutional arises the first time as result decision). plaintiffs bypassed those opportunities, as well as opportunity petition review in Supreme Court United States. S UP T R ULE 13; Remer Burlington Area Sch. Dist. , 2000) (“[N]o how erroneous unconstitutional judgment may be, Supreme Court States only could review judgment.”) In short, opportunity raise their claims was required. their reply brief, reverse course differentiate themselves from plaintiff in Gilbert. now contend they could not raise

claims in restrictions on challenging judgment after confirmation judicial sale result Illinois’s ruling in Bank, McCluskey , N.E.2d rulings particular cases. But argued opening brief, where insisted McCluskey decision did prevent broadening scope its review.

McCluskey holds Illinois Foreclosure Law displaces more liberal Illinois Code Civil Procedure provides rules adjudicating attacks judgment after judicial sale has been confirmed. McCluskey N.E.2d at 323. these cases cited McCluskey support its conclusion that, challenging proceedings, both limited identifying defects judicial sale rather than seeking overturn underlying foreclosure. WL *3; at 781. This new ruling, say, thus McCluskey source could appealed right Rule *5 No.

This argument fails too. Although McCluskey was decided after filed their appeals, harmed directly decision. Instead, any harm suffered flowed application opinion preexisting statute. And either way, notion McCluskey source is nonsensical light now say seek: “remand” can start all over again. If such transfer could occur (and we cannot imagine how), bound decision court. Vill. Deerfield Greenberg 12, Ct. 1990). Despite arguments contrary, could raised scope ability petitions writs certiorari filed States. one side, we cannot resist adding underneath obviously frivolous complaint. State an element any Hallinan Fraternal Order Police Chi. Lodge (7th Cir. 2009); Alvarado Litscher (7th Cir. Private banks normally actors, London RBS Citizens, 746–748 offered any theory could overcome gaping hole case. One way other, doomed. We AFFIRM