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Roy Lee Wells, Jr. v. State
06-17-00180-CR
| Tex. App. | Dec 4, 2017
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*0 FILED IN 6th COURT OF APPEALS TEXARKANA, TEXAS 12/4/2017 8:54:25 AM DEBBIE AUTREY Clerk *1 ACCEPTED 06-17-00180-CR SIXTH COURT OF APPEALS TEXARKANA, TEXAS 12/4/2017 8:54 AM DEBBIE AUTREY CLERK TN THE

SIXTH COURT OF APPEAIS OF TEXAS NO. 06-17-00180-CR ROY LEE VüELLS, JR.

Appe I ant v

THE STATE OF TEXAS Appellee ON APPEAL FROM THE 19TH JUDICIAL D]STR]CT COURT OF MCLENNAN COUNTY TR]AL COURT NO. 2076-7203_C7 BRIEF OF APPELLANT John M. Hurley

Attorney Law N. 38th Street

Vüaco, Texas 1671-0

Telephone: (254 ) 753-616]-

Facsimile i (254) 11,4-2564

j mhurleyl Gyahoo . com Bar No: 10311100

Attorney for Appel-lant

December 4,

TN THE S]XTH COURT OF APPEALS OF TEXAS NO . [0] 6- [1] [7] - [0] 0 1 B [0] -CR \

ROY LEE WELLS, JR. \ J

Appe 1l- ant

S s

V

s

THE STATE OF TEXAS, S Appellee N J

NAD{ES OF ALL THE PARTIES (Rule 38.1(a), T.R.A.P.) Roy Lee Wells, Jr. Appe I I ant Appell-ant's Attorney at Trial Michel Simer

3715 Bel-l-mead Drive Vüaco, Texas [1] [67] 05 John M. Hurley Appellant's Attorney Appeal:

427 N.3Bth Street Vüaco, Texas [1] 61IA of Texas Appellee

Attorneys for the Stat,e Texas: Hillary LaBorde

Christi Hunting Horse As st. . Crim. District Attys. 2I9 N. 6th Street Suite Vüaco, Texas 0L Siana Negash Complainant

fl *3 TABLE OF CONTENTS NAMES OF ALL THE PARTIES .11

TABLE OF CONTENTS. l- l_ l_ .avr v

rNDEX OF AUTHORITIES.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE. [1]

TSSUES PRESENTED.

Issue No. [1] Vühether the trial- court incorrectly overruled Appellant's objection that the State's question t.he police of ficer's anshler \^/ere impermissible comment.s Appell-ant' s right to remai-n silent after he had been arrested Mirandized? (4 R.R. It7-118). .1 Issue No. [2]

Whether the State failed to prove a reasonable doubt an essential el-ement offense of aggravated kidnappitg, namely t.hat the alleged vict.im \^/as secreted or \^¡as held in a place where she was not likely be found? 5 R.R. I24). .1 STATEMENT OF FACTS [3]

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT [4]

ARGUMENT . [6]

PRAYER.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE. T1 .18

CERT I FT CATE OF VüORD COUNT

lil *4 IIIDEX OF AUTHORITIES Cases

Bowen App Crim. . (Tex 427 3d . TÍ. S 4 [37] , State v . 2OL2l

16 Brimage v. State, 7Lg S.VÍ. 2d 466 (Tex. Crim. App .L4

1994) .

Hooper v . State , 2L4 S .IÍ. 3d 9 (Tex .

,Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307 (1979) .13

Lucio v. State 351 S.W. 3d 878 (Tex. Crim. App 2OLLl

.L4 NeaI v . State , 256 S .It. 3d 264 (Tex . Crim. App . 2008)

. .10

Roberson v. State, 100 S .W. 3d 36 (Tex. App. - IÍaco

2002, pet. ref'd). I

Salinas v. State, 369 S.w. 3d L76 (Tex. Crím. App

2OL2l . [8]

Smith v. State 522 S.It. 3d 628 (Tex. App Houston

[14th Dist.l 2OLll . . 8, 10

Snowden v. State, S.It. 3d 815 (Tex. Crim. App 9, 11

2OLLI

I[aIl v. L84 s.Iü. 3d 730(Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

Whitehead v. State, S. vÍ. 3d 547 (Tex. App

Texarkana, 2OL4, pet. ref' .10 d)

lv

Statutes Ru1es

Texas Ru1es Appellate Procedure, RuIe 44.2 (a). I

Texas Pena1 Code, S20 . L4

Texas PenaL Code, S20.O4. L4 I

]SSUE NUMBER ONE

Vühether the trial court incorrect.ly overrul-ed Appellant's objection that the State's question the police of f icer's ansh/er \^/ere

impermissible comments on Appell-ant's right to

remai-n silent after he had been arrested and

Mirandized? (4 R.R. L\7-118).

]SSUE NUMBER TVüO

Vühether the failed to prove a reasonable doubt an essential el-ement of the

offense of aggravated kidnappitg, namely that

alleged vict.im ü¡as secreted or was held in a

place where she r,¡¡as not likely to be found?

(5 R.R. I24)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE On August 3, a Mclennan County Grand Jury indicted Roy Lee Vfells, Jr. f irst

degree felony charge aqgravated kidnappitg, a

violation of Texas Penal Code S20.04. (C.R. 5)

On July 5, 2011 a Mclennan County Grand Jury handed up a "true bill of superceding indictment"

which added a third degree felony charge of

attempted sexual assault (Count II) . (C.R. 22-23)

A j ury trial- commenced July 18 , 2071 . ( 3 R. R. )

The jury found Wells guilty on both counts. (C .R. [57] , [5] B ) . As Appellant had el-ected

Court assess punishment, a pre-sentence report

\iras ordered on September It, 2017 a hearing

on punishment v/as held. The Court sentenced

Vrlells t.o years confj-nement Count. I (C.R.

69-10) , years confinement on Count II

(c.R . 1I-1 4)

Appellant fil-ed Notj-ce Appeal on September Lr, 2011. (C.R. 75).

The tri-al court.'s certification of Defendant's right of appeal is found page 11

of the Clerk's Record.

There \^/as no Motion for New Trial-.

STATEMENT OF FACTS (through an Amharic Siana Negash testified speaking interpreter) that she came t.o America in as a refugee from Eritrea (Ethiopia) . Vüith

no other resources she rel-ied on agencies and a

church shel-ter for housing and other necessities.

(4 R. R. 126-L2B) .

She met Mr. Wel-ls at, Presbyterian Shel-ter in Fort Vüorth where he also resi-ded times.

Eventual l y the two be came invol-ved in a

relationship with each other. (4 R.R. 130-I32) .

She said t.hat. he hurt her t.hree occasi-ons and (4 R.R. L41-1,52)

that he had raped her. As pertains to the case at bar, Siana Neqash stated that Vüel-l-s had placed her in a rented

Cadillac in Fort Worth and drove to Vüaco. She

said he attempt.ed have sex with her, when

she refused, he hit her with a belt. She thought

she was having a heart attack so he drove t.o

Baylor Scott Vühite Hospital in Vüaco where she

received medical care and eventually police \^Iere

call-ed to j-nvestigate. Mr. Wel-ls r^/as arrested at

the hospital. (4 R.R. L62-112).

Appellant did not testify (5 R.R. 11-78) SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT fn Appel-lant's first issue he addresses State's quest.ioning Vüaco Police Officer Lyle

Smith who had responded to the hospital and

remained with Appellant while police and hospital

staf f j-ntervj-ewed Siana Negash. Smith h/as t.here

for one purpose/ to make sure that Wel-l-s did not.

leave. Upon questioning by the , Officer

Smith testified that once Wel-1s had been placed

under arrest. \^/as Mírandized that Vrlell-s no (4 R.R

longer wanted to talk about anything.

I1-l). Appellant contends that the State's

questions Smith ans\^/ers were comments on

Vüell-s' Fifth Amendment right. to remain sifent

after his arrest. and h/ere calcul-ated prejudice

Wells in the jury's view j-n so much as being

silent includes the failure of the accused t.o

deny or cont.est the charges at the time he was

arrested.

Appel-lant did not testify. Therefore, he had a high level of constj-tutional protection under

the Fifth Amendment, to not have his pre-tria1

post-arrest., post Miranda sil-ence used as

substantive evidence of his guilt against him at

trial.

In his second issue Appel-l-ant suggests that evidence \,\¡as 1ega11y insufficient to sustain a conviction for aggravated kidnapping (Count I) a reasonable doubt that the alleged victim

hras secreted or hias hel-d in a place where she was

not likely to be found an essent.ial- element. of

the of fense. Appel-l-ant points to Siana Negash' s

O\^/n testimony where she admits that Vüells

insisted that medical tests be done when Negash

exhibited heart attack sympLoms . (4 R. R. 7-

L96)

ARGUMENT

Issue Number One Restated

The Court erroneously overrul-ed Appellant's correct objection to the State/s quest.j-on and

Of ficer's Lyle Smith's anshler that \^Iere comments Appell-ant.' s post-arrest, post.-Míranda silence:

(4 R.R. 7I1-118).

Q: Was he Mirandized some point?

A: He \^¡as Mírandi- zed.

Q: And af ter that. h¡as any further information gathered from the Defendant? A: No. He didn't want t.o t.alk about anythì-ng

To defense counsef's proper objection Lhe just that he prosecutor replied: "My point l_s

hTAS Mirandized not.hing else was gotten. "

Appellant contends that t.he Fifth Amendment, to the Const.itution forbids prosecutors from

making that point. According to Officer Smith,

he Vfells had been talking, but that stopped

when Vfells hras arrested and read his Miranda

Rights which include the right to be sil-ent.

Appellant contends that police testimony about his silence after being arrest.ed and read

his Miranda warnings vj-ol-ated his Fifth Amendment

right t.o be silent \^/as cal-cul-ated to

prejudice the jury against him who must have

taken Appellant's silence as agreement with the

charges for which he had been arrested, because

an innocent person woul-d have spoken out t.o at

l-east deny the charge when he \^/as arrested.

The Court overruled defense counsel-'s objection instead of sustainíng the objection and

directing the jury to disregard improper

question ansh/er which might have cured

harm, but that didn't happen.

Appellant did not testify at this trial-. Pre- trial- he h/as si-lent once he hras arrested and

received hj-s Miranda Vüarnings " Therefore, his

silence before trial is deserving a hiqh level-

of protection provided by the Fifth Amendment See

Salinas v. State , 369 S.Iü. 3d L76,L78 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2012l .

Appellant's pre-trial, post. arrest, post Miranda silence vúas used by State his

trial- as substantive evidence of his guilt' and

not for impeachment because he did not testify at

his trial . Therefore, t.he Court's error j-n

overrulíng defense counsel-'s object was

constitutional- error that must. l-ead reversal-

unl-ess the Court of Appeals finds a

reasonable doubt that the error \^Ias harmless.

T.R.A.P. 44.2 (a). Smith v. I 522 S.rÍ. 3d

628 (Tex. App Houston [14th Dist.l ( Prosecutor' s comment violatJ-ng

2OL7 r D. p. h. ) .

Appellant' s privilege aqainst self-incrimination

\^¡as of constitutional magnitude invokì-ng T . R. A. P

44.2 (a) analysis. ) See also, Roberson v. State S.w. 3d , 43'44 (Tex. App. - Iüaco 2OO2 ,

pet. ref' d) ( State' s improper comment on

Defendant's failure t.o testify was error of

constitutional magnitude ) .

HARM AI{AÏ.YSIS The Court of Appeals must reverse the judgment unless it concl-udes a reasonabl-e

doubt that the error did not contri-bute the

Defendant' s conviction or punishment.. Snowden v.

State, 353 S.It. 3d 815, 818 (Tex. Crim. App

2011). The Court of Appeals must calcufate as

nearly AS possible the probable J-mpact. of

error l-n light of the record as a whol-e TÍa].L v. , L84 S .IV. 3d , [7] 46 (Tex . Crim. App

2006)

The Court Appeals considers facLors such as nature of the error, whether the State

emphasized t.he error, the probable implications

of the error the weight the jury likely would

have assigned to the error. See Snowden v. 353 S.W. 3d 822; Smith v. State, 522

State,

S.W. 3d 628, 637-638 (Tex. App. - Houston [14tn

Dist.l 20L7, n.p.h.)

If the reviewing CourL finds a reasonable likelihood that the error materially affected

jury's delíberations, the trial court's error is

not harmless a reasonable doubt. See Neal

v. State , 256 S .Iû 3d 264 , 284 (Tex . Crim. App

2008)

1. Nature Emptrasis of the Error The error violates the constitutional- right. against a Defendant's post-arrest, post-Miranda

silence being considered as evidence of his

gui1t. The trial court overruled Appell-ant's

objection to the quest.ion and ans\^/er, thereby

conveying to the jury that the jury coul-d

consider question and answer. Smith v. , S.Iü. 3d 637 . This factor weighs in

f avor f inding the error t.o be harmful . See

Ittritehead v. State, S.TÍ. 3d 546,553 (Tex. Texarkana 20L4 pet. ref 'd) . Moreover, t.he

App. emphasized the error and magnified the harm

caused by the error by the prosecutor's ans\^/er to

defense counsel's objectj-on: "My point is just

that he vras Mirandized and nothing else \^ias

gott,en . " (4 R. R. IIl ) bringing Vüe11s' silence

to the jury's at.t.entj-on agaj-n before the Court

signaled to the jury the silence could be

considered by them because Court. overruled

def ense counsel' s ob j ect j-on

2. ProbabLe Implications of Error and IÍeight

Under t.he third and fourth factors discussed l-n Snowden, t.he Court. of Appeals considers the

probable implication of the error weight

jury likely would have placed on it. See

Snowden , S.Iv. 3d at 822. Jury note #2 shows

that the jury r^/as considering finding Appell-ant

guilty of the l-esser included offense unfawful-

restraint upon which they had been charged (C.n.

53), not convicting him of first degree

il

aggravated kidnapping (see jury note #2 C.R

6I- "In the event that aggravated kidnapping is

not proven but unfawful- restraint is, do the same

venue restrictions apply?") Appellant conLends

t.hat human nature expects an accused deny an

accusation when it is made when he is

arrested. In the case at bar the jury h/as noL

instructed not to consider Appellant's post-

arrest., post-Mj-randa silence as evidence when the

court overrul-ed Appelf ant's objectj-on. The Court

effectively told the jury that the silence could

be considered as evidence. The record as a whole

including the State's emphasis t.he question ans\^rer and t.he jury's uncertainty of

Appellant's guilt of aggravated kidnapping AS

shown by jury note #2 establ-ishes a reasonabl-e

likelihood that the error materially affected

jury's deliberations. Therefore, the trial

court's error is not harmless a reasonable

doubt. Appellant requests Court Appeals to

t2

reverse the judgments as to both counts and

remand the case for a ne\^/ trial .

ISSUE NUMBER TWO RESTATED t.o prove that

The evidence hras insufficient Appellant had secreted or hel-d Negash in a place

where she r^/as not likely to be found as required

to establish the offense of agqravated

kidnappíng. ( 5 R. R. I24) .

In det.ermining whether the evj-dence is 1egal1y sufficient to support a conviction, a reviewing court must. consider all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether, based the evidence and reasonabl-e inferences t.herefrom, a rational- fact finder could have found the essential elements of the crime a reasonable doubt. ilackson v. Virginia, 443 u. s. 307 , 318-19 (L9791 ; Hooper v. State, 2L4 S.Iü. 3d I , 13 (Tex. Crim" App . 2OO7') This "familiar standard gives full pfay to the responsibifity of the trier of fact fairly to resol-ve confl-icts in the testimony, weigh the evldence, t.o draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facls . " Jackson U. S . at . "Each fact need not point directly independently to the guilt of Appellantr âs long as the cumul-atj-ve force of all the j-ncríminating circumstances is sufficient to support convj-ction. " Hooper , 2L4 S.Iv. 3d 13. *19 Lucio v. State , 351 S.W. 3d 8'18, 894 (Tex.

Crim. App . zOtL, I cert den'd. , L32 St. Ct. 27L2 |

183 L.Ed. 2d 7t(20L21 .

The State \^ias required to prove a reasonabl-e doubt that Appellant, in addition to

the other essentj-al elemenLs 520.04 aggravat.ed

kidnappirg, by secreting or holding her in a

place where she !úas not likely to be found..."

(C.R. 22) , one of the hrays "abduct.ion" is

accomplished under 520.01,.(2) . Under this

indictment State hras required to prove that

the restraint \^ras completed and that Appellant

evj-denced a specific intent to prevent l-iberation

by secreting or hiding Sj-ana Negash in a place to be found. See

where she \^/as not likely

Brimage v . , S .It. 2d | 47 5-7 6 (Tex .

Crim. App. 1994)

Viewed in the light most favorabl-e the jury's verdict., Appellant contends t.hat

evj-dence shows that Appellant placed Negash in

t4

t.he back seat (not the trunk) of a rented

Cadillac, and drove from Fort Vüorth Waco wlth stop at a rest. stop or truck stopr âssaul-ted

a

her, then insisted on taking her to a hospital

for medical care and diagnostic tests. Appel-lant

suggests that the secretion component of

offense of aggravated kidnappi.g, as charged, \^¡as

not satisfied a reasonabl-e doubt. Sj-ana

Negash was in the passenger compartment. of a

vehicl-e traveling on public highways or stopped a public rest. stop or truck stop \^/as taken

to a hospital-. Appellant suggests that it \^¡as at

least as likely as it hras not likely that she

woul-d have been f ound.

For these reasons the evidence was insufficient to show that Appellant is guilty of

aggravated kidnapping. The conviction on Count I

must be reversed a judgment of acquittal

entered Count I aggravated kidnapping. I f Court. Appeals determines that the evidence

l5

ís sufficient to support. the lesser j-ncluded

offense unlawful- restraint, then it may reform

the conviction from aggravated kidnapping to

unlawful- restraint remand the case for a ne\^/

punishment hearing. Bowen v. State, S.TÍ. 3d

428 (Tex. Crim. App . 20t2l

PRAYER For reasons stated in this brief, Appell-ant prays f or the relief requested herein.

Respectfully submitted, -Ln Jo M. Hurley Bar No. 103111-00 N. 38th Street Waco, TX 161I0 Tel: (.254 ) 753-616I Fax : (254) 114-2564 jmhurleylßyahoo. com Attorney for Appellant Roy Lee Wel1s, Jr. t6

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that a true correct copy of Appel-lant's brief h¡as served el-ectronically on

the 4th day December 2011 the Office of

Mclennan Count.y Criminal District Attorney, Attn:

ADA Sterling Harmon, 279 N. 6th Street, Suite 200,

üIaco, TX 0t

,Lm. v I J hn M. ur t7

CERTIE'ICATE OF TTORD COI'NT certify that AppellanL's brief contains 3,352 I Microsoft Vüord 20L0.

words,

\,¿- n ¿( ql" M Hüifev

Case Details

Case Name: Roy Lee Wells, Jr. v. State
Court Name: Court of Appeals of Texas
Date Published: Dec 4, 2017
Docket Number: 06-17-00180-CR
Court Abbreviation: Tex. App.
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