Peter Szanto appeals pro se from the district court’s order affirming the *2 bankruptcy court’s order dismissing Szanto’s chapter 11 bankruptcy case. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). We review de novo the district court’s decision on appeal from the bankruptcy court and apply the same standards of review applied by the district court. In re Thorpe Insulation Co. , 677 F.3d 869, 879 (9th Cir. 2012). We affirm.

The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Szanto’s bankruptcy case “for cause.” 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(4)(J) (explaining that “failure to file a disclosure statement, or to file or confirm a plan, within the time fixed by this title or by order of the Court” provides cause to dismiss a chapter 11 bankruptcy petition); Toibb v. Radloff , 501 U.S. 157, 165 (1991) (bankruptcy court has “substantial discretion” to dismiss a chapter 11 case).

The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion by granting JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A.’s motion to vacate the order granting Szanto’s motion to approve a settlement agreement because, after reconsideration, the bankruptcy court found that Szanto’s motion was not properly served and that the attached documents did not constitute a settlement agreement as Szanto alleged. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9024 (making Fed. R. Civ. P. 60 applicable to bankruptcy cases); Casey v. Albertson’s Inc. , 362 F.3d 1254, 1257 (9th Cir. 2004) (setting forth standard of review).

Contrary to Szanto’s contentions, the bankruptcy court did not err by *3 dismissing the case while Szanto’s motion to disqualify under 28 U.S.C. § 144 was pending. See Smith v. Edwards & Hale, Ltd. (In re Smith) , 317 F.3d 918, 932 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[S]ection 144 applies only to district court judges and not to bankruptcy court judges. Rather, bankruptcy court judges are subject to recusal only under 28 U.S.C. § 455.” (internal citations omitted)), abrogated on other grounds by Lamie v. U.S. Tr. , 540 U.S. 526 (2004).

We reject as unsupported by the record Szanto’s contentions concerning bias of the bankruptcy judge or that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a).

We do not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal or matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright , 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.

[*] This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

[**] The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).