Federal prisoner James Branch appeals from the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253. We review the district court’s denial of a section 2255 motion de novo, see United States v. Reves , 774 F.3d 562, 564 (9th Cir. 2014), and we affirm.

*2 Branch’s section 2255 motion argued that Johnson v. United States , 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), rendered the residual clause in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2) unconstitutionally vague, and therefore his prior California robbery conviction could no longer support his career offender sentence under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. This argument is foreclosed by Beckles v. United States , 137 S. Ct. 886, 895 (2017). The government’s concession in the district court that the residual clause in § 4B1.2(a)(2) was void does not bind this court. See United States v. Perez-Silvan , 861 F.3d 935, 938 n.2 (9th Cir. 2017) (courts “are not bound by a party’s concession as to the meaning of the law” (internal quotations omitted)).

Branch contends, for the first time in his reply brief, that he is actually innocent of being a career offender because his predicate California robbery conviction no longer constitutes a crime of violence under the 2016 version of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2). Even if this argument were properly before this court, see Padgett v. Wright , 587 F.3d 983, 985-86 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009), it would be foreclosed. See United States v. Chavez-Cuevas , 862 F.3d 729, 740 (9th Cir. 2017) (reaffirming United States v. Becerril-Lopez , 541 F.3d 881 (9th Cir. 2008), which held that California robbery categorically qualifies as a crime of violence).

AFFIRMED.

2 16-16957

[*] This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

[**] The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).