Robin appeals from (Briccetti, J.) dismissing Amended Complaint (“FAC”) failure state claim, denying leave file proposed Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”), declining exercise supplemental jurisdiction over claims. assume parties’ familiarity with *3 facts and record of the prior proceedings, to which refer only as necessary to explain our decision affirm.

First, the states a violation of his First Amendment rights. disagree. A by government employee retaliation under First Amendment requires at least the plaintiff (1) spoke “as citizen” (2) about “matters of public concern.” Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. (1983); see Weintraub Bd. of Educ., F.3d 196, 2010). Otherwise, employee “has no cause action based on her employer’s reaction speech.” Garcetti Ceballos, (2006); Weintraub, F.3d at 201. The allegations FAC, viewed in light most favorable Bhattacharya, satisfy neither element. spoke as an employee rather than citizen because speech contends is protected—refusing permit cheating students—is “part ‐ parcel” official duties. Weintraub, at 203. Indeed, “maintaining class discipline” is one “core duties” teacher. Id. at In addition, there plausible allegation matter public concern rather “calculated redress [a] personal grievance[]” between *4 Bhattacharya students. Ruotolo v. City 514 F.3d 184, 189 (2d Cir. 2008) (quotation marks omitted). responds that Garcetti does not apply because Supreme

expressly left open whether its holding applies “speech related scholarship or teaching.” Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 425. But here speech involved neither scholarship nor teaching. See Lane Franks, S. Ct. (2014) (applying Garcetti college employee when speech non scholastic). Rather, involved “maintaining class discipline.” See Weintraub, F.3d at 198. stated an “academic freedom” under First Amendment. recognized an academic freedom where restriction on speech implicates content teacher’s lessons restricts school’s ability determine its curriculum. See Burt Gates, 190–91 2007) (collecting cases). But does not allege any appellees restricted content class. Accordingly, properly dismissed claim.

argues that the District Court erred in denying him leave to file proposed SAC to add due process claim. Bhattacharya’s proposed due process based the same claim academic freedom that, we have already concluded, the District Court properly rejected. Amendment would therefore have been futile. Additionally, Bhattacharya’s original complaint asserted due process claim. His begins stating that it “eliminates all federal claims except [his] to free and association as part academic freedom.” App’x

Finally, pointing out that action removed from State court, that the District Court should have remanded State law claims rather dismissing them without prejudice. When district court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction case removed from State court, it discretion either to dismiss claims without prejudice or to remand claims. Carnegie Mellon Univ. Cohill, (1988); Baylis *6 Marriott Corp., 1988). not identified any reason why remand more appropriate dismissal, nor does appear raised before Court. Accordingly, discern abuse discretion Court’s decision dismiss claims without prejudice. considered remaining arguments conclude they are without merit. For foregoing reasons, AFFIRMED. THE COURT:

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk

[1] Moreover, even if Garcetti did not apply case, would still affirm because at not matter public concern, requirement predates Garcetti. Connick,

[2] note Court’s March Opinion Order states only declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over State law claims, without reference to whether those claims were dismissed remanded to State court. The subsequent dismissed case. In light appellees’ statements oral argument they objection remand State claims State court, invite clarify whether intended remand those claims court, within its discretion.