*1 Before B AUER , E ASTERBROOK , H AMILTON , Circuit Judges .

E ASTERBROOK Judge This proceeding begins where L.D.G. Holder F.3d (7th Cir. 2014), ends. held un der U.S.C. §1182(d)(3)(A)(ii) inadmissi bility—and thus halt removal temporarily—while al *2 2 16 3784 ien requests a U visa from Department of Se curity. After Jorge requested that relief from an immigration judge, however, Board of Immigration Ap peals held that IJs lack authority such requests.

LDG addressed question whether eral has authority waive of an alien seeking U visa. We assumed that, in removal proceedings, IJs of discretionary powers over immigration. The panel justify that as sumption, because parties had doubted correct ness. after LDG concluded assumption is mistaken. Khan I&N Dec. (2016), holds IJs have such powers as have been delegated power waive an alien’s during seeking U visas among them. The Third agreed conclusion. Sunday General F.3d (3d Cir. 2016). must decide case follow Sunday Khan

Delegation immigration judges matter of regulation, arguably pertinent reg ulations are scattered through Title Code Federal Regulations. The observed, correctly, panel had mentioned C.F.R. 235.2(d), 1235.2(d), which omit delegation IJs admissibility. And that’s true, those regu lations concern powers District Directors rather than IJs. principal regulation cover IJs’ C.F.R. §1003.10, provides part:

(a) Appointment. judges attorneys whom appoints administrative judges within Office Chief Judge conduct specified classes proceedings, including hearings section *3 the [Immigration and Nationality] Act. Immigration judges shall act as the Attorney General’s delegates in the cases that come be ‐ fore them.

(b) Powers and duties. In conducting hearings under section the Act and such other the Attorney may assign them, immigration judges shall exercise the powers and duties delegated them by Act and by through regulation. In deciding individual cases ‐ fore them, and subject applicable governing standards, immigration judges shall exercise their independent judgment and discretion and may take any action consistent with their au ‐ thorities Act and regulations that appropriate and necessary disposition such cases. judges shall administer oaths, receive evidence, and interrogate, exam ine, and cross examine and any witnesses. Subject 1003.35 and 1287.4 this chapter, they may issue administra tive subpoenas attendance witnesses presenta tion evidence. all cases, judges shall seek solve questions before them in timely impartial man ner consistent Act regulations. General’s brief in court observes that

§1003.10(b) delegate IJs any inadmissibility. Sure enough, doesn’t. §1003.10(a) does. says that “[i]mmigration judges shall act General’s delegates cases come before them.” This sounds like declaration IJs may ex ercise powers “in cases come before them”, unless some other regulation limits general delegation. BIA did identify provision subtracts delegation §1003.10(a). Nor Third Circuit Sunday Indeed, neither nor Third cited §1003.10(a). therefore adhere view IJs eral’s over immigration. *4 ‐

Perhaps anticipating we would reach this conclu ‐ sion, the Attorney brief makes a much broader ar gument defense of BIA’s decision. brief contends General himself no to waivers of inadmissibility aliens seeking U visas—and that, if does possess this authority, it used only with respect who seek relief before entering States. (Baez was inside our borders when he sought waiver.) first of these arguments rests on U.S.C. §§ 271(b) and 557, reads transferring Secretary Homeland Security of Gen eral’s discretionary laws. There are two problems with contention.

First, §271(b) transfers particular set powers, waivers inadmissibility on its list. Section independently transfer powers; instead de pends its effect on other statutes, regulations, reor ganization plans. Although Department Homeland Security principally responsible administering im migration laws, statutory power waive an al ien’s belongs exclusively Secretary Security depends on statutes, regulations, reorganization plans briefs do address.

Second, Appeals rely on 271(b) or either or decision respect Sanchez. Instead assumed an belongs eral. fundamental principle administrative law validity agency’s depends on agency’s reasoning. See SEC Chenery Corp ., U.S. 87–88 (1943). *5 16 3784 5 Because BIA has made anything §271(b), §557, or law, regulation, or reorganization plan those two statutes might implement, we cannot do so either. The sub ject open on remand, but it is ground on current decision may be enforced. remaining contention—that to grant

waiver be exercised only favor alien who has yet enter United States—was at least hinted at by Board. rest on ground. law has historically applied at least some rules about “admissibility” aliens already United States, see In re Menendez , I&N Dec. 292 (1967); re Sanchez Sosa I&N Dec. (2012), Secretary Security seems believe he waivers §1182(d)(3)(A)(ii) States. See C.F.R. §212.17. If Secretary can do this, why General? Perhaps neither official can do so, but Chenery pre vents us from pursuing question. should clear what we have said par

ties’ arguments about effects Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc ., U.S. (1984), Auer Robbins U.S. (1997), premature. First Board must address resolve essential issues; then can we consider whether disposition lies within scope agency’s discretion. free address these matters on

mand, also free decide favor of, or against, whatever discretion Attor ney possesses. *6 petition review granted, Board’s

vacated, matter remanded con sistent opinion.