Guillermo Cruz Trujillo, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging due *2 process and retaliation claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Hamilton v. Brown , 630 F.3d 889, 892 (9th Cir. 2011) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A); Barren v. Harrington , 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (order) (dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Trujillo’s due process claim because Trujillo had an adequate postdeprivation remedy under California law. See Hudson v. Palmer , 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984) (“[A] . . . deprivation of property by a state employee does not constitute a violation of the procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available.”); Barnett v. Centoni , 31 F.3d 813, 816-17 (9th Cir. 1994) (“California [l]aw provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy for any property deprivations.”).

The district court properly dismissed Trujillo’s retaliation claim because Trujillo failed to allege facts sufficient to show that Trujillo’s filing of a grievance was the substantial or motivating factor behind defendants’ alleged conduct. See Rhodes v. Robinson , 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005) (elements of a retaliation claim in the prison context); see also Brodheim v. Cry , 584 F.3d 1262, 1271 (9th Cir. 2009) (“To prevail on a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must show that his protected conduct was the substantial or motivating factor behind the *3 defendant’s conduct.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

AFFIRMED.

[*] This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

[**] Trujillo consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. See U.S.C. § 636(c).

[***] The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).