PER CURIAM: ^[*]

Raymundo Gonzalez Garibay appeals his 78-month, top-of-the- guidelines sentence for illegal reentry in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. He contends that the sentence violates his due-process rights, asserting that it could not exceed the two-year maximum under § 1326(a) because the indict- ment did not allege that he had a conviction that would trigger a sentencing enhancement under that subsection. He further avers that the sentence is substantively unreasonable because the court failed to account for his cultural assimilation. Gonzalez Garibay has also filed a motion requesting that appointed counsel be relieved of duties for abandonment and conflict of interest.

Gonzalez Garibay did not raise a due-process challenge in the district court, so review is for plain error only. See United States v. Mondragon- Santiago , 564 F.3d 357, 368 (5th Cir. 2009). In any event, he concedes that Almendarez-Torres v. United States , 523 U.S. 224 (1998), forecloses his due- process argument, but he wishes to preserve the issue for possible Supreme Court review.

We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of dis- cretion. See United States v. Delgado-Martinez , 564 F.3d 750, 753 (5th Cir. 2009). Gonzalez Garibay asserts that the district court improperly balanced the sentencing factors because it did not give appropriate weight to the miti- gating factor of his cultural assimilation. Although cultural assimilation is a permissible basis for granting a downward departure, courts are not required to grant such departures and still have discretion when determining the sen- tence. See United States v. Castillo , 386 F.3d 632, 637 38 (5th Cir. 2004) (finding that district court did not plainly err by granting a downward depar- ture based on cultural assimilation); U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, comment. (n.7) (noting that a “downward departure may be appropriate on the basis of cultural assim- ilation”) (emphasis added). Moreover, a departure is not warranted where it is “likely to increase the risk to the public from further crimes of the defen- dant.” § 2L1.2, comment. (n.7). The record reveals that Gonzalez Garibay had a serious criminal history, including some violent crimes. There is no require- ment that all sentencing factors must be given equal weight; accordingly, the district court could properly give Gonzalez Garibay’s criminal history more weight than his cultural assimilation. See United States v. Hernandez , 633 F.3d 370, 375− 76 (5th Cir. 2011). Furthermore, the record reveals that, in addition to considering the appropriate 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, the court considered, but explicitly rejected, Gonzalez Garibay’s theory that his cultural assimilation warranted a reduced sentence.

Gonzalez Garibay has not rebutted the presumption of reasonableness that attaches to his properly calculated within-guidelines sentence. See United States v. Cooks , 589 F.3d 173, 186 (5th Cir. 2009). Accordingly, he cannot dem- onstrate that the court abused its discretion. See Delgado-Martinez , 564 F.3d at 753.

Gonzalez Garibay is represented by appointed counsel and is not entitled to “hybrid representation”; therefore he cannot file a pro se motion. United States v. Ogbonna , 184 F.3d 447, 449 n.1 (5th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). To the extent that Gonzalez Garibay is request- ing to proceed pro se , his request is untimely because it was filed after counsel’s appellate brief was filed. Cf. United States v. Wagner , 158 F.3d 901, 902-03 (5th Cir. 1998) (stating that once counsel’s withdrawal brief is filed, a motion to proceed pro se is untimely and should be denied).

The judgment is AFFIRMED; Gonzalez Garibay’s motion to relieve counsel of duties is DENIED.

[*] Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4.