PER CURIAM: ^[*]

In 2015, Santiago Alejandro Diaz-Esparza, a native and citizen of Mexico who had been granted lawful permanent resident status, was ordered removed pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) based on his 2014 aggravated felony conviction and two-year prison sentence for evading arrest with a vehicle in violation of Texas Penal Code § 38.04. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed Diaz-Esparza’s appeal of the removal order and his motion for reconsideration. Diaz-Esparza has filed petitions for review of the BIA’s orders, in which he asserts that his prior conviction was not an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) because it did not constitute a crime of violence (COV) under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) and, further, that § 16(b) is unconstitutionally vague in light of Johnson v. United States , 135 S. Ct. 2552, 2557 (2015).

We generally lack jurisdiction to review a removal order against an alien who is removable under § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) based on the commission of an aggravated felony. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C); see Marquez-Marquez v. Gonzales , 455 F.3d 548, 560-61 (5th Cir. 2006). However, review nevertheless remains available for constitutional claims or questions of law raised in a petition for review. § 1252(a)(2)(D); see Marquez-Marquez , 455 F.3d at 560-61. Whether a statute of conviction constitutes an aggravated felony under § 1101(a)(43) is a question of law over which we retain jurisdiction. Arce-Vences v. Mukasey , 512 F.3d 167, 170-71 (5th Cir. 2007). Likewise, “[w]hether a statute is unconstitutionally vague is a question of law.” United States v. Gonzalez- Longoria , 831 F.3d 670, 674 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc), petition for cert. filed (Sept. 29, 2016) (No. 16-6259). Such questions of law are subject to de novo review. Id.

Section 16(b) defines a COV to include a felony crime “that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.” § 16(b). In , 630 F.3d at 449-51, we concluded that the § 38.04 offense of evading arrest with a vehicle is categorically a COV under § 16(b) and thus an aggravated felony as defined by § 1101(a)(43)(F). In , 135 S. Ct. at 2557, the Supreme Court struck as unconstitutionally vague the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), which defined a violent felony as an offense involving “conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.”

Diaz-Esparza first argues that we should join certain other circuits in holding that § 16(b) is facially unconstitutional in light of Johnson , 135 S. Ct. 2551. However, that issue is foreclosed by our en banc decision to the contrary in Gonzalez-Longoria , 831 F.3d at 677. See United States v. Alcantar , 733 F.3d 143, 145-46 (5th Cir. 2013). Diaz-Esparza’s additional argument that § 16(b) is unconstitutional as applied to him likewise fails, as the standard of § 16(b) can be straightforwardly applied to his prior conviction under § 38.04 for evading arrest with a vehicle. See Gonzalez-Longoria , 831 F.3d at 677-78; see also Sanchez-Ledezma , 630 F.3d at 449-51. Finally, Diaz-Esparza’s argument that undermined is unpersuasive. Because the two decisions involved different statutory provisions, the former did not unequivocally overrule the latter. See United States v. Traxler , 764 F.3d 486, 489 (5th Cir. 2014); Alcantar , 733 F.3d at 145-46.

In light of the foregoing, Diaz-Esparza’s petitions for review are DENIED.

[*] Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4.