STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. HECTOR R. DELGADOÂ STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. DARRIN S. BRYANT(13-06-1842, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)(CONSOLIDATED)
A-2329-14T2/A-3012-14T2
| N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. | Aug 24, 2017|
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SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NOS. A-2329-14T2
A-3012-14T2
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
HECTOR R. DELGADO, a/k/a VICTOR
DELGADO,
Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________________
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
DARRIN S. BRYANT, a/k/a DARREN BRYANT
and SHAWN BRYANT,
Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________________
Submitted April 3, 2017 – Decided August 24, 2017
Before Judges Sabatino and Nugent.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Camden County, Indictment No.
13-06-1842.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney
for appellant Hector Delgado (Jaime B.
Herrera, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of
counsel and on the brief).
Helmer, Conley & Kasselman, PA, attorneys for
appellant Darrin Bryant (Patricia B. Quelch,
of counsel and on the brief).
Mary Eva Colalillo, Camden County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Linda A. Shashoua,
Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the
briefs in A-2329-14 and A-3012-14).
PER CURIAM
Co-defendants Hector R. Delgado, Darrin S. Bryant, and James
O. Coles beat and injured Daniel DeChurch in a Chesilhurst bar,
The Last Chance Saloon. Delgado and Bryant appeal from their
respective judgments of conviction: Delgado for disorderly persons
simple assault and third-degree criminal restraint, for which a
judge sentenced him to an aggregate forty-two month prison term;
Bryant for third-degree aggravated assault and third-degree
criminal restraint, for which a judge sentenced him to an aggregate
five-year prison term with two years of parole ineligibility.1
On appeal, Delgado challenges the trial court's jury
instructions. Bryant argues that, separately and cumulatively,
several errors deprived him of a fair trial. He contends a
detective's testimony commenting on video surveillance recordings
1
Delgado and Bryant filed separate appeals. We have consolidated
them for purposes of this opinion.
2 A-2329-14T2
invaded the function of the jury; the trial court abused its
discretion by refusing to sanitize his prior conviction; the record
did not sustain a conviction for criminal restraint and the trial
court erroneously denied his motion for a new trial; his trial
counsel was ineffective; and his sentence is excessive.
For the reasons that follow, we affirm the convictions and
sentences of both defendants.
In June 2013, a Camden County grand jury charged Delgado and
Bryant in a multi-count indictment with second-degree aggravated
assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1) (count one); second-degree
conspiracy to commit aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 and
2C:12-1(b)(1) (count two); fourth-degree unlawful possession of a
weapon, a knife, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d) (count six); third-degree
possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-
4(d)(1) (count seven); and third-degree criminal restraint,
N.J.S.A. 2C:13-2(a) (count eight). In counts three, four, and
five, the grand jury charged Delgado with, respectively, third-
degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:1(b)(2), fourth-degree
unlawful possession of a weapon, a beer bottle, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-
5(d), and third-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful
purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d)(1). In count fourteen, the grand
jury charged Bryant with fourth-degree certain persons not to have
weapons, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(a).
3 A-2329-14T2
In addition to Delgado and Bryant, the grand jury charged
James O. Coles in counts nine, ten, and eleven with, respectively,
third-degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(2), fourth-
degree unlawful possession of a weapon, a pool cue, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-
5(d), and third-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful
purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d). Lastly, the grand jury charged the
bartender, Nicole L. Reichle, in counts twelve and thirteen, with,
respectively, third-degree hindering apprehension, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-
3(a)(3), and third-degree hindering apprehension or prosecution,
N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3(a)(7).
Delgado, Bryant, and co-defendant Coles were tried together.
The jury found Delgado guilty of conspiracy to commit simple
assault, simple assault, and third-degree criminal restraint. The
court subsequently held Delgado's conspiracy conviction was
"effectively . . . a not guilty finding[,]" and the parties
agreed.2 On the simple assault count, the court ordered Delgado
pay fines and penalties and provide a DNA sample. On the criminal
restraint count, the court sentenced defendant to a forty-two
month custodial term and imposed appropriate fines and penalties.
2
On October 20, 2014, the judge determined Delgado's conspiracy
conviction was "really effectively a not guilty" because
defendants could not conspire to commit a disorderly persons
offense.
4 A-2329-14T2
The jury found Bryant guilty of conspiracy to commit simple
assault, third-degree aggravated assault, and third-degree
criminal restraint. The court dismissed the conspiracy
conviction, holding the verdict was "really effectively a not
guilty" again because defendants could not conspire to commit a
disorderly persons offense. The parties agreed the conspiracy
count "was effectively a not guilty finding[.]"
Bryant moved for a new trial, but the judge denied the motion.
On the aggravated assault count, the judge sentenced Bryant to a
five-year custodial term with two years of parole ineligibility,
and ordered that he pay appropriate fines and penalties. On the
criminal restraint count, the judge sentenced Bryant to a
concurrent four-year custodial term.3
The State developed much of their case at trial through The
Last Chance Saloon's video surveillance recordings, which they had
a detective comment on, and the testimony of the victim's brother-
in-law. This evidence and testimony established the following
timeline and facts.
Shortly before 7:00 p.m. on November 18, 2012, after a day
of drinking, Daniel DeChurch and his brother-in-law entered the
3
The jury convicted Coles on the three counts with which he was
charged.
5 A-2329-14T2
Last Chance Saloon in Chesilhurst.4 The two men ordered a beer at
the bar. At 7:00, DeChurch walked into the men's room and Delgado
and Bryant walked in behind him. A third man, approximately six
feet three inches tall, weighing 230 pounds, and bald, stood in
front the men's room door, arms crossed. Three minutes later,
DeChurch's brother-in-law heard some commotion and walked toward
the bathroom door. The big man standing in front of the door
punched him three times, knocked him down and kicked him. By
then, DeChurch was on the floor outside the bathroom and men were
beating him. DeChurch's face looked like he had been stung by
bees multiple times.
DeChurch explained what happened before and after he entered
the men's room. He was not familiar with the bar's restrooms and
mistakenly attempted to turn on the light in the women's bathroom.
Delgado, who was sitting at the bar, told DeChurch he had entered
the wrong bathroom and directed him towards the men's room.
DeChurch walked into the men's bathroom. Delgado and Bryant
entered the men's room after DeChurch and stood next to him while
he used the urinal. One of the men asked DeChurch why he had
touched the wall. Confused, and under the assumption the man was
4
DeChurch was hospitalized the night he was beaten. His blood
alcohol concentration was .317, nearly four times the level at
which a driver is deemed to be driving under the influence of
alcohol. N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.
6 A-2329-14T2
referring to his mistaken attempt to enter the women's room,
DeChurch said he had been looking for the light switch.
While DeChurch continued to use the urinal, Bryant punched
him in the side of his head. As DeChurch turned towards the men,
Delgado struck DeChurch in the back of his head with a beer bottle.
DeChurch testified:
it pretty much knocked me unconscious. I
remember a few seconds of falling forward. I
hit my teeth on the chrome flush, the part
where you flush the urinal. I actually slid
down the inside of the urinal and ended up on
the floor. At that point I started being
kicked and hit from pretty much every
direction.
Delgado and Bryant kicked DeChurch in his face and ribs, stomped
on the back of his head, and knocked him down each time he attempted
to get off his back and onto his hands and knees.
DeChurch fought back in self-defense. He reached and opened
the bathroom door, which had been locked from the inside, but a
man standing outside the door attempted to push DeChurch back into
the bathroom. DeChurch fell down in the doorway of the men's
room, and the kicking, punching and stomping resumed. DeChurch
could not recall being attacked after exiting the men's room;
however, footage from the saloon's surveillance cameras depicts
DeChurch falling near the bar, being surrounded by men, and being
struck with a pool cue.
7 A-2329-14T2
DeChurch asked the barmaid to call the police while he stood
at the bar and used napkins to wipe blood from his eyes, but the
barmaid refused. According to Dechurch's brother-in-law, when he
asked if the bar had video surveillance, the bartender told him
it did not work.
Following the assault, DeChurch and his brother-in-law went
to DeChurch's home where they called the police. The police and
emergency medical services arrived at DeChurch's home and
transported him to the hospital where Doctor Steven E. Ross treated
DeChurch for "bruises around his face and head, a small
subarachnoid hemorrhage to the right frontal region, [and] a large
laceration of his right thigh." The doctor explained that a
subarachnoid hemorrhage is "a very mild bruise on the surface of
the brain." The cut on DeChurch's thigh required thirty-seven
stitches and the doctor placed a draining tube in the wound for
about one week to prevent infection. DeChurch spent three days
in the hospital. Upon being discharged, a doctor treated DeChurch
for a local infection of the wound on his thigh.
On appeal, Delgado argues:
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTION ON ACCOMPLICE
LIABILITY DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF A FAIR TRIAL
DUE TO THE CONFUSION AND AMBIGUITY RESULTING
FROM THE USE OF "AND/OR," AND DUE TO THE
COURT'S FAILURE TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON
8 A-2329-14T2
ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY WITH RESPECT TO THE
CHARGE OF CRIMINAL RESTRAINT AND FALSE
IMPRISONMENT.
A. The trial court's repeated use of
"and/or" in the jury charge resulted in
ambiguity such that jurors may have
reached a guilty verdict based upon
different theories.
B. The trial court's failure to instruct
jurors on accomplice liability with
respect to criminal restraint and false
imprisonment, pursuant to the principles
enunciated in State v. Bielkiewicz,
deprived defendant of a fair trial.
Bryant argues:
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.
POINT II
THE DETECTIVE'S TESTIMONY WAS INAPPROPRIATE
AND CONSTITUTES REVERSIBLE ERROR.
A. HEARSAY.
B. THE DETECTIVE'S IMPROPER LAY
OPINION INVADED THE PROVINCE OF THE
JURY.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY
REFUSING TO SANITIZE DEFENDANT'S PRIOR
CONVICTION.
9 A-2329-14T2
POINT IV
THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD
TO SUSTAIN A CONVICTION FOR CRIMINAL
RESTRAINT.
POINT V
DEFENDANT RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL.
A. FAILURE TO REQUEST AN ADJOURNMENT OF
TRIAL.
B. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO IN-COURT
IDENTIFICATION OF DEFENDANT AND/OR
REQUEST WADE HEARING.
C. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO PRITCHETT'S
TESTIMONY.
D. CRIMINAL RESTRAINT, COUNT 8.
POINT VI
A NEW TRIAL IS WARRANTED DUE TO CUMULATIVE
ERROR.
POINT VII
DEFENDANT'S SENTENCE IS EXCESSIVE.
We first address Delgado's arguments, neither of which he
raised before the trial court. "[N]o party may urge as error any
portion of the charge to the jury or omissions therefrom unless
objections are made thereto before the jury retires to consider
its verdict" except when the error "is of such a nature as to have
been clearly capable of producing an unjust result[.]" R. 1:7-2
and -5; R. 2:10-2. Plain error in a jury charge is a "legal
10 A-2329-14T2
impropriety in the charge prejudicially affecting the substantial
rights of the defendant and sufficiently grievous to justify notice
by the reviewing court and to convince the court that of itself
the error possessed a clear capacity to bring about an unjust
result." State v. Hock, 54 N.J. 526, 538 (1969) (citation omitted), cert. denied,399 U.S. 930
,90 S. Ct. 2254
,26 L. Ed. 2d
797 (1970). We find no plain error here.
Defendant first challenges the trial court's charge on
accomplice liability. The court gave the following instruction:
A person is an accomplice of another person
in the commission of an offense if with the
purpose of promoting or facilitating the
commission of the offense he solicits such
other person to commit it and/or aids or
agrees or attempts to aid such other person
in planning or committing it.
. . . .
That each defendant solicited the other
to commit it and/or did aid or agree to attempt
to aid him in planning or committing it.
. . . .
If you find that . . . Darrin Bryant,
with the purpose of promoting or facilitating
the commission of the offenses solicited
[defendant] or that . . . defendant . . . with
a purpose of promoting or facilitating the
commission of the offenses solicited Darrin
Bryant to commit it and/or aided or agreed or
attempted to aid him in planning or committing
it, then you must consider him as if he
committed the crimes himself.
11 A-2329-14T2
. . . .
That Darrin Bryant and/or [defendant]
solicited each other to commit it and/or did
aid or agree or attempt to aid each other in
planning or committing it.
. . . .
Guided by these legal principles then if
you've found the defendants not guilty of the
crime charged, you should then consider
whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty
as an accomplice on the lesser charge of
aggravated assault, significant bodily injury
and/or simple assault bodily injury.
. . . .
Therefore, in order to find the defendants
guilty of the lesser included offenses of
aggravated assault significant bodily injury
or simple assault bodily injury, the State
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
Darrin Bryant and/or [defendant] committed the
crimes of aggravated assault and significant
bodily injury and/or simple assault bodily
injury as alleged in the lesser included
offenses, that Darrin Bryant and [defendant]
solicited the other to commit aggravated
assault significant bodily injury and/or
simple assault bodily injury and/or did aid
or agree or attempt to aid him in planning to
commit the aggravated assault significant
bodily injury and/or simple assault bodily
injury.
Number three, that . . . [defendant]
and/or Darrin Bryant's purpose was to promote
or facilitate the commission of the aggravated
assault and significant bodily injury and/or
simple assault bodily injury.
Number four, that Darrin Bryant and/or
[defendant] possessed the criminal state of
12 A-2329-14T2
mind that is required for the commission of
aggravated assault significant bodily injury
and/or simple assault bodily injury.
(Emphasis added).
Delgado contends the trial court's use of the phrase "and/or"
in the accomplice liability charge "was likely to have resulted
in juror confusion, and to have also created a myriad of
potentially problematic, non-unanimous verdicts. As there is no
way of ruling out the possibility that the verdict was other than
unanimous in this case, the convictions must be reversed." To
support this argument, defendant relies upon State v. Gonzalez,
444 N.J. Super. 62 (App. Div.), certif. denied,226 N.J. 209
(2016).
In denying Gonzalez's petition for certification, the Supreme
Court stated:
The Court agrees with the Appellate Division's
conclusion that the use of "and/or" in the
jury instruction in this case injected
ambiguity into the charge. The criticism of
the use of "and/or" is limited to the
circumstances in which it was used in this
case.
[Gonzalez, supra, 226 N.J. at 209 (citations
omitted).]
The circumstances in the case before us do not replicate those in
Gonzalez. Comparing the charge in Gonzalez, supra,444 N.J. Super. 13
A-2329-14T2
at 73-75, with the charge given by the court in the case before
us makes the difference apparent.
In addition, here defendant restricts his challenge
concerning the use of "and/or" to the accomplice liability portion
of the charge. The trial court substantially followed Model Jury
Charge (Criminal), "Liability for Another's Conduct" (1995). We
infer from the Supreme Court's statement accompanying its denial
of Gonzalez's petition for certification that if the Court deemed
the model jury charge so per se ambiguous so as to deprive Gonzalez
of a fair trial, the Court would have directed that the ambiguity
in the model charge be corrected.
Lastly, we infer from the silence of three defense attorneys
and the prosecutor that the parties did not perceive any ambiguity
in the trial court's jury instructions. If, as defendant contends,
the use of "and/or" was likely to have resulted in juror confusion,
certainly one of four experienced attorneys would have called the
issue to the court's attention.
We find equally unavailing Delgado's second argument: the
trial court committed reversible error by omitting to repeat the
accomplice liability charge with the instructions on criminal
restraint and the lesser-included offense of false imprisonment.
The State did not seek to convict Delgado and Bryant of criminal
restraint on an accomplice liability theory. Accordingly, the
14 A-2329-14T2
court instructed the jury to consider false imprisonment if it
found "one or either of the defendants" not guilty of criminal
restraint, and explained the verdict sheet identified each
defendant specifically with the charge against him, independent
from his codefendants. In other words, the judge explained
criminal restraint and the lesser-included offense of false
imprisonment separately, and instructed the jury to consider the
charges as they pertained to each defendant specifically.
Delgado's reliance on State v. Bielkiewicz, 267 N.J. Super.
520 (App. Div. 1993) is misplaced. There, a panel of this court reversed a murder conviction not because the trial court failed to give an accomplice charge, but rather because "the trial court's instructions regarding accomplice liability for murder were inadequate."Id. at 524-25.
The panel explained:
By definition an accomplice must be a person
who acts with the purpose of promoting or
facilitating the commission of the substantive
offense for which he is charged as an
accomplice. Therefore, a jury must be
instructed that to find a defendant guilty of
a crime under a theory of accomplice
liability, it must find that he shared in the
intent which is the crime's basic element, and
at least indirectly participated in the
commission of the criminal act.
In addition, when an alleged accomplice is
charged with a different degree offense than
the principal or lesser included offenses are
submitted to the jury, the court has an
obligation to carefully impart[] to the jury
15 A-2329-14T2
the distinctions between the specific intent
required for the grades of the offense.
[Id. at 527-28 (alteration in original)
(citations omitted).]
Here, unlike Bielkiewicz, the court did not charge on
accomplice liability. Moreover, the charge the trial court gave
on accomplice liability as to aggravated assault complied entirely
with the pronouncements in Bielkiewicz.
We turn to Bryant's arguments. Having considered Points I
through IV and VI in light of the record and applicable legal
principles, we conclude they are without sufficient merit to
warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). We add
these brief comments.
We find no basis for concluding the trial court abused its
considerable discretion concerning either the testimony of the law
enforcement officers about the surveillance videos, State v. J.D.,
211 N.J. 344, 354 (2012), or the admissibility of defendant's prior criminal record, State v. Sands,76 N.J. 127
, 144 (1978). Moreover, even if the trial court did misapply its discretion, the error was harmless considering the strength of the State's case and the verdicts. R. 2:10-2; State v. Macon,57 N.J. 325
, 337-38
(1971). The trial court properly instructed the jury on the crime
of criminal restraint and the jury's verdict on that count was
supported by adequate evidence on the record. Defendant's claim
16 A-2329-14T2
the trial court erred by denying his motion for a new trial is
entirely devoid of merit, as is his cumulative error argument.
As for Bryant's claims his trial counsel was ineffective,
there is "a general policy against entertaining ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claims on direct appeal because such claims
involve allegations and evidence that lie outside the trial
record." State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 460 (1992) (citations
omitted). We decline to address the issues on direct appeal.
Lastly, Bryant claims his sentence is excessive. We disagree.
A sentencing court must exercise discretion "based upon findings
of fact . . . grounded in competent, reasonably credible evidence"
and "apply correct legal principles in exercising its discretion."
State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 363 (1984) (citations omitted). An appellate court reserves the power to modify sentences only "when the application of the facts to the law is such a clear error of judgment that it shocks the judicial conscience."Id. at 364
(citation omitted). An appellate court must not substitute its
judgment for that of the trial court's judgment, but can:
(a) review sentences to determine if the
legislative policies, here the sentencing
guidelines, were violated; (b) review the
aggravating and mitigating factors found below
to determine whether those factors were based
upon competent credible evidence in the
record; and (c) determine whether, even though
the court sentenced in accordance with the
guidelines, nevertheless the application of
17 A-2329-14T2
the guidelines to the facts of [the] case
makes the sentence clearly unreasonable so as
to shock the judicial conscience.
[Id. at 364-65.]
Here, defendant argues the trial court misapplied the aggravating
and mitigating factors at sentencing and failed to provide a
comprehensive statement of reasons.
A trial court must state its reasons for imposing a sentence,
including the factual basis supporting its finding of aggravating
and mitigating factors affecting the sentence. State v. Fuentes,
217 N.J. 57, 73 (2014) (citations omitted). A clear and thorough explanation of the balancing of the factors is particularly important, and a detailed statement of reasons is critical for appellate review because an appellate court must determine whether the aggravating and mitigating factors were based on competent credible evidence in the record.Id. at 73-74
(citations omitted).
At sentencing, the trial court explained its reasons for
imposing defendant's sentence, including the factual basis
supporting his finding of aggravating and mitigating factors. The
judge based the aggravating and mitigating factors on defendant's
criminal record, the testimony presented, and the Last Chance
Saloon's surveillance footage. The court also "considered the
nature and degree of the crime, the need for punishment and
deterrence, the defendant's prospects for rehabilitation, the
18 A-2329-14T2
presentence report, the defendant's previous involvement in the
criminal justice system, and the recommendations of the prosecutor
and the probation department."
Moreover, defendant's sentence was within the proper range
of sentencing. The jury convicted defendant of third-degree
aggravated assault and third-degree criminal restraint. N.J.S.A.
2C:43-6(a)(3) states the term of imprisonment for a crime of the
third degree shall be between three and five years. Further, the
court may fix a minimum term of parole ineligibility where it "is
clearly convinced that the aggravating factors substantially
outweigh the mitigating factors[.]" N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(b).
In light of the foregoing, the imposition of an aggregate
five-year custodial sentence with a two-year period of parole
ineligibility is not excessive. It is supported by the record and
does not shock the judicial conscience.
For the foregoing reasons we affirm defendants' convictions
and sentences.
Affirmed.
19 A-2329-14T2