JUDITH FERRARIS VS. JEFFREY SCOTT JONESÂ (DC-397-16, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
A-4568-15T1
| N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. | Aug 22, 2017|
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SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4568-15T1
JUDITH FERRARIS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
JEFFREY SCOTT JONES,
Defendant-Respondent.
_________________________________
Submitted August 15, 2017 – Decided August 22, 2017
Before Judges Manahan and Gilson.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Special Civil Part, Hudson
County, Docket No. DC-397-16.
Scott C. Buerkle, attorney for appellant.
Respondent has not filed a brief.
PER CURIAM
Plaintiff Judith Ferraris appeals from the order of the Law
Division dismissing her complaint with prejudice against defendant
Jeffrey Jones following a non-jury trial. After reviewing the
record developed before the trial court and in consideration of
our standard of review, we affirm.
Ferraris filed a complaint in the Hudson County Special Civil
Part alleging that Jones owed her approximately $26,000, but she
would "accept $15,000." Jones filed an answer. A one-day bench
trial was conducted before a Law Division judge.
After the conclusion of the testimony, the judge dismissed
the complaint in a decision rendered from the bench. In reaching
the decision, the judge found Jones's testimony to be more
credible. The judge also found that the spreadsheets and self-
notarized documents offered by Ferraris as proofs in support of
her claim were insufficient to sustain her burden of persuasion.
On the same day, the judge entered an order in favor of Jones
dismissing Ferraris's complaint with prejudice.
Ferraris filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied.
The judge supplemented the denial of the motion for a new trial
with a statement of reasons.1 This appeal followed. On appeal,
Jones failed to file a timely brief.
We take the following from the trial record. Ferraris and
Jones's initial relationship was a friendship, which resulted in
marriage, then reverted to a friendship. Ferraris claimed that
Jones owed her money on loans disbursed on various dates totaling
1
The judge's oral opinion rendered after trial was somewhat
truncated. The judge issued a written opinion on the motion for
a new trial stating the findings of fact and conclusions of law
supplementing her oral decision.
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$26,560. During trial, Ferraris presented promissory notes for
three individual loans and a promissory note dated March 31, 2008,
which was intended to supersede the earlier notes. The March
promissory note included a clause that it would bear an interest
rate of four percent compounded monthly and a clause that the note
would bear an eighteen percent interest per annum.
Ferraris testified she was repaid approximately $5000 on the
March note. In support of her claim, Ferraris proffered an Excel
spreadsheet that listed the balance and payments she received from
Jones and a bank statement showing two cash deposits in 2012.
Although s signature appears on all of the promissory notes,
he disputed the validity of his signature on two of the notes.
Jones testified that he only signed two notes totaling $12,000.
Jones further testified that the debt was paid off through
installment payments totaling $10,800 and after he paid for a
cruise ticket for Ferraris totaling $1000. Jones testified that
he lacked proof of his payments as he no longer maintained the
bank account associated with the payments. In reply, Ferraris
denied that payment toward the cruise operated as an offset for
the debt.
In reference to the remaining two promissory notes, Jones
testified that the signatures on the notes were likely forged by
Ferraris. Jones further testified that Ferraris forged his
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signature with his permission during their marriage and that she
likely forged his signature on the two notes due to her being
upset that Jones caused her to become "uninvited to a party."
Ferraris raises the following arguments on appeal:
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION WAS [UNSUPPORTED]
AND INCONSISTENT WITH THE COMPETENT, RELEVANT
AND REASONABLY CREDIBLE EVIDENCE.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT'S MANY PROCEDURAL ERRORS
REQUIRE THIS COURT TO VACATE THE JUDGMENT AND
REMAND FOR A NEW TRIAL. (NOT RAISED BELOW)
A. The Trial Court Failed To
Adequately Identify Documents For
The Record And Formerly Accept Them
Into Evidence To Be Preserved
Pending Appeal.
B. The Trial Court Failed To Provide
The [Plaintiff] The Opportunity To
Examine The Evidence Submitted To
The Court By Her Adversary.
C. The Trial Court Failed To Make
Sufficient Findings Of Fact To
Support The Court's Decision.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR BY
PERMITTING DEFENDANT'S TESTIMONY FOR WHICH HE
HAD NO PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE AND THAT AMOUNT TO
RANK HEARSAY. (NOT RAISED BELOW)
The standard of review of judgments or orders entered after
bench trials is well settled. The findings of the trial judge are
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binding on appeal if they are supported by "adequate, substantial
and credible evidence." Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inv'rs Ins.
Co. Of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974). Deference to the judge's factual findings is appropriate because the judge who saw and heard the witnesses testify "has a better perspective than a reviewing court in evaluating the veracity of witnesses." Seidman v. Clifton Sav. Bank, S.L.A.,205 N.J. 150
, 169 (2011) (quoting Cesare v. Cesare,154 N.J. 394
, 412 (1998)). Nevertheless, we review a "trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts" de novo. Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan,140 N.J. 366
, 378 (1995).
In denying Ferraris's motion for a new trial, the judge found:
Although [d]efendant failed to present the
[c]ourt with competent evidence, [p]laintiff,
as the moving party, held the burden of
demonstrating that [d]efendant failed to pay
the alleged debt. In this regard, [p]laintiff
failed to do so.
At trial, the [c]ourt did not accept that
promissory notes proffered by [p]laintiff as
legitimate or valid. Plaintiff produced four
promissory notes bearing [d]efendant's
signature. Defendant acknowledged two of them
(memorializing an alleged debt of $12,000[]
and claimed the other two were fraudulent
(memorializing an alleged debt of $14,000[]).
Defendant offered testimony that he had
authorized [p]laintiff to sign various
documents during the course of their marriage.
Plaintiff did not rebut this testimony.
Furthermore, aside from the signature, the
promissory notes contain a notarization, which
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was performed by [p]laintiff herself. As
such, even now, the [c]ourt [plainly] cannot
accept a self-serving notarization as
sufficient evidence to carry [p]laintiff's
burden of production as to the existence of
the additional $14,000[] debt.
Even assuming, arguendo, that the
additional debt exists/existed, the [c]ourt
cannot draw any sound conclusions as to
payment. The only evidence proffered by
[p]laintiff regarding payment (or non-
payment) are self-prepared Microsoft Excel
spreadsheets, purporting to account for the
loans. The [c]ourt cannot reasonably
determine whether these spreadsheets are true
accountings of a legitimate loan debt or if
they were fraudulently prepared the night
before the hearing. Further, out of a total
of [fourteen] payments listed on the
spreadsheet, [p]laintiff has provided bank
statements that allegedly correspond to only
two of them. Plaintiff offered no additional
evidence to support the bank deposits as
payment aside from the entries in the Excel
spreadsheet.
Predicated upon our review of the judge's oral opinion post-
trial and her written opinion on the motion for a new trial, we
are satisfied that the judge exercised independent judgment in
reaching her decision. The judge evaluated each allegation
asserted by Ferraris and resolved them by making credibility
determinations as well as determinations relating to Ferraris's
proofs. Given the above, we discern no basis for error.
We next address Ferraris's second and third points, not raised
below, wherein she argues the judge made erroneous evidentiary
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rulings. "[A] trial court's evidentiary rulings are 'entitled to
deference absent a showing of an abuse of discretion, i.e., there
has been a clear error of judgement.'" State v. Brown, 170 N.J.
138, 147 (2000) (quoting State v. Marrero,148 N.J. 469
, 484 (1997)). As such, "an appellate court should not substitute its own judgment for that of the trial court, unless the trial court's ruling was so wide of the mark that a manifest denial of justice resulted."Ibid.
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Marrero,supra,
148 N.J. at 484
). Here, the record does not
demonstrate that the evidentiary rulings were so wide of the mark
that it resulted in a manifest denial of justice.
Affirmed.
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