*1 Before F LAUM K ANNE H AMILTON Circuit Judges. *2 & F LAUM Circuit Judge . In 2014, Mary Haley and others filed a putative class action against Kolbe & Kolbe Millwork Com pany, claiming that windows purchased from Kolbe were de fective and allowed air and water to leak into (and dam age) homes. Kolbe tendered defense of product claims several companies, and two of them—United States Fire Insurance Company and Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company—sought obtained permission intervene case. United States Fire later filed motion summary judgment, arguing recent decision Supreme Court, Wisconsin Pharma cal Co., LLC Nebraska Cultures California, 2016), absolved their duty defend Kolbe underlying suit. district granted United States Fire’s motion (and sua sponte awarded judgment Fire man’s Fund)—a decision Kolbe now appeals. appeals court’s decision require Kolbe reimburse insurer post defense fees, asks we remand case determination whether pre defense fees reasonable. reverse duty defend, but otherwise affirm decisions dis trict court.

I. Background Plaintiffs companion Haley Kolbe Kolbe Millwork No. — F.3d —, WL (7th Cir. Jul. 2017), alleged two general categories damages suffered result defects window products: “direct” losses ( i.e. from having replace windows), indirect “consequential” losses injuries plain tiffs’ homes (such stained walls buckled plaster). *3 ‐ ‐ tendered the defense of these claims to four of its insurance providers, and four agreed to defend Kolbe reser ‐ vation of rights.

When dispute arose over the choice defense counsel, however, two insurance companies—United States Fire and Fireman’s Fund—sought to intervene underlying suit, and to compel Kolbe to switch defense lawyers. The same insurers also moved bifurcate insurance coverage liability issues, and stay liability portion until choice counsel resolved. The dis ‐ trict court permitted intervention but declined stay un ‐ derlying litigation, held insurers equitably estopped forcing Kolbe change defense attorneys.

The intervening ultimately moved for summary judgment, arguing they no duty defend be cause coverage win dow claims. Kolbe’s policies did not cover “di rect” cost replacing faulty windows, said insurers, because policies did cover damage Kolbe’s own product where, here, source damage prob lem with product itself; policies likewise apply indirect “consequential” injuries plain tiffs’ homes, argued insurers, because each home formed “integrated system” Kolbe’s windows—and thus entire house should be treated “product” insur ance purposes. district court accepted first these arguments but rejected second, initially awarded judgment only part. district changed course sys tem issue, however, when renewed mo tion summary light Supreme *4 Court’s decision Co., LLC Nebraska Cultures California, Inc. 2016). court then entered judgment United States Fire and, sua sponte, Fireman’s Fund (which had neglected join United States Fire’s second motion but whose policy contained similar lan guage), concluding neither policy covered consequential damages claims. United States Fire also sought reimbursement defense fees incurred since had decided, but district court denied request, concluding United States Fire forfeited reim bursement generally by failing raise earlier litigation.

Kolbe now appeals district court’s ruling surers no duty continue defending lying leaky windows suit. appeals court’s refusal compel reimbursement post Pharma cal defense fees, seeks remand district determination whether fees charged Kolbe’s defense counsel reasonable.

II. Discussion A. Appeal review de novo district court’s grant summary

judgment, construing facts drawing all reasonable ferences favor non moving party—here, Kolbe. Co han Medline Indus., F.3d (7th Cir. (ci tation omitted). Summary judgment appropriate where are genuine issues material fact movant entitled matter law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). *5 5 16 ‐ 3563 16 ‐ 3648 “Integrated Systems” Economic Loss Doctrine

At heart parties’ dispute over cover age here is rule, a common law rule from so called “economic loss” doctrine. Under doc trine, purchaser product barred from using tort law recover from manufacturer purely economic inju ries (such loss product’s value) arising product’s failure work expected. See Linden v. Cascade Stone , 699 N.W.2d 189, 192 (Wis. 2005) (citations omitted); Wausau Tile, Inc. Cty. Concrete Corp. , N.W.2d 451 (Wis. 1999) (citations omitted). By eliminating tort based avenues recovery (which general offer “a broader array damages” than do contract suits, Grams Milk Prods., , N.W.2d (citation internal quota tion marks omitted)), doctrine encourages buyer commercial transaction—the party “best situated assess risk[s] economic loss”—to allocate those risks through bargaining process, Linden N.W.2d at 194–95 (quoting Wausau Tile N.W.2d 451), thus helps protect manufacturer’s ability continue making its goods, see Grams (“With ability share their risk commercial users product, manufacturers would … be reluctant produce certain products.”) (citation omit ted).

As name suggests, economic loss doctrine applies only economic injuries, does preclude actions tort bodily injuries injuries property than defective product. Wausau Tile (ci tations omitted). But there’s catch: If product *6 ‐ ‐ a component a larger, “integrated system,” damage component elements system, to sys ‐ tem a whole, likewise considered damage component itself, and does not qualify damage “other property.” See id. (citations omitted). Thus, in Wausau Tile Wisconsin Supreme Court held a manufacturer and seller concrete paving blocks could not maintain tort based claims against cement supplier after ce ment—an ingredient concrete—had allegedly caused paving blocks crack and buckle. As cement was an in tegral component finished blocks, cement damaged “other property,” economic loss doc trine applied. See id. 453–54.

2. The Decision The economic loss doctrine generally does apply surance disputes, see Am. Family Mut. Am. Girl, 65, (citation omitted), but Supreme Court extended Wausau Tile ’s analysis involving a general liability policy similar ones here. plaintiff retail supplier dietary supplements, agreed purchase from supplement manufacturer probi otic pills containing certain species bacteria. See manufacturer sourced ingredients from another company—which turn procured bacterial component separate supplier—before blending gredients together compressing mixture into chewa ble tablets. See id. As turned out, however, bacteria corporated into tablets wrong one, retailer forced recall finished pills. id. Litigation ensued, bacteria supplier’s company moved *7 & summary coverage. See id. at 77. The trial court agreed insurer that there was no coverage because there “property damage” within meaning relevant policy. See id. The court ap ‐ peals reversed, Supreme Court granted re ‐ view. See id.

The supreme court began its analysis reiterating general procedure determining whether exists an policy: First, court examines facts insured’s claim to determine if an “initial grant” coverage—that is, if policy generally covers cate ‐ gory loss issue; if so, court examines policy any exclusions that may preclude coverage; if an exclu sion applies, court determines whether exceptions exclusion operate restore coverage. See id. (citing Preisler Gen. Cas. Ins. Co. , (Wis. 2014)). policy like policies here, required surance company cover losses insured became obligated pay “as damages because … property dam age,” where “property damage” defined include “[p]hysical injury tangible property.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). court observed previously terpreted this definition describe only those injuries property “ than [the insured’s] product … itself ,” id. (quot ing Wis. Label Corp. Northbrook Prop. Cas. 2000)). So court asked whether incorporation wrong bacteria into supplement tab lets constituted physical injury tangible property “other than” bacterial component. id. To answer question borrowed analysis Wausau Tile explaining such an analy sis necessary because, if supplement tablet *8 integrated system, then damage system would consti ‐ tute damage only element. id. (citing Wausau Tile N.W.2d at 452). held mixing probiotic ingredient together other ingredients, combining whole into single tablet, indeed create an integrated system, as various components could be “separate[d] out” larger product. Id. 82. Thus, injury claimed—the inability use finished tablets—was one damage “other property,” there no ini ‐ tial grant coverage. Id . 82–83. Coverage Suit Against insurance here read Pharmacal as mandat

ing an integrated system analysis (and importing en tirety Wisconsin’s law into) gen eral liability disputes. therefore dictates no initial grant coverage this case, argue insurers, because Court Appeals has wise held (under economic loss doctrine) win dows house no function purpose apart from— thus form “integrated system” with—their surround ing structures, see Bay Breeze Condo. Ass’n. Norco Windows, N.W.2d (Wis. Ct. App. 2002) (citations omit ted); Selzer Brunsell Bros. Ct. App. (citing Bay Breeze 746). Damage those structures, caused defect windows, therefore counts damage windows themselves; and, absent injury “other” property, ob tains—or argument goes. In our view, this argument stretches beyond intended reach. *9 9

Whether an policy covers a particular claim de ‐ pends the nature of the plaintiff’s (alleged) loss. In Pharma ‐ cal only loss alleged—and thus only basis for un derlying suit—was plaintiff’s inability use supple ment tablets as a whole . See plaintiff not seek reimbursement for cost of repairing or replacing tablets’ non ingredients —presuma bly because, even if there evidence of physical injury those components (and none, see id. 82), components indistinguishable each other from larger product, see id. Not here. Here, homeowners sought compensation repair replacement of individ ual elements larger structure. This kind particularized demand not issue Pharmacal . Accordingly, we do not read Pharmacal as requiring an integrated system analysis this case. next assert that, even if policies here

afford an initial grant leaky win dow claims, “your product” exclusion operates remove such coverage. We interpret exclusion would rea sonable person position insured. See Water Well *10 16 3563 16 3648 Sols. Serv. Grp., Inc. Consol. Co. N.W.2d (Wis. 2016) (citations omitted); Fontana Builders, Assur ance Am. N.W.2d (citation omit ted). Unambiguous terms are given their common ordi nary meaning, while ambiguous terms are construed favor coverage. Fontana (citation omitted); Am. Girl (“Exclusions are narrowly or strictly construed against insurer if their effect is uncer tain.”) (citation omitted).

The policy excludes any “’[p]roperty damage’ ‘your product’ arising out it or part it,” where “your product” defined as:

(1) Any goods or products … manufactured, sold, handled, distributed or disposed by: (a) You [the insured];

(b) Others trading your name; or (c) A person or organization whose business or assets you acquired; (2) Containers (other than vehicles), materials, parts or equipment furnished connection with such goods or products. Fireman’s Fund policy largely identical, except de

fines insured’s “product” “[a]ny goods or products, *11 other than real property manufactured, sold, handled, distrib uted or disposed by” Kolbe (along with any containers, etc., “furnished in connection with” those goods or products) (em phasis added).

The parties agree that Kolbe’s windows, which Kolbe manufactured, are Kolbe’s “goods or products” under first part definition—so Kolbe’s are on hook cost replacing any windows that are (or, relatedly, any losses stemming replacement opera tions). The parties disagree, however, whether walls other elements homes constitute Kolbe’s “product” second part definition, such damage those materials is likewise extin guished by exclusion. Kolbe says not, because Kolbe “furnish” drywall, wood framing, stucco, or bricks issue. argue that, unlike first part “your product” definition—which explic itly limits “product” goods or products made or sold, etc., by insured —the second paragraph contains such limitation, looping in materials simply “furnished in connection with such goods products.” agree Kolbe reasonable insured could un derstand “furnished connection with,” phrase is used second part “your product” definition, mean furnished actors specified preceding clause—here, (the insured). “In connection with” phrasal preposition that, like prepositions, used dicate relationship between object antecedent. particular relationship signaled, however, may differ depend ing context which preposition appears. When journalist reports “a man questioned connection *12 16 3648 with robbery,” instance, we understand “in connection with” mean “concerning” or “regarding.” But if someone tells us “these chairs were purchased connection with the table,” the “connection” has changed: Now we stand chairs were purchased “together with,” or “around same time as and reasons related pur chase of” table—and, importantly, former items purchased by same person, or least by someone acting agreement with person, who bought latter. policies define Kolbe’s “product” as (1) “goods or products … manufactured, sold, handled, dis tributed or disposed by” Kolbe, (2) “[c]ontainers …, materials, parts or equipment furnished connection with such goods or products.” An insured could understand “in connection with,” as it used here, same meaning our table chairs example above. Because both “containers” et al. “goods or products” are capable being “furnished” or supplied, reader could reasonably assume former items must come from source of, someone acting agreement source of, latter items; first clause clearly identifies source insured. Cf. N.W.2d (“[T]he insured risk (i.e., physical injury tangible property) applies phys ical injury tangible property other than … product … insured supplied.” (citing Vogel Russo N.W.2d (Wis. 2000), abrogated part grounds N. Am. Cease Elec., 2004))) (em phasis added); Am. Girl (“The business risk exclusions eliminate … property damage insured’s own … product ….”) (emphasis added). At very least, definition “your product” ambiguous, we *13 13 16 3648 must construe “your product” exclusion in favor cover age. Am. Girl N.W.2d at As Kolbe did not supply request that anyone else supply drywall mate rials allegedly damaged in plaintiffs’ homes, damage, though arising “product,” not also that “product”—so “your product” exclusion does elimi nate coverage these claims.

Where, as here, it appears that may be least one claims in an underlying suit, insurer has duty defend policyholder against all claims alleged in that suit. Water Well N.W.2d (citing Fireman’s Fund Wis. Bradley Corp. 2003)). We therefore reverse judgment declaring United States Fire Fireman’s Fund duty defend in this case, remand instructions vacate judg ment.

B. United States Fire’s Cross Appeal While United States Fire’s (renewed) motion summary duty defend still pending in district court, dismissed remain ing claims underlying suit ordered company show cause why, light dismissal, pending motion should be denied as moot. responded motion should still be resolved be cause, event plaintiffs filed appeal, would continuing duty defend throughout *14 the appellate process unless the district court decided wise. In addition, should the court determine that the duty to defend had extinguished, United States Fire asked that the court order to reimburse its insurer for all monies paid toward Kolbe’s defense since the duty had ended. insurance company also suggested that it planned to chal lenge reasonableness of the defense fees already charged Kolbe’s counsel. Although district court agreed with United States Fire that longer a duty to defend, court declined to order reimbursement fees, as United States Fire not asked for kind relief its pleading, and it too late litigation to allow amendment. court then entered judgment insurers’ favor on their duty defend claims, terminated case. appeals denial request for re imbursement, but we have concluded insurer owed continuing duty defend, we do not reach issue: It moot. As reasonableness defense fees gener ally, company never made formal request recoupment excessive charges. Having resolved out standing motions causes action, inappropri ate district court terminate case. If, remand, district court wishes entertain motion recoupment, however, certainly has discretion do so.

III. Conclusion For foregoing reasons, we REVERSE duty defend REMAND instructions vacate judgment. AFFIRM reimbursement defense fees initial termination case.

[1] parties agree law governs their dispute.

[2] requests (in alternative) we certify Supreme Court several questions concerning application cases like this one. Cir. R. 52(a); Wis. Stat. § 821.01. In general, certi fication is appropriate where relevant issue is one “vital public con cern” likely recur suits, where resolution dispositive present action, where state supreme has not yet opportunity “illuminate clear path” forward. Plastics Eng’g Co. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. F.3d (7th Cir. (quoting Allstate Menards, F.3d n.18 (7th Cir. 2002)). do see need certification here, we think sufficiently clear ’s approach does govern this dispute.

[3] insured’s “product” also includes: “[w]arranties or representa tions made time respect fitness, quality, durability, per formance or use [the insured’s product],” “providing or fail ure provided [ sic ] warnings instructions.” (internal quotation marks omitted).

[4] note, however, if rule applied this then “your product” exclusion would deed extinguish coverage, urge. n.14.