STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. AMIR LEGRANDEÂ (13-10-1875, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
A-4900-14T4
| N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. | Aug 7, 2017|
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SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4090-14T3
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
CAMILE LAMAR WILLIAMS,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________
Submitted February 6, 2017 – Decided February 27, 2017
Before Judges Nugent and Haas.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Hudson County, Indictment No.
06-11-2028.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney
for appellant (Michele C. Buckley, Designated
Counsel, on the brief).
Esther Suarez, Hudson County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Lillian Kayed,
Assistant Prosecutor, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Camile Williams appeals from a January 28, 2015
order denying his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR). He
argues his trial counsel misinformed him that testimony he gave
at a codefendant's trial was inadmissible at his trial, advice
defendant claims he relied on in rejecting a plea. Defendant also
alleges trial counsel was ineffective for failing to prepare him
to testify at his trial. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
In November 2006, a Hudson County grand jury returned a 111-
count indictment against defendant and five codefendants. The
indictment charged defendant with twenty-seven counts of first-
degree robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1; seven counts of second-degree
conspiracy to commit armed robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1 and N.J.S.A.
2C:5-2; three counts of fourth-degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A.
2C:12-1(b)(4); one count of second-degree attempted armed robbery,
N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1 and N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1; and fifty-eight weapons
offenses.
On March 26, 2007, four months after the grand jury returned
the indictment, defendant accepted a plea offer. He pled guilty
to seven counts of armed robbery and agreed to testify truthfully
at his codefendants' trials. In exchange, the State agreed to
recommend an aggregate fifteen-year custodial sentence with an
eighty-five percent period of parole ineligibility.
Thereafter, defendant testified at the trial of codefendant
Bradley Burgess. Defendant disavowed the statement he gave to
police implicating Burgess in the armed robbery for which Burgess
was on trial. Defendant testified Burgess was not involved in the
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robbery.1 During his testimony, defendant admitted his role in
the robbery for which Burgess was on trial, as well as his role
in other robberies.
Following Burgess' trial, the State moved to vacate
defendant's guilty plea. A new attorney – the attorney defendant
now claims was ineffective – represented defendant at the hearing
on the State's motion. During the hearing, defense counsel had
defendant confirm her advice that if the plea were vacated, the
case would proceed to trial. Defendant acknowledged he had been
so informed. Defense counsel continued:
[Defense counsel]: And you're also aware
that you did come to court and testify at the
trial in the matter of State v. Bradley
Burgess, correct?
[Defendant]: Yes.
[Defense counsel]: And it's my understanding
that at that time you also made statements
that may implicate yourself, correct?
[Defendant]: Yes.
[Defense counsel]: And you're aware that if
your case goes to trial, the State may be able
to use those statements that you made?
1
Before the Burgess trial, defendant had prepared a written
statement disavowing the statement he gave to the police
implicating Burgess. At a hearing out of the presence of the
jury, during questioning by counsel for Burgess, defendant
acknowledged that he had prepared the written statement
exonerating Burgess on his own. He also testified he was aware
the statement would affect his plea.
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[Defendant]: Yes.
[Defense counsel]: And the only way that that
would happen, the case would proceed to trial,
is if the Judge takes back your guilty plea,
correct?
[Defendant]: Yes.
[Defense counsel]: And did you instruct me,
knowing all of that, that you did not want me
to oppose this motion?
[Defendant]: Yes.
[Defense counsel]: Who made that decision?
[Defendant]: I did.
[Defense counsel]: Is that your decision made
voluntarily?
[Defendant]: Yes.
[Defense counsel]: And I advised you with
regards to the consequences and what could
take place if . . . we did not oppose this
motion.
[Defendant]: Right.
Defendant was tried and convicted on multiple counts. After
appropriate mergers, the trial court sentenced him to an aggregate
forty-year custodial term subject to the No Early Release Act
(NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. On direct appeal, we reversed four
of defendant's robbery convictions and remanded for correction of
the judgment of conviction as to those counts, but otherwise
affirmed defendant's convictions and sentence. State v. Williams,
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No. A-3084-10 (App. Div. Dec. 24, 2012). The Supreme Court denied
defendant's petition for certification. State v. Williams, 214
N.J. 176 (2013).
The following year, defendant filed his PCR petition. He
alleged counsel was ineffective for failing to properly
investigate the case, for failing to move to dismiss some counts
of the indictment, and for other reasons. The court appointed
counsel and defendant filed a supplemental certification and
brief. He alleged, among other claims, trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to explain that defendant's testimony at
Burgess' trial could be used against him at his own trial,
regardless of whether he testified. Defendant also alleged trial
counsel failed to prepare him to testify at his trial.
The PCR judge conducted an evidentiary hearing on defendant's
petition. At the hearing, defendant testified his trial attorney
told him if he did not testify during his trial, the State could
not use the testimony he gave at Burgess' trial: "[s]he just told
me, basically, that as long as I don't take the stand the testimony
couldn't come in, that's the only way it could come in."
According to defendant, counsel's erroneous advice affected
his decision to accept the plea. He claimed that had he known the
videotape of his previous testimony would be used at his trial,
he would have taken the plea bargain and never gone to trial. When
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asked why, he replied: "[b]ecause less time. Forty years from
[fifteen] years is a big difference."
Defendant acknowledged he testified at his trial, but said
he did so only because "the tape [of his previous testimony] was
already in, so there was nothing else left for [him] to do but
testify to [his] [version] of the story." In terms of his own
testimony, defendant claimed his trial counsel never prepared him.
He asserted she did not review basic rules of testimony, topics
she would cover, or practice questions. In short, he maintained
counsel prepared him for neither his direct examination nor cross-
examination.
On cross-examination, defendant conceded he had given
fourteen separate statements to the police about his involvement
in the robberies. He acknowledged counsel had told him that if
not suppressed, his inculpatory statements could be used against
him at his trial. Defendant admitted his attorney told him his
testimony at his codefendant's trial might be used against him if
his case went to trial. Defendant also admitted counsel told him
the only way the State could use his statements would be in the
event the court granted the State's motion to vacate his guilty
plea. Lastly, defendant acknowledged it was his decision not to
oppose the State's motion, and that he made the decision
voluntarily.
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Defendant's trial counsel testified at the PCR hearing. She
explained she had filed a pre-trial motion to suppress the
statements defendant gave to police after his arrest. The trial
court denied the motion. During the trial, when the State decided
to use defendant's testimony from his codefendant's trial, counsel
also attempted to bar the State from doing so. Once again, she
was unsuccessful.
Counsel testified she prepared defendant for trial and
ultimately for his testimony. She explained she met with defendant
numerous times at the jail. Defendant had a copy of all discovery,
including transcripts and statements. Before the trial began,
counsel explained to defendant what evidence the State would use
against him and the consequences if he chose to testify. Counsel
stated she would further prepare defendant to testify at the close
of the State's case.
Once defendant decided to testify, counsel "went over his
entire case[,]" asking questions as if she were the prosecutor.
Counsel explained she could not say for certain what the State
would ask defendant, but could only guess.
In a written decision filed January 28, 2015, the PCR judge
denied defendant's petition. The judge determined trial counsel
had "incorrectly advised [defendant] that his testimony at the
codefendant's trial would only be admissible if he were to
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testify[.]" According to the judge, the record from defendant's
trial and trial counsel's testimony at the PCR hearing supported
defendant's claim trial counsel had misinformed him about the use
of his prior testimony. The judge based these determinations on,
among other reasons, trial counsel's testimony at the PCR hearing
about how she strenuously and repeatedly argued against the
admissibility of defendant's prior testimony at his own trial.2
Nonetheless, the judge determined defendant could not show
he suffered prejudice as a result. The judge pointed out defendant
declined a twenty-year plea offer from the State following his
unsuccessful motion to suppress fourteen confessions he made to
the police. The judge rejected as not credible defendant's
testimony that had he known his testimony from codefendant's trial
could have been used at his trial, he would not have refused the
plea offer. The judge noted that in his confessions, defendant
admitted to directly participating in the robberies of four
establishments and serving as the lookout during the robbery of a
fifth establishment. The judge also cited instances in other
2
In her written decision, the PCR judge did not comment on the
explicit advice trial counsel gave defendant at the hearing on the
State's motion to vacate the plea; namely, that if defendant chose
to go to trial, the State might be able to use the testimony he
gave at his codefendant's trial against him.
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statements where defendant admitted to participating to some
degree in other robberies.
Additionally, the judge rejected as not credible defendant's
"self-serving testimony that trial counsel advised him he had to
take the stand once the videotape [of his testimony at his
codefendant's trial] was played and then neglected to prepare him
for his direct and cross[-]examination." The judge noted defendant
"has failed to specify how his testimony would have been different
had trial counsel better prepared him."
On appeal, defendant contends:
POINT I
THE PCR COURT IMPROPERLY DENIED MR. WILLIAMS'S
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF WHERE MR.
WILLIAMS ESTABLISHED THAT HE RELIED ON
COUNSEL'S ERRONEOUS ADVICE WHEN HE REJECTED
THE STATE'S PLEA OFFER AND RECEIVED A
SIGNIFICANTLY HIGHER SENTENCE AFTER TRIAL.
A. Counsel erroneously advised
Mr. Williams that his prior
trial testimony could not be
used against him at trial,
which impacted the plea
process [and] greatly
prejudiced Mr. Williams.
B. Trial counsel failed to
adequately prepare for trial
and to prepare Mr. Williams to
testify in his own defense.
To prove ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must
satisfy the Strickland two-part test by demonstrating counsel's
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performance was deficient, that is, "that counsel made errors so
serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel'
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment;" and "there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different."
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 694,104 S. Ct. 2052
, 2064, 2068,80 L. Ed. 2d 674
, 693, 698 (1984); accord, State v. Fritz,105 N.J. 42
, 58 (1987). Applying that standard, we affirm,
substantially for the reasons given by the PCR judge.
The judge rejected as not credible defendant's claim he would
not have rejected a plea had he known his testimony at his
codefendant's trial could be used against him at his trial. We
generally defer "to those findings of the trial judge which are
substantially influenced by [the] opportunity to hear and see the
witnesses and to have the 'feel' of the case, which a reviewing
court cannot enjoy." State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 161 (1964).
This principle is particularly applicable to the case before us.
Here, defendant claims his decision to accept or reject a plea was
affected by erroneous advice about the use of testimony he had
given in another trial, yet seemingly unaffected by his fourteen
admissible confessions. Defendant has failed to establish the
second Strickland prong, namely, "there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the
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result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland,
supra, 466 U.S. at694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068
, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698.
We also agree with the PCR judge that defendant's bare
allegation his attorney did not prepare him to testify is
insufficient to establish an ineffective-assistance claim. State
v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154, 170 (App. Div.), certif. denied,162 N.J. 199
(1999). Defendant's remaining arguments are without
sufficient merit to warrant further discussion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
Affirmed.
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