Case Information
*1 MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
A PPELLANT P RO S E A TTORNEY FOR A PPELLEE Keith A. Foor, II Nathan H. Blaske Hebron, Indiana Graydon Head & Ritchey LLP
Cincinnati, Ohio I N T H E
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA July 31, 2017 Keith A. Foor, II, Court of Appeals Case No. Appellant-Defendant,
64A03-1701-MF-149 v. Appeal from the Porter Superior Court PennyMac Loan Services, LLC, The Honorable Mary R. Harper, Judge Appellee-Plaintiff
Trial Court Cause No. 64D05-1601-MF-120
Vaidik, Chief Judge.
[1] PennyMac Loan Services, LLC filed a mortgage-foreclosure action against
Keith Foor II and then moved for summary judgment on all issues (including on the counterclaims asserted by Foor). The trial court granted PennyMac’s motion, and Foor appeals. Foor does not deny that he is in default for failing to Page 1 of 2 Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 64A03-1701-MF-149 | July 31, 2017 *2 make mortgage payments. The only clear argument he raises on appeal is that PennyMac failed to prove that it is in possession of the original promissory note and that, therefore, it is not entitled to foreclose on the mortgage. We disagree. One of PennyMac’s foreclosure-operations supervisors provided an affidavit in which she stated that “PennyMac has been in continuous possession and/or control of the original Note since prior to the filing of its Complaint in this case,” Appellee’s App. Vol. II p. 72, and that a copy of the note was attached as Exhibit A to the affidavit. Moreover, PennyMac’s attorney brought with him to the summary-judgment hearing documents that he said were the original note and mortgage. The trial court personally inspected the documents and said, “I will tell you that the note and the mortgage that have been given to me today appear to have original signatures on them.” Tr. p. 18. On appeal, Foor has not directed us to any designated evidence that might have created a genuine issue of material fact on that point, so we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of PennyMac. See Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). [1]
[2] Affirmed.
Bailey, J., and Robb, J., concur.
[1] Foor’s opening and reply briefs refer to other aspects of the case, such as his counterclaims, the affidavit of PennyMac’s foreclosure-operations supervisor, and discrepancies between certain documents relied upon by PennyMac. To the extent Foor was attempting to raise separate arguments relating to these issues, he has failed to develop them with cogent reasoning, citations to relevant legal authority, and/or citations to the record on appeal, as required by Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a). Therefore, any such arguments are waived. Robinson v. State , 5 N.E.3d 362, 365 n.6 (Ind. 2014). Page 2 of 2 Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 64A03-1701-MF-149 | July 31, 2017