*1 Before R OVNER W ILLIAMS H AMILTON , Circuit Judges . H AMILTON Circuit Judge . This appeal presents dispute over liability insurance. Defendant surance Company denied claim insured, Warehouse, LLC, for liability cus tomers contamination warehoused products. One basis denial failed document warehous ing transactions receipts, storage agree *2 ments, quotations, required by applicable insur ‐ ance policies. Litigation ensued. Plaintiff PQ Corporation a customer of Double D whose products were damaged while warehoused there. PQ now assignee Double D’s pol ‐ icy rights, having settled own case against Double D stepping into Double shoes try collect insurance policies. PQ argued in essence even though D had documented warehousing transaction one ways specified insurance policies, there were pragmatic reasons excuse strict compliance those terms. court, however, granted summary judg ment favor Lexington, enforcing documentation quirement policy.

We affirm. has point when says documen tation actually (bills lading online tracking system) should serve much same purpose documentation required (especially ware house receipts). Yet commercially sophisticated parties agreed unambiguous terms conditions insurance. We hold them those terms. To do otherwise disrupt risk allocations part parcel contract, but particularly commercial liability insurance contract. has offered no persuasive reason depart plain lan guage

I. Factual Procedural Background limited liability company op erates facility Peru, Illinois. main tained liability defendant Lexington, Delaware corporation. For approximately ten years, plaintiff PQ, Pennsylvania corporation, stored two chemical prod *3 ucts at Double warehouse: magnesium sulfate com pound commonly known as Epsom salts, and sodium meta silicate sold trademark METSO BEADS ® . 2011, PQ began receiving complaints from its own customers about product discoloration. investigated eventually con cluded likely culprit vapors from phenol formal dehyde resin Double D stored its warehouse. vapors apparently reacted highly alkaline products. notified Double D intended to hold Double D sponsible for any claims made by its customers. D then alerted potential claim.

Two annual warehouse legal liability issue: one effective from June 29, June 29, 2011, other from June June 29, 2012. Both poli cies provided would pay all sums for which became legally obligated “for direct physical ‘loss’ or damage personal property others because [its] lia bility operator,” subject several terms conditions. most important condition for our purposes appeared sections I.1 (“Insuring Agreement”) II.4 (“Property Not

Covered”). It said pay damages only extent produced or storage agreement signed customer or quotation presented customer before storing prop erty. Another relevant condition appeared section X.1.F (“Loss Adjustment”), forbidding assuming any obligation admitting any liability without consent. A third condition, “Pollution Contamination Exclusion,” barred loss caused release pollution, defined broadly irritants contaminants *4 “which after … release can cause or threaten damage hu man health … or cause[] or threaten[] damage … property insured hereunder.” late an independent adjuster hired Lexington

informed Double D he investigating PQ’s claim. adjuster also contacted counsel PQ, requesting details and supporting documents. following June, PQ sent ad juster claim letter with documentation. Seven months later, Lexington denied coverage claim, citing Insuring Agreement and Property Not Covered section, as well as Pollution and Contamination Exclusion. Lexington explained “neither Double D nor PQ ha[d] provided Lexington proof signed receipt, storage agreement quotation.” Lexington said because PQ ported damage its products caused chemical vapors, Pollution and Contamination Exclusion barred any coverage. Lexington reiterated denial April letter. Both denial letters included vague invitation: “Should you any other information you feel may be applicable relevant matter, please immediately forward [Lex ington]. Please advised Lexington will review ad ditional information submitted under full reservation rights under Policy and law … .”

Following denial coverage, sued state alleging breach contract seeking declaration as rights removed action federal court. (Diversity citizenship complete both PQ plain tiffs defendant, amount contro versy exceeds $75,000. See U.S.C. § 1332(a).) Shortly after removal, sued state court. *5 No.

D settled. key term of settlement was that Double D agreed consent judgment under which it assumed “one hundred percent … fault for PQ’s damages” and as ‐ signed its rights against Lexington PQ in exchange for promise not collect any Double D. PQ then replaced Double D plaintiff federal action. PQ later filed Second Amended Complaint adding claim for attorney fees and costs Section Insur ance Code, Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/155.

PQ Lexington eventually filed cross motions sum mary judgment. At summary judgment, PQ did not argue that Double D complied with literal terms docu mentation condition appearing Insuring Agreement Property Not Covered section. Nor could it: parties agree Double D did use warehouse receipts con tracts its dealings PQ, nor did it supply PQ quotations satisfy PQ argued instead knew D used bills lading online tracking system substitute receipts. PQ argued term “warehouse receipt” ambiguous district court should consider extrinsic evidence tending show was aware how ran business. disagreed, explaining (1) bills lad

ing receipts, (2) never signed “re ceipt” generated online tracking system, (3) Lex ington’s knowledge business practices “ir relevant whether fact satisfied contractual obligations—Double either met those obligations did (and case not).” Corp. Ins. CV WL *5–6 (N.D. Ill. July 29, *6 16 3280 2016). The district court then considered whether waived strict enforcement the documentation condition. The court rejected possibility well, finding no evidence acted inconsistently intent enforce condition. Id. at *7. The court could ended analysis there. However, it went on hold alternative Dou ble violated duty under Loss Adjustment section obtain consent before admitting liability PQ. Id. at *9. The court also rejected PQ’s claim Section Illinois Insurance Code. Id. district court en tered final judgment Lexington’s favor.

II. Analysis

A. Standard Scope Review We review de novo district court’s grant summary Lexington. In doing so, we apply same stand ard district court applied, construing all facts drawing all reasonable inferences favor PQ. Indianapolis Airport Authority Travelers Property Casualty Co. F.3d 355, (7th Cir. 2017). parties agree substantive law applies.

Illinois, “the general rules governing interpretation … contracts also govern interpretation ‘If policy language unambiguous, policy will ap plied written, unless contravenes public policy.’” Nation wide Agribusiness Ins. Dugan F.3d (7th Cir. *7 2015), quoting Hobbs Hartford Ins. Co. Midwest N.E.2d (Ill. 2005). “Courts will strain find am biguity in an policy where none exists.” McKinney Allstate Ins. N.E.2d (Ill. 1999). “Although policy terms limit insurer’s liability will liberally construed favor coverage, this rule construction only comes into play when policy is ambiguous.” Hobbs N.E.2d at 564.

B. Duty Obtain Consent central dispute appeal concerns meaning documentation condition coverage Insuring Agreement Property Not Covered sections. Before we alyze condition, briefly address Lexington’s argu ment, which agreed with, Double D breached policy settling without obtaining consent.

Under Loss Adjustment section X.1.F, D agreed “not, except [its] own cost, voluntarily make payment, assume any obligation, admit any liability, cur expense, without [Lexington’s] written consent.” admitted consent liable all damages PQ’s products. There no evidence obtained (or even sought) permission from before making admission. That enough decide case, though, because estopped asserting section X.1.F consent requirement avoid claim. denied before sued Dou ble before those parties settled admis sion liability. *8 16 3280 law is clear this point. In Davis v. United Fire &

Casualty Co. N.E.2d (Ill. App. 1980), example, the court explained where company informs insured it will provide no coverage, insured is “justi ‐ fied concluding further communication and notice would be useless and company will not be allowed to as ‐ sert, a defense, failure insured to give such fur ‐ ther notice.” Id. 987; see Owners Ins. Co. Seamless Gut ‐ ter Corp. N.E.2d (Ill. App. 2011) (“[A]n insurer should not be allowed assert blanket denial coverage then assert insured’s failure provide proof loss, since law does not require insured perform what appeared useless act.”), citing Jones Universal Casu alty N.E.2d (Ill. App. 1994).

Lexington advised D provide no cov erage under policies: denial letters were clear une quivocal. In January letter, claims exam iner wrote: “Lexington has completed investigation PQ’s claim regrettably must advise … there no PQ’s claim.” April follow up, claims exam iner elaborated: “Inasmuch did not obtain [or] signed storage agreement present quotation, Policies do cover PQ’s goods.” ex aminer added “even if PQ’s property were covered prop erty under Policies (which not) claim barred Pollution Contamination Exclusion.” denials were clear. Most important, offering de fend reservation rights.

To avoid logic, point out denial letters close door further communication. They invited submit *9 No.

“any other information” felt “may be applicable rel evant this matter.” Such vague open ended invitation does neutralize effect of the explicit denials of cover age. An insurer could always change its mind about coverage, of course. That mere possibility could justified quiring Double D clear settlement with advance insurer had (we assume only purposes de ciding this issue) breached contract by denying coverage. Having received denial letters no offer defense under reservation rights, D had no reason lieve further communication serve purpose.

In arguing breached duty obtain con sent, cites American Country Insurance Co. Bruhn N.E.2d (Ill. App. 1997), Malaker Cincinnati In surance C WL (N.D. Ill. Apr. 2011). Both cases readily distinguishable case, where been denied before reached settlement. In Bruhn insured concealed his involvement fatal automobile accident fear criminal liability. N.E.2d at 367. It was only years later, after insured was sued administrator decedent’s estate, sured finally notified his insurer about accident. Id. at 368. declaratory action brought insurer, Appellate Court signaled insured likely breached his duties policy’s notice cooperation provisions, adding “public policy considerations militate strongly against coverage” where insured has concealed his criminal activity. Id. 372–73. There no concealment here. alerted immediately after receiving notice potential claim. *10 ‐ 3280

Malaker is likewise distinguishable. In case, ‐ surer denied insured’s claim letter directed insured to notify it any related lawsuit “so we may view wording suit any possible coverage.” WL 1337095, *1. case, Lexington’s denial letters simply disavowed coverage made no mention any de fense event litigation. denials much closer to flat denial Davis than incomplete denial Malaker .

After rejected claim, reasonably concluded any further communication fruitless. We agree Lexington, having denied coverage, estopped from asserting Loss Adjust ment section’s consent requirement as defense to claim. Having left its insured its own devices defend itself, Lex ington could relied on consent requirement as alternative basis support its denial decision.

Under Illinois law, liability insurer declines de fend its insured generally estopped asserting policy defenses (including plausible defenses based on later acquired evidence) if turns out denial was un warranted then existing information. See Title Industry As surance Co. First American Title Ins. Co. F.3d (7th Cir. 2017). estoppel rule strong medicine: generally leaves insurer hook satisfy any against insured pay cost reasonable settlement. See Guillen ex rel. Guillen Potomac Ins. N.E.2d (Ill. App. 2001), aff’d modified N.E.2d (Ill. 2003). Fortunately Lexington, explain below, de nial decision justified separate policy condition.

C. The Documentation Condition for Coverage Although reject reliance Loss Adjust ment section X.1.F, undisputed facts show that Double D failed comply with documentation condition cover age appearing Insuring Agreement Property Not Covered section. For this reason, claim Double D’s assignee must fail.

1. Policy Language Under Insuring Agreement, agreed pay for damage third party property Double custody. However, extended only property which Double D issued a “warehouse receipt storage agreement.” Property Not Covered section II.4 clarified that would pay damages a Double D customer’s property only if Double D produced one three documents: (1) a “signed receipt” that Double D obtained “from ‘customer’ time ‘customer’ deposited [its] personal property;” (2) a “signed storage agreement” D obtained “from ‘customer’ covering personal prop erty;” (3) a “rate quotation” presented “prior receiving personal property.” The defined “rate quotation” “quotation [Double D] includes a ‘loss’ limitation acknowledged accepted ‘cus tomer.’” The terms “warehouse receipt” “storage agree ment” were specifically defined parties agree neither obtained signed storage agreement nor presented quo tation included loss limitation. disputed issue whether memorialized transactions doc ument satisfy option *12 3280 policies. See Sherrod v. Esurance Ins. Services, Inc. , N.E.3d 471, (Ill. App. 2016) (“The burden insured prove that claim falls within policy.”), citing Addison Ins. Co. v. Fay N.E.2d 747, (Ill. 2009). Steve Olsen, owner, testified that his ware house did not use receipts. Instead, warehouse managed inventory by scanning bills lading that truckers use when transporting goods. argues these bills lading functionally equivalent warehouse receipts they satisfied documentation condition.

But policies did say bills lading could used substitutes warehouse receipts. Nor poli cies say could satisfy documentation con dition producing whatever documents title found most convenient. policies were specific. They listed three documents satisfy condition: a ceipt, a contract, or a rate quotation. This requirement was obscured jargon or buried fine print. It appeared plain English first two sections defined “customer” reference condition: a “customer” “person or entity” deposited property storage “obtain[ed] signed ha[d] storage agreement place” received quota tion. courts maintain “strong presumption against provisions easily could been included [a] contract but were not. A will add another term about which agreement silent.” Klemp Hergott Group, Inc. N.E.2d (Ill. App. 1994) (citation omitted); accord West Bend Mutual Ins. DJW Ridgeway Building Consultants, Inc. N.E.3d 205–06 (Ill. App. 2015). *13 13 16 3280

PQ argues undefined term “warehouse receipt” is ambiguous and should therefore apply a canon construction such as contra proferentem (interpretation against drafter) principle ambiguous terms in insur ‐ ance policies should be read favor coverage. premise is flawed: fact “warehouse receipt” was undefined does not make term ambiguous. (If rule were other ‐ wise, already long and complex policies would be ‐ come virtually unreadable. Insurers resort longer longer glossaries avoid charges ambiguity and un ‐ predictable results litigation.) “Warehouse receipt” ambiguous. The term has a settled meaning common use industry, as does, matter, “bill lading.” These terms are neither interchangeable nor even roughly synonymous. ^[2]

We begin common usage. William Blair & v. FI Liq uidation Corp. , N.E.2d 760, 770 (Ill. App. 2005). A receipt commonly understood a document supplied a vendor goods services record transaction. vendor gives *14 16 3280 receipt customer to acknowledge transfer of goods payment. A warehouse receipt protects customer by confirming ownership of goods has entrusted warehouse. See Mercantile Trading Co. v. Roth , N.E.2d 194, 196–97 (Ill. App. 1953) (enforcing provision of Warehouse Re ceipts Act requiring a writing prove customer transferred ownership warehouseman; evidence of oral agreement sufficient). A bill of lading, by contrast, is com monly understood document used a carrier identify goods transit and conditions of carriage. Both terms have been use since early days of commercial law. E.g., Union Trust Co. v. Wilson , U.S. 530, (1905) (“Apart statute, simply imports goods are hands of certain kind of bailee.”); Pollard v. Vinton U.S. 7, (1881) (“A bill of lading is instrument well known commercial transactions, character effect been defined judicial decisions. hands of holder evidence of ownership … of property mentioned it, right receive said property place of deliv ery.”); see generally Bluebonnet Warehouse Cooperative Bank ers Trust F.3d 294–95 (6th Cir. 1996) (reviewing his tory receipts relevant uniform laws). plain meanings terms “warehouse receipt” “bill lading” undermine argument terms interchangeable, but if harbored doubt, we could consider contemporary trade usage. See Bristow Drake Street Inc. F.3d (7th Cir. 1994) (evidence trade usage “admissible interpret seemingly clear contract;” unlike party’s testimony concerning his idiosyncratic understanding language, evidence trade usage “objectively verifiable”). *15 ‐

The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), as adopted in Illi nois, defines “bill of lading” as a “document evidencing the receipt of goods for shipment issued by a person engaged in the business of transporting or forwarding goods.” Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/1 ‐ 201(b)(6) (emphasis added). The UCC defines “ware house receipt” a “receipt issued by a person engaged in the business of storing goods for hire.” 5/1 ‐ 201(b)(42) (emphasis added). The UCC sheds light on the standard contents of a warehouse receipt, providing warehouse will liable for damages caused omission of such details the storage handling signature of warehouse agent. 5/7 ‐ 202(b). may include limita tion of warehouse’s liability. 5/7 204(b). None of this infor mation is included sample bills lading sum mary record. tries find ambiguity where there none citing

deposition excerpts showing underwriters disagreed about precise contents warehouse receipt. Even if took account extrinsic evidence—and there no reason for us do so because policy language not ambiguous—we accept argument. Whatever underwriters may have thought about contents *16 ‐ warehouse receipt, neither of them confused warehouse ‐ ceipts bills of lading. Underwriter Toby Petzel testified that a “bill of lading used transportation of goods, a warehouse receipt.” Underwriter Chad Zomek described a bill of lading a “document that provided to a trucker for when they assume responsibility for moving a load,” add ‐ ing if agreed that bills of lading were ac ceptable substitutes receipts, would have en dorsed policy accordingly. Steve Olsen, D’s owner, recognized difference between these documents, tes tifying a “warehouse would come ware house” whereas “[y]ou have to have a bill lading if you are transporting goods.”

PQ argues strict enforcement policies’ docu mentation condition—which PQ calls a “hyper technical terpretation”—would amount to a commercially unreason able requirement agent PQ physically sign off each storage transaction at time goods are delivered to D. PQ apparently used third party trucking service transport goods warehouse. It would surely be impractical expect agent go along ride just satisfy Lexington.

But framing commercial reasonableness argument, seems have overlooked approved use three documents: receipt, storage agreement, rate quotation. Under section II.4, neither storage agreement provision nor quotation provision required customer physically present time delivery. Steve Olsen testified he has used storage agreements several customers, suggest ing such contracts commercially reasonable means *17 ‐ of memorializing warehouse transactions, or least good enough for Double D. Even if the warehouse provision comport with Double business practices, surance policies provided other options that D could have used. sum, then, neither plain language of policies,

trade usage, nor evidence of parties’ subjective knowledge about receipts bills of lading leads us con clude these terms interchangeable for purposes of If wanted beyond four corners policies, could have requested en dorsement or found different insurer. district court cor rectly determined failed comply con dition coverage.

2. Estoppel Waiver PQ argues even if failed comply docu mentation condition Insuring Agreement Property Not Covered section, we should nevertheless remand trial on whether either waived should be estopped relying on condition. PQ’s estoppel argument new on appeal, “as long held, ‘[i]t axiomatic issue first presented district court may raised before appellate court ground reversal.’” Economy Folding Box Corp. Anchor Frozen Foods Corp. F.3d *18 18 16 3280 (7th Cir. 2008) (alteration original), quoting Christmas v. Sanders , 759 F.2d 1284, 1291 (7th Cir. 1985). We do consider estoppel argument. also raises its waiver argument first time on ap peal, but here there is a quirk: district judge raised is sue of waiver himself decided waived its right enforce condition. Since district decided what now presents its waiver theory, exercise our discretion consider argument. We agree judge reject on merits.

In context of contracts, waiver “arises an affirmative act, is consensual, consists of an intentional relinquishment of a known right.” Home Ins. Co. v. Cincinnati Ins. , N.E.2d 269, 282 (Ill. 2004). Waiver can be either express implied conduct is inconsistent an tent enforce right. Where, here, there no express waiver, “party claiming implied waiver”—PQ—“has burden proving clear, unequivocal, decisive act opponent manifesting intention waive rights.” Nitz N.E.2d 93, (Ill. App. 2000); see Ryder Bank Hickory Hills N.E.2d (Ill. 1991) (“Implied waiver legal right must proved clear, unequivocal, decisive act party who alleged committed waiver.”); Pielet Hiffman N.E.2d (Ill. App. 2011) (same). waiver theory based applica

tion insurance. Item application di rected attach “complete copy used.” Rather than doing so—since use receipts—either employee Dou *19 ble insurance broker, Jeff Krzyaniak (the record un clear), annotated the application handwritten phrase: “CONTRACT DELIVERIES BY BIL LADEN” [ sic ]. Krzyaniak testified that nobody from ever asked him clarify what the phrase meant and that he never submitted any other supporting documentation. owner Steve Olsen con firmed that never followed up him on the ap plication. application dates from while claim relates the policies. Lexington’s underwriters, Toby

Petzel Chad Zomek, acknowledged that they relied the existing file when quoting the subsequent renewals. Nei ther Petzel nor Zomek gave indication that he was aware handwritten notation. fact, Zomek testified that he was unaware used bills lading lieu ware house receipts; that he “would consider bill lading receipt;” that he could recall whether he “read anything … application indicated one way another what being used receipt.” But Zomek recall reading application, Petzel likewise said he received application from Krzyaniak. Perhaps most likely inference underwriters just overlooked barely legible notation when reviewing file renew On appeal summary judgment, though, owe benefit conflicts evidence reasonable inferences favor. On record, rational jury could conclude underwriters were aware handwritten note.

*20 20 16 3280

That assumption does not provide sufficient support for the waiver theory. PQ’s best evidence of waiver is an ambigu ous note on an expired insurance application. has not demonstrated “clear, unequivocal, and decisive act” Lex ington manifesting intention waive rights the Ryder 585 N.E.2d 49. There no evidence that one Lexington ever told Olsen Krzyaniak that bills of lading were acceptable substitutes for receipts. itself acknowledges never followed up on the obscure note. waiver argument weaker still because of another

aspect the application—the inclusion of “Page 2 of 4” document titled “STANDARD TERMS AND CONDITIONS FOR MERCHANDISE WAREHOUSEMEN,” appended last page application. provenance Terms and Conditions sheet not entirely clear. owner Steve Olsen said he used document for some customers but not PQ. He not know whether Krzyaniak submitted sheet along applica tion. He could remember whether he gave sheet policies included preamble stating granted “in reliance upon Declarations application pol icy.” (We assume policies similar language, though these were included summary record.) fact acted reliance application, most insurers presumably do, does mean application became part policy such modified policy’s plain language. Cf. LLC Trinity Industries, Inc. F.3d (7th Cir. 2002) (“‘For contract incorporate all part another document reference, reference must show intention incorporate document make part contract.’ requires incorporation clear specific.”) (citations omitted).

Krzyaniak, and he did not recall seeing the sheet when he signed the application.

On appeal, PQ argues that the “incorrectly assumed, relied upon, and expanded facts not in evidence— namely that the [Terms and Conditions sheet] was provided either [Krzyaniak] as part the Application.” argument curious: PQ placed the application (along with the mysterious Terms and Con ‐ ditions sheet) in the summary judgment record, and it ‐ serted own Statement Facts Local Rule 56.1(a) was the application Krzyaniak had submitted. During Chad Zomek’s deposition, counsel initially pre ‐ sented Zomek copy the application did not clude Terms and Conditions sheet. Zomek noted the miss ing page. He testified Terms Conditions sheet had been part underwriting file, though he did know when sheet was submitted. Later his deposition, Zomek reviewed sheet testified it was document Lex ington used “to identify presence warehousing con tract and/or warehousing receipt.” Toby Petzel reviewed document, described it “contract limiting [Double D’s] *22 liability,” noted he pays “very close attention” to such documents when writing

Again, this is an appeal from summary judgment, so we must draw reasonable inferences PQ’s favor. Even scales tipped far, record does provide evidence let rational jury conclude know ingly voluntarily waived right to enforce docu mentation condition coverage. cannot avoid plain language policies offering an ambiguous notation on insurance application, particularly where inference urges us draw from notation (that knew used “BIL LADEN” lieu receipts) conflicts inference apparently drew Terms Conditions sheet (that using ceipts contracts, required). PQ’s scintilla evidence support waiver theory enough put matter jury. See Roger Whitmore’s Automotive Services, Inc. Lake County F.3d (7th Cir. 2005).

D. Concluding Matters Because correctly granted summary Lexington, must reject request attorney fees Section Insurance Code. Section authorizes fee award only where insurer’s conduct “vexatious unreasonable.” It neither vexa tious nor unreasonable litigate “bona fide dispute con cerning scope application coverage,” let alone deny based position prevails. See Citizens First Nat’l Bank Princeton Cincinnati Ins. F.3d (7th Cir. 2000).

At bottom, case reminder law con tracts, words matter. We understand argument available records show reliably how much property damaged warehouse. purpose doc umentation requirement may well been satisfied here. But agreed document transactions receipts, storage agreements, quotations condition liability cover age. It do so. PQ, standing shoes, cannot recover where failed comply enforceable condition coverage.

AFFIRMED.

Notes

[1] Though district court ruled generally Lexington’s favor, jected reliance Pollution Contamination Exclusion. Corp. WL *5. Because we agree documentation condition bars claim, do decide whether pollution exclusion might apply.

[2] argues appeal were internally inconsistent Insuring Agreement required receipt issued whereas Property Not Covered section required signed receipt ob tained customer. raise intrinsic ambiguity argu ment so forfeited it. Omega Healthcare Investors, Inc. Res Care, Inc. , F.3d 853, 858–59 (7th Cir. 2007); Humphries v. CBOCS West, Inc. F.3d (7th Cir. 2007), aff’d U.S. (2008). Even if argument were properly before us, persuasive. two pro visions can should be read complementary. As oper ator, required issue receipt then obtain sig nature—on issued—from customer. See Herbert Shaffer As sociates, Inc. First Bank Oak Park N.E.2d (Ill. App. 1975) (“Where possible, all provisions [a] contract construed harmo niously.”).

[3] It appears law requires regulated warehouses store personal property others compensation issue either negotiable non negotiable receipts conformity Uniform Com mercial Code. See Ill. Comp. Stat. 10/10 (requiring issuance receipts) 10/2 (defining “warehouse” “receipt”). parties dis cussed these statutes their briefs, but statutes provide further sup port view references receipts were ambiguous but instead described type document well known industry.

[4] argued on notice used bills lading lieu receipts. On appeal, reframes argument suggesting parties amplified modi fied express terms through course dealing. This course dealing argument variation waiver theory, ad dressed below.

[5] argues policy “incorporated applica tion policy language,” implication being subsequent newals likewise incorporated application. That’s quite right.

[6] reply brief, PQ writes it introduced Terms Condi tions sheet into summary record only “because, Lexing ton’s insistence, [sheet] been included previous application exhibits used depositions,” PQ wanted “avoid assertion altering format documents.” We do un derstand argument. If believed application include Terms Conditions sheet, should have introduced whatever considered genuine document. If then introduced alternative version, there might simply been fact question solve trial.