PER CURIAM: ^[*]

Jennifer Vanmeter was convicted of being a felon in possession of a *2 Case: 16-11184 Document: 00514005169 Page: 2 Date Filed: 05/24/2017

No. 16-11184

firearm and appeals her within-guidelines sentence of 46 months of impris- onment and two years of supervised release. She contends that the court erred by calculating her sentence under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) and designating her Texas conviction of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon as a quali- fying crime of violence (“COV”) as defined by U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 (2015). We review de novo whether the district court properly characterized a conviction as a COV. United States v. Guillen-Alvarez , 489 F.3d 197, 198 (5th Cir. 2007).

Although Vanmeter contends that her Texas conviction does not consti- tute generic aggravated assault, she concedes correctly that her challenge in that regard is foreclosed by Guillen-Alvarez , id. at 200–01. See also United States v. Villasenor-Ortiz , No. 16-10366, __ F. App’x __, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 491, at *5 (5th Cir. Jan. 11, 2017) (per curiam) (reaffirming the continued valid- ity of Guillen-Alvarez in the wake of Mathis v. United States , 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016)). Vanmeter also avers that aggravated assault is no longer an enumer- ated offense under § 4B1.2 because Johnson v. United States , 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), also invalidated § 4B1.2(a)(2)’s residual clause. In Beckles v. United States , 137 S. Ct. 886, 892 (2017), the Court held that Johnson ’s holding was not applicable to the definition of a COV in § 4B1.2(a)(2) because the guidelines are not subject to a vagueness challenge under the Due Process Clause. Beck- les therefore effectively forecloses Vanmeter’s theory based on Johnson .

Accordingly, the judgment is AFFIRMED.

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[*] Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4.