Juan Manuel Ramirez-Villalzana appeals his 46-month, within- guidelines sentence for illegal reentry, 8 U.S.C. § 1326, asserting that the district court erroneously applied a 16-level “crime of violence” enhancement, under former U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii), based on his prior Texas convictions for burglary of a habitation. The enhancement was improper, Ramirez- Villalzana contends, because the Texas burglary statute, Texas Penal Code *2 Case: 16-40529 Document: 00513997491 Page: 2 Date Filed: 05/18/2017

No. 16-40529

§ 30.02(a), does not categorically define a “generic” burglary of a dwelling and is not divisible in light of Mathis v. United States , 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016). We review the district court’s interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo. See United States v. Calderon-Pena , 383 F.3d 254, 256 (5th Cir. 2004).

In Mathis , the Supreme Court explained that the modified categorical approach may be used to distinguish only between alternative elements of a statutory offense, not alternative means of satisfying a single element. 136 S. Ct. at 2249-50. Whether the district court erred thus turns on whether, in light of Mathis , § 30.02(a)’s three subsections constitute elements or means. While the instant appeal was pending, we concluded that § 30.02(a) is a divisible, elements-based statute. See United States v. Uribe , 838 F.3d 667, 669-71 (5th Cir. 2016). Consequently, “the modified categorical approach applies to determine which of the provisions of § 30.02(a) was the basis of [Ramirez- Villalzana’s] conviction[s].” Id . at 671.

Our review of the permissible record documents reveals that Ramirez- Villalzana’s prior convictions were based on § 30.02(a)(1) and were therefore “generic” burglaries. See United States v. Conde-Castaneda , 753 F.3d 172, 176 (5th Cir. 2014); see United States v. Constante , 544 F.3d 584, 585 (5th Cir. 2008). Accordingly, the district court properly applied the 16-level “crime of violence” enhancement.

AFFIRMED.

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[*] Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4.